Seaborn Fourth Mission
The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of pages 29-34.
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In tabling the Commission’s Special Message, including the Canadian minority statement, in the House of Commons on March 8, the Minister made an extensive series of comments on the Vietnam situation in which he elaborated on the theme of the minority statement. The following extracts from Mr. Martin’s remarks at that time provide a useful summary of Canadian policy:
"... As both the Prime Minister and I have made clear on several occasions, the factor which underlies the grave situation in that country is the determined and long-standing attempt of the Hanoi regime to bring South Vietnam under its control through the pursuit of aggressive policies.... Our independent observer position in Vietnam has brought us face to face with an insidious form of aggression, with which the Free World has yet to devise adequate means of dealing. We have seen a new political entity emerge from colonial status only to be forced into a cruel struggle for survival against hostile pressures beyond its control. In whatever form aggression manifests itself, it must be recognized as such and it must be stopped, not least because we cannot afford to let the practitioners of this technique come to the conclusion that it pays dividends."
"This is surely the basic issue at stake in Vietnam today, and it is of vital interest to all members of the international community. This is what we, by virtue of our membership on the International Commission, have established as the lesson of the past ten years. I think it is important for all of us to have this fact clear in our minds before we go on to the next and most vital task, which is to attempt to restore peace to that troubled area. And here I must stress that I do not believe that the answer which all concerned would accept lies either in escalation and all-out war or, on the other hand, surrender to Communist pressures."
"... The Canadian Government, for one, intends to continue using all means at its disposal to see if the prerequisites for negotiations exist and, where possible, to help create those conditions. If negotiations can be arranged (let me repeat, it is our hope that conditions conducive to such negotiations will be encouraged by all possible means), our extended experience in the field of Indochina will help us to be of assistance in making concrete and practical proposals as to how the Geneva or any alternative machinery could be developed to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement."
Such was the "shape" of Canadian thinking at the time of Seaborn’s fourth special mission to Hanoi.
This was perhaps the least satisfactory of all Seaborn’s missions. Towards the end of February, Seaborn reported that a convenient opportunity would be available to him the following week - a Commission visit to the North - to speak to the Hanoi leaders without attracting too much attention. In the circumstances of late February, we took the initiative this time in raising the possibility of a message with the Americans. In light of developments of the preceding weeks, we thought it important to do anything we could to facilitate contacts, although once again we had reservations about the possibility of being asked to make another non-substantive presentation.
These fears proved well-founded. When it was received, the American suggestions amounted to a request that Seaborn re-present a recent American presentation to the Chinese in Warsaw. We came close to declining to act. On the other hand, in circumstances in which we accepted among ourselves at least the possibility that we might not know everything that was going on, it was difficult to refuse to cooperate in something that might have been even minimally helpful. In the Minister’s absence, the Prime Minister’s reaction and authorization had to be obtained. He was not enthusiastic at something so non-substantive and was worried about the effect it might have on further downgrading the whole exercise and Seaborn’s role as an interlocuteur valable. Nevertheless, he felt that we could not refuse flatly, although he insisted on Seaborn being given ultimate discretion, in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time, to decide whether or not to proceed. He also drew attention to the need for Seaborn to parallel the Warsaw presentation very closely since "any material departure from the Cabot (USA Ambassador to Poland) text may widen the gap between your presentation and the possibly harsher version conveyed by the Chinese and cause misunderstanding and uncertainty which would impair the usefulness of your interview".
The USA request and suggestions are outlined in Washington telegram 642 of February 27 (Appendix 20); our instructions to Seaborn are given in Ottawa telegram Y-108 of February 27 to Saigon (Appendix 21).
Seaborn arrived in Hanoi on March 1. Although an appointment with the Prime Minister was sought, Seaborn was not received by Pham Van Dong. Instead, his presentation was made to Col. Ha Van Lau, whose personal opinion was that "it contained nothing new". He promised however to report to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. The text of the presentation and Seaborn’s report - Saigon telegram 203 of March 5 - are given as Appendix 22.
In Hanoi, zero. In Washington, the belief that "two main purposes had been achieved inasmuch as the USA position in Warsaw had been made clear to the DRVN and the Bacon channel was kept open for any eventual communication". In Ottawa, severe disillusion not so much with the channel as such - where else was there another means of contacting senior North Vietnamese so easily and inconspicuously? - as with the use to which it was being put."
The mounting of operation “Flaming Dart” (retaliatory air strikes against targets in North Vietnam) by the USA in February and its replacement by operation “Rolling Thunder” (more generalized bombing) in March unleashed a maelstrom of public diplomatic activity around the world. The British Co-chairman approached his Soviet counterpart asking for cooperation in an initiative vis-à-vis other Geneva parties; the South Vietnam Liberation Front (Viet Cong) issued a five-point statement of its position; a group of 17 non-aligned nations conferred and issued an appeal calling for negotiations without preconditions; and the British Foreign Secretary sent a special emissary on a fact-finding mission to the capitals of Southeast Asia.
Canadian policy was based on understanding what the USA was trying to do in Southeast Asia, although there was a growing sense of uneasiness about the implications of the directions along which USA policy seemed to be evolving. In a speech in New York on March 5, Prime Minister Pearson spoke of the containment of aggression as an international responsibility.
“So the nations of the world must be ready to produce an alternative. Such an alternative could lie in the international community itself taking over the responsibility of sealing off frontiers against guerilla infiltration and massively and effectively - and I mean effectively - policing and enforcing international agreements that aim to check and control local hostilities. If the Geneva agreements of 1954 had provided for supervision and policing and enforcement in this way, infiltration of Laos and South Vietnam from outside could have been checked in time.”
In the House of Commons on April 6, he said that the Canadian Government 'had supported the policy of the United States in Vietnam and wished to be able to continue that support.' And again on April 26: 'It (the Canadian Government) supports the purposes and objectives of United States policy in Vietnam.’ As we understood them at the time, these objectives were to restore a state of stability and equilibrium in Vietnam without the North interfering in the South and without the South feeling that it required a significant American military presence to resist this interference, so that all the Vietnamese themselves could decide whether they wished to remain divided or to be re-united, and if the latter, under what aegis. Since the problem was basically political, we were convinced that somewhere along the line political contacts would have to be made and negotiations undertaken. The Americans thought that military pressure would encourage these results by demonstrating that the USA meant what it said in supporting an ally and in buttressing the unstable regimes in the South through which South Vietnam was groping towards an alternative form of government to the Diem regime.
The first public indication of Canadian skepticism about the techniques the USA was adopting - and even this indication was fairly mild - was contained in the Prime Minister’s speech of April 2 at Temple University in Philadelphia, when he said:
“After about two months of air strikes, the message should now have been received loud and clear. The authorities in Hanoi must know that the United States with its massive military power can mete out even greater punishment. They must also know that, for this reason, the cost of their continued aggression against South Vietnam could be incalculable... There are many factors in this situation which I am not in a position to weigh or even know. But there does appear to be at least the possibility in my view that the suspension of air strikes against North Vietnam at the right time might provide the Hanoi authorities with an opportunity, if they wished to take it, to inject some flexibility into their policy without appearing to do so as a direct result of military pressure.”
It was this speech, and its timing that so angered President Johnson: it would appear that, quite unknown to us, the Americans may in fact have been planning a bombing pause for the future; the idea of a pause or a respite in military activity was not original and it had featured prominently in the arguments of domestic protest groups in the USA. More than that, the President was to deliver a major Vietnam policy statement on April 7 in which he offered unconditional negotiations and proposed a greatly expanded programme of cooperative development assistance for the region.
This offer of unconditional negotiations, outlined in a speech in Baltimore, was the first major breakthrough, since up until that time the USA had not offered the prospect of negotiations, but rather the prospect of “rewards for observance of existing agreements.” The next day - and it will probably never be known whether this was directly related to President Johnson’s speech - the Prime Minister of North Vietnam publicly put forward a four-point proposal as a basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem. For a time, there appeared to be grounds for a certain amount of optimism; no one thought that either side was “giving in”, but at least there were signs of movement, and new positions which might be modifiable through negotiation were being put forward.