https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/32fe856ff29e4b6319d4e0d933bd21fb.pdf 8440451501c076921b5807bf6ea5ed27 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en veAuBle l8j£e£fflM]f'tofa& a I'information DRAFT 4 etf/ SECRET Dear General Foulkes: I have your letter of August 8 concerning the U.S. proposal for M T O stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and I note your concur- rence in our suggestion that this question should be in due time the subject of interdepartmental consultation. I see no difficulty in having this form A part of the current study of the "Fourth Power Problem", and to having the iv-M Committee mentioned in your letter chosen as the forum in which to examine the United States proposal, 2. In view of the considerable importance which you attach, in this context, to the related problem of "control" over the use of nuclear weapons, this department would also readily agree to have this particular issue considered in the Committee at the same time as the others. 3. oJ^ I might say at this stage that the principle of control over the use of nuclear weapons does not appear to this department to raise the complex and apparently controversial issues which your letter under reference would seem t o suggest. Our d e p a r t m e n ts p o s i t i o n , which we also understand to have been t h e Government's p o s i t i o n , has always been t h a t of General Gruenther, MM^j*A At which you quote with approval i n paragraph 6 of your l e t t e r : A t h e use of *1 Vhm.\ *J7 x , K *~* l v % k wr • . C/v fa/* nuclear weapons must await a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n l J t h a t "there was an act of j war, and t h a t i t was an a l l - o u t act of war, anc^iot simply a l o c a l war". This Sis i s of course what we mean by " c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l " , end what we meant i n paragraph l6 of t h i s department r s paper t o the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the U.S, proposal for HATO stockpiles of nuclear weapons, when 000479 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act « document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information *-• -.,» i . ^^fjhw&efi we s t a t e d that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of c i v i l i a n control "left to member governments, through the NATO Council, rather than to the \y. y * iy m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s , the decision as to when the NATO nuclear weapons would , _ s < be used", iThere can be very l i t t l e doubt, in so far as t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s & - concerned, that NATO governments have never agreed to relinquish this "civi- .. \M^ tJ Ly <k V*^ l i a n control" over the use of nuclear weapons, that they have on the cosntrary always been extremely careful to reserve their position on this score. To put it in another way, our understanding is that, once governments have decided that en act of all-out nuclear aggression has been committed, the approved HATO strategy then callus for the use by the military of nuclear weapons. In this sense, it is correct to say that SACEUR would not be required to go to the Council to secure authority for nuclear retaliation, XjM y. He is precluded from using^these weapons^until and unless the NATO government! ^ ir* have decided h, that they are faced with an act of all-out war. I think that all the discussions that have taken place at the minis- terial and other sessions of the Council on this question Jiave made it J abundantly clear what the thinking of governments is on this point. You will ' li. r j- }iu^y M/i/\ » no doubt find useful the annex to t h i e l e t t e r i n which we give the source, and \,y. (y* . in some instances the text of the HATO documentation pertinent to this issue, I would not wish of course to bd guilty of misinterpreting the sense of your (&LK ify letter, and it may well be that the general senee (of your letter, particularly JL on the basis of paragraphs U, 6 and 12, was meant to reflect [that same.lposition so clearly taken by the NATO Council and the Canadian authorities on this matter, , 000480 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ~ 3 Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Of c o u r s e , t h e v p r i n c i p l e h a v i n g been e s t a b l i s h e d , we a l l r e c o g n i z e ^4 v* ^j^ t h a t v a r y i n g circumstances may make i t s implementation more or l e s s c\ . jjA {•J y W*\ difficult, and no one, as f a r as we know, has (so f a r ever,'' r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t i n g w**' < l u a l i f i c a t i o n s » •rt/y" yy\ and c o n v e n t i o n a l a g g r e s s i o n by t h e Soviet Union would l e a v e v e r y l i t t l e time to f^t I * i s [all) a g r e e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t a sudden a l l - o u t n u c l e a r the KAT0 c o u n t r i e s to c o n s u l t , as envisaged i n the v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l r e c t i v e s i s s u e d by t h e NATO C o u n c i l . di- C o n s u l t a t i o n i n such o r y b t h e r - i n s t a n c e s might assume a v a r i e t y of forms, but no attempt has been made t o s p e l l them o u t , 6, There i s a l s o the o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n which you have y o u r s e l f mentioned, t h a t NATO f i n d s i t s e l f i n t h ^ e ambiguous p o s i t i o n of having a s t r a t e g y based on t h e concept of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t s , w h i l e i t s main r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e i s a c t u a l l y t o be found i n t h e United S t a t e s S t r a t e g i c Air Command. But t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S t r a t e g i c Air Command<does~not only s e r v e ^ as t h e n u c l e a r r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e of NATO, but c o n s t i t u t e s a s w e l l t h e main d e f e n c e of t h e United S t a t e s , i n eny c a s e of a l l - o u t a g g r e s s i o n , w h i t h e r or not t h i s a g g r e s s i o n i s w i t h i n t h e Y NATO a r e a . i, I t i s o b v i o u s l y t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n which has always made the U n i t e d -• S t a t e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n NATO r e l u c t a n t t o d e f i n e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e c i v i l i a n o o n t r o l over t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons, and i t i s b e c a u s e the o t h e r NATO members a p p r e c i a t e d and understoo d the United S t a t e s p o s i t i o n t h a t none has ever p r e s s e d i n t h e NATO Council for a n y t h i n g more ^ A ^ ^ sfoie^e.^ t&-<XfcL M^TO Um. ftrk'c*|ak4 t h a n t h e somewhat "vague" £e*s»*la which y c o n s t i t u t e s s a t p r e s e n t NATO p o l i c y i n ' :V Po\;^ Jr c*^U\ (C-n (54) \z5 t'Wr?) th*s-£i42l4,' C But I t h i n k we a l l agree t h a t t h e s e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s cannot be c o n s i d e r e d t o d e r o g a t e from t h e p r i n c i p l e l a i d down i n General Gruenther*s r e m a r k s , and i n 000481 . . . k k �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act „,. lj. Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ' . \ jm%W Councilts acceptance of M.C. ks, I gather from paragraph 12 of your letter that you accept at any rate the principle that (in Mr, Dulles' words) "the authority to push the button . . . is vested in the civilian heads of governments". J /) In the case of NATO, this can only mean the NATO Council, vfalch speaks and r rxy. speaks alone, for the NATO governments. To suggest otherwise would, I am sure, ,y y y \ give r i s e to the strongest objections from several NATO governments, and might v>* well in fadt induce these governments to press for an even more rigid formula vr of civilian control than that which exists at present. This is only plain y-A> •^Fy p o l i t i c a l realism, which was again more than confirmed recently when the qusestlon ' "" J ^ \r»*j* ^y ** arose of stationing atomic weapons in certain "European NATO countries, 1 g* I cannot hut feel it would be unrealistic today to assume ths,t the only 1jy^ - vV\ p o l i t i c a l choices facing NATO in the future would be those of no wax, of border fiyyX conventional warfare, and of a l l - o u t nuclear war. P r e c i s e l y because varying 4it \j,^ degrees of nuclear engagements are now becoming conceivable, from the so-called i " t a c t i c a l " weapons to H-bombs of unpredictable capacity, NATO members considered i t necessary l a s t year, i n the l i g h t of the changing p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , to undertake a military reappraisal, and to formulate at the December ministerial 7 (meeting a new political directive. Otherwise the military reappraisal and the new political directive would not have been necessary. 9. Governments have now indeed come to realize that there is no longer any single or clear cut meaning to the act of declaring war. The political directive has confirmed above all (other things) that aggression against the NATO area could assume several forms,/all of which would(not,necessarily call for mass nuclear retaliation. There has hever been of course any question of imposing on K. ^ ... 5 000482 f �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ec&ument divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information V f*s' . NATO military authorities a rigid system of graduated deterrents, nor has i t ever been suggested that the actual carrying out of the appropriate NATO plans AJ should be made the responsibility of the NATO Council, ©tod that the NATO military * I * A A authorities would have to seek "civilian authorisation" as to the implementation of the appropriate strategy. 10, But what was certainly clearly understood was that, as the possibility of an all-out nuclear aggression by the Soviet Union was receding, situations could arise which would c a l l , granted, for effective NATO counteraction, but which would not necessarily call for mass nuclear retaliation, and thus a world nuclear holocaust. tf/1 k*/f* " limited area, has become conceivable. ijff^Y P" y In other words, a modern war fought for limited objectives, and in a tiie I t is because of these considerations that United States National Security Council themselves have recently undertaken vF to try to recast the basic military end political strategy of the United States r government, NATO authorities, including General Norstad, have also recognized that the possibility of local conflicts has increased to the extent that the likelihood of en all-out nuclear wa£ has receded. We have always understood the underlying philosophy of last year's military reappraisal and the ensuing p o l i t i c a l directive to deal with just that evolution, adjusting NATO strategic thinking to recent politica l changes, and anticipating those developments by which tactical atomic weapons will have been fully integrated into NATO forces, 11. T he emergence of the possibility of "minor" outbreaks, to use Mr, Dulles' own words, hW-emphasi-g^ri in, rmr—v^w the need for a clearly understood \ m&3gg& of civilian control. &3er*fe**&eBKw«&. The <*«EEeft& may no longer heve|only the task of declaring whether or not an all-out nuclear aggression has been committed, 000483 �' * Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act *" "Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY > Ana*=sess&dialso have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , in case of any act of apparent h o s t i l i t y , of determining the actual nature and degree of the "aggression", eu*w*iifrr- nf oowgs^g!wmi^^wy<a^»beaiPiii3s mi the extent to which NATO forces should be committed. The task of defining the nature of any a c t of war would seem therefore, A io^ust^ to be s matter f a l l i n g within the Council's competence, 12, In the l i g h t of these considerations, (it does not seem to us therefore >} J' that")this p a r t i c u l a r issue srhould d i s t r a c t us from such concrete proposals as that advanced by the United States for NATO stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The p r i n c i p l e of " c i v i l i a n control" was recognized years ago by member governments, i t and it has been found possible so far to live with it, without unnecessarily stirring controversies detrimental to the unity and effective functioning of the Alliance. In practice, circumstances might make an ideal implementation of this \ principle -somewhat difficult, and perhaps even impossible, but this is no doubt \ part of the price of the nuclear age in which we live. yy yy y yA Ky ^y- ,/f & y^ *>. :y 000484 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02235 Title A name given to the resource Draft Letter to General Foulkes Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource n.d. 1957 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons, Europe Description An account of the resource Concerning U.S. Proposal for NATO Stockpile of Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en