26 March 1969: Memorandum from Disarmament - Arms Control Implications of Safeguard ABM System

In this memorandum to Politico-Military Affairs, Disarmament provided their insights regarding the proposed Safeguard ABM system and arms control for a paper to be used by the Minister and Prime Minister when considering the issue in Cabinet.

Disarmament officials emphasized that the Soviet reaction would ultimately determine the effect of the decision on the arms race, and that Moscow still appeared committed to engaging in SALT talks. However, Disarmament claimed that the Safeguard system would have negative impacts on three potential arms control agreements: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and a cut-off agreement regarding the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.  

Disarmament also stressed that Canada should take a firm position on Safeguard, as “Canadian participation in Safeguard would infer approval of the decision to deploy it and Canada's position as a credible leader in the field of arms control and disarmament negotiations would be undermined.” A reminder of what was at stake came in the final paragraph, as Disarmament warned that the USSR and U.S. might soon reach a “point of no return” in terms of escalation of the arms race.