November 8 - November 13, 1962

This page contains diplomatic cables from November 8th to 13th. During this time, the removal of missiles from Cuba and Soviet discussions with Castro were ongoing (CDNW12638, CDNW12630). These documents include Western commentary on the difficult state of Cuban-Soviet relations, discussions of regional politics in Latin America in relation to the crisis (CDNW12452, CDNW12631), and Western speculation tying Soviet motivation to Berlin (CDNW12435).  

Negotiations Between Cuba and the USSR 

The US pledge not to invade Cuba was contingent on Khrushchev's promise to dismantle the Cuban missiles and to prevent any reintroduction of them (CDNW12625). However, the inspection had been delayed, since, according to Canada’s American ambassador Charles Ritchie, Castro viewed the inspection of weapons as an “infringement of Cuban sovereignty.” This stalled the negotiations between Anastas Mikoyan (the Soviet Foreign Minister) and Fidel Castro (CDNW12452).  

On November 9th, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN reported “possibly significant evidence of deterioration” in the Soviet-Cuban relationship. The Cuban delegation in the UN voted differently from the Soviets for the first time, and did so twice (CDNW12407). This was important because Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw from Cuba also strained the USSR’s relationship with another communist state, China (CDNW12631). 

Still, Mikoyan appeared to be gaining the most from their negotiations. The British Ambassador to Cuba stated that “Castro looked dissatisfied with everything” (CDNW12630). 

American Involvement 

Castro dragging his feet on negotiations led to a degree of mockery in the U.S. of Castro’s lack of power. In a TV interview, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin Martin, called out Castro’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union, and claimed that it was “a little surprising” that Castro felt he was in a position to make demands (CDNW12625). Despite Castro’s attempts, by November 8, medium and intermediate ballistic missile equipment was beginning to be removed from Cuba by Soviet ships, and extensive naval and air surveillance by the US was carried out to ensure this occurred (CDNW12638, CDNW12622).  

Other lingering issues between the United States, Cuba and the USSR were not yet resolved, including the removal of bomber planes and an American threat to extend the quarantine around Cuba (see here, and CDNW12655).  

The United States and its Western allies speculated about Khrushchev’s motivations. This speculation in turn informed attitudes toward the crisis. While assumptions from French, Canadian, West German, and American officials were often contradictory, many thought that Khrushchev’s primary goal in putting missiles in Cuba had been to have an advantage in negotiations over Berlin (CDNW12435, CDNW12631). They doubted that Khrushchev’s position within the Soviet Communist Party had been truly weakened by the events (CDNW12637, CDNW12615).  

Cuban Crisis Elsewhere 

Relations between Latin American states in the OAS (including Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, and various other countries) with Cuba were strained, to the point that Charles Ritchie, the Canadian Ambassador to the US, noted that OAS countries hoped Castro’s negotiations would stall long enough to “leave open the possibility of direct Latin-American action against the Castro regime” (CDNW12452).  

An influential political move came from the OAS member state Brazil, which had proposed a Latin American denuclearized zone in the UN. The prospect was met with mixed reactions. Llewellyn Thompson, a key advisor to Kennedy during the crisis, believed that the idea “might bring Cuba back into relations with Latin America,” though he was nervous about the precedent it set (CDNW12631). The issue might have been more contentious in Brazil itself: a conversation between the British and Brazilian ambassadors in Havana on November 6 revealed that the Brazilian ambassador was “not anxious” to discuss the recent proposal (CDNW12613).  

In contrast to Latin American countries, Switzerland was eager to stay out of the conflict. On November 8, The Guardian reported on growing resentment in Switzerland over the idea of involving the Swiss-based Red Cross in verifying the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Reportedly, the Swiss disliked the “artificially constructed” nature of the plan to check Soviet ships, and believed it would prejudice the Red Cross’s reputation as “an exclusively humanitarian body” (CDNW12616). It was the USSR that previously suggested this proposal. (see here, CDNW12344).