https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/75c458b2bb1796c69f332f56d473ac9a.pdf b5aff61b358c112dc0d3151c063a9548 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • D.L. (1) A.R.Cr&#ai^ity<ff\«%^ ec: Mr. R.B.Bryce, Office of the Privy Council SECRET no 1 5*2 , September 6, 1957. Dear General Foulkes: I have received your letter of August © concerning the United states proposal for NATO stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and 1 note with satisfaction your concurrence in our suggestion that this question should be in due time the subject of interdepartmental consultation. I see no difficulty in having this subject form part of the current study of the "Fourth Power Problem*# and agree that the Committee mentioned In your letter should be the forum in which to examine the United states proposal. Be In view of the considerable importance which you attach, in this context, to the related problem of ^control" over the use of nuclear weapons, this department would also readily agree to have this particular issue considered in the Committee at the same time as the others. 3. I mi^it say at this stage that the principle of civilian control over the use ©f nuclear weapons does not appear io this department to raise the apparently controversial issues which your letter under reference would seem to suggest* Our department*s position* which we also understand to have been the Government's position, has always been that of General Graenther, which you quote with approval in paragraph 6 of your letter: the implementation of KG(48) and the use of nuclear weapons must await a political decision: namely, that "there was an act of war, and that it was an aH-out act of war, and not simply a local war**. Efcls is Of coarse what we mean lay "civilian control". We know of course that HAfO is committed to a strategy involving the use of nuclear weapons but the actual implementation of this General C. Foulkes, CB, CES, DSO, CD, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Department of national Defence, Ottawa, Ontario* •••2 000468 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - strategy presupposes the political decision by the HAfO governments that they are faced with an all-out act of war*. 4. Perhaps it Is not necessary to elaborate this prin~ciple that {in Mr. Dulles* words) "the authority to push the button*..is vested In the civilian heads of government".- In the case of HATO, this can evidently only mean the Council, which speaks and speaks alone for the HATO governmenta*Paragraphs 6 and IS of your own letter seem thoroughly to approve the principle that only the political authorities ean send HATO to war; aad it can assuredly be taken for granted that the Counoil will not send HAfO to war until the momentous consequences of thermo-nuclear retaliation have been taken into account* 5. It is true that varying circumstances, such as the easo you raise of an all-out nuclear attack, would make the Implementation of this principle more or less difficult; and no one, as far as we know, has refused to accept the resulting qualifications of the principle which circumstances might conceivably impose* But It would be wrong to suggest that, because the principle of civilian control was not elaborately articulated In the tt&cemher 1954 meeting, agreement on this crucial point had not been reached. You refer to the American desire at this time for a vague formula; you will of course also recall the misgivings of European partners about a formula In which the principle of civilian control was not also expressed* Subsequently, Mr. Dulles, when approving 130(48) for the purpose of planning by the military authorities, agreed that such approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility iwhich, as he pointed out, rested "in the civilian heads of government*) *for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities"* {C-?E(54)50 p*23) Subsequent discussion pointed to the importance attached to this qualification, which was incorporated both In the Council Resolution on lS*C*4e{0-R(54)S0 para*43(l)) and in the final Communique which was released* (G-M(54)123 para*6) We have attached an annex which indicates some of the highlights of these discussions and of the circumstances under which they took place,; but perhaps the best documentation is the ?erbatim Record of the 50th Meeting of the HATO Council (C-VR{54)50, pp*21ff). I wonld draw your attention particularly to the statement of the French representative, if; Temple: "La delegation francaise approuve la proposition qui a ete' faite par le Secretariat ...3 000469 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informatio — 3 - International et est prete a voter ea sa favear* Hous pensons en effet que oe texts repond bien aux deux preoccupations que nous avons ea vue: I. laisser les Autorites militaires poursuivre leurs etudes sur les transformations des forces armees rendues n4eessaires par l*empioi eventuel de l'arme atomique: 2* laisser atix pouvoirs politiques la decision d*employer ou non en cas de necessity cette arme atomique*" (loc.cil.,p.2S) 6* There is also the other consideration which you have yoarself mentioned, that H&fO finds itself in this ambiguous position of having a strategy based on the concept of nuclear deterrents, while its main retaliatory force is actually to be found ia the United States Strategic Air Command* The United States Strategic Air Command does not * only serve as the nuolear retaliatory force of HATO,, but constitutes as well the main defence of the United States, in any case of all-oat aggression, u&ether or not this aggression Is within the HATO area* Ho one would suggest that the HATO Council has either the right or the power to veto the directives which the President of the United States may give directly to his Strategic Air Command, fhe United States,, however, have not shown any desire to "go it alone** should it come to an all-out nuclear conflict in Europe; and it is reasonable to expect, given the tremendous political importance of following such a course, that they will wish, if humanly possible, to consult their closest allies before releasing the power of the Strategical Air Force* It is obviously for these considerations that the United States representatives in HATO have always beea reluctant to define the application of the principle of collective civilian control over the use of nuclear weapons, and it is because the other HATO members appreciated and understood the United States position tftat none has ever pressed in the HATO Council for anything more than the wording used by the Council on December '17* 1954 in approving IKC-48* 7* In short, the principle that the civilian heads of government would not delegate the authority flto push the 000470 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informatio - 4 - button* was unanimously reaffirmed in December 1954 with the clear implication that such decisions, insofar as they were taken by HATO, would be taken in the Council and not by the military authorities* To suggest otherwise would* I am sure, give rise to the strongest objections -/• from several HATO governments, and might well in fact induce these governments to press for an even more rigid formula of civilian control than that which exists at present* This Is only plain political realism, which was again more than confirmed recently when the question arose of stationing atomic weapons in certain European HATO countries* 8* Since 1954, however, there have been new developments which may call for a re-assessment of the conditions under which the principle of civilian control ought to be exercised* Oa the one hand, a wider range of nuclear weapons have been developed, from the so-*called "tactical weapons'* to H-bombs of unpredictable capacity. On the other hand, governments have now come to realize that the implications of a declaration of war may not be as precise, in terms of weapons to be used, as they have hem in the past* It was in part to meet these changing circumstances that NATO members considered it necessary last year to undertake a military reappraisal andjt© formulate at the December ministerial meeting a new Political Directive* This directive has confirmed that aggression against the HATO area could assume several forms, not all of which would necessarily call for the use of nuclear weapons at the outset* The emergence of the possibility of "minor out breaks'*, to use Mr. Dulles* expression, means in effect that HATO member governments may no longer have only the task of declaring whether or not an all**out act of aggression has been committed* but they may also have the responsi bility for determining the actual nature and degree of the "aggression" In case of any acts of apparent hostility such as those mentioned in para 4(b) Fart H of the Balitieal Directive. 9* Document 13*0.70 entitled "Minimum Essential Force Requirements" now under preparation by SACJEGR will probably throw some light on the possibility of graduated defence, including or excluding nuclear weapons* and civilian and military responsibilities may have to be reconsidered in the light of that document* Moreover, the fact that it is now planned to provide forward troops with tactical nuclear weapons will give a fresh impetus to reviewing the problem of the implementation of political control over the ma of these weapons and to the development of procedures to reader 000471 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 this implementation as effective as possible* fours sincerely, JJOEES LEGER Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 000472 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02241 Title A name given to the resource Letter to General Foulkes from Under-Secretary Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 06-Sep-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons, Europe Description An account of the resource Concerning U.S. Proposal for NATO Stockpile of Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en