Summary

This briefing book sheds light on the Canadian government’s attempt to anticipate, analyze, and respond to the potential American deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems from late-1965 to mid-1969. It reveals Canada’s “special interest” in the issue of ABM deployment. Aside from logistical questions regarding NORAD and debates regarding Canadian participation in the defense of North America, Ottawa was particularly concerned with avoiding an escalation of the arms race, and with protecting Canada’s reputation as a champion of arms control.

Adding to Canadian discomfort with American ABM deployment (whether vis-à-vis China, or the Soviet Union), officials in Ottawa frequently found themselves kept in the dark on the issue by their American allies. Canadian officials were frequently forced to seek their information indirectly: from American political debates, briefings, and even media reports. Despite these frustrations, Canadians were careful not to anger their American partners, often keeping their concerns relatively quiet and remaining vague in their position on potential Canadian participation in a North American ABM system.

By 1969, President Richard Nixon had replaced President Lyndon Johnson, and the Safeguard ABM system proposal had replaced the Sentinel ABM system proposal. Yet the Canadians found their situation mostly unchanged. All they could do was try to stay in the loop, by studying the potential implications of such a deployment, closely tracking political developments in the U.S., and anxiously waiting for Washington’s next decision.