December 4 - December 19, 1962
This page contains diplomatic cables from December 4 to 19, 1962. The documents include discussions of US and NATO surveillance of Cuba, as well as subtle requests by various parties to remove the communist Fidel Castro from his office.
What to do with Castro? —The Resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis
A December 4th telegram from Washington, DC informed Ottawa of ongoing discussions between the US and USSR (in particular, a meeting between American diplomat and Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson and Anastas Mikoyan). Cuba was still the main topic of discussion, and numerous aspects of crisis resolution were brought up—the most surprising being the Americans’ and Soviets’ shared dislike of Cuban communist leader Fidel Castro. Thompson suggested to Mikoyan that “if the Russians could find a way of getting rid of Castro and making [the] USA look responsible they [the US government] would welcome it” (CDNW12497).
On December 6th, the Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC sent another telegram to Ottawa, this time summarizing a conversation with McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The US would continue to conduct aerial surveillance over Cuba, and the Americans did not want their NATO allies to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba. They hoped NATO countries that did still have missions in Cuba (like Canada) would exercise a “discrete watchfulness” there (CDNW12496). That same day, Ottawa received a document from the Canadian Embassy in Paris passed to them by the Quai d’Orsay (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs) containing the French assessment of Soviet policy as well as some hints about how the French were interpreting US policy regarding Cuba (CDNW12693).
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
4-Dec-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3537 |
|
6-Dec-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3563 |
|
6-Dec-62 |
EMBPARIS |
EXTERNAL |
1570 |
The following day, a telegram from Rome outlined the Italian position on Cuba: while the Italians heard Mexico and Brazil’s calls to leave Cuba alone (allow it to remain communist), they also heard the cries of smaller Latin American countries that saw Castro and communism as a serious threat—the worry was that Castro would soon achieve a level of popularity and enhanced status similar to that of Egyptian President Nasser’s following the Suez Crisis in 1956. Italy would not “be assuming a definite position in this debate,” but “rather hoped that when the dust settled it would reveal a Cuba without Castro” (CDNW12501).
US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, gave a press conference on December 11th, a summary of which was conveyed to Ottawa that same day. Rusk considered the continued presence of Soviet troops in Cuba unacceptable and criticized the USSR for failing to provide proof that the missiles had indeed been removed from Cuba (CDNW12504). Two more telegrams from Washington, DC dated December 19th contained summaries of important points raised in televised interviews of McGeorge Bundy (CDNW12509) and US President John F. Kennedy (CDNW12508) regarding Cuba. The Americans reaffirmed their commitment not to invade Cuba, reiterated their intentions about continued surveillance of the island in the absence of on-site inspections (which had been categorically refused by the Cuban government), and discussed the removal of Soviet missiles and troops.
Item |
Date |
From |
To |
Number |
7-Dec-62 |
ROME |
EXTERNAL |
595 |
|
11-Dec-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3601 |
|
19-Dec-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3683 |
|
19-Dec-62 |
WASHDC |
EXTERNAL |
3685 |