October 24, 1962
This page includes diplomatic cables from October 24th, 1962. On this day, the UN Security Council (UNSC) met twice to discuss the evolving situation in Cuba: once at 9am (read the meeting transcript), and again at 6pm (meeting transcript). Many of these telegrams were likely sent between the two meetings, containing information Canadian diplomats collected regarding American and Soviet strategy in the UN (aiming to convince the world of the legitimacy of the “quarantine” and the illegitimacy of the “blockade” of Cuba, respectively), as well as information on which side other members of the UNSC would be on, including the UK, France, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), and Ghana. The Canadians also reported on developments in the Organization of American States (OAS), the international reaction to the crisis (including protests in front of US Embassies), and reactions to Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s proposal to send neutral UN observers to Cuba.
Havana
Canadian diplomats stationed in Havana, Cuba kept their eyes trained on Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro— Ottawa wanted to know what he was saying, thinking, feeling, and planning following US President Kennedy’s famous speech. The news the Canadian Ambassador, George Kidd, relayed to Ottawa was that Castro would not back down from his assertion that Cuba had a right to defend itself. He remarked that in a speech to his supporters Castro “reiterated his readiness to die with his people but seem[ed] rather less concerned about whether they or anyone else remain[ed] alive.”
Following the announcement of mobilization just days earlier, the Canadians witnessed “office workers, male and female, turning up in the centre of the city in their militia uniform.” The advent of the crisis was treated as a holiday in Havana—there were pep rallies held all day long and no one worked. Kidd worried that if this mobilization fever continued, Cuba’s economy would be wrecked.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
HAVANA |
EXTERNAL |
203 |
Bonn
The Canadian Embassy in Bonn, West Germany learned that a German journalist had called the Soviet Ambassador to get the Soviet reaction to the Kennedy speech. The Soviet diplomat had stated “force would be met with force.” Hours later, the Soviet Embassy called the journalist backed and asked that the sentiments expressed by the Ambassador not be printed or shared, instructing the journalist to wait for the official statement from Moscow to be released.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
BONN |
EXTERNAL |
715 |
Moscow
Canadian Ambassador to the USSR, Arnold Smith, kept Ottawa abreast of the information he collected on Soviet decision-makers and provided his own analysis of the situation in the USSR and how events were likely to play out. Smith worried that because of the sympathetic portrayal that had been given to Cuba by Soviet media for the past two years, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would have a hard time backing down and abandoning Cuba as the Americans wished him to do. He also fretted that nuclear war could be easily triggered by the sinking of a single Soviet vessel by the Americans (CDNW12571).
Smith ended his telegram with an anecdote meant to comfort the reader: “Before supper [the] Drews and ourselves had been at Boris Godunov where it was surprising but somehow reassuring to see Khrushchev and most of his presidium, with Georghiu Dez, calmly sitting through four-hour opera with an American star” (CDNW12571).
The Canadian Ambassador also reported on large demonstrations occurring in front of the US Embassy in Moscow (CDNW12090).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
|
24-Oct-62 |
MOSCOW |
EXTERNAL |
763 |
|
|
24-Oct-62 |
MOSCOW |
EXTERNAL |
765 |
Prague
The Canadian Embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia reported that the Czech reaction to Kennedy’s speech was “predictably extreme.” Still, according to this telegram, the Czechs were more worried about the situation in Berlin than in Cuba. Additional news relayed from Prague was that the Warsaw Pact had been placed on alert in response to US forces being put on alert, as well as word from the US Embassy that they anticipated demonstrations targeting them in the coming days.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
PRAGUE |
EXTERNAL |
447 |
Rio
The Canadian Ambassador in Rio, Brazil explained Brazil’s complicated stance on the US’ quarrel with Cuba. Essentially, Brazil was pro-blockade, but anti-use of force when it came to Cuba (CDNW12148). The OAS council had voted in favour of the US resolution, with Mexico voting against the proposed “quarantine” of Cuba and the use of the US armed forces, and Brazil objecting only afterwards (CDNW12228). Telegram number 204 from the same day (which is missing from this collection) and number 206 (CDNW12152) together contained Brazil’s official statement on Cuba and the actions taken by the US.
While Brazil supported the American initiative to prevent further weapons buildup in Cuba, the official line was that the “Brazilian gov[ernmen]t does not give its support to measures which would violate the territorial integrity of an independent country and put world peace in peril” (CDNW12152). The precedent that could be set by fully endorsing US interference in the domestic politics of a sovereign nation was too risky for Brazil—the Cuban people, of course, had the right to choose their own form of government—so it emphasized its desire for a political solution to the crisis which did not involve the use of force (CDNW12228).
The third and final telegram from Rio (CDNW12228) indicated that the Brazilian government’s stance was born of domestic political needs—the President was even considering “making a dramatic appeal” to American and Soviet leaders to work towards peace, in order to increase his own popularity. One other piece of news that Ottawa would perhaps be pleased to hear was that the Brazilian government would certainly support the Canadian Prime Minister’s proposal for a neutral commission to Cuba to verify the US’ claims (CDNW12228), and that local newspapers were also supportive of the idea (CDNW12148). As of October 24th, the Canadian Ambassador reported that there had been no demonstrations in from of the US Embassy in Brazil and “not one stone hurled” at it (CDNW12148). However, this state of affairs would not last long (see CDNW12361).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
RIO |
EXTERNAL |
205 |
|
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24-Oct-62 |
RIO |
EXTERNAL |
206 |
|
|
24-Oct-62 |
RIO |
EXTERNAL |
207 |
Montevideo
Seeking an explanation for Uruguay’s abstention from voting on the OAS resolution the US put forth regarding the Cuban situation, the Canadians turned to their Ambassador in Uruguay. He wrote that the abstention did not stem from opposition to the US, but rather indecision within the Uruguayan government. The Canadian Ambassador spoke to the American Ambassador to Uruguay, who stated that he would “not try to convince any members of [the Uruguayan National] Council [of Government to vote in favour of the US] in order to avoid charges of interference.”
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
MVIDEO |
EXTERNAL |
82 |
Washington, DC
Telegram CDNW12577 from Washington, DC focused on the legitimacy of the actions the US had taken thus far with regards to Cuba. The Canadians listened carefully to the Americans’ justifications (legal or otherwise) for their “quarantine” and reported back to Ottawa. Much of the telegram is taken up with explaining why the Americans chose to call their action a “quarantine” rather than a “blockade”. By using this terminology and with the support of the OAS, the US was confident that the UN could not object to its actions—the “quarantine” could not be considered an act of war and was legal under Article 52 of the UN Charter, which allowed for “regional security arrangements” to be made. Based on the detail of this telegram, the US seemed well prepared to defend its actions going into the UN Security Council debate (CDNW12577).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3097 |
|
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24-Oct-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3133 |
Accra
The Canadian Ambassador to Ghana reported information he had received from the American Charge d’Affaires in Accra regarding President Nkrumah’s reaction to US President Kennedy’s speech and the Americans’ proposed solutions to the Cuba problem. Nkrumah thought it was unlikely British and Soviet vessels in particular would submit to being searched by the Americans, and he called for UN observers to be sent to Cuba to “get the facts” (it is unclear whether he was responding to Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s proposal or came up with a similar proposal on his own). The Ghanian President also believed blame for the crisis fell more on Cuba’s shoulders than the USSR, as Cuba had its own agency and could have refused Soviet missiles. Nkrumah was also aware that the US had similar bases similarly close to the Soviet Union.
Ghanian media was for the most part quiet on the Cuba-US front, and the Ghanian government maintained silence on the issue as well. The Canadian Ambassador speculated that this silence may have something to do with a warning the American Ambassador gave to Nkrumah in late September, urging him “not to take sides on the Cuban question.” Nkrumah’s silence meant that no one knew for sure which side Ghana would support on the UN Security Council.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
ACCRA |
EXTERNAL |
411 |
Cairo
There were two telegrams sent from the Canadian Embassy in Cairo, Egypt (United Arab Republic) to Ottawa on October 24th. Unfortunately for the Canadians, the UAR government would not support the Prime Minister’s proposal for verifying the existence of missiles in Cuba because of the precedent it would set—allowing UN observers into any country to inspect its weapons (CDNW12153). Egyptian media did not offer any opinions on the Canadian proposal, and seemed to sympathize more with Cuba than the US (CDNW12147). The government in Cairo disagreed with the US’ approach to “solving” its problem (the American blockade of Cuba would make it easier for the USSR to assert its right to control routes into and out of Berlin, they thought), and expressed some confusion on whether or not they believed the Americans’ or the Soviet’s story about the missiles in Cuba (CDNW12153).
The UAR wanted peace above all, expressing the sentiment that it was the duty of non-aligned countries to keep the peace between the US and the USSR and prevent nuclear war. (That same sentiment would carry through to the UN Security Council meeting the next day: read the meeting transcript.) Even so, the Under-Secretary of State, Hafiz Ismael, could not resist wryly observing that perhaps the “Americans now understood how they [the Arabs] felt about foreign military bases in general, particularly those that threatened the Arab world—Cyprus, Dhahran, Aden, and above all Israel” (CDNW12153). Interestingly, a similar sentiment was expressed in Israeli military circles at this time (see CDNW12330).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
CAIRO |
EXTERNAL |
537 |
|
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24-Oct-62 |
CAIRO |
EXTERNAL |
538 |
Paris
The Canadian Embassy in Paris, France reported back to Ottawa that French President Charles de Gaulle was supportive of the US and understood its need to defend itself against Soviet expansion—France would stand with the US and NATO if the USSR chose to retaliate. He speculated that Soviet leader Khrushchev would want to avoid war, but due to the embarrassment caused by the unfortunate position the US publicly placed him in, he would likely seek redress by pursuing stronger policies regarding Berlin or US military outposts which bordered the Soviet Union and its allies. As far as de Gaulle was aware, no French vessels were impacted by the quarantine on Cuba imposed by the US, and rumour was that the French would vote in favour of the US in the UN Security Council (CDNW12221).
The press reaction in France to the evolving situation in Cuba, according to the Canadian Embassy, was a mixed bag. While not exactly anti-US, most French papers weren’t anti-Cuba either. Skepticism about whether there were in fact missiles in Cuba—as the Americans claimed—was rife. French press alternated between speculating about US President Kennedy’s motives (was this all part of a complex re-election plan?), pointing to the existence of American missiles on the USSR’s doorstep in Turkey (hypocrisy on the part of the US?), and wondering what impact this crisis might have on the situation in Berlin. More than anything, the French seemed preoccupied with their upcoming referendum, and questions about how the current superpower showdown between the US and USSR might impact domestic French politics (CDNW12136).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
EMBPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
1357 |
|
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24-Oct-62 |
EMBPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
1358 |
London
Canadian diplomats stationed in London, UK were working hard to bring detailed accounts of the British reaction to the US-Cuba standoff, sending three detailed telegrams on the subject on October 24th alone. The first telegram contained extracts from a Times report on UK Foreign Secretary Lord Home’s speech to the National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce. The speech reaffirmed the UK’s support for the US (including in the upcoming UN Security Council meeting), called out the USSR for lying about the missiles in Cuba, and included one comment directed specifically to the non-aligned countries of the world—neutrality would not protect them from the communists, as the “Indians are learning at the hands of the Chinese” (referring to the ongoing Indo-Chinese border crisis). The Foreign Secretary concluded his speech on an ominous note: that there were only two options remaining for the US and USSR: destroy the world as we know it, or talk to one another (CDNW12140).
The second telegram contained the reaction of the opposition (the Labour Party). Some wished that the US had gone to the UN about Cuba before taking matters into its own hands, and Labour politicians were skeptical of the legitimacy of using a naval blockade in peacetime. The UK, they argued, was a “nation which has always insisted on freedom of the seas”, and the American “quarantine” led to the searching of UK vessels. Additionally, there were worries that the US’ actions would give the Soviets an excuse to take similar action against American and NATO bases close to them, or to small democratic states they disliked (CDNW12227).
The third telegram relayed the press coverage from several notable UK newspapers. While most newspapers accepted the Americans’ claims of the existence of ballistic missiles in Cuba, there was much debate around whether the actions taken by the US so far were the right ones. In a particularly scathing report, the Daily Herald even compared the US’ blockade of Cuba to the UK’s disastrous invasion of Egypt in 1956. The Guardian directly accused the US of playing directly into Soviet leader Khrushchev’s hands—he would then be able to what he liked to remove nearby American bases which irked him. The Canadian diplomats made a point of noting that the Herald also stated that the UK should have supported Canada’s proposal for a UN neutral investigation (CDNW12234).
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3801 |
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24-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3802 |
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24-Oct-62 |
LDN |
EXTERNAL |
3804 |
Djakarta
The Canadian Embassy in Djakarta, Indonesia reported that the Indonesian government was still on the fence with regards to the rapidly developing situation in Cuba, and that Indonesia had also continued its ambivalence regarding the ongoing Indo-Chinese border conflict. The American Charge d’Affaires in Djakarta informed the Canadian Ambassador that he viewed the lack of a response as a “favourable sign of likely Indonesian attitude.”
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
DJAKARTA |
EXTERNAL |
149 |
Rome
A telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Rome, Italy provided a complete retelling of a session of Italian Parliament. Even though Italy would support the US in this crisis, the Italian government itself was divided between those in power and the leftist minority, who wished for the dismantling of all military bases worldwide and nuclear disarmament. The most dramatic moment of the debate was perhaps when Italian communist party members rose to their feet and shouted “viva Cuba!”
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
ROME |
EXTERNAL |
450 |
Lisbon
The Canadian Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal reported that the Portuguese would support the US when it came to Cuba, but that they would do so mainly with the hope that it would serve as an incentive for the US to alter its policy regarding Angola to one that would be more beneficial to Portugal.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
LISBON |
EXTERNAL |
52 |
Copenhagen
The text of this telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark has been completely withheld.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
COPEN |
EXTERNAL |
158 |
NATOParis
The text of this telegram from NATO in Paris, France has been completely withheld.
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Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
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24-Oct-62 |
NATOPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
2472 |
