Seaborn First Mission
The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of pages 2-13.
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The first of what might be called special political contacts between Canadian representatives in Vietnam and the Government of North Vietnam took place towards the end of November 1962 when the newly appointed Commissioner, G. E. Cox, paid his first visit to Hanoi. It should be borne in mind that this visit took place six months after the presentation of the Commission’s Special Report of June 2 in which Canada and India, in a majority opinion, drew attention - for the first time officially - to the problem of Northern intervention and subversion in the South. Cox had no special instructions and no specific brief to engage the North Vietnamese authorities in discussions of the terms and conditions under which a durable settlement in Vietnam might be arranged. He was received by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister and the interview was cordial and lengthy - a fact that was noteworthy since it took place in the wake of the June 2 Special Report. Pham Van Dong, in reviewing the Vietnam situation for Cox, said that he "wished some way could be found to begin some sort of contacts, however minor, with the authorities in Saigon and added that all their efforts in this direction had been rebuffed”. In response to the Prime Minister’s invitation to comment on the situation, Cox developed the theme that "the measures which had been taken in the South to ensure the extension of the undisturbed authority of the Government over the whole of the South would eventually be successful”; the North should welcome such a development, for only if this condition prevailed and the Saigon Government felt secure could there be any hope of real progress towards such ultimate goals as reunification. According to Cox’s report, the Prime Minister registered considerable interest and invited the Commissioner to accompany him, without advisers and interpreters, for a stroll around the garden. "He said that he wanted me to know that he was very impressed with what I had said and when he had an opportunity to reflect on it, he would like to discuss it further. Twice later he invited me to return whenever I had even a few minutes.” (Saigon telegram 181 of December 4 appears as Appendix 1).
It is not clear from the records what action, if any, was taken with respect to this report; my recollection of conversations with officers who had been involved at headquarters at the time is that they were reluctant to interpret this encounter as a significant diplomatic move and even more, they were extremely cautious about following it up. It took almost four months, and then in response to prodding by Cox, for Ottawa to reply. Recognizing the inevitability of discussions in North Vietnam, Ottawa went on to note the "dangers of excessive involvement”. The operative paragraphs of this telegram are worth quoting in extenso as a reflection of official Canadian thinking at that time with respect to the Vietnam problem and the possibility of a special political role being played by Canada:
"2. We have two main concerns. The first relates to the possibility that your relationship in the South might be undermined if you were to appear to be acting as a bearer of messages from the North ostensibly conciliatory in nature but actually designed merely to weaken resistance in the GRVN and its allies. So long as the DRVN maintains its active policy of undermining GRVN, indications of a desire on the DRVN’s part for the establishment of contacts are probably more tactical than substantive. While there is no reason why these indications should not be passed on objectively to GRVN leaders and Western Ambassadors, you should be careful not to express any personal view in transmitting them. You should bear in mind that such messages may be aimed at bringing outside pressure to bear on Diem. You should also bear in mind that the Viet Cong is quite capable of getting messages to Nhu clandestinely and there is evidence that such contacts are made occasionally...
"4. Our second concern relates to limited Canadian responsibilities in Vietnam and our recognition of the large responsibilities of others. We would not wish you to enter any sort of negotiation on matters outside the Commission’s mandate. We are aware that the Indian Chairman has a broader mandate from his Government and we are of course interested in information concerning his initiatives. We have no objection to your stating views on a personal basis to DRVN leaders with our prior approval. We agree that your comments (para 2 of yourtel 181) were along the right lines. We see no harm and possibly some good in expressing the view that there is an alternative to continuing the war which could lead to stable and profitable relationships between North and South and that the present course will lead only to prolonging human misery without achieving Northern objectives." (Ottawa telegram Y-47 of March 21, Saigon telegram 25 of February 21 and Saigon letter 385 of December 11 appear as Appendix 2).
Nothing further came of this encounter and Canadian policy throughout 1963 and early 1964 concentrated on attempts to encourage the Indians to follow through on the commitment outlined in the June 2 Special Report looking to further action on the subversion problem. Within South Vietnam itself, this period was marked by severe political instability beginning with Diem’s troubles with the Buddhists, and leading onto the President’s overthrow before the end of the year. Political instability continued thereafter and was a primary preoccupation for the Americans; obviously the absence of effective political control in Saigon would have implications for military action in the villages and the countryside. Whatever interest may have been attached to the Cox/Pham Van Dong conversation in the beginning was quickly forgotten in circumstances which were leading away from a state of stability and effective control in the South, rather than towards it.
In this context and by way of obiter dicta, it is worth noting that the authorities in Hanoi throughout this period were fascinated and apparently puzzled by what was happening in the South. Throughout this period I visited Hanoi approximately once every six weeks or two months and found the authorities in the North eager for information and interpretation. They seemed to feel that it was as much the Americans as they themselves who were forcing the pace and calling some of the shots in the South.
Canadian attitudes throughout this particular period were marked by a sense of frustration and exasperation with the Indians and their procrastinations with respect to follow-up action by the Commission on the subversion problem, and in particular with respect to processing and finalizing the draft report prepared earlier by the Commission’s legal committee (i.e. the so-called Legal Report). The purpose of this report was to present the basic detailed proof of the judgment outlined in the Special Report of June 2, 1962 that the North had been sponsoring and intervening in armed insurgency in the South. We were also pressuring the Indians for action on the so-called “new cases” which were allegations of subversion received by the Commission subsequent to the material on which the Legal Report and the Special Report of June 2, 1962 had been based. As time passed, and as the situation in the south became more unstable, it became progressively clearer that the Indians had no intention of cooperating in any significant way, all of which led to increasing Canadian frustration and a serious questioning of the value of our continued participation in a “do-nothing” Commission. This latter consideration was given an added importance by the growing feeling that the politico-military situation in the Sout would get much worse before it got any better, and that a deeper and deeper American involvement appeared almost tragically inevitable. Many of us felt that we did not wis hot be around when that happened – for the sake of the Vietnamese themselves, and for the sake of Canada/USA relations.
In the late spring of 1964, the Americans were growing increasingly concerned at indications that North Vietnam was planning a significant move into the South in support of Viet Cong military operations there. In terms the total situation in Vietnam, this concern seemed quite plausible since the instability that had wracked the South since the overthrow of Diem in late 1963, invited a more active insurgency in the countryside. About mid-May, the Americans had decided that it would be necessary to get a message through to Hanoi warning them against any attempt to push the USA presence out of South Vietnam and to ensure that the North Vietnamese leaders had not seriously miscalculated the strength of USA determination to remain in South Vietnam in support of the government there. What they were looking for was an interlocutor in whom Washington had confidence and who, at the same time, would have access to Hanoi and command the respect of and be given a sympathetic hearing by the top leaders in the North Vietnamese capital. It was decided that the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the International Commission in Vietnam could serve this purpose admirably especially in view of the Commissioner’s ready and relatively inconspicuous access to Hanoi. The incumbent Commissioner, G. E. Cox, was due to leave on the termination of his assignment in July or early August, and because the Americans envisaged that the diplomatic project they had in mind could be a protracted one, and because they wished to handle the briefings in Ottawa rather than through their Embassy in Saigon, a new Commissioner, J.B. Seaborn, was selected and the changeover as Head of Delegation was brought forward by a few weeks.
Seaborn’s assignment grew out of a number of top-level Canada-USA meetings including one between the Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Rusk, and the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Pearson, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Martin; another between Prime Minister Pearson and the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson; and finally between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and senior Canadian and American officials. All these meetings took place towards the end of May, and out of them emerged the terms of reference for Seaborn’s special mission.
The substance of the Pearson/Martin/Rusk discussions is recorded in an undated memorandum marked as Appendix 3. It should be noted that Mr. Rusk made it clear at the outset that the USA did not wish to "develop hostilities on a higher scale and to try for a Korean type of military solution". At the same time, "... the USA was seeking ways to signal to Hanoi that it would be wrong for the Viet Minh to expect that the USA was getting discouraged and were thinking of pulling out. It was important for them to realize that if they did not put a stop to their operations they would be in trouble".
Attached as Appendix 4 are summary records of conversations between Mr. Martin and senior Canadian and American officials on May 28 and 29.
Our records show that on the evening of May 28, the Prime Minister and the President discussed "ways in which we (Canada) could be helpful in Vietnam" - a reference to the evolving Seaborn mission. Unfortunately, our records contain no information whatsoever on the nature of the Pearson/Johnson discussions beyond the memorandum and its attachment that appear as Appendix 5. We can therefore neither confirm nor deny the claim stemming from the Pentagon Papers that "Pearson went along with USA bombing" (Globe and Mail, Friday, July 6, 1973). Personally, I doubt very much whether the USA had any clearly thought-out "war game" or carefully graduated plan in mind at the time, as is witnessed by the unwillingness or inability of senior officials to expand upon the precise meaning of the "stick" in the "carrot and stick" approach in North Vietnam as this was being discussed with the Canadians. Clearly they must have had contingency plans for virtually every conceivable situation but how detailed these plans might be and how directly related to specific foreseeable situations as appropriate responses is very much an open question. When Mr. Rusk told the Prime Minister and Mr. Martin that if the North Vietnamese did not stand down, they would "be in trouble", he clearly had the application of military force in mind, but the record gives no hint that this had been thought out in the precise terms of when, where, how and why. I would not venture a guess as to whether it was "likely” that the Prime Minister may have "gone along" with advance indications that the Americans would bomb North Vietnam. Personally, I think it unlikely that the President would have announced to the Prime Minister in May that the USA intended to do something which it did not undertake as a matter of policy until the following February, excluding the use of force in the Tonkin Gulf incidents which probably fall into a special category. I think it much more likely, in terms of the total context at the time, that the President might have referred to the possibility of bombing as one general option.
At a high-level American policy planning meeting in Honolulu on June 1-2 in which Messrs Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Bundy, Sullivan, McCone, General Westmoreland, Admiral Felt, General Taylor, inter alia, participated, no firm decisions of a far-reaching nature were taken, according to information made available to our Embassy in Washington. The meeting "...concentrated mainly on clarifying political and military requirements and risks of various specific courses of action in Southeast Asia - with the choice between those courses of action still to be made by the President in accordance with developments..." “… On the military side the various graduated alternatives which the USA considers it has open to it were not explained in full to us but we were given to understand by Cooper that so far as dealing with interference in South Vietnam was concerned, the main discussion focussed on what could be done from the air, i.e. by bombing either (a) VC logistic facilities such as trails and bridges in North Vietnam and Laos along supply routes or (b) North Vietnamese military bases used to channel aid such as Vinh; or (c) significant industrial targets in the North. We were told that while no decisions were reached there was very little disposition at present to contemplate alternative (c) above.
There was a thorough discussion of the political and military implications of use, of the South Vietnamese Air Force for such operations, how it would have to be beefed up for the purpose and so on.” And in conclusion: "It is our impression that Honolulu has not resulted in any significant shift in USA attitude. A closer contemplation of all the possible alternatives does not seem to have led to any decisive consensus in favor of or against a harder line and the present blend of caution and resolve continues in about the same proportions. Our belief is that USA policy will evolve fairly gradually and will be determined largely by events particularly by the future actions and reactions of Hanoi as they are assessed here.” (Telegram No. 2043 of June 5 from Washington).
It was against the background of these trends of thought and these speculations and "atmospherics" that Seaborn’s special assignment was agreed to.
Codenamed "Bacon”, Seaborn’s assignment was, essentially, to serve as a confidential channel to the Government of North Vietnam, in the first instance to convey to the North Vietnamese leaders a message from the President of the USA concerning American intentions in Southeast Asia, and to transmit any North Vietnamese reaction back to Washington. Basically, the "message” Washington wanted Hanoi to understand was that American intentions were peaceful, but that just as American objectives were limited, so too was American patience with Communist provocation limited: Washington did not intend to allow a Communist take-over of the South. The Americans hoped that Seaborn's first presentation would elicit a considered North Vietnamese response and they seemed to be hoping that this might initiate a dialogue. Seaborn was also asked to "form an evaluation of their mental outlook”.
"In sum, the purpose of Seaborn's mission in the North would be as an interlocutor with both active and passive functions. On the active side, he should establish his credentials with the North Vietnamese and incidentally with the East Europeans as an authoritative channel of communications with the United States. On the passive side, he should function as a channel which could bring back either observances (sic: observations?) or direct communications concerning the North Vietnamese attitude toward extrication from or escalation of military activities. In each of his functions, Seaborn should assume the posture that the decision as to the future course of events in Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi and that the United States is looking to Hanoi for the signal which will determine the nature of events to ensue in Southeast Asia." (Concluding paragraph from briefing paper from which Sullivan spoke when in Ottawa; full text as Appendix 6.)
It will be noted that there was no mention of negotiations at this stage: Seaborn was simply being asked to transmit a message, and, hopefully a reaction, together with personal impressions. (Appendix 7 gives the text of the outline of the assignment as proposed by the Americans and agreed to by the Canadian Government: Washington telegram No. 1951 of May 30.)
Of special interest is the following qualification in the agreed terms of reference: "The interlocutor or his Government need not agree with nor associate themselves with the messages that are passed. The only requirement is that there be faithful transmittal of the messages in each direction."
The Canadian Government required that other conditions be met: Seaborn was to be regarded as a Canadian diplomatic agent, working for the Canadian Government with his activities controlled by Ottawa; he would transmit faithfully in each direction, but his instructions must be formulated in Ottawa, the substance of his messages must be reviewed by Ottawa (although Canada would not be associated with the substance as delivered), and his reports prepared for and submitted to Ottawa. These conditions were made explicit in Ottawa telegram Y-524 of July 9 to Washington and Saigon, attached as Appendix 8. Evidently these concerns, which had been "understood" at the beginning but not spelled out in detail, seemed in danger of being overlooked by the Americans: hence this reminder shortly after the first Bacon mission.
Although it was clear from the outset that the assignment raised the political danger of being criticized by hostile critics for "running errands for the Americans", the potential impact it might conceivably have on peace and stability in Southeast Asia made this a calculated risk which the Canadian Government was prepared to take - subject to the controls mentioned above.
There was also a further danger: Seaborn’s personal security in Saigon where a good many senior generals might well have been hostile to the whole exercise had they known it was being undertaken. The utmost secrecy was therefore necessary. To help protect his position vis-a-vis the Saigon Government where questions might arise if and when Seaborn’s visits to Hanoi became noticeably frequent (it seems to have been anticipated that they might) he was provided with a sympathetic letter of introduction to General Khanh, the South Vietnamese Prime Minister, from Prime Minister Pearson.
With regard to the North, however, Seaborn was given a letter signed by Prime Minister Pearson authorizing him to transmit to the North Vietnamese messages from the United States government and to report back any comments or propositions made by the North Vietnamese. (The text of this letter, dated May 30, appears as Appendix 9.) Seaborn was authorized to show this letter to President Ho Chi Minh or other senior North Vietnamese personalities.
The crux of the Canadian position was expressed in the following words: "I venture to hope that President Ho will welcome the opportunity thus provided to eliminate all misunderstanding and that he will interpret your mission as being founded on a genuine desire to ensure the return of peace to Vietnam and Southeast Asia."
Seaborn went to Hanoi first on June 16, 1964, and was received by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on June 18. The hour-and-a-half long meeting was cordial. Seaborn explained his mission; Pham Van Dong appeared to understand and indeed to welcome the Canadian Commissioner’s role as an intermediary. Seaborn also felt that when the American message was conveyed, Pham Van Dong had understood both its importance and the context in which it was delivered. At the conclusion of his presentation, Seaborn noted that he was at Pham Van Dong’s disposal should the latter wish a reply conveyed back to Washington. Although the North Vietnamese Prime Minister had commented on various points raised by Seaborn’s remarks, he stated explicitly that he had no immediate and specific message to transmit at that time in response.
Basically, then, all that was accomplished was a prise de contact. No more was really expected, and this was regarded as a successful beginning.
At a more general, but equally significant level, Seaborn returned to Saigon with a number of observations regarding conditions and attitudes in North Vietnam which ran counter to the views speculatively held - and published - by contemporary Hanoi-watchers and journalists. “Certainly on my brief visit I detected no evidence to suggest (as some columnists have been doing) that starvation, war-weariness, and political discontent are bringing the regime close to collapse and that they would therefore grasp at any straw which might enable them to save something before the country falls apart.” He noted further: “I am also inclined to think that the DRVN leaders are completely convinced that military action at any level is not going to bring success for the USA and Government forces in SVN.” The text of Seaborn’s reports are attached as Appendix 10. These were shared with the interested USA authorities in Washington and of course with the USA Embassy in Saigon.
On June 24, the Embassy in Washington reported that the State Department (Sullivan) had described Seaborn’s assessment of the Hanoi situation as “a sobering picture which was in line with the least optimistic among various assessments prevalent in Washington”.
Early in July, Seaborn reported from Saigon that consideration was being given to holding a formal meeting of the Commission in Hanoi in mid-July and he asked whether there were any specific further points to be conveyed to the North Vietnamese Government. The Department of External Affairs, in a preliminary reaction, noted the danger that “too great an eagerness to reopen the dialogue might in these circumstances be misinterpreted..." North Vietnamese public statements at the time had been interpreted as being cast in maximum terms for the purposes of the record and were designed possibly to discourage any thought that a fruitful dialogue was possible at that stage. The State Department agreed with this assessment and indicated that if the Commission did not meet in Hanoi in July it would be desirable for Seaborn to make his next trip to North Vietnam before mid-August. In the end, the proposed Commission meeting was postponed until mid-August. Seaborn noted that if the revised plan to meet in Hanoi the following month was not realized, he would proceed on his own, in order to complete his remaining introductory calls on North Vietnamese leaders.