First Ronning Mission
The following text is drawn from the document "A Study of Canadian Policy with Respect to the Vietnam Problem, 1962-1966." The full text of the report can be accessed as a PDF in the introductory page of this exhibit. Each of the sections of this exhibit constitutes a section of the study -- this page is composed of pages 66-80.
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The conception of a special Commission role had originally made its appearance in the period preceding the long pause, and while these various trends of thought were being carried forward through rapidly changing circumstances, the "Special emissary" idea emerged from our internal discussions. Just as Seaborn had been sent to Hanoi in May/June of 1965 in part to ascertain North Vietnamese reactions to the mid-May bombing pause, so it might now be possible to send a special representative to Vietnam, under cover of Commission business or a "Commission initiative," to determine whether there had been any evolution in North Vietnamese attitudes. Initially, our discussions had been cast in terms of the possibility of a senior official taking on this assignment: he would be less conspicuous under a Commission "cover" than an outsider and if he were thoroughly steeped in the intricacies of the Vietnam problem from an Ottawa point of view, he might be more sharply attuned to the subtleties of the North Vietnamese position as this might be explained in discussion in Hanoi.
This line of thought did not commend itself totally to the Minister who envisaged operating with a rather different kind of (transcript illegible) and at a rather different level.
The Minister was convinced that (transcript illegible) continuing interest in the problems raised by China’s position in the international community, the road to peace in Vietnam lay through Peking. Thus, where officials had originally conceived a special mission to Vietnam alone, the Minister was thinking more in terms of an approach which would place a heavy concentration on China. That being the case, the logical choice for the assignment, in his view, was Chester Ronning whose knowledge of the language and some senior personalities in Peking constituted credentials which probably no other Canadian possessed; this was reinforced by the fact that Ronning had never taken up an open-ended invitation issued to him in general terms at the Geneva Conference on Laos by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi.
Towards the end of January, the Minister directed that Ronning be brought to Ottawa for discussions. In the course of these discussions, it became clear that the Minister wished to maximize the potential advantages of Ronning’s Chinese connections. In the beginning, he had not wished Ronning to visit Saigon at all and a visit to Hanoi would be subordinate to the Peking discussions which it was hoped Ronning would have; if, in the light of these discussions, it seemed that a visit to Hanoi might be useful, Ronning would go - otherwise possibly not. This preliminary trend of thought was modified early on in the discussions, but while the Minister soon envisaged Ronning visiting both Peking (to discuss a variety of subjects including Vietnam) and Hanoi, he continued to have strong reservations about including Saigon. Attached as Appendix 40 are copies of memoranda to the Minister and to the Prime Minister concerning the preliminary planning for the Ronning Mission. Appendix 41 is the text of our telegram Y-66 of January 27 to Saigon authorizing the new Commissioner, Victor Moore, to proceed to Hanoi as soon as possible to make his introductory calls in the North Vietnamese capital, and to take advantage of these calls to initiate arrangements for Ronning's visit to Hanoi.
"The Minister has decided that it would be useful at this stage of developments in the Vietnam crisis, to take soundings of Government opinion in Peking and Hanoi and to convey an expression of the Canadian Government’s views in these capitals. Chester Ronning has agreed to undertake this special assignment on behalf of the Government. Ronning will carry a diplomatic passport but the assignment will have the character of a "special visit" rather than the more formal designation of a "special mission".
It will be noted from the full text of the message that a decision regarding Saigon had not then been made, even though it was recognized that Ronning's actual path would have to take him through the South Vietnamese capital; equally noteworthy is the fact that the Commissioner was instructed to make it clear to the North Vietnamese Government that Ronning’s "special visit" was not to be regarded as a continuation of the Seaborn assignment.
Before any of these arrangements were finalized, we received on January 30 the text of President Ho Chi Minh’s letter of January 24 to Prime Minister Pearson. Although not very forthcoming in tone or content, it proved useful as a hook on which further action might be hung. In other circumstances, the letter might not have merited much attention: it was more interesting in terms of the timing of its appearance in relation to the long bombing pause than in indicating any new directions in Hanoi’s policies or outlook. From our point of view, however, the presentation of a reply would add a further good reason for a special visit to Hanoi - and indeed one which could be explained and defended in Saigon if need be. (Attached as Appendix 42 are the texts of Ho Chi Minh's letter of January 24 and the Prime Minister’s reply of February 28.)
In the early stages of the operation, it was considered that it would be desirable to protect the identity of Ronning against premature leaks in the event that telegrams or other material might be seen by persons other than the very few officials directly involved in the preliminary planning. Consequently, Ronning, and therefore the exercise as a whole, came to be known as "Smallbridge". (In the search for a suitable cover name, the Ottawa telephone directory was consulted and when opened at random at the letter "S", the name "Smallbridge" jumped out with symbolic attractiveness.) Part of the reason for this protective element in an operation regarded as highly sensitive reflected the fact that Ronning was fairly well-known in interested domestic and international circles as a retired senior Canadian diplomat possessing special qualifications with respect to Asia.
In agreeing to undertake the assignment, Ronning himself had certain reservations. He recognized that he was reasonably well-known, and in particular, that his personal views on China were not always appreciated by others, specifically Dean Rusk whom he had met some years ago. Ronning wondered whether Rusk would be prepared to trust fully a man whose views on China and Asia generally differed so markedly from his own. In addition to these considerations, but also related to the fact that he was reasonably well-known, Ronning expressed some concern about the possibility of his assignment eventually becoming part of the public debate in Canada through premature revelation or otherwise, thus vitiating all of the early precautions with which the operation was being surrounded.
After preliminary consultations in Ottawa, Ronning visited Washington and met Bundy and Harriman for discussions to enable him to form his own first-hand impression of American policy.
There was never any question of delivering an American "message". The Ronning operation was an entirely Canadian diplomatic effort, mounted on our own initiative and based on our own concerns; in all respects, it was intended as a probing operation without prior commitment on either side. To probe effectively in Hanoi, however, would require a comprehensive and up-to-date grasp of American thinking. It was in this spirit that discussions were held in Washington and in Ottawa.
Ronning’s "briefing" on American policy on Vietnam took the form of a general review with Bundy, the outlines of which are given in Washington telegrams 290 and 291 of January 28, attached as Appendix 43, and conversations with Harriman. Although Rusk welcomed the initiative as "constructive", Bundy asked us to bear in mind that "other developments" might take place at the time of the visit. As matters turned out, the bombing was resumed long before Ronning ever reached Hanoi.
The Chinese aspects of Ronning’s assignment, however, seemed to give the Americans more trouble and Rusk felt it necessary to write to the Minister, expressing his concerns on certain points. With regard to Vietnam, he emphasized the need to handle with care of the briefing material the Americans had made available to Ronning; this material was intended exclusively for Ronning’s background, and was not to be quoted as “the American position.” Rusk also expressed concern that Ronning’s trip seem to be shaping up in a more formal and official way than he had understood was planned originally and this could have wider implications especially for relations with China. Finally Rusk expressed concern over the possibility that Ronning when in Peking might discuss Chinese representation at the United Nations, and the question of Canada/China relations.
In reply the Minister reassured Rusk that his first concern was fully appreciated and understood and that with respect to the second, “there has never, of course, been any question of Ronning’s, being given any sort of formal accreditation as my special emissary”. With regard to bilateral relations between China and Canada, the Minister assured his American counterpart that he had “no intention that this particular subject should at this stage be the object of discussion let alone negotiation”; if the Chinese raised it in personal conversations with Ronning, this would be regarded as a listening operation. However, with respect to the question of Chinese representation at the UN, the Minister acknowledged a special Canadian interest in this matter:
“It is my hope that Ronning’s talks with Chinese leaders will provide an opportunity to probe Chen Yi’s conditions and will perhaps provide us with information which can help our own consultation and review of the situation. Again, in this area Ronning’s brief will be very much a listening brief and we will certainly wish to discuss with you whatever information he may be able to obtain.”
Attached as Appendix 44 is the text of the Rusk letter and the minister’s reply together with a related departmental memorandum.
What might have happened if the original Smallbridge operation had worked out as planned is an interesting historical speculation. In actual fact, the focus and impact of the project changed in mid-stream when the Chinese Government indicated that it would be "inopportune" for Ronning to visit Peking at the time. Ronning had left Ottawa early in February and was waiting in Hong Kong for the formal invitation from Chen Yi to materialize. On February 17, this reply was presented to the senior Canadian representative in Hong Kong;
"Vice-Premier Chen Yi was glad to receive Smallbridge’s (hereafter Ronning - ed.) letter and recalled with pleasure his meetings with Ronning in Geneva. At present, the Government of the USA is accelerating the expansion of its war of aggression against Vietnam and engineering a peace talks plot in many ways. Regrettably, the Canadian Government has taken a position in support of this policy of the USA Government. In these circumstances, it will be inopportune for Ronning to visit China now. However, Vice-Premier Chen Yi expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity of receiving Ronning in Peking at an appropriate time in the future."
The tone and substance of the Chinese reply came as a surprise and was a source of considerable disappointment to the Minister. Consideration was given to asking for a reconsideration of the visit and explaining that the Minister had been prepared for a rather wider exchange of views, in Ronning’s personal discussions in Peking, than Chen Yi had anticipated by singling out Vietnam in his negative reply. Our records do not indicate clearly whether such a follow-up message was ever actually presented to the Chinese at that time; one was drafted. At all events, the visit to China never took place.
Meanwhile, preparations for the Hanoi aspect of the project had been going forward. Moore visited the North Vietnamese capital in early February and was received by the Prime Minister on February 11. He reported Pham Van Dong as saying that the North Vietnamese Government "would receive Ronning happily although he (Pham Van Dong) doubted it would produce useful results. He welcomed Pearson’s goodwill and asked that his greetings be conveyed." (Saigon telegram 103 of February 11). A fuller account of Moore's conversation with the Prime Minister of North Vietnam but without mention of the Ronning visit is given in Saigon Telegram 107 of February 12, Appendix 45.
Subsequently, the North Vietnamese indicated that a suitable time for the visit would be between March 6 and March 19.
Although we had hoped to keep the visit informal, the North Vietnamese insisted on written notification. Accordingly, an Aide-Memoire was presented in Hanoi which described Ronning’s assignment as "a special visit on behalf of the Prime Minister of Canada to discuss personally with President Ho Chi Minh or Prime Minister Pham Van Dong the points made in the President’s letter of January 21 to Prime Minister Pearson, and in general the views of the DRVN Government with respect to the problems in Vietnam.
The Commissioner in Saigon, supported by officials in Ottawa, continued to press for the inclusion of Saigon in Ronning’s itinerary as something more than an airport at which to catch the Commission courier aircraft to Hanoi. In response to these urgings, the Minister on February 16 instructed Moore as follows:
"I am prepared to agree to minimum contacts with the SVN Government and with the Commission. These will be for the purpose of dispelling suspicions in Saigon and maintaining a cover for the visit. This is that Smallbridge will be reviewing problems in Vietnam at first hand with special emphasis on the current and a possible future role of the Commission in relation to these problems. You should inform Col. An officially of the proposed visit in those terms explaining that Smallbridge will be visiting Hanoi as part of the same assignment.
"You should tell Col. An that I would be grateful if the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister could receive Smallbridge to give him his current assessment of the Vietnam problem and his thinking with respect to a peaceful settlement, with particular emphasis on any role the Commission may be able to play in present and future circumstances.
I would prefer it if any other calls on South Vietnamese leaders could be avoided since I am concerned not to have unnecessary publicity focused on this exercise. For the same reason, you should do what you can to discourage any offers of official entertainment in Saigon.”
Shortly thereafter, the China phase of the operation collapsed. The emphasis of Operation Smallbridge was quickly transformed into an exclusively Vietnam undertaking - and it was in this connection that the concept of the Commission initiative, which had been our starting point, was again pushed into the foreground.
In a telegram dated February 22 to Moore, we commented:
"Events subsequent to the initiation of this operation have had the effect of changing its emphasis even though its essential purposes remain the same. The Chinese refusal to receive Smallbridge and the public attention that has been focused recently on Canadian exploration of the possibility of the Commission playing a useful role looking to negotiations have resulted in a situation whereby the "cover" and the substance of the Smallbridge exercise in Vietnam have moved closer together.
"The Minister’s agreement that discussions should be held with SVN authorities and with the Commission should minimize or eliminate the possibility of difficulties arising later.
"In the arrangements you will be making for the visit, you should be guided by our general desire to avoid any apparent disparity between the Saigon and Hanoi aspects of the visit."
Shortly thereafter, the Polish Foreign Minister’s reply was received to the Minister’s earlier message about a special Commission role, and the negative position taken by Rapacki confirmed our earlier suspicion that if the concept of a Commission role were to be kept alive until the Poles were prepared to cooperate, responsibility for doing so would clearly rest with Canada. In our preliminary planning for Ronning’s discussions in Hanoi, this aspect of the total situation had been minimized - although Commission business was the "cover" for the Saigon visit - because we felt that there might be complications in possible feedback from Hanoi to Warsaw if we were to develop these ideas too explicitly in our discussions with the North Vietnamese. Rapacki’s negative reply, however, made possible a greater degree of latitude for planning Ronning’s talks in Hanoi. In its final formulation, Ronning’s briefing encompassed three main elements: (a) The presentation of the Prime Minister’s reply to Ho Chi Minh’s letter; (b) An oral presentation of the Canadian Government’s view of a possible peace-seeking role for the Commission; (c) An attempt to obtain clarification from the North Vietnamese Government – in discussions as specific and detailed as possible – of the prospects for negotiations.
Of these three elements, clearly the third was the most important, although the other two had presentational and some substantive significance. Attached as Appendix 46 is the text of our telegram Y-205 of March 2, outlining the talking points Ronning was to use in seeking a clarification of the North Vietnamese position with respect to negotiations. It was, of course, understood, and Ronning was so informed, that in the final analysis, much would have to depend on his own discretion in deciding on the specific content of his presentation.
The North Vietnamese had indicated that they might wish to issue a "joint communique" at the conclusion of the Ronning visit; they had also made clear that they were not enthusiastic about a cover story involving Commission business, since from their point of view, they had agreed to receive Ronning as a "special visitor" representing the Canadian Government. We had general reservations about the desirability of highlighting a visit to Hanoi with any kind of special announcement, and we had more specific reservations about the possible implications this could have for the question of recognition. If the North Vietnamese insisted on issuing their own announcement, we took the position that it should specify that discussions had taken place with a "special representative of the Government of Canada, which is a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam. It should not state that agreement has been reached on any matters." (Attached as Appendix 47 is a copy of our telegram Y-212 of March 4.)
As guidance for dealing with questions, especially from the press since the story was beginning to break, we prepared the following outline:
"The Canadian Government is concerned about the course of developments in Vietnam. It has been particularly disappointed by the absence of any prospects of a peaceful settlement of the present conflict being reached. In recent weeks, it has been giving thought to the possibility which may be open to the International Commission to play some part in the present situation. The Commission is in a special position by virtue of its long association with the Vietnam problem and the access it has to all the parties to the conflict. We have had preliminary discussions about a possible Commission role with India and Poland, who are our partners on the Commission. To enable us to carry forward our thinking, we have also considered it useful to seek the views of the Governments of North and South Vietnam on the current situation and any role which the Commission may be able to play in creating conditions in which a peaceful settlement of the conflict may be possible. It was for this purpose that we asked Mr. Ronning to visit Saigon and Hanoi. In the course of his visit to Hanoi, Mr. Ronning is taking an opportunity to deliver the Prime Minister’s reply to Ho Chi Minh’s message of January 24."
Ronning arrived in Saigon on March 5 and during his stay in the South Vietnamese capital he had discussions with the Indian Chairman of the Commission, the Polish Commissioner, and senior South Vietnamese personalities. Attached as Appendix 48 are the texts of telegraphic reports of conversation with the Commission Chairman, the Polish Commissioner, the Chief of State, and the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam.
Two days later, on March 7, Ronning took off for Hanoi accompanied by Victor Moore, the Commissioner. They stayed in the North Vietnamese capital until March 11. Ronning was received by the Vice Foreign Minister, by the Foreign Minister, by Col. Ha Van Lau, Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission and, on the last day of the visit, by the Prime Minister. This final interview lasted for two hours. Attached as Appendix 49 are the texts of Saigon telegram 184 of March 11 giving Ronning’s own account of the interview and Saigon telegram 189 of March 14, giving Moore’s account based on his own almost verbatim notes.
All the discussions in Hanoi were marked by a repeated North Vietnamese emphasis on the necessary acceptance of their Four Points as the only basis on which a peaceful settlement could be built, and by an apparent uncompromising belief in the ultimate "victory" of their cause; their presentations were “completely hard-line”, and” bitter and almost abusive”.
The early part of the interview with Pham Van Dong revealed these same obdurate attitudes and seemed to suggest that there would be no deviation by the Prime Minister from the determined, confident, hard-line approach registered by the others in previous discussions. Towards the end of the interview, however, and under persistent questioning by Ronning about the conditions Hanoi would require to have met before entering into direct or indirect talks with the USA, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister gave the following indication: North Vietnamese willingness to enter into some form of preliminary contact hinged on a commitment by the USA to cease "bombing and all acts of war against North Vietnam" “unconditionally and for good”.
In reply to questioning, he made it clear that this condition was limited to North Vietnamese territory and did not encompass USA military activity in the South.
It was not clear whether the commitment envisaged by Pham Van Dong was to be given publicly or diplomatically (the translator used the term "declaration"). Furthermore, while Pham Van Dong conveyed the impression that Hanoi’s response to such a move by the USA would lead to negotiating contacts, he gave no clarification of whether he envisaged these as being direct or indirect. He said: "In fact, our position includes many aspects. In brief, we can say that informal talks and a cessation of attacks against North Vietnam go together."
Initially, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister undertook to record this position in an Aide Memoire - which did not materialize subsequently. He did intimate, however, that he was soliciting a USA response and a further exchange with the USA through Canadian channels. "For our part," Pham Van Dong said, "we will look into the attitude of the USA, and with all understanding."
It was agreed that what had been said to Ronning would be conveyed to the USA as a Canadian understanding of the North Vietnamese position and not as a result of any request by North Vietnam to do so. It was also understood that Canada was not volunteering to act as a mediator.
Emphasis was laid on the importance of absolute secrecy in any exchange that might develop from Ronning’s discussions. Earlier feelers had become public, and the North Vietnamese had been forced to issue denials.
On his return to Ottawa, Ronning reported his impression to the Minister, and intensive discussions ensued as to the interpretation to be put on the Pham Van Dong interview. It was decided that Ronning himself should give an account to the Americans, and to this end, he proceeded immediately to Washington. He took with him an agreed "piece of paper" summarizing the encounter in Hanoi, highlighting, of course, what he thought was the essence of the North Vietnamese proposition. Although the immediately preceding paragraphs are drawn from that account, the actual text of that "piece of paper" is attached as Appendix 50; a copy was made available to the Americans.
Ronning and the Ambassador received Bundy at the Residence in Washington on the evening of March 20, and Ronning presented a detailed account of his mission, concentrating on the proposition and the circumstances surrounding it. "Ronning stressed that he might be entirely wrong in concluding that the DRVN was separating the bombing issue from the Four Points, but this was undoubtedly the impression that Pham Van Dong sought to create. Ronning thought it was significant that the DRVN displayed a desire to keep the channel open." Bundy expressed great interest, and extensive notes were taken. "The nature of his questions confirmed that he fully understood the possible significance of what had been said to Ronning. He was particularly concerned to establish whether Pham Van Dong, in bringing up the question of the USA declaration on bombing, had stipulated any other consideration in this context such as de-escalation in the South, prior USA withdrawal, or the position of the VC in negotiations. Ronning replied in the negative..." "Bundy wondered if Pham Van Dong had specifically asked Ronning to return, to which Ronning said that the DRVN was merely anxious that the Canadian channel (rather than any one personality) should remain available.”
Bundy promised that Ronning’s account of his "findings" would be studied with deliberation and care. The Ambassador concluded: "Bundy himself remarked that the implications of Ronning’s talks constituted hard cards to play, and I should think that the USA authorities will want to give the whole problem very careful study before deciding on any reaction".
Attached as Appendix 51 is the text of Washington telegram 838 of March 21.
About two weeks later, during a call on Bundy, the Ambassador asked whether the USA had reached any conclusion about the significance of Ronning’s conversations in Hanoi. Bundy replied that Rusk had been informed of Ronning’s "report", and that the State Department was now preparing a message for the DRVN authorities which they hoped Moore would take with him on his next trip to the North. Bundy said that he thought that the American response should be phrased in such a way as to constitute a reply to Hanoi's "suggestion" only if a suggestion had in fact been intended. The idea, he said, was to "smoke it out a bit". It was unlikely, however, he concluded, that much flexibility would be found in Hanoi’s position in view of the situation in the South.
If the Americans envisaged the second encounter in the series as a "smoking out" operation, our preliminary thinking was that matters might best be carried forward by Moore, since there would apparently be little or nothing new to say, and the Commissioner could move into and out of Hanoi relatively inconspicuously. The Minister, however, insisted on Ronning carrying out the assignment, unless USA comments, if and when they came, were of an entirely routine nature. In any event, it was agreed that, whatever the American reaction, the North Vietnamese would infer that the second encounter did not have the same importance as the first round of discussions if Ronning were not the interlocutor.
Although we recognized that the political situation in South Vietnam was unsettling for the Americans, we were anxious to move ahead as promptly as possible with the dialogue with the North Vietnamese; if the proposition Ronning had brought back from Hanoi was intended as a serious "offer", we did not wish it to go by default, and we were not anxious to see Canadian efforts, or the so-called Canadian "channel" downgraded again by a demonstrable lack of interest.
The Minister became impatient. On his own initiative, he telephoned Bundy on April 22 and personally underlined the importance he attached to the channel and to giving the North Vietnamese some proof that what they had said to Ronning was being taken seriously. Bundy apologized for the fact that no response had been formulated to the "proposition" Ronning had brought back and hoped that something might be cleared in a few days.
By early May arrangements were put in hand — although nothing formal had been forthcoming from the Americans. On May 6, the Commissioner in Saigon was instructed to inform the authorities in Hanoi that "the Canadian Government would welcome an early opportunity for a further exchange of views with the Government of the DRVN in accordance with the Canadian Government’s understanding of the conversations which Mr. Ronning had with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in March. The Canadian Government hopes that the Government of the DRVN would find it possible to renew these conversations, and if so, Mr. Ronning would be prepared to visit Hanoi again at an early date".
The Government of North Vietnam subsequently indicated that a mid-June visit would be satisfactory.
We were encouraged by the North Vietnamese positive response, even though it was conveyed to us - in an Aide Memoire dated May 21 - in terms that were relatively hard and which reiterated the established public position of the North Vietnamese Government. It seemed fair to speculate, however, that the North Vietnamese could do nothing other than suggest that the second Ronning visit would be taking place at Canada’s initiative not North Vietnam’s, and that any exchanges would be carried out within the established framework of North Vietnamese policy. In short, this was yet another demonstration of Hanoi’s interesting ambivalence in their dealings with us: in style and public presentation they could be tough, even abusive, while substantively and in private there was a clear measure of confidence and even goodwill.
A copy of the text of the Aide Memoire is attached as Appendix 52. The reference to the Prime Minister’s 'proposal' concerns a speech delivered in Toronto on May 1 by Mr. Teillet on the Prime Minister’s behalf, advocating a cease-fire as part of a wider pattern of peace negotiations without prior conditions: what irked the North Vietnamese was that the Prime Minister had not condemned the bombing as a separate element in the situation.