Preparing for Safeguard: Ottawa Examines the Implications of ABM Deployment (April-July 1969)

The following documents range from April to July of 1969 and focus on the Canadian attempt to track, understand, and respond to the evolving debate in the United States regarding President Nixon’s proposed Safeguard ABM system.

Relying on public statements and media reports, Ottawa took note of Nixon’s reasoning for the Safeguard proposal. Yet they also maintained a degree of skepticism towards the system, and viewed it as a product of the military-industrial complex, and a potential escalation of the arms race that could harm arms control efforts. Within this collection, a May 1969 report titled “Implications to Canada Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Systems,” is a particularly good summary of Canadian goals in this time period:  strategic stability; limiting the arms race; protecting Canada’s reputation as a champion of arms control, clarifying NORAD control details, etc.

Ultimately, the documents reveal that the Canadian government paid constant, detailed attention to internal U.S. politics – especially where Senate approval of Safeguard was concerned. Canadian officials also closed examined the perspectives of other countries regarding Safeguard, including the arms control concerns of their European allies and the potential negative reactions from the Kremlin.

Despite their private concerns, and an immense interest in the issue, by July of 1969, the Canadian government had not yet taken a clear public position on the Safeguard system. Instead, they maintained a careful watchfulness: studying the potential implications; monitoring the Senate vote; and preparing for a decision to be made in Washington.