Seaborn Fifth Mission

The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of pages 34-44.

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The first major bombing pause took place in May; from May 12 to 18 all attacks on North Vietnamese targets were suspended. This, together with the USA offer to negotiate unconditionally as well as the publication of the North Vietnamese Four Points, seemed to indicate to us the desirability of early contact with the North Vietnamese authorities and with this in mind we began giving urgent consideration to another visit by Seaborn to Hanoi.

Our discussions with the Americans, prior to dispatching Seaborn on his fifth mission on May 31, again gave rise to very mixed feelings on our part, even though the American position this time was not as devoid of substance as it had been on the two preceding occasions. On the one hand, some interesting features emerged from our pre-visit discussions in Washington. The principal positive element was a reference to “a solution by reciprocal actions on each side”. This was explained by Bundy as something relatively new and it was intended to convey the thought that “if Hanoi tapered off its activities in the South, the USA could likewise change its tempo.” In its totality, however, the Aide Memoire presented as a basis for Seaborn’s talks in Hanoi was not in our view as forthcoming as the circumstances seemed to require. It all seemed a bit limp and passive. With regard to the Four Points, the Americans asked Seaborn not to initiate any probing questions; only if this matter were raised with him was he to state that he had no specific message about these points but that he should go on to say that his own study of them would indicate that some would be acceptable to the USA and some not. (The text of the USA Aide Memoire as a basis for Seaborn’s presentation is given in Washington telegram 1739 of May 28 and the explanatory comments by Bundy in telegram 1744 of May 28, appearing as Appendix 23.)

Taken together and even including the positive elements, the package was not overwhelmingly attractive in Ottawa. In our view, the circumstances demanded a rather more interested-looking and vigorous diplomatic stance. More than that, the total situation was such that it was no longer possible for the Canadian Government to function simply as a passive transmitter of USA messages; we had come to have our own political interests in the Vietnam situation. Could any Canadian Minister have told the House of Commons or the press that he had sent a Canadian representative to Hanoi without specific and urgent instructions to seek clarification at the highest level of the North Vietnamese Four Points? With these thoughts in mind, our initial instructions to Seaborn (Ottawa telegram G-154 of May 128, attached as Appendix 24) said that on arrival in Hanoi he should seek an appointment with the Prime Minister or the new Foreign Minister and that he should emphasize that his instructions to do so reflected the Canadian Government’s interest in the situation.

“If you are given interview with either of these two you should begin by expressing the Canadian Government's concern with the situation in Vietnam, our interest in seeing whether negotiations can be usefully stimulated and undertaken, and willingness to play a helpful role. As a manifestation of our willingness to be helpful, you have conveyed messages in the past and the USA Government now has asked that further comments be conveyed, beyond what has been presented in the points made in paragraphs 1-5 of the proposed message outlined in Washington reftel. Your presentation would conclude with a request for a clarification of the status of Pham Van Dong’s Four Points of April 8 expressing the comment that on the basis of its close contacts and continuing discussions with the USA Government, the Canadian Government believes that some aspects of Pham Van Dong’s thinking might be acceptable to the USA Government but that other features would clearly be unacceptable. The remainder of your presentation of this matter would then follow the outline given in paragraph 6 (of the USA draft) but as a Canadian Government interpretation rather than your own."

The interested USA authorities were unhappy with our proposed changes and made it quite clear that they considered that the presentation we had in mind would go well beyond what they had envisaged, emphasizing that they had given careful thought to the preparation of this material in light of Seaborn’s earlier reports. Recalling our original undertaking to transmit faithfully without ourselves necessarily agreeing or disagreeing, we acceded to their wishes - but with individual reservations rather stronger than the reluctance we acknowledge officially and textually:

“We consider that in using the Bacon channel so ultra-cautiously, there is a danger that its usefulness will be completely destroyed, if it has not been destroyed already. After a series of approaches which were in effect merely enquiries whether the other side had anything to say, you were authorized to convey a message which simply repeated a message already passed to the DRVN through other channels. It seemed to us that if any credibility was to remain, something more active would have to be done this time. This we sought to achieve by using the Canadian aspect of the approach more openly, as befitted our own more active approach toward negotiations. In light of your advice and the agreed view between Johnson (Deputy Ambassador in Saigon) and Washington, however, we are reluctantly prepared to acquiesce in the more timid approach the Americans appear to wish on this occasion. You may accordingly proceed as in Washington telegram 1939 May 28.” (Our telegram Y-118 of May 30 to Saigon.)

As an indication of the skepticism prevailing in Ottawa about the Seaborn mission, it is interesting to note that the Prime Minister, doubtless recalling the non-substantive nature of the March mission, commented as follows on Seaborn’s latest assignment: “I’ll wager one piastre that no one in Hanoi will talk to him.”

The Prime Minister’s prediction proved wrong. Seaborn saw Ha Van Lau on June 1 and was given an interview by the new Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, on June 3. With considerable skill, Seaborn managed to maximize the Canadian aspect of his presentation as a lead-in to the presentation of the USA message he had been requested to deliver. The interview produced no clarification of the status of the Four Points and more specifically, threw no light on the crucial question of whether they were seen as a set of preconditions to negotiations or as the characteristics of a final negotiated settlement. “Throughout the interview, the Foreign Minister showed little inclination to enter into substantive dialogue and even less interest in hearing the USA message.” Seaborn concluded - and noted that his conclusion was shared by all the foreign representatives in Hanoi with whom he had spoken - that the North Vietnamese Government was not interested in talking to the USA at that time, nor was it prepared to clarify the Four Points.

“I can find no indication of any desire to pick up several opportunities given by President Johnson and others to talk rather than go on fighting. The leadership gives every sign of being confident in its stand, perhaps even more confident than during my visit just after the air strikes began and determined not to be dissuaded from its present course almost regardless of the duration of the war or of the damages and hardships to which they may be subjected.” (Saigon telegram 462 of June 4 outlining Seaborn’s report is given as Appendix 25.)

In the House of Commons on June 7, the Minister was questioned by Mr. Diefenbaker about the possibility of the Canadian Government taking steps to reconvene the Geneva Conference. No such steps had of course been taken since we knew perfectly well from the soundings that had been going on almost continuously since February that such a proposition stood no chance of being accepted. Rather than giving a negative statement to the House in reply, the Minister decided that he was going to have to say something about Seaborn’s activities as an indication that Canada had not been totally passive.

"I may say that on May 31, the representative of Canada on the International Supervisory Commission was authorized to proceed to Hanoi and made contact there with the Foreign Minister of the Government of North Vietnam, in order to indicate the concern which the people of Canada feel with regard to developments in Indochina.”

“He wanted to ascertain as well, as a spokesman for the Canadian Government, the reaction of the North Vietnamese Government to the interruption that occurred a few days ago in the bombing by the forces under the command of the United States. The Foreign Minister of North Vietnam indicated that there were four conditions which stood in the way of negotiations which had been urged on the North by the President of the United States, and which had previously been given support by other countries, including Canada.”

“I regret to say that the reaction of the North, of Communist China and of other interested countries is such at the moment that these overtures for peace discussions have not won their support. We shall continue to resort to every method known to us to try and gather support for our objectives.”

“The Government of the United States has said it is prepared to attend a conference on Cambodia without relating that conference to any other question but the dispute on borders between Vietnam and Cambodia. I would hope that this position may yet encourage all concerned to have a conference on Cambodia with, I would think, quite possibly useful results.”

On the same day, our Ambassador in Washington gave Bundy a copy of Seaborn's telegram reporting on his conversations in Hanoi. (Attached as Appendix 26 is Washington telegram 1863 of June 7). Two aspects of the Ritchie/Bundy conversation deserve comment:

(A) This was the fullest and, to the best of my knowledge, the only real account that we ever had from the Americans of diplomatic activities during the May bombing pause. Bundy had mentioned it briefly on May 28 but without elaboration. (See Washington telegram 1744 of May 28, para 5.)

(B) Bundy's reference to the possibility of public disclosure of the fact that a Canadian representative had been taking diplomatic soundings in Hanoi recently, and that the replies to his queries had been evasive. Bundy wondered whether it might not be necessary to brief a few Senators confidentially. “Our conversation on this point concluded with his confirmation that the USA would say nothing publicly about the Canadian role and that if there were any changes in this position, he would let me know. I think however we cannot exclude the possibility that if further French-inspired leaks develop, the USA administration may tell us of a desire to talk quietly to one or two Senators the general tenor of Seaborn's findings in Hanoi.”

We are apprehensive about the prospects (substantive, in terms of Seaborn's role, and political, in terms of our relations with the Americans) this raised and authorized the Ambassador in Washington to reaffirm, as an official view, the personal reactions he had conveyed to Bundy: the less information made public the better. Attached as Appendix 27 is our telegram Y-442 to Washington.

Whether Bundy had an ulterior motive in raising with us the possibility of disclosure, we do not know; nor do we know whether his comments were intended to be an advance tip-off. At all events, we were not “consulted” again on the matter. Three days later, on June 10, the Minister made several references to Seaborn's missions to Hanoi as a Canadian activity in a statement to the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons. The Americans may have have felt that this constituted its own form of green light. Without further references to us, the following week the secrecy which had invested Seaborn’s mission from the beginning and his “cover” came close to being blown when President Johnson in a press conference in Washington on June 17, paraphrased parts of Seaborn’s reports of his June 3 discussion with the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam. Worse still, he indicated that he had received the report directly from a foreign diplomat acting as his representative. Speculation continued but the special nature of Seaborn’s mission was never publicly acknowledged.

What the North Vietnamese thought about all this is a question to which we will probably never know the answer. If they had not already done so, it is a reasonable speculation that they might have come to the conclusion that the Bacon channel was not as reliable as it had been in the beginning – through no personal fault of Seaborn's – nor were its purposes the same.

The simple truth of the matter was that the operation was becoming mixed up with a lot of other factors and considerations which had developed since it was mounted, and this was making a straight and confidential presentation of views almost impossible.

It was partly a matter of the political pressures generated virtually everywhere by a public opinion that was becoming more and more aroused and hostile towards American actions in Vietnam. And it was partly a matter of the diplomatic activity of others, specifically the French, as discussed by Bundy with Ritchie in their conversation of June 7. It was the French “revelations” about diplomatic activity in Paris at the same time of the bombing pause more than anything else that seems to have contributed to the President’s public statement about Seaborn’s role and the press speculation that followed. The French were putting about the story that “something interesting” had happened; whereas Seaborn had reported intransigence in Hanoi. 

This was the first time – there was to be a second – that evidence of a disparity of views between Seaborn and others was to be revealed in the public debate on USA policy in Vietnam, with Seaborn’s reports being adduced as proof that Hanoi was not interested in negotiation. The facts available to us were not extensive. 

Towards the end of May our Embassy in Paris had reported on a conversation they had at the Quai on May 26. Translated and paraphrased the report was as follows:

“The only new fact that he (Brethes) believed might interest us was that the Head of the North Vietnamese delegation in paris, having called on the Quai last week to explain the reasons why Hanoi had rejected the Indian proposal, had taken advantage of this occasion to underline that the Four Poitns in the Pham Van Dong declaration were not preconditions but constituted the principles of a negotiation … Brethes was under no illusion about what might come of this North Vietnamese demarche given the fact that the proposals of Pham Van Dong were unacceptable to the USA.’

 

In retrospect it is fascinating that this was reported in such a low key and that the whole interview had begun with Brethes saying that he had "pas grand chose” to say on the subject of the Vietnam situation: so low key in fact that the telegram was referred to Saigon only by bag and Seaborn would not therefore have seen it before his trip to Hanoi. Seaborn would have had only the account given by Bundy to Ritchie on May 28 as follows:

"According to the French Foreign Ministry, Mai Van Bo (the NVN representative in Paris)’ told the French on May 18 that if NVN’s Four Point proposals were accepted as a basis it would be impossible to find ways and means of applying the proposals in a "peaceful" fashion. He reportedly added that the possibilities of this approach "were many”. French officials said they were convinced that Bo had had instructions to make the approach as a matter of urgency during the pause. Bundy said the NVN approach proved to be a reiteration of previous NVN position. It was made to the French the same day as the pause ended.”

That was all we knew of the so-called "Paris response” by North Vietnam to the bombing pause until our Ambassador in Washington on June 7 discussed with Bundy the results of Seaborn’s discussions in Hanoi. Although the full text of Washington telegram 1863 of June 7 is included as Appendix 27A, the report of Bundy’s comments is worth quoting here in extenso:

"He ... expressed regret that the USA authorities in their prepared brief for Seaborn had not felt able to provide a completely frank account of their dealings with the DRVN until I raised the subject in the manner described in the previous paragraph. He said the USA had of course made no mention of the Canadian channel to the French. The reason for the initial USA reserve with us had been that they wished to see whether a new channel was in fact about to open up at the initiative of the DRVN.

"Bundy then recapitulated the DRVN approach to the French as follows: On May 20 (two days after the bombing had resumed following the pause) the French (Lucet) informed the USA that on the morning of May 18, Bo, the DRVN representative in Paris, sought an interview with them, obviously on instructions. (Although the bombing had started again on the night of May 17-18, Bo may not have known this, and his instructions were undoubtedly sent during the pause). The first part of Bo’s communication was to convey in familiar terms the DRVN objections to the Indian proposal for an Afro-Asian force. The second part consisted of a reiteration of Pham Van Dong’s Four Points but whereas most DRVN public statements had indicated that these points were the essential or the only basis for a settlement Bo was quoted by the French as saying merely that these points were the "best" basis for a settlement. (Bundy termed this a "shading of wording"). Bo then reportedly went on to say that if there were agreement on these bases of negotiation, ways and means could be found in a peaceful manner. When the French asked whether USA withdrawal could be dependent on the conclusion of a negotiation (i.e. whether USA withdrawal under Hanoi’s point 1 could come last instead of first) Bo answered affirmatively, and in response to a further question said that his answer was based on instructions. Bundy pointed out that it could be argued that this represented a step forward on the part of the DRVN, so that it was of particular interest that the DRVN Foreign Minister had waffled on the same point in talking to Seaborn (paragraph 3 reftel).

The French did not attempt to draw out Bo further on the question as to whether an acceptance or recognition of four points by the USA was a firm DRVN condition for negotiations. Here again the evasive reply received by Seaborn was of interest. Bundy said the USA did not return any reply through the French in part because USA officials were not confident that the French could be counted on to present the American viewpoint with precision or impartiality."

When this telegram was shown to the Prime Minister Mr. Pearson sent a handwritten note to Mr. Martin, reading as follows:

"This is an unsatisfactory business.

(1) The USA should have told us of the French exchange before we sent Seaborn to Hanoi.

(2) The French told us nothing yet they expected us to give them an account of Seaborn’s visit.

If there is to be any exchange with Paris on these matters it is to be reciprocal. We can be proud too."

Quite apart from the lack of serious substance in the Bacon exercise, the whole business was becoming too complicated and too subject to press speculation - even before President Johnson’s ’’revelations’’ of June 17 - following Mr. Martin’s comments in the House and in the Standing Committee. In a telegram from Saigon on June 10 Seaborn recommended that we should "discourage USA from using the Canadian channel again". The attitudes he had encountered in Hanoi led him to the conclusion that not only was the channel not producing significant results but it seemed only to be "exacerbating DRVN antagonism to USA and annoyance with Canada". He also noted that repeated demands to pass messages might give the DRVN the erroneous idea that the USA was looking for a way out. "In any event the publicity given to my recent trip to Hanoi both in Ottawa and in Washington even though it does not specifically refer to the role of intermediary may well have ‘blown’ or at least compromised this channel. DRVN authorities also have some reason based on Western press reports to consider the channel unreliable. My telegrams 462 of June 4 and 472 of June 7 emphasized that the Foreign Minister had not removed ambiguities in the Four Points of April 8 whereas press reports have interpreted Ottawa and Washington statements to mean that the Four Points and particularly the one re withdrawal of USA troops are definitely preconditions to any discussions. These reports have caused me some embarrassment with friendly local diplomats to whom I gave a full report of my conversations ... and will certainly have lowered my stock with the DRVN.”

On a memorandum recommending the desirability of allowing public interest in Seaborn’s special assignment to lapse for a time the Prime Minister commented: "I entirely agree with this". We had explained that we continued to be concerned not only about Seaborn’s position and usefulness but about his own personal safety vis-a-vis conceivably hostile elements in the Government in Saigon.

In a memorandum dated June 11 for the Minister and for his onward transmission to the Prime Minister we commented on the points raised earlier by the Prime Minister in connection with French involvement. This memorandum is attached as Appendix 28. Of particular interest as a reflection of our reactions at the time is paragraph 2 which, for ready reference, reads as follows:

"The French told us nothing yet they expect us to give them an account of Seaborn's visit. If there is to be an exchange with Paris on these matters it is to be reciprocal...’. Although most of our detailed knowledge of what transpired in Paris between the Quai d’Orsay and the North Vietnamese representative has come from Washington the French were not entirely silent on the subject and on May 28 our Embassy in Paris reported on an earlier conversation with the Quai d'Orsay in which some mention is made of these discussions. I am attaching for your information a copy of telegram 1038 of May 28 from Paris in which the first paragraph is relevant. Although the North Vietnamese approach was mentioned I would agree that it was not presented in a very forthcoming manner, nor in a way which would indicate the French assessment of its significance."

Then came President Johnson’s comments to the press on June 17 in which he drew a piece of paper from his pocket and quoted from Seaborn's latest reports to prove that inflexibility characterized the North Vietnamese Government’s position and that Hanoi was not interested in negotiations of any kind. (Extracts from this press conference appear as Appendix 29.)

Subsequently the press carried reports with headlines such as "LBJ's man in Vietnam Really a Top Canadian".