31 August 1943, No. 112

August 31, 1943. Wilgress follows up on his dispatches No. 107 of August 23 and No. 108 of August 24 by trying to understand how the divergence between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets would impact the chances for future alliance. Wilgress was already concerned with a possible Soviet shift towards hostility. In particular, Wilgress and Archibald Clark Kerr contended that bilateral Anglo-American meetings were counterproductive. Wilgress argues that the Western allies had not paid enough attention to the Soviet point of view, and as a result, fostered a sense of growing mistrust. In essence, Wilgress calls for “prudent statesmanship” to rectify the tension between allied interpretations of Soviet attempts at control and Soviet insecurities regarding their losses in the war. Wilgress was not in favour of total appeasement, but conceded that some appeasement could be justified in order to bring the Soviets on the side of the Western allies. He puts onus on the Western allies to pay heed to basic political considerations in the interest of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Wilgress does admit that there is evidence that the Soviets saw it necessary to begin preparing for another major conflict after the war was over, ending the dispatch on a note of warning about what might lie ahead. Ultimately, Wilgress makes it clear already in 1943 that removing distrust between the Western allies and the Soviets is of the utmost priority as they looked ahead to the end of the war.