October 30, 1962
This page includes diplomatic cables from October 30th, 1962. Documents identified below reference key themes including the resolution of the crisis, international reactions, and Canadian responses and proposals to the crisis.
Key Players Post-Crisis
Two days after Khruschev agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba, reports emerged about the post-crisis situation in the three key states: the USSR, the US, and Cuba. The reports regarding the situation in the US following the immediate crisis include guidance on press interactions and analyses of the events of the previous days (CDNW12358).
Canadian ambassador to Cuba, George Kidd, reported on the diverse "unofficial reactions to the crisis" in Cuba (CDNW12374). Reactions ranged from government supporters in a state of "psychosis," anxiously awaiting Castro's address, to humiliated Cubans who saw themselves as "smudges on a wall." Meanwhile, others believed that Cuba had achieved a victory, thinking the US had been “scared” away.
Writing from the USSR, Canadian ambassador Arnold Smith discussed the state of the Soviet Union and its leadership following the "ten days that shook the world" (CDNW12340). Smith also examined the lessons learned by Khrushchev and the potential political actions that could be taken to mitigate Soviet embarrassment, including collaboration with Mao Tse-tung.
Item | Date | From | To | Number |
CDNW12358.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | WASHDC | EXTERNAL | 3183 |
CDNW12374.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | HAVANA | WASHDC | (no number) |
CDNW12340.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | MOSCOW | EXTERNAL | 785 |
International Perspectives
Writing from Rio, telegram CDNW12606 assessed the Brazilian government’s attitude towards actions taken by the USSR and USA and what should happen going forward. Similarly, document CDNW12363 details Uruguayan support for Kennedy’s actions in Cuba. The position of the Mexican president, reported in document CDNW12359, included congratulatory messages to Kennedy and reiterated Mexican policy of non-tolerance for nuclear weapons on its territory.
Item | Date | From | To | Number |
CDNW12606.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | RIO | EXTERNAL | 211 |
CDNW12363.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | WASHDC | EXTERNAL | 3189 |
CDNW12359.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | MEX | EXTERNAL | 89 |
Canada’s Role Post-Crisis
An article published in the Washington DC Star (CDNW12364) detailed Canada's offer to send reconnaissance aircraft to assist in the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The report also discusses the uncertainty surrounding Cuba's acceptance of Canadian involvement, given Canada's status as a NATO ally and UN member. It also mentions Canada's earlier role in providing landing facilities for Soviet aircraft traveling to Cuba before the discovery of missiles there.
In a message from NATO, Canadian representatives were told to stand by for a potential meeting to assess the situation in Cuba. NATO also asked for intelligence from allies concerning Soviet motives – this intelligence would help inform the meeting (CDNW12245).
Item | Date | From | To | Number |
CDNW12245.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | NATOPARIS | EXTERNAL | 2536 |
CDNW12364.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | WASHDC | EXTERNAL | 3195 |
British Reports of Missiles in Cuba
A British representative in Havana stated that a road convoy appeared to be carrying missiles, suggesting a possible relocation of missile equipment.
Item | Date | From | To | Number |
CDNW12583.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | LDN | EXTERNAL | 3879 |
UN Embarrassment After Swedish Press Leak
One telegram mentioned a preliminary request from the UN to Swedish armed forces to dismantle Cuban missile bases. To the embarrassment of the Secretary General, this request for assistance was leaked, with reports of "national self-admiration" in the Swedish press. With this leak leading to the UN's inability to reject Swedish cooperation, a large number of applications were submitted to assist in the dismantling of missile bases.
Item | Date | From | To | Number |
CDNW12371.pdf | 30-Oct-62 | STKHM | EXTERNAL | 120 |