November 3, 1962

This page includes diplomatic cables from November 3rd, 1962. Documents are mostly focused on Cuba’s future with reference to the inspection of dismantled missile bases. The role of the OAS and the Soviet motives are also discussed.

The Resolution of the Crisis in Cuba and Castro’s Five Points 

Canadian diplomats in Washington reported on a press interview given by Edwin Martin, US Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs (CDNW12388) about developments in Cuba and the effects of the crisis in Latin America. Martin discussed the OAS, its recognition of the quarantine, and the role of the UN as a mediator in the crisis. Martin questioned the motives behind Castro’s five-point demand and made clear the US would retain its base at Guantanamo Bay. 

Previously, on October 28, 1962, Castro had listed “five points” in a letter to Secretary General U Thant. The points, listed below, were reproduced by The Avalon Project here. 

1) cessation of the economic blockade and commercial and economic pressure against Cuba;  

2) cessation of subversive activities;  

3) cessation of piratical attacks from U.S. and Puerto Rican bases;  

4) cessation of violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters; and  

5) U.S. withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its return to Cuba.  

Castro argued these five points or conditions were necessary accompaniments to Kennedy’s pledge not to invade Cuba. For others, the list seemed to be an attempt to insert Cuba into the US-Soviet diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. The “five points” come up again in later diplomatic telegrams in this briefing book.  

On November 2, Kennedy had made a statement there was evidence the missile bases in Cuba were being dismantled. He also noted his desire to continue procedures to inspect Cuba bound cargo (CDNW12387).

Item Date From To Number
CDNW12388.pdf 3-Nov-62 WASHDC EXTERNAL 3252
CDNW12387.pdf 3-Nov-62 WASHDC EXTERNAL 3251

Soviet Motives  

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered several motives for Soviet actions in Cuba, including an attempt to gain greater concessions in Berlin or a genuine Soviet belief in the threat of military action by the US (CDNW12607).

Item Date From To Number
CDNW12607.pdf 3-Nov-62 EMBPARIS EXTERNAL 1305