October 27, 1962

This page includes diplomatic cables from October 27th. On this date, the shooting down of an American U-2 plane over Cuba inflamed tensions. While officials knew about US President John F. Kennedy receiving a letter from the Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev demanding the removal of missiles from Turkey in exchange for the Cuban missiles being removed (CDNW12296), they did not yet know of a secret agreement being reached by both countries that night (see here). The strength of Canada-US relations was on display as both countries engaged in speculation about Soviet motives (CDNW12305). Meanwhile, non-aligned states hoped for peace (CDNW12299, CDNW12586).  

London, Washington, and Ottawa

Canadian diplomats in Washington reported the special mention Canada received in American newspapers, and the thanks offered by American diplomats (including Secretary of State David Dean Rusk, and Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General) for Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s speech on October 25th. The Washington Post, which argued that “Mr. Khrushchev’s blatant move has brought neighbours together,” emphasized that both Diefenbaker’s government and Pearson’s opposition were supportive of the United States government (CDNW12297, CDNW12334).  

Meanwhile, officials in both London and Washington engaged in speculation about Khrushchev’s motives (CDNW12305, CDNW12306) for constructing missiles in Cuba (CDNW12298). Officials in the UK largely focused on great power competition, theorizing that the Soviet move could, among other things, be a test run for a Berlin conflict. Reflecting the tumultuous nature of this speculation, it was acknowledged that “this theory may be proved invalid at any moment” (CDNW12305).  

Lewis Bowden, of the US State Department Office of Soviet Affairs, engaged in wilder speculation, discounting Canadian suggestions that the Soviet move in Cuba was part of an effort to improve Moscow’s negotiating position over Berlin. Charles Ritchie, the Canadian ambassador, reported that Bowden “rapidly dismissed remarks we made along these lines, suggesting that all but the maximum Soviet motivations have been discarded” (CDNW12306). A White House press release from October 27th reflected a similar level of worry, and called the Soviet threat one “under which no sensible negotiation can proceed” (CDNW12335).

Moscow and Washington, DC

A protest of around one thousand people was held outside the American embassy in Moscow, but Soviet citizens seemed otherwise subdued. The Canadian Ambassador to the USSR, Arnold Smith, reported that “queues at food shops in Moscow seem normal.” Smith observed that Khrushchev made a “continued effort to play down (the) atmosphere of crisis.” Khrushchev’s meeting with the Indian and Iranian Ministers took the front page of the Soviet newspapers, contributing to a portrayal of him as a master statesman in contrast to American aggressiveness (CDNW12327). American Secretary of State Dean Rusk cautioned journalists that the initial moderate Soviet reaction would not mean moderation going forward (CDNW12306).  

Havana

In Havana, Canadian diplomats reported that the Cuban military had moved into small towns and was exhibiting unusually high levels of activity (CDNW12263), at the same time sightings of missiles occurred (CDNW12585). This information was reported directly to the Joint Indications Room in Canada via “Emergency” cable.

Stockholm and Accra 

The Swedish government warned that there was a risk of “disastrous consequences for [the] entire world.” They praised the Secretary General of the United Nations for trying to resolve the conflict, while condemning the United States for their interception of vessels travelling towards Cuba, stating that this action violated international law (CDNW12299).  

Despite being a member of the Commonwealth, Ghana maintained strict neutrality. Ghanian Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah said he had “heeded USA warning not to become involved.” Nkrumah pushed for peace, sending a letter to Khrushchev stating that the world had been “gravely disturbed” by unfolding events, and asked British Prime Minister Macmillan to appeal to Kennedy to prevent “precipitous action” (CDNW12586).