CDKW00446 - Contingency Planning

In this annex, originally prepared by the UK Chiefs of Staff, fears of a breakdown in negotiations with Peking were discussed. Two potential responses were given serious thought. The first, fighting up the Korean peninsula yet still avoiding directly bombing the People’s Republic of China, raised concerns that the UN Forces were actually outmatched in terms of troop figures by the Chinese and North Koreans. The second option, instituting a naval blockade in the region, presented clear disadvantages for Hong Kong and Japan. Furthermore, a naval blockade may not be materially detrimental to the Chinese support of the Korean conflict, which relied largely on local production and overland arms distribution from the USSR. Based upon these considerations, the UK Chiefs of Staff desired to hold the Kansas line for as long as possible—if General Ridgway decided to fight much further north, this change in strategy would require the consent of participating governments.