Epilogue
The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of the epilogue, which starts the page count again at 2, and thus represents epilogue pages 2-4.
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(INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS: 1966-1967)
By and large, the more significant peace initiatives with which Canada was associated during this period shared two characteristics: they emanated from sources other than Canadian and, secondly, they revolved around the utilization of the ICSC as a vehicle for establishing a basis for peace negotiations between the warring parties in Vietnam.
The two proposals of note during this period were put forward by Professor Roger Fisher of Harvard in early October of 1966 and by Dean Rusk in late November of the same year. Fisher’s proposal, which was informally discussed by representatives of the ICSC countries in New York, involved the convening of an international conference on Vietnam, similar to the Geneva Conference of 1954, to negotiate a halt to the hostilities. Fisher’s general approach to the convening of a conference was, however, dropped in favor of an initiative to be made, after consultations, by the ICSC countries acting through the Commission. In a similar vein, Rusk suggested to the Minister that the Commission countries meet in Geneva to discuss the potential role of the ICSC in arranging peace talks.
Both suggestions, however, foundered when the Minister, during a visit to Warsaw in November, was informed by the Poles that they wished to see the Commission lapse into a state of complete inactivity to avoid complicating positions in Vietnam while, at the same time, preserving a basis for possible future cooperation. The Polish view, which did not undergo any change during this period, thus effectively precluded the possibility of any unanimous Commission initiative being undertaken. Nevertheless, Canada continued, with India, to explore the possibility of a Commission initiative (specifically permutations of the Fisher plan) against the day when (transcript illegible) modification, indicating that the North Vietnamese might be willing to see action taken.
The last Canadian "proposal" was advanced by the Minister in a statement before the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 11, 1967:
"It may well be necessary to envisage a progressive re-application of the 1954 cease-fire terms as an agreed preliminary to direct discussions between the two sides and as something which would, of itself, help to create a favorable climate for such discussions. If there were any merit in an approach on these lines, I could envisage it being carried out in four stages.
"The first step should involve some degree of physical disengagement of the parties. This might be accomplished by restoring the demilitarized character of the zone on either side of the 17th Parallel by the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from that zone, by enforcing a prohibition against any artillery action across the zone, and by barring any overflights of the zone except for purposes of impartial supervision. At the same time, it would be necessary to reactivate those provisions of the cease-fire agreement which prohibit either North or South Vietnam from being used for carrying out hostile acts against the other. In my view, this would, in equity, have to include the bombing and any other military action against North Vietnam, whether actually undertaken from South Vietnam or from some other point of origin.
"Second, I think it would be necessary to freeze the course of military events in Vietnam at its present level. This might entail undertakings on both sides not to engage in any military activities which differed in either scale or pattern from the activities which are currently being engaged in. It might also entail the practical re-application, as from an agreed point in time, of those articles of the Geneva cease-fire agreement which prohibit reinforcement of troops or arms, munitions, and other war material into North or South Vietnam from any source or quarter.
"The third stage of such an approach would logically involve the cessation of all active hostilities between the parties, whether on the ground, at sea, or in the air.
"The fourth and final stage would complete the process of return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva settlement. At that stage, provision would have to be made for the liberation and repatriation of prisoners, for the withdrawal of all outside forces whose presence in the area of conflict was not provided for at Geneva, and for the dismantling of military bases or their conversion to peaceful purposes.
"I want to make it clear that I am not here putting forward a formal set of proposals. I have been concerned to sketch out one line of approach to ending the present conflict which seems practicable to me and which, in addition, has behind it the sanction of the Geneva arrangements, to which both sides have said that they continue to subscribe.
"Any such approach, however, would clearly have to be acceptable to the parties concerned. I want to be perfectly frank with the Committee and say that, on present evidence, I am not very optimistic on that score. For while it is true that both sides are prepared to subscribe to the objective of a return to the Geneva arrangements, I am not so sure that they are at one in their interpretation of what that objective implies or as to the means by which it can best be achieved. In particular, of course, we cannot be unmindful of the position of the Government of North Vietnam, which is that they cannot accept any proposal which treats both sides on a basis of strict equity because this would ignore the factor of responsibility for the present conflict as they see it."