October 23, 1962
Buenos Aires
A telegram from Buenos Aires reported on the Argentine Government’s official statement regarding Cuba, which was delivered to the press by the Foreign Minister. This statement reaffirmed Argentina’s anti-communist stance, and support for the free world.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
BAIRES |
EXTERNAL |
151 |
Canberra
In a speech to Parliament, the Prime Minister of Australia reaffirmed his support for the US. The Prime Minister made clear that Australia believed the Americans’ claims about Cuba and the USSR’s deceitfulness, and that he believed Cuba’s actions directly threatened the United States.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
CNBRA |
EXTERNAL |
303 |
Paris
The Canadians carefully monitored global reception of Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s suggestions that the UN send a neutral delegation to Cuba to verify the US’ claims. Telegrams from the Canadian Embassy in Paris contained summaries of French newspaper articles about Diefenbaker’s proposal.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
23-Oct-62 |
EMBPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
1354 |
London
Nicholas Cheetham, a British Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, told George Drew, the High Commissioner of Canada in London, about divisions in British opinion over Cuba. While the British supported U.S. actions, their support was nuanced. (CDNW12081).
For example, the British Cabinet did not instruct their armed forces to take any special precautions, contrary to what the United States wished. Cheetham also indicated that while the UK planned to support the US’ Draft Resolution in the UN Security Council publicly, they intended to privately tell the Americans it could be improved. They thought the legal grounds on which the US was acting were “dubious.”
Cheetham outlined the British diplomatic strategy: The instructions provided to the UK’s UN representative, Sir Patrick Dean, involved redirecting the conversation to the “threat to the peace” that the USSR posed, and showed the contrast between the “clandestine” actions and “false statements” of the Soviets with the openness of American leaders.
Cheetham feared that “the Labour Party may demand [a] debate on Cuba” before Parliament prorogated (CDNW12081).
Reports from London summarized the reactions of various British newspapers to Kennedy's speech concerning the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba. Though the British press appeared divided, the majority leaned towards criticizing Kennedy’s actions. Those critical of the U.S. emphasized the need to avoid heightened tension and drew parallels between U.S. missile bases in Turkey and Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba. Other articles stressed the necessity for Britain to fully support Kennedy (see CDNW12256).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
23-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3778 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3790 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3792 |
NATOParis
In this telegram (CDNW12554), Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, George Ignatieff, conveyed what was said in a letter US General Hal Moore sent to the Acting NATO Secretary General. It sheds light on the delicate situation that NATO was facing during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and their attempts to be cautious during the “period of international sensitivity.”
While NATO increased security in some ways, including increasing intelligence collection and attempting to avoid public disclosure of plans, they were careful to avoid provoking other countries and ran their operational centers “at reduced strength.” NATO attempted to avoid appearing threatening during this time.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
NATOPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
2458 |
Oslo
In this telegram (CDNW12563), the Canadian representative in Norway, Joseph Louis Eugène Couillard, passed along a statement made by the Norwegian Foreign Minister at a Press Conference about events in Cuba. The Foreign Minister criticized the US, and said the US measures “are very far-reaching in a situation where there exists no state of war between [the] USA and Cuba.”
However, the Norwegians stated their hope of an honest attempt for peace by all parties, and praised the US for having referred the situation to the UN Security Council. Despite being a member of NATO, Norway was unafraid to publicly question the US position.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
OSLO |
EXTERNAL |
219 |
Port of Spain
In this paragraph-long telegram, a Canadian diplomat in the Port of Spain (the capital of Trinidad and Tobago) wrote about the local Prime Minister's views of the US quarantine of Cuba. The PM thought the US action was “approaching hysteria” and was interested in know what Canada thought. He also mentioned a warning he had received from the CIA about a possible Communist attack.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
PORTOFSPAIN |
EXTERNAL |
109 |
Canadians at the United Nations, New York
As American naval vessels surrounded Cuba and American spy planes flew overhead, the Cuban permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) wrote a letter to the President of the Security Council. It urged him to call a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the US’ act of war against Cuba. The Cuban representative declared this “unilateral and direct aggression” on the part of the US to be a “culmination of a series of aggressive acts committed against revolutionary govt of Cuba and Cuban people by govt of USA.” The letter cited Articles 34, 35(1), and 39 of the UN Charter as reason for the requested gathering of the Security Council (CDNW12083).
In response to the US naval “quarantine” of Cuba, the USSR issued a statement to the United Nations condemning the American actions. The statement outlined which actions the USSR considered to be acts of aggression against Cuba by the US: the naval action and troops sent to the US Guantanamo military base. The USSR appealed to UN conventions and hoped that other UN countries would join them in asserting Cuba’s right to defend itself and control its own foreign policy. The statement went so far as to liken the American actions to “piracy”, claiming that the United States was breaking international standards and that its recklessness would lead the world into nuclear war. The Soviets rejected the accusation that the USSR would ever launch a nuclear strike against the US without provocation, but warned that “if the aggressors touched off a war the Soviet Union would strike a most powerful retaliatory blow” (CDNW12238).
Paul Tremblay, Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations, reported on a detailed briefing American diplomats provided to a group of delegates of “friendly countries” at the UN. The briefing included photographic evidence of Soviet actions in Cuba, and included details about the Soviet missiles (CDNW12126). Of particular importance to Canada was the fact that missiles in Cuba were a security threat to Canada. Tremblay reported to Ottawa that the range of 220 IRBM would include the entirety of Eastern Canada, “as far west as [the] Prairies” (CDNW12126).
Tremblay noted that the US believed all the missiles in Cuba were “under exclusive control of USSR forces,” and worried that placement of the missiles on the island was related to the Soviets’ strategic maneuvering in Berlin (CDNW12126).
Following Kennedy’s October 22 speech, Prime Minister Diefenbaker made a statement in the House of Commons, in which he “made quite clear that [Canada] would want UN to be seized as soon as possible of this serious problem” (see CDNW12553). The Department of External Affairs sent a message to Canadian diplomats in Washington and New York outlining a possible draft resolution and sought comment from those posts (see CDNW12552). Suggestions included sending an "investigation and observation group" to Cuba to monitor the presence of offensive missiles and inspect the USA’s "quarantine" measures (embargo) against Cuba. After receiving suggested edits, External removed explicit reference to inspecting the quarantine, for fear of appearing to contradict or question American policy (see CDNW12559).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
EXTERNAL |
PERMISNY |
V104 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
EXTERNAL |
PERMISNY |
V105 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
CANDELNY |
EXTERNAL |
1889 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
CANDELNY |
EXTERNAL |
1896 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
PERMISNY |
EXTERNAL |
1903 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
PERMISNY |
EXTERNAL |
1904 |
Washington, DC
Canadian diplomats in Washington reported on their conversations with American colleagues. US officials speculated that the Soviet presence in Cuba was a retaliation to the American presence in Berlin, and that perhaps a deal could be arranged to disarm the bases under UN observation (CDNW12558, CDNW12573).
The Canadians also heard about US efforts to build support in the Organization of American States (OAS) by presenting “incontrovertible evidence” of missiles in Cuba (CDNW12135). One resolution proposed by the US in the OIC requested aid under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, while a second was more substantive and demanded “the immediate dismantling and withdrawal” of the warheads from Cuba (CDNW12235). The OAS voted on the resolutions and the results were almost unanimous, with 19 votes in favour of the American’s proposals, 0 against, 1 abstention (Uruguay) and 1 absence (Peru) (CDNW12139).
On October 23, President Kennedy issued a “proclamation” (CDNW12088), stating that US forces would “interdict the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba.” The Secretary of Defense would spearhead this effort, which would employ “land, sea, and air forces.” Any vessels that were seen to be travelling towards Cuba could be intercepted and searched; failure to comply with these instructions meant the vessels would be “taken into custody.” Kennedy ended his proclamation by stating that if vessels failed to follow directions, no excessive force would be used, but “only to the extent necessary.”
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3074 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3084 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3085 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3087 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3090 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3091 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3092 |
|
|
23-Oct-62 |
EXTERNAL |
WASHDC |
V487 |
