October 25, 1962
This page included diplomatic cables sent on October 25, 1962. Several OAS (Organization of American States) member states offered their support to the U.S. (see Latin America section), including European countries like Germany. Poland and Iran's relationship with the U.S. remained precarious, while the United Kingdom and Turkey called for a peaceful resolution to avoid further escalation. In the United States, Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, commented on the looming nuclear threat, and in Canada, there continued to be concerns about insufficient or delayed responses to the crisis.
Bonn, Paris, Prague, and Warsaw
In Germany, the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, other ministers, and political party leaders expressed their support for US action in Cuba. The Germans criticized the Soviets for believing they could harbour missiles in Cuba and expect the US to “resign itself to the situation.” The telegrams’ tone indicated a lack of concern among the Germans about a Soviet counter-attack if the US intercepted a Soviet ship because the Soviets would not want to sacrifice another ship (CDNW12201).
In France, the Council of Ministers in Paris convened to discuss the potential consequences of the crisis “with respect to the security of Europe” (CDNW12372).
Across the Iron Curtain, in Czechoslovakia, the sense of emergency among the public led them to “rush to buy goods” with stores “emptied of staples, sugar, flour, salt, and oil” (CDNW12593).
Poland’s population did not yet feel the same sense of emergency as the people of Prague; however, students and workers protested against aggression. Relations between Poland and the USA also seemed to be souring, with the Polish “condemning USA policy” and hoping that the US would “stop playing with fire before it was too late” by reaching an agreement with the Soviets (CDNW12592).
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
25-Oct-62 |
BONN |
EXTERNAL |
719 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
EMBPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
1362 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
PRAGUE |
EXTERNAL |
449 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
WARSAW |
EXTERNAL |
706 |
London
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan suggested that the UN, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, should assist in the talks for an agreement rather than heads of government. Britain believed that the threat to security “should be dealt with as rapidly as possible” and gave the US full support to prevent “the creation of a military power in Cuba.” The UK realized they couldn’t trust Russian leaders like Khrushchev and Gromyko, who lied to the US that Soviet weapons were not being delivered to Cuba. (CDNW12232)
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
25-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3831 |
Moscow
Even during the crisis, cultural exchange and appreciation continued between the Soviets and Western countries. Western musical and theatre groups continued to tour the USSR, while the Bolshoi ballet group toured the USA and Canada (CDNW12212).
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
25-Oct-62 |
MOSCOW |
EXTERNAL |
770 |
Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Montevideo, Lima, Santo Domingo, and the United Nations (New York)
On October 25, 1962, several member states within the Organization of American States offered their support for the U.S.
(1) Argentina offered two destroyers to “patrol the area from Cape Santa Catarine to Antarctica,” and these ships would be placed under the command of the U.S. Navy. This marked a historic moment in Argentina’s history because it was the first time the country “had taken sides at the outset of international crisis” (CDNW12302).
(2) Mexico supported the USA position “one hundred percent” during the crisis and encouraged other OAS member states to “act against further supply of offensive weapons to Cuba” (CDNW12303).
(3) Uruguay voiced its support for the US by stating, "Uruguay is on the side of democracy, and when the time comes to choose between good and evil, there is no room for hesitation.” However, reaching this consensus was difficult since there would be “electoral repercussions” within the Uruguayan government. There were protests outside a university (unspecified), but there was no panic among the population (CDNW12332).
(4) In response to Kennedy’s speech on October 22, 1962, the Peruvian government supported the US in taking action against the “Soviet penetration of Cuba.” Additionally, Peru vowed to send military support for the US blockade if the Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously voted in favour of military support for the blockade (CDNW12229).
(5) Adhering to the OAS resolutions from October 23, 1962, the Dominican Republic’s Council of State offered one naval vessel and multiple aircraft facilities to assist US naval and air units in preventing the Soviets from delivering more weapons (CDNW12230).
Castro communicated his position on the possibility of arms inspectors travelling to Cuba by saying, in a threatening manner, that they “better come ready for combat.” The Cuban Permanent Representative to the United Nations echoed Castro’s sentiments by stating that Cuba “will not accept any kind of observers” (CDNW12578).
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
25-Oct-62 |
BAIRES |
EXTERNAL |
154 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
MEXICO |
EXTERNAL |
86 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
MONTEVIDEO |
EXTERNAL |
83 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
LIMA |
EXTERNAL |
107 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
SANTODOMINGO |
EXTERNAL |
25 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
PERMISNY |
EXTERNAL |
1941 |
The United Nations (NY), Tehran, and Ankara
At the United Nations, a draft resolution by Ghana and the former United Arab Republic (UAR) outlined four requests they believed would help in “removing the existing threat to world peace” and avoiding a nuclear war.” Ghana and the UAR called upon all countries involved to “provide every assistance” to the UN Secretary-General and advised countries to “refrain from any action” to prevent an escalation so a resolution could be reached (CDNW12112).
Iran had yet to release a statement on the crisis because it was in a precarious position. Prime Minister Foroughi’s delegation recently visited Moscow to sign the Iranian-Soviet Transit Agreement, and the government was “embarrassed to take sides openly.” Like Poland, this marked an uncertain time when relations with the US were delicate while other countries voiced their support for the US (CDNW12236).
Turkey aimed for all parties to reach a peaceful solution and to avoid any action that could escalate tensions. There was no great concern within the Turkish government that the USSR would set their sights on Turkey because it would “murder local opinion and stiffen the Turkish position” (CDNW12304).
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
CDNW12112 |
25-Oct-62 |
PERMISNY |
EXTERNAL |
1932 |
|
CDNW12236 |
25-Oct-62 |
TEHRAN |
EXTERNAL |
105 |
|
CDNW12304 |
25-Oct-62 |
ANKARA |
EXTERNAL |
139 |
Washington, DC
In a press conference with the US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, he spoke about what types of missiles were found in Cuba, who would be leading the quarantine operation and its forces, and the types of naval vessels used to enforce the quarantine. Interestingly, he was asked if there were nuclear weapons in Cuba. While he did not explicitly answer this question, he did say that it is safe to assume that nuclear weapons are on the island since they identified a “substantial number of missiles that can only operate with nuclear warheads” (CDNW12106).
In a speech given by the UN Secretary General the day before (October 24, 1962), he spoke about the fate of humankind, which he believed hung in the balance. He expressed his “profound hope that moderation, self-restraint, and goodwill will prevail over all other considerations.” The SecGen suggested a suspension of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba and a suspension of US quarantine measures for approximately three weeks to de-escalate the situation. To end his speech, the SecGen reminds his audience of the destruction caused by the Second World War (CDNW12118).
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
25-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3131 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
PERMISNY |
EXTERNAL |
1931 |
NATOParis and Moscow
A private conversation between George Ignatieff and Thomas Finletter (appointed NATO ambassador by JFK) details Finletter’s disappointment in the North Atlantic Council’s delayed expression of solidarity with the US. (CDNW12114).
A Canadian diplomat, Arnold Smith, wrote about the moderate and restrained Soviet government reaction to JFK’s speech (on October 22, 1962) and the introduction of the quarantine. Smith warned Ottawa not to “underestimate the anger of the situation” because the Soviets might not be so restrained if the Americans sank their ships (CDNW12213).
|
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
25-Oct-62 |
NATOPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
2481 |
|
|
25-Oct-62 |
MOSCOW |
EXTERNAL |
771 |
