December 19, 1962 to May 6, 1963

This page contains diplomatic cables from December 19, 1962 to May 6, 1963. The documents include observations of US policy following the resolution of the crisis, particularly with regards to shipping to and from the island, aerial surveillance, and the continued presence of Soviet troops in Cuba. 

US Policy Regarding Shipping to and from Cuba  

Following the end of the “quarantine” placed on Cuba by the United States, the question of the resumption of shipping to and from Cuba still bothered the US. It became clear to the Canadians that the Americans’ goal was to reduce shipping to Cuba as much as possible, despite the resolution of the crisis. On December 19th, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO in Paris spoke to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) regarding America’s persistent concerns about vessels from the “free world” shipping goods to Cuba (CDNW12517). On January 15th, this issue was raised again, and the regulations the US intended to impose on free world vessels carrying cargo to Cuba were discussed at length (CDNW12527).  

The following month, the U.S. Permanent Representative thanked the NATO countries for their help in reducing shipping to Cuba, citing that even after the end of the quarantine, only “473 ships had called at Cuban ports” (CDNW12533). The UK Permanent Representative stated that his government would likely not share in the Americans’ jubilation as US policy violated of the principle of Freedom of Navigation. It was clear that the animosity between the US and Cuba was not over, and that the US would continue to use any means necessary to eliminate the perceived Cuban threat.  

US Surveillance and the Continued Presence of Soviet Troops in Cuba  

The year 1963 is introduced in this collection of documents by a January 8th telegram from the Canadian representative at NATO in Paris, which revealed that while outwardly the US and USSR had resolved the Cuban crisis, issues such as continued American surveillance of the island and the presence of Soviet troops there remained sources of tension. The telegram warned that “the need for intensified action by OAS and other countries for effective countermeasures against Soviet penetration [in Cuba] remained” (CDNW12520).

On January 15th, word arrived in Ottawa from Washington, DC detailing the results of Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov’s visit to the US. The Canadians noted the USSR’s eagerness for a nuclear test ban agreement and a German Peace treaty. The Americans, for their part, had voiced their ongoing concerns about Cuba to Kuznetsov, but after his visit the US State Department “remained puzzled as to [the] real purpose of [the] USSR in maintaining such a large military garrison [in Cuba] following [the] withdrawal of strategic weapons” (CDNW12523).  

The US continued “daily aerial surveillance” of the island of Cuba—as the Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency stated publicly in February (CDNW12530)—and members of the US Senate became increasingly worried about the growing Soviet military presence there following the supposed resolution of the crisis (CDNW12537).  

In April 1963, the situation in Cuba still rested on a knife’s edge, according to secret NATO meetings conducted in Paris. The Canadian representative wrote that at the time Cuba was more likely to cause a nuclear war than any other region in the world, thus keeping its hold on NATO’s attention well into 1963. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs thought the presence of Soviet troops in the Western hemisphere alone was enough to create the risk of a “serious situation”, even though no American spy planes had yet been shot down over Cuba (CDNW12541).

In May, Canadian inquiries in Washington, DC revealed that Soviet Premier Khrushchev, when confronted by the Americans about his troops’ presence in Cuba, alleged that the Soviet military personnel in Cuba wanted to be there about as much as the Americans wanted them there—the Russians detested the hot Cuban climate—and would leave Cuba as soon as they had trained the Cubans to use the Soviet weapons remaining on the island (CDNW12544).