Exercise Longstep, 1952
On October 10th, 1952, Ottawa received a dispatch detailing the logistics for Exercise Longstep as NATO aimed to prevent a “recurrence of undesirable political repercussions” as had occurred during Operation Mainbrace [CDEX00043]. The dispatch highlighted that SACEUR would only conduct a press release with the Standing Group’s approval, which required all participating nations to flag any potential political implications. The note also provided general details about the Exercise: it would take place in the Mediterranean from November 3rd to November 13th of that year and would be a joint tactical training operation between air, land, and sea forces.
A few days later, Mr. Blockley replied to Mr. Wershof of the Defence Liaison Division that External Affairs had “no political comments” regarding the exercise but lamented the “shortness of time provided for consideration” [CDEX00046]. Mr. Wershof relayed this feedback to the NATO Under-Secretary, referring to the time constraint as “absurd." He went on to argue that the procedure implemented to vet political implications was unsatisfactory and was in need of considerable adjustments before it could be leveraged effectively [CDEX00048]. Along these lines an extract from a recorded conversation between NATO representatives on the political procedure revealed similar complaints across the Member States. Norwegian Rear Admiral Hostvedt added that the procedure should also provide the foreign affairs departments with sufficient information onLongstep in order to gauge potential political effects [CDEX00070]. Logistical provisions needed to be more specific: rather than “Mediterranean” it would be preferable to detail the territory, and instead of “air, land, and sea” make note of any potentially concerning weapons like atomic power.
An additional memo to the Under-Secretary further highlighted that Member States would have two opportunities to disclose political implications and propose amendments to the exercise. The first would be when the exercise is being deliberated in the Military Representative Committee (MRC) while the second opportunity would be after the exercise receives approval from the MRC. Mr. Wershof believed that such updates to the procedure for contemplating political implications was on the whole “reasonable” [CDEX00072]. Interestingly, in the discussion debating the procedure on political concerns between Member State governments and NATO, the focus was on political implications of “national” concern and did not deliberate on reputational harm to NATO as an independent entity.
As Exercise Longstep came to a close, Canada’s Permanent Representative to NATO, Mr. Arnold Heeney, who had the privilege of observing the exercise in full, gave an exuberant account of the operation to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The representatives were first ferried via the U.S Navy from Orly, France to Naples where they were greeted by Admiral Robert Carney, Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces in Southern Europe. They sat down to a series of briefings which Mr. Heeney regarded as “amongst the best” he ever heard, and he came away from the experience seeing Admiral Carney as an intelligent leader who had a firm grasp of “the political as well as military requirements of NATO." Mr. Heeney particularly appreciated that “international flavour” of Exercise Longstep. Despite most of the personnel involved being of American origin, he found that “every opportunity was taken” to expand the roles of contributing forces of Greece, Italy, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Under Admiral Carney, Mr. Heeney found a strong sense of “public responsibility for the success and reputation of NATO” in Southern Europe [CDEX00083].
A copy of British diplomat Frederick Millar Hoyer’s account of Exercise Longstep largely concurs with Mr. Heeney’s commentary. Mr. Hoyar particularly appreciated the extensive consideration given to potential Soviet threats in Southern Europe and the efforts to gauge Soviet military strength in the Mediterranean. From Admiral Carney’s remarks, Mr. Hoyar gathered that there was a very real possibility that a Russian attack could originate in Southern Europe and that military challenges posed in Slovenia, North Africa, and Eastern Thrace must also be prioritized. Mr. Hoyar also touched on some of the emerging issues in Greece. He noted that the Greek General Grigoropoulos made it very clear that their armed forces faced extensive difficulties and expressed general refusal to make any changes to the army division, despite their clear inefficiencies. While it was clear to Mr. Hoyar that General Grigoropoulos was attempting to ask the Americans for additional aid, Mr. Hoyar doubted that “his pleas had much effect” since he presented his case in French, which the American representative barely understood [CDEX00084].
CDEX00086 presents a summary of the tactical and logistical maneuvers of Exercise Longstep.