November 22 - November 23, 1962

This page includes documents from November 22nd and 23rd. On these days, the High Commission in London and the Embassy in Moscow sent Ottawa details about meetings between Anastus Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, speculation on Nikita Khrushchev’s motives for installing missiles in Cuba, and whether Castro had learned a “hard lesson” from the crisis.  

November 22, 1962

A telegram from London detailed talks between Mikoyan and Castro (CDNW12653). Mikoyan had visited Havana to convince Castro to cooperate with the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba. But when a dinner was held in honour of Mikoyan, Fidel Castro failed to attend. This was apparently not out of character for the “defiant” Castro, who had not been seen for more than two weeks at this point. On this day, Arnold Smith, the Canadian ambassador to Moscow, assessed Khrushchev’s possible motives for installing missiles in Cuba (CDNW12670). He thought Khrushchev’s mistake was overestimating the threat he posed to the US’s European allies and believing they would also concede.  

November 23, 1962

Following the missile crisis, Soviet policy seemed to change. On November 23, 1962, Arnold Smith reported on Khrushchev’s speech in the Soviet press (CDNW12667). Khruschev defined peaceful coexistence as a “policy of mutual concessions,” with his goal being to reduce tensions with the US. Previously, Khrushchev defined a peaceful coexistence as “a continuation of class struggle… a struggle between communism and capitalism.” Another telegram from London on November 23, 1962 (CDNW12668) passed on a report from the British Ambassador in Havana. While the removal of offensive weapons was a humiliating defeat for Castro, it taught him a lesson to “think globally and not merely as a Cuban patriot.” There was a discussion of a possible Soviet move against Castro, and the possibility this would risk civil war.