Second Ronning Mission

The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of pages 80-90.

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We had assumed all along that Hanoi would agree to the second Ronning visit and plans were being developed long before the formal approval for the visit was received. Early in May Ronning returned to Ottawa and accompanied by the Head of Far Eastern Division he proceeded to Washington where discussions were held with Bundy and Kreisberg. In these discussions the Americans indicated that they were anxious to reopen a direct circuit with North Vietnam as soon as possible; they expressed appreciation of the availability of the Canadian channel and said that they wished it kept open. They continued to have reservations, however, about the precise interpretation to be put on the results of Ronning’s first mission to Hanoi; they also had questions about the possibility of there having been any real change in the status of the Four Points. The Americans made it quite clear that they would not regard 'a mere willingness on the part of the North Vietnamese to engage in informal talks as an adequate price for a renewed suspension of the bombing, even on the understanding that the suspension would be maintained only as long as meaningful discussions were in progress.”

In other words the proposition that Ronning had brought back from Hanoi was rejected by the USA Government. Moreover, they seemed reluctant at that stage to name a specific price for a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam; our impression was that any package would have to include more than a willingness to talk on North Vietnam’s part - possibly an undertaking to halt the further infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam.

We had suggested that there might be advantage in countering what we had interpreted as a specific North Vietnamese proposition with a specific American response; for example, that the USA would be prepared to consider an undertaking to cease bombing on condition that and for as long as the North Vietnamese were prepared to abide by some specific reciprocal undertakings of their own which would have the effect of resulting in a reduction in hostilities.

The Americans thus continued to favor a generalized approach, designed to elicit further clarification of North Vietnamese thinking. They had prepared a "piece of paper" outlining their own position as a basis for Ronning’s forthcoming presentation to the North Vietnamese Government. We thought that this "position paper" might be recast and undertook to do so. In due course, an agreed text of the "oral message" emerged and after approval by officials in Washington and Ottawa it was discussed by the Minister and Mr. Rusk at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in early June. Attached as Appendix 53 is the final text of the document on which Ronning would be basing his presentation in Hanoi. 

In signifying approval (at the official level) of the final draft, Bundy explained the USA desire to delete, from the text, any explicit reference to the Canadian channel by saying that if the dialogue continued, it would become important at some point for the Americans and the North Vietnamese to be able to communicate more quickly and directly than via trips by Canadian officials. He also noted that "visibility" could become a serious problem if the dialogue developed further: in other words the travels of Ronning could become an apparent indication of serious diplomatic activity. He thought that we might wish to consider making more use of the Commission as a channel in future since Moore could travel to and from Hanoi more inconspicuously.

In the course of our continuing discussions, the Americans also asked whether we would include in Ronning’s instruction an American request to deliver a message to the North Vietnamese Government about American prisoners being held in North Vietnam. This we agreed to do but on the understanding that Ronning would be given discretion to decide, in the light of circumstances attending his various discussions in Hanoi, on the precise context in which this presentation was to be made.

And then the Americans again did something very curious. In the context of their continuing talks with the Chinese in Warsaw, the American Ambassador on May 25 presented a statement of the American position with respect to terms for a mutual reduction of hostilities in Vietnam. This statement was cast in the following terms:

"We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination nor military alliances in Vietnam. There are many roads to a peaceful solution. We are willing at any time to engage in discussions or negotiations leading towards peace without condition.

Alternatively, we are willing to undertake a reciprocal damping-down of war. We will respond if others are prepared to reduce the use of force. Specifically, we are willing to suspend or even cease our air attacks on North Vietnam if Hanoi gives clear evidence that it is prepared to take reciprocal action, for example with respect to its infiltration of military personnel and equipment into South Vietnam and its military activity and terrorism in South Vietnam. Such evidence and suspension of the bombing could be determined by mutually acceptable observers." (Washington telegram 1564 of May 27).

This statement was apparently not regarded as sensitive and within a week its main aspects had been made known publicly.

In the context of planning the second Ronning mission to Hanoi, we found it difficult to understand why a message of this character should be conveyed to Hanoi through an intermediary which was assumed to be the most adamantly opposed to any form of accommodation in Vietnam. And then to make it public...

Most curious of all, however, was the fact that while the Americans had told us early in May that they did not wish themselves to propose or suggest the specific price tag to be attached to a cessation of the bombing, they had now done something which amounted to that in their message to the Chinese and moreover they had added a new element, namely, mutually acceptable observation.

We decided to interpret this situation in the following terms, should the North Vietnamese query Ronning on the relationship between the messages conveyed through the Chinese and the Canadian channels:

"In such an event would we be right in telling the North Vietnamese that the USA would be prepared to consider the cessation of the bombing of the North in circumstances where this would be a step towards peace, that the message conveyed through the Chinese outlined certain areas in which the North Vietnamese could make concessions that would be attractive to the USA and South Vietnam, but that the fundamental USA interest was still to elicit from Hanoi some indication of the areas in which they might be able to move towards reduction of the scale and scope of the hostilities."

In the absence of any contrary commentary from the Americans, we regarded this as an accurate interpretation of their intentions.

The general reaction from everyone on the network was one of dismay - and indeed apprehension: was it worth going through the exercise at all in these circumstances? From Saigon, Moore commented in starkly realistic terms by noting that the Americans seemed to be escalating what had begun as a serious diplomatic overture into an enormous "peace offensive" reminiscent of the campaign they had mounted during the long bombing pause in December and January.

"I remain convinced that such pressure will be counter-productive. Further, if these tactics raise doubts in even my mind about American sincerity they will surely convince the DRVN leaders of the correctness of their earlier suspicions. We can, therefore, expect them to withdraw into their corner and foolishly but doggedly and stubbornly continue the war. As for our "small bridge", there is undoubtedly value in our talking to the DRVN leaders if only for the sake of talking. However, it is open to question how many more times we shall be received in Hanoi if we come only as a mouthpiece to American propaganda. The state will soon be reached I fear when the sincerity of Canada will appear to Hanoi to be as questionable as that of the USA."

The Prime Minister commented on this telegram:

"We should take this message seriously. It would be a sad ending to our initiative in this matter if we became merely an instrument of USA propaganda or for putting the DRVN on the spot."

In all the circumstances, however, it seemed unlikely that it would be possible to get the Americans to add something new to the agreed "Canadian understanding" of the American position which would make Ronning’s presentation in Hanoi more attractive, authoritative, and meaningful than the version received through the Chinese, and we could only interpret the material we had in the best way possible. Attached as Appendix 54 are telegrams 450 of June 6 from Saigon and ourtel Y-405 of June 6 to Brussels (for the Minister and the Under-Secretary).

The Minister raised these questions with his USA counterpart and authorized the exercise to go forward as originally planned without seeking any major revisions. In conveying this decision to Ottawa by telegram, the Under-Secretary noted that "Mr. Martin considers that we should have no illusions as to possible success, but Mr. Rusk said this seems to be the only channel now available." The Ronning visit, he continued, should still provide the North Vietnamese with an opportunity to explain their reaction to the American proposals and to indicate if they have any alternative scheme for bringing the hostilities to an end.

Ronning’s instructions for his talks in Hanoi had emerged from a long and complicated series of discussions and reconsiderations in the light of fast-changing circumstances. The final version, however, is given in the text of the Minister’s telegram Y-425 of June 10 to Saigon, which appears as Appendix 55. After setting the stage in appropriate terms and establishing the essentially Canadian character of the visit, Ronning was authorized to present the "oral message" as agreed to earlier. (The reference to telegram Y-402 of June 3 to Brussels is to the text of this message that appears earlier as Appendix 53. Similarly, the reference to our telegram Y-114 of June 4 is to our attempt to reconcile the agreed Canadian “oral message” and the message the Americans had put to the Chinese in Warsaw. Then, if circumstances were such as to make this possible, "...we regard it as important that he (Ronning) should do everything he can to elicit some element of response from Pham Van Dong...". The instructions continued:

"Ronning might make the point that, if the cause of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem is to be advanced — as all who have the interests of Vietnamese people in mind profoundly hope that it can be - there will have to be a willingness on both sides to move beyond their present positions. As far as the Canadian Government is concerned, we would of course particularly welcome any move which would have a mitigating effect on the present scope and scale of hostilities and in this way provide a better climate for the discussion of substantive issues which will inevitably have to be embarked upon at some stage. We are satisfied that the USA Government is sincere in wishing to work towards a peaceful settlement and prepared to take meaningful steps which would further such an outcome. On the other hand, we would be less than frank if we failed to underline what we take to be the determination of the USA to persist in their present course of policy in the absence of some indication that the North Vietnamese were willing to meet them part way.

"We recognize that, in a situation in which considerable commitments of power and prestige are engaged on both sides, there is an inherent tendency for positions to remain frozen. It would be our hope, however, that if there were to be some beginning of movement this could be accomplished with minimum embarrassment to either party. If there was anything we could do to facilitate matters with this consideration in mind, we would be glad to take whatever action we could to that end."

The lengthy instruction concluded with a brief paragraph inserted at the Minister’s request:

"It is important that in any event Ronning should do everything to keep open the contact regardless of the result."

It was agreed that any Commission cover story could be dispensed with this time, and that a more straightforward public explanation would be suitable: in line with the Canadian Government's position as favoring a peaceful and honorable accommodation of interests of those involved in the Vietnam conflict, we had been concerned with exploring the views and attitudes of all the parties, and Ronning’s visit to Hanoi should be seen in that light. If more specific questions were raised we proposed to deal with them in the following terms:

1. “The initiative for Ronning’s second visit comes from Ottawa and not from Hanoi although the latter has obviously agreed to receive him.
2. "Ronning’s brief for his discussions in Hanoi of the Vietnam problem as a whole is a Canadian brief. We are aware of USA thinking on the Vietnam problem and we shall be taking soundings of opinion in other interested capitals. This second visit to Hanoi is part of a continuing process. In addition, it will provide an opportunity to give and obtain clarification of certain specific matters of mutual interest.
3. “If specific questions arise as to the relationship between the Ronning mission and the much publicized Warsaw exchanges, you could say that we are of course aware of recent USA diplomatic activities such as the discussions in Warsaw with Chinese representatives. These and other factors have been taken fully into account in planning for Ronning’s visit."

Although the Commission initiative idea, as a practical possibility in any of its conceivable forms, was pretty far from our thoughts at that time, we still wished to keep channels open to the Indians and Poles. Accordingly, the Minister sent the following explanatory message to his Indian and Polish counterparts on June 10 just a few days before Ronning’s arrival in Saigon.

"As you are aware from our earlier exchanges of views, the Canadian Government attaches the highest priority to a peaceful and honorable accommodation of interests between those concerned in the current Vietnam conflict. In line with this objective we have been concerned to explore the views and attitudes of interested parties, and generally, to do what we can to help bring this dangerous situation to a peaceful conclusion. I know that your Government shares the sense of importance we attach to this problem. Accordingly, I thought you should know that I have asked Mr. Chester Ronning to visit Vietnam again in the very near future for discussions in Saigon and Hanoi. Mr. Ronning will be arriving in Saigon on June 12, and he will be visiting Hanoi from June 14 to 18 for discussions with Vietnamese leaders. I am hopeful that this visit, which is being carried out on the initiative of the Canadian Government, may help to clarify some of the difficult issues which continue to stand in the way of a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam."

At about the same time, it was agreed that when in Hong Kong Ronning should attempt to renew contact with the Chinese with a view to determining whether the Chinese Foreign Minister would be prepared to receive him after his proposed visit to Hanoi. This effort was made, but the Chinese again declined.

By now, however, the possibility of a visit to China was secondary: our main preoccupation was with American intentions in Vietnam. Following a conversation with Bundy on June 10 in Washington to Ambassador reported that Bundy had expressed the very strong hope that Ronning’s would be authorized to convey to Sullivan (US Ambassador in Vientiane) at least a general impression of the flavor of the conversations in Hanoi, for example, whether the North Vietnamese attitude was negative or "teasing" or whether it contained affirmative elements.

"Stressing the seriousness and urgency of his request, Bundy said that the USA had received indications from a number of sources (including comments by Moore to Lodge) implying that bombing was perhaps now beginning to have a severe effect on the DRVN. The USA was currently giving consideration to 'playing about with the pace of its actions' in the light of these indications. Bundy did not elaborate, but he seemed to be hinting fairly directly that some kind of early change in the pattern or intensity of bombing is currently under study." (Washington telegram 1725 of June 10.)

(Moore’s comments to Lodge had been more balanced than Bundy suggested: he had observed that even though the bombing was undoubtedly hurting the North, there were no signs that it was reducing their determination to resist.)

This sounded ominous indeed, and while we did not know for certain what it meant, there was enough speculation at the time about the possibility of bombing oil storage dumps in Hanoi and Haiphong to give rise to considerable apprehensiveness and to reinforce the doubts we had been entertaining for some time about the usefulness of this mission. But as was the case with similar operations in the past, we seemed to have little choice but to carry matters forward. We knew that there was a strong possibility that the mission would fail and that failure itself could have embarrassing consequences. We were, however, also aware of the possibility, no matter how small, that there might just be an element of success - and as in the past, this suggested that the risks were worth running.

Ronning arrived in Saigon on June 13. He had been authorized to make contact with the South Vietnamese Government as well as commission and Some other representatives. In the end, he saw no South Vietnamese and departed for Hanoi on June 14 accompanied by Moore. The visit to the North Vietnamese capital lasted until June 18. Moore reported subsequently that the airport reception indicated that expectations were high in Hanoi and suggested that they expected something of substance to emerge from the Ronning mission.

In the course of his stay in Hanoi, Ronning saw Ha Van Lau, Chief of the Liaison Mission; Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his capacity as Vice-Prime Minister in the absence from Hanoi of Pham Van Dong. The overall atmosphere was cordial, although Trinh was unusually critical of Canadian policy in general: moreover, the level at which Ronning was received was one notch lower than it had been on the previous visit. Most importantly, the line taken by the North Vietnamese in discussion was perceptibly harder in all respects. They seemed to be making a deliberate effort to convince Ronning that they were reconciled to a continuation of the war and to the intensified bombing of North Vietnam if it was necessary to accept such a fate.

Ronning presented the USA position in the terms of the agreed text of the "oral message". The North Vietnamese, in turn, reiterated their willingness to open talks with the USA on the basis of their original proposition, that is, a unilateral USA undertaking to stop the bombing of North Vietnam permanently and unconditionally. They were unwilling to entertain any thought of reciprocity for a cessation of the bombing. The general approach of the USA Government as presented by Ronning was equated by the North Vietnamese with the formula mentioned in Warsaw; the latter was already known to the North Vietnamese from public sources, and they expressed the view in strong terms that the approach was unacceptable to them.

Notwithstanding the fact that no progress appeared to be possible on the basis of this particular proposition, the North Vietnamese indicated, in response to Ronning’s questioning, that they would not wish the Canadian channel to be closed, and Ronning was specifically told that they would not be opposed to its further use, even though Canadian policy was not to Hanoi’s liking.

Attached as Appendix 56 are telegrams 523 of June 18 (Ronning’s own brief report), 528 of June 18, and 527 of June 19 reporting in full on Ronning’s discussions in Hanoi.

As the Americans had requested, Ronning raised the prisoners issue in discussion with Vice-Foreign Minister Thach. Attached as Appendix 57 is a copy of Saigon telegram 526 of June 18 reporting on this aspect of Ronning’s assignment.

The question of whether or not Ronning should give a full briefing to American representatives in the field - more specifically in Vientiane - on his way back to Ottawa continued to receive active consideration. On June 16, the Minister sent a telegram in the following terms to Vientiane for Ronning on his arrival on the courier flight from Hanoi:

"This is to confirm previous indications given to you of my attitude towards "briefing" USA representatives in the field. I am strongly convinced that your reporting should be to the Canadian Government in the first instance, and that what we say to the USA should be based on a careful analysis and interpretation of your impressions. However, I appreciate the USA concern to be given the earliest possible indication of the "general flavor" of your discussions in Hanoi to the extent and only to the extent that this may have "an immediate bearing" on matters raised with Ritchie by Bundy. I am prepared to authorize you to do this on the basis of the absolute minimum required to meet USA concerns and purely in terms of "general flavor". I believe that, if this needs to be done, it should be done in Vientiane to the USA Charge d’Affaires only and not to the USA Ambassador in Bangkok. You are, of course, free to discuss with the USA Charge d’Affaires anything relating to your Subsidiary presentation on USA prisoners, which is a presentation we made on behalf of the USA, and which was made in parallel with a similar presentation in Vientiane in which the Charge d’Affaires has been personally involved."

As matters worked out, only the barest minimum contact was made with the Americans at Vientiane airport, and the information made available to them was confined to the results of the démarche on prisoners.

Among those waiting at Vientiane airport to greet Ronning was his son-in-law, Seymour Topping of the New York Times who was at that time posted in Hong Kong. Four days later the Times carried an article datelined Hong Kong giving an account of the results - or rather the lack of results - of the Ronning mission. It was a curious way of doing things, if indeed it had been consciously thought out, but at least it allowed time for Ronning to return to Canada and Moore to report fully from Saigon on the Hanoi discussions before anything of substance was made available to the USA Government or indeed to the press. The interest of the State Department in this matter is suggested by the fact that Rusk himself telephoned the Minister on the morning of June 18, alleging that no contact had been made in Vientiane!