https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c7faa2b38a6fc76c86d747b27069f614.pdf fe7e2f891860eebe2aaf90ec63405188 PDF Text Text Document disclosed Act osed under the Access to Information At Document divulgue ejct/Qtu de la tef sur Topees a I'infgpmation je eyftfOxu de la W sur I'acces al'infgym THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA '-' TOP SECRET yx^fo &2/9-A *> ft MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET y Stockpiling of Kuclear VIeapona In NATO Countries 1. Recent Soviet developments emphasize the significance of public statements by the President of the United States and Mr. Dulles in July 1957, and again by Mr. Dulles in Hovember 1957, to the effect that the United States government is considering the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in NATO countries• Under suoh a programme it is understood that nuclear warheads would be kept under the control and custody of United States officers to avoid amendment to the United States Atomic Energy Act. It lo expected that a proposal to this effect will be made by the United States at the forthcoming NATO heads of governments meeting in Paris. NATO and Nuclear Weapons 2.* NATO strategy depends upon the possession of nuclear weapons in two principal components of its military structure, that is, the national retaliatory forces of the United States and the United Kingdom and the collective shield forces of the NATO countries. In the case of the retaliatory forces the stockpiling of nuclear weapons has had in the past little direct Implication to other NATO countries» However, with the proposed introduction of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) to be located in some of the NATO countries in Europe this will have a significant implication to such countries because of their involvement in the launching of a strategic nuclear offensive although such missiles would be under the direct control of SACEUR. In the case of the NATO shield forces the possibility of United States stockpiles abroad is significant as a measure to implement the decision in the current NATO Political Directive that "The shield forces must include the capability to respond quickly, should the situation so require, with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression"„ o 9 mo o TOP SECRET 2/ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information I- ~T5 TOP SECRET 3. It has been recognized that the shield forces are only effective as a deterrent against numerically superior Soviet forces if equipped with nuclear weapons. As a result shield forces are being developed with weapon delivery systems on the assumption that nuclear warheads will be available on the outbreak of war. It is understood that tactical missiles and delivery systems would be incorporated in National forces, and the custody and control of the atomic warheads wherever located, would be vested in the Supreme Allied Commanders in their capacities as United States officers. Canadian Nuclear Weapons Requirements A* (a) The Chiefs of Staff envisage future Canadian requirements for nuclear weapons as presently planned as follows$ i) The Canadian Infantry Brigade Group assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe require a ground-to° ground missile of the close support type (Little John rocket) from about I960* ii) Royal Canadian Navy and possibly Royal Canadian Air Force maritime forces earmarked for the Supreme Allied Commander^ Atlantic require nuclear depth bombs and torpedoes. iii) Although it seems likely that Canadian air defence forces, at least in North America, will eventually require air~to~air missiles with atomic warheads, no decision has yet been reached to adopt either the MB1 P which is used nov/ by the U.S.A.F.p or any alternative defensive weapono (b) As the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile is a strategic weapon there is no requirement for this weapon in the Canadian forces and in view of its range it would have no operational use based in North America. TOP^SECRgT o.. o 0/3 000345 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information Implications to Canaada 5. The main problems arising from the stockpiling of nuclear warheads appear to be associated vdth storage, maintenance and control. As far as Canada is concerned these problems would be negligible in Europe where Canadian requirements could be met from stockpiles in other NATO countries under the custody and control of SACEUR as a United States officer. 6. The needs of the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force maritime forces could be provided from stocks at a United! States base in the United States or in Canada which could be under the custody and control of SACLANT also a United States officer. If however nuclear warheads should be required ty Canadian air defence forces they would haTO to be stored at each RCAF fighter base in Canada under the nominal custody of a United States officer. 7o Discussions with government departments concerned has revealed that no change in Canadian legislation would be required, but that'minor modifications to regulations would be needed, to permit stockpiling of nuclear warheads In Canada for the use of Canadian forces, or for the use of United States air defence forces at GOOB S Bay, Labrador and Ernest Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. 8. Heretofore the problem of civilian' control over the use of nuclear weapons has been purely American- andv. more latterly",;. British. With the arming of the shield forces of other nations in Europe with such weaponsp decisions will have to be reached as to the authority necessary to commit such forces to war. As yet no real resolution of this problem within the NATO context has been foundo Undoubtedly a proposal to stock" pile and use nuclear warheads for the shield forces will raise this problem, and thought will have to be given to a practical arrangement that will meet both the political and military necessities of the NATO partners. Recommendation 9. The Panel on the Economic Aspects of Defence Questions, which has considered this problem, recommends that Canada should support a proposal for the stockpiling of nuclear warheads in NATO countries, aad TOP SECRET .....A 000346 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - A " TOP SECRET arming Canadian forces in Europe with defensive nuclear weapons if NATO and the countries concerned should decide that these shield forces should be so armed. 10• We concur in this recommendation. SECRETARY QF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE .3 December, 1957 • 000347 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02293 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to the Cabinet Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 03-Dec-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons, Europe Description An account of the resource Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons in NATO Countries Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en