Tripartite Alerts Agreement - Introduction

In the early 1950s, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada each developed their own indications intelligence projects in an attempt to determine when the Cold War might turn “hot.” From the very beginning, Canadian intelligence officials were highly interested in exchanging indications intelligence with the United States and they were growing concerned about how indications intelligence would be exchanged in a crisis. Indeed, there was the possibility that American indications intelligence could put Canadian military units on alert without any of that intelligence ever being assessed by the Canadians.

In late 1954, the Canadians relayed their worries to British intelligence officials and suggested that “hot” pieces of indications intelligence should be quickly exchanged between Ottawa and London. The British were equally desirous of an agreement on indications intelligence sharing, especially in the wake of NATO discussions in Paris and the MC 48 report. With Canadian support, the British drew up a proposal for a tripartite alerts agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada.

The Americans, however, were less enthusiastic. While some within the US government were supportive, many in the Pentagon and the CIA reacted unfavourably to the idea of a tripartite alerts scheme. With the Americans dragging their feet, British ministers raised the issue with their American counterparts during the Bermuda meeting in 1957. The Americans agreed to a tripartite meeting in March where many of their concerns were ironed out. After further discussion within the US State Department, the Americans eventually agreed to the Anglo-Canadian alerts proposals in May 1957. Left unregistered with the UN, the agreement was formalized through an informal exchange of letters between ambassadors of the three governments. What follows is a selection of key documents that help narrate this meandering road to the Tripartite Alerts Agreement.

See the Open Access article: Sayle, Timothy Andrews. 2023. “Indications of War: American, British and Canadian Intelligence Diplomacy and the 1957 Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement.” Intelligence and National Security 38 (3): 427–46. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2123936.