October 30 (The SubAir Barrier & Maritime Patrol)

On October 30th, a message from Maritime Air Command in Halifax reported that the U.S. Navy had established a “SubAir” barrier – a screen to detect Soviet submarines. The barrier reached “from shoreline of South East Point Newfoundland for a distance of approx 600 miles in a SSE direction.” The U.S. Navy requested that Canada, with its long-range Argus patrol aircraft, take on a maritime air patrol forward of the U.S. submarines. This message includes details about command responsibilities and communications between aircraft and submarines, as well as the Canadian assessment of the protection provided to Canada by the barrier (CDNW12277). 

According to Halifax Air Command, there had been five positive, two likely, and four possible submarines in the Western Atlantic (CDNW12278). Before the creation of the SubAir barrier, there were several “positively identified south of US” (CDNW12277). A report from Halifax command highlighted the unusualness of this situation, and stated that “never since the last war has such a situation existed” (CDNW12278).  

Already, by October 30, “Ottawa considers this crisis practically over.” Discussions about the dissolution of the barrier started several days later (see more on the SubAir barrier here). It was stated here that Canada could not meet the “special air patrols flying requirement,” and barrier participation was going to be cut back (CDNW12278). However, in the days immediately following this, Canadian planes were still flying with increased hours (see more about flying hours here and at CDNW12398).  

Canada informed COMASWFORLANT (the Commander, Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces, Atlantic) that it could “only assist to a limited degree” (CDNW12278). (See more about the inability to commit Maritime Patrol in November at CDNW12281). The “apparent easing of tension” internationally also contributed to the decision to not do an operational readiness test for the 429 Squadron (CDNW12277).