Exercise Long Thrust II, 1961

An October 1961 memorandum from External Affairs’ Defence Liaison Division discussing Exercise Long Thrust II highlights significant shifts in NATO's approach as it began developing communication channels to address political tensions. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander of Europe General Norstad's strategy for LongThrust II involved showcasing NATO's capabilities without provoking the Soviets. This was in part a response to Canadian concerns raised during preparations for Exercise Long Thrust I which had to be cancelled [CDEX00803]. The initial scheduling of Long Thrust I was May 1st, 1961, a day for Communist celebrations and the anniversary of the U2 Incident, which prompted revisions as such an exercise on that day could be construed as aggressive.[CDEX00643/CDEX00663].

Following the completion of Long Thrust II in January 1962, General Norstad proposed a continuing series of exercises developed with rotating American and German troops at 90-day intervals. The DEA’s Defence Liaison Division, which dealt with military aspects of Canada’s foreign policy, perceived this as SACEUR's intention to maintain American battle groups as part of NATO’s strategic reserve indefinitely. This would keep American troops in rapid deployment and redeployment, serving as a reminder to European alliance members that the Americans could supply reinforcements on short notice [CDEX00975]. General Norstad’s decision following Long Thrust II marked a growing trend towards the enduring nature of NATO as a military entity and geopolitical alliance.