The Failure of the Ronning Missions
The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of pages 90-93.
***
Ronning arrived back in Ottawa on June 20 or 21 and the State Department dispatched Kreisberg to Ottawa to discuss the visit. On the afternoon of June 21, the Minister received Kreisberg and Mr. Scott, Minister at the USA Embassy in Ottawa and gave them a preliminary briefing on Ronning’s discussions in Hanoi. After giving an account of the factual results of the mission, including the North Vietnamese comments about the Canadian channel, the Minister went on to make two further points:
"Because we take it that the maintenance of the channel is of interest to the USA we would like to draw their attention to the adverse effects which an early escalation of USA activities against North Vietnam is likely to have both retroactively on the Ronning mission and potentially on the future use of the Canadian channel. We would also hope that the USA would not find it necessary, in any public statements, to refer to North Vietnamese attitudes in a way which might imply that their judgment has been arrived at on the basis of indications provided by Canada as a result of the Ronning visit.
"It has been our intent to see whether a basis could be found on which it might prove possible for talks to be opened between the USA and the North Vietnamese. It appears that, as far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, there are no present prospects of an acceptable formula being devised on the basis of reciprocal action for a cessation of bombing. We shall be considering and, we hope, discussing with the USA other possibilities open to us of making use of the channel to Hanoi."
The Minister was not, however, fully satisfied with this preliminary presentation; specifically he felt that Kreisberg, however brilliant, was not senior enough and that since Bundy had had such an important role in the planning of these missions, he should be involved in the follow-up discussions. Accordingly, the Minister picked up his telephone and "instructed" Bundy to come to Ottawa for discussions with Ronning and himself the following day. Regardless of what Bundy might have thought or said when he hung up the telephone, he appeared in Ottawa as required. The afternoon of June 22 was spent in intensive discussions in the Minister’s office with Ronning giving a first-hand account and Bundy cross-questioning him. Towards the end of the afternoon, Bundy - in a characteristic form of expression - remarked that it was "a little difficult to find the right handle to all this". He made it quite clear that the Americans were perplexed at best, and not convinced at worst, by Ronning’s "findings".
That evening the Minister hosted a dinner in mildly comic semi-secrecy at the Chateau Laurier - but even so, Bundy’s presence in Ottawa was noted. The discussion at dinner covered the whole Asia-Pacific area in general terms and found Bundy at his philosophic and expository best: a fascinating performance on the future of American-Japanese relations, the role of China, what was happening in Indonesia, to mention only a few of the subjects discussed.
Although interested in what Bundy had to say, the Minister was clearly preoccupied with Vietnam and the apparent failure of Ronning’s mission. On a number of points, he reiterated to Bundy the view that he had expressed during the afternoon discussions, namely that the American message should have been more forthcoming, and that it was the lack of "give" in the formulation of the American position that had resulted in failure.
In the months that followed, there was, of course, a great deal of speculation as to whether the Americans had deliberately used the Ronning mission for purposes which were quite different from those which we had intended it to serve. Some critics felt that this was deliberate, and indeed it was not always possible to argue a totally convincing case in the other direction. On June 29, the Americans extended the pattern of bombing to include POL dumps in Hanoi and Haiphong and nine other locations in North Vietnam, and on July 8, the Washington Post published an article by Chalmers Roberts in the following terms:
“A conversation in Hanoi between a foreign diplomat and North Vietnam’s President Ho Chi Minh was a key element responsible for President Johnson’s current tough policy and hard talk about the war in Vietnam. This is the story as told yesterday by high Administration sources: the diplomatic visitor to Hanoi discussed the war with Ho, who told him that his country was prepared to fight a long war against the Americans and their allies. But, Ho added, that will not be necessary because 'we won’t have to wait too long'. President Johnson’s political base for his military action, continued Ho, will be shattered in November. This conversation took place about three weeks ago, that is about June 15. Officials will not disclose the source of the report but it may have been Canada’s Chester Ronning, who was in Hanoi from June 15 to 18. At any rate, the report was taken as a genuine reading of Ho’s frame of mind and its arrival on the President’s desk was soon followed by double-barreled action. On or about June 23, Mr. Johnson at last gave a go-ahead to the long-planned American air attacks on the oil installations in the Hanoi and Haiphong region. The first attack took place on June 29. The day after that raid, the President spoke of the war in both Omaha and Desmoines. The speeches continued the themes that (transcript illegible) would continue unless the Communists agree to negotiate and that "we will see this through; we shall persist; we shall succeed".
Had the Americans tried deliberately to scuttle the Ronning project because they distrusted Ronning personally or because they were less enthusiastic in public and in private about the Canadian channel than was the Minister? Had we been deliberately used by the Americans because the military and civilian hardliners had decided that further escalation was really what was required? Questions such as these were not entirely absent from our thinking at the time, but any definitive answers will have to await more authoritative historical judgments. A contemporary commentary, however, might be worth bearing in mind in attempting to formulate any historical judgment:
"As to the sequel of the Ronning mission, there are obviously various ways of looking at it. There can be no doubt that the USA were on the verge of deciding at that time to bomb fuel storage facilities in North Vietnam. All the indications available to us pointed in that direction. If there had been any positive elements emerging from Ronning’s second round of discussions in Hanoi, it is possible that the USA would have held back. In the absence of anything really positive from their point of view, they went ahead. So in one sense, there is a connection between the results of Ronning’s mission and the bombing of fuel storage facilities in the North - but is it really fair to say that it was Ronning’s mission that led to the decision to bomb these facilities?"