https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/30508e8f8ee17e860b9697d4700ced19.pdf 8ffcca3b98187c6862aedacda09ede77 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'infosfnation .-J"" ° >******* fcXTBRMAL AFFAIRS CANADA SECRET November 29, i9!?7 * Political Implications of Stockpiling Nuclear •.'•Weapons in Europe . . , n Among the important problems which Will be discussed at the forthcoming NATO meeting of heads of government will ' be one having far-reaching political implications, that of the proposal to stockpile nuclear weapons in Europe* Previous NATO military decisions haveypaved the way for the use bf v nuclear weapons by the>-sh_ieldJforces to enable them to deal with any.type of aggression. The implementation of the strategy by the creation of a NATO stockpile in Europe of.atomic Warheads for tactical weapons was raised by France at the last NATO ministerial meeting in Bonn and it is understood that the United.States will bring the matter up for consideration at the • December meeting. Parallel with any decision to go ahead with stockpiling nuclear warheads are a number of related politico-military problems. First, there is the vital problem of control. Existing United States legislation would necessitate continued * American control OfR.the atomic components which might be stored at points in Europe. While United States officials have, indicated that amendments to the Atomic Eflergy Act might be made to ease the present restrictions on the exchange of technical information with foreign countries, they seem fairly certain that Congress would be unwilling to authorize any alteration in the control feature of nuclear weapons. It is the Canadian understanding that what the United States has in mind is to retain both ownership and control in United States hands through an American logistic chain, but to give SACEUR operational control under the NATO Council. While this may be satisfactory to the United Kingdom, as a nuclear power'in being,•and to France, as a nuclear power in embryo, provided In the latter case that it did not imply any abandonment of France's own right to manufacture.nuclear weapons, it is unlikely to calm the fears of the smaller West European nations, particularly the Low Countries and the two Scandinavian members. These countries are concerned over the possibility of precipitate^orR^unauthorized^use^ofAniiclear weapons in the absence of any joint NATO political control, which might convert otherwise local hostilities into an all-out nuclear war. They recognize that in an emergency it may be impossible to arrange for political consultation before the decision is taken to employ nuclear weapons'* They have doubts as to how effective the United States guard over the nuclear cupboard might be. They are worried as to whether SACEUR's authority Would be adequate to restrain countries such as Turkey, that have already moved national forces under NATO command on their own initiative, and might not, therefore, hesitate to seize such weapons from a nuclear stockpile in certain circumstances. Finally, they see.in the stockpiling plan the risk of opening up a Pandora's box, out of which may develop moves to equip all national forces under NATO command with nuclear weapons. • �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informatio y - 2 A second problem is the question of acceptance by the European members of. NATO of stockpiling bases on their territory. Again, reluctance is likely to be encountered in certain countries. Norway, for example, possessing a common border with the U.S.S.R., has been at pains in recent years to reassure its powerful neighbour that no foreign forces would be stationed on its territory In peacetime. Germany is perhaps even more conscious of the unfortunate effects that might arise from a decision to store nuclear weapons on its territory. The Federal Republic would have to consider the stimulus this might provide to the recognition of East Germany in neutral countries and In general the effect it might have in making more remote the prospect of achieving progress on reunification and in retarding current efforts to improve relations with*EasternREuropean States, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, who, with vivid memories of German militarism, would be bound to become concerned about the existence of nuclear weapons on German soil and potentially in German hands. On the domestic political scene, too, Socialist criticism, while not as important now as before the elections, might evoke a sympathetic response among many Germans who are uncomfortably aware of the country's exposed position. The stockpiling question is also likely to awaken the latent sensitivities of the West European members of NATO to the remilitarization of Germany, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the related United States proposals for the deployment, production and development of intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe. Germany is, of .course, prohibited under the London and Paris Agreements of 195^ from manufacturing ABC weapons. Nor. did these agreements conceive of the provision 6f nuclear weapons to the German armed forces. Admittedly, German ministers have recently stated that they do not wish to see the Bundeswehr equipped with atomic weapons or have the production prohibition abrogated, but there have been indications that they might not object to assisting in scientific research" and production of such weapons in other countries. The lurking suspicion remains, In countries that have experienced Nazi rule, that in reality the Germans may only secretly wish to have their arms twisted a little. • Apart frora the military complications within NATO itself, major reverberations may be anticipated behind the iron curtain. The satellites will see in this move a threat to their own security. Poland in particular:.is likely to become alarmed, fearing that it might presage a German attempt to regain territory now under Polish control, which fear would be greatly intensified if there were a nuclear stockpile on German territory. To a lesser degree, this alarm would also be shared in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In these circumstances, the satellite peoples might become more receptive to restrictions on their Independence and freedom and equally prove more willing to accede to the requirements of Soviet bloc security. For its part, the U.S.S.R. would probably see no military need to advance its own atomic stockpile westward and additionally would be reluctant to do so on security grounds. However, it could be expected to seize this opportunity, by offering reasons of military expediency, to tighten its political relations with the satellites and curb the constant pressures for greater liberalization. Further afield, it may be expected that the reaction in uncommitted countries will almost inevitably be unfavourable. Moreover, Soviet propaganda to these states will carry a greater sense of conviction. The neutral countries will be especially susceptible to Communist accusations that" the advent of nuclear weapons in-Europe merely gives further proof of the aggressive intentions of NATO and the way in which the West is increasing tension throughout the world. 000349 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information ** BEST AVAILABLE COPY - 3In sum, it would appear that NATO will have to recognize that in securing military advantages through the build-up of a . nuclear stockpile in Europe it is also assuming considerable political, liabilities. In order to mitigate the unsettling political consequences which are likely to follow upon the announcement of such a decision, Canada has seen the need to balance it with a broad and forward-looking declaration reaffirming the objectives of the alliance, which would be closely related to the prevailing international conditions. For this purpose, it is considered desirable to emphasize the Western determination to press for genuine disarmament and to seek a peaceful solution of outstanding problems. Political Co-ordination Section Department of External Affairs 000350 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02292 Title A name given to the resource Report Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 29-Nov-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons, Europe Description An account of the resource Political Implications of Stockpiling Nuclear Weapons in Europe Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en