October 28, 1962

This page includes diplomatic cables from October 28th, the recognized end of the crisis. It was announced to the world that Khrushchev had agreed to remove missiles from Cuba in exchange for a non-invasion pledge with the United States, though the US agreement to remove missiles from Turkey was kept secret from the public at the time (see here). There was speculation about how this could affect Khrushchev’s future as the leader of the USSR (CDNW12265). 

Before the News 

Presumably before Khrushchev’s decision was made public, the Canadian Ambassador to NATO, George Ignatieff, detailed a meeting called by the US representative to brief the others on the situation in Cuba. Interestingly, there are two copies of this document (CDNW12252) in this records release, but the second copy was almost entirely redacted (CDNW12180). 

Ignatieff’s report contained a great deal of speculation about Khrushchev’s motivations, particularly whether the situation in Cuba was connected with Berlin (and many NATO representatives believed it was). The message also provided hints of tension within NATO during the last hours of the crisis: when the Belgian representative asked if Washington would make a decision to attack Cuba without NATO and UN consultation, the US representative, Thomas Finletter, replied that “he could foresee a situation in which USA might be compelled to act alone as at Pearl Harbour [sic]” (CDNW12252).  

After the News  

The announcement that Khrushchev would withdraw the missiles ushered in a wave of relief around the world. But Charles Ritchie, Canada’s ambassador to the United States, cautioned that those who “expected the easy solution of problems all around the world… would be self-deluding” (CDNW12300). Arnold Smith, the Canadian ambassador to Moscow, echoed this statement, and said it was important to “avoid excessive gloating” (CDNW12265).  

The White House's response to Khrushchev’s declaration was carefully worded to avoid inflaming the crisis and welcomed the Soviet leader’s “statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in Cuba” (CDNW12366). However, in private, speculation about Khrushchev continued, with questions about why he was backing down and the consequences this would have for him. From Moscow, Smith suggested keeping “eyes wide open for tricks,” and argued that overwhelming support for America made Khrushchev back down, and would cause him to lose prestige with communists worldwide (CDNW12265).  

It is worth noting that the telegram Smith sent has an exact copy (CDNW12161) in this release package, which was completely redacted at the same time the other (CDNW12265) was released in full.