24 February 1962: “The Will and the Ability of the Alliance to Use Nuclear Weapons”

In February of 1962, General Norstad briefed the North Atlantic Council on the preliminary NATO Berlin contingency plans, which would “apply only when the implementation of Live Oak plans had failed.” According to Ignatieff’s description, these plans were intended not only as a contingency but to give political authorities greater flexibility in their considerations. These Berlin Contingency plans, or “BERCON,” were divided into air, ground, and sea action each with levels of escalation and “nuclear annexes.” Ignatieff describes the advantages and disadvantages, with the general advantage being “that the implementation of these plans would demonstrate the willingness of NATO to use significant force to counter Soviet Action” and the main disadvantage being “that all of the plans involved the risk of general war.”

Following Norstad’s presentation was a Council discussion where the issue of nuclear escalation was a major concern. When the Norwegian representative wondered if it was possible to use a nuclear weapon without a nuclear retaliation from the Soviets, Norstad said that he had simply been instructed to draft such plans and that the issue “was primarily political and not military.” Furthermore, it was necessary to include the nuclear option because “LIVE OAK plans envisaged action which was essentially defensive. BERCON plans on the other hand were meant to provide a demonstration of intent to go further.”