https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/6494e491231acd356efcee9e53abd1bc.pdf 73f25353e7587cfde659ca8ac5dda86d PDF Text Text Documentdisclosed underthe AccepsjqInformation ActQotument divulgue en vertu fie la Loi sUtf dttfts a I'information *A * **• SECRET Jmly 26*, 1957 HATO STOCKPILING OF SUCLIAH W A P US the Baited States Proposal There has been, In recent yeprs, considerable iressure on the part of the smaller HATO Members for a share ef the nucloar weapons which have now become available, And with which some of the United States troopa stationed in Europe are equipped. Numerous suggestions hrve been made in the paat for the establishment of seme NATO pool of nuelear weapons, from which member nations could draw their requirements. The United States government now appears to have accepted, for the first time publicly, the possibility of HATO stocklies of nuclear weapons. 2At his press conference in Washington on July l6, Mr. Dulles revealed that the United States defease authorities had been giving serious thought to the creation of HATO stockpiles of nuclear weapons, through which such weaoons could be aade available to the members of the Alliance, The following day, on July 17, President Eisenhower endorsed publicly the principle of HATO stockpiling of nuclear veepons, and confirmed generally the Information given by Mr. Dulles concerning the United States study of plana for the creation of such stockpiles. The text of Mr. Dulles' remarks at his press conference la attached as annex *A" to this -sper. 3. The United St tea Secretary of St. te has explained th*=t the United St-tea had at present no specific programme for carrying out the proposal, and indicated th-t in any eaae Congressional sanction wo Id probably be necessary before one Could be worked out and Implemented. The United States Atomic Energy Act might *lso require endmeats, since it permits at present supoly of nuclear weapons !to allies of the Umited St tea only after war has broken out. Both the President and Mr. Dulles have said enough, however, to suggest that the United States authorities are mow prepared to take concrete steps towards the establishment of such HATO stockolles. HATO S t o c k p i l i n g and Disarmament km The publicly amaounced United S t ' t e s proposal for HATO stockp i l i n g ef nuelear weapons i s in harmony with U.S. policy in the current disarmament negotiations i n London. In their l a t e s t proposals ea disarmament, the United States mas indie-ted the intention to reserve the privilege of deciding. In case of a disarmament agreement, to station their stockpiles of nuelear weapons outside the borders of the United Statea, and further the privilege of training other than United St'tes troops in the uae of nuclear weapons. The United States proposal for HATO stockpiling of nuelear weapona gives therefore a practical significance to the recent United States reservations l a the Disarmament Sub-Committee. 5. I t i s orobably also designed to a l l e v i a t e the feera of seas of their partners in the Sub-Committee, especially the United Kingdom and Trance, to the effect that agreement on the suspension of nuclear t e s t s , with an eventual halt in the nroduction of nuclear weapons, might leave these countries without real means of modern defence. I f the temporary suspension of nuclear teats were linked not only with the cut-off of production for weapons purposes, as the U.S. plans envisage, but also with a prohibition of deliveries to a l l i e s , then such countries as the United Kingdom, which i s actually producing materials for nuelear weaoons, aad France, which apparently i s considering such 3514 000514 �Document disclosed una Document divulgue en vertu d e l - 2 - production, might Indeed be left In a position of having meaas for the delivery of nuclear warheads, hat inadequate sapplia of such warheads. This is particularly important for the United Klagdoatfhichhas jtist recast aost of its defence policy oa a basis of nuelear as opposed to conventional armaments. 6. It remains to bs seen, however, hov the Soviet government will react in the Disarmament Sub-Committee to this United States proposal for HATO stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The Russians are known to fear aay dispersal ef nuclear wenpone amongUte HATO countries, especially Germany. Discussion of the distribution of missiles (without atonic warheads) by the United States to some Western laropesa allies was sufficient, a few months ago, to prompt the Soviet government to desor.teh to these NATO governments, at the risk of being charged with interference in internal affairs of other states, letters of dire warning about accepting the stationing of such weapons on their respective territories. A strong Russian reaction in the Sub-Committee to the publicly announced United States pro osal for HATO stockpiles should sot therefore be unexpected, and tiie course of the dlsarmaaent negotiations might in turn well suffer. HATO Stockpiling and the "Fourth Power" Problem 7* The Bmraada conference earlier this ye<--r underlined the concern of both the United States and the Jnited Klagdoa over the problem of production and of possession of nuclear weaoons by "fourth" powers. The ent discussions have shown that the Soviet Union was no less with the "Fourth Power" problaa, although their position might be somewhat simpler, as they wish above all to ensure, for their own security reasons, that ao fourth country could secure possession of nuclear weapons either by transfer or manufacture. One of the main conclusions which have emerged so far from Canadian inter-departmental consideration of the "Fourth Power" problem is that renunciation of manufacture of nuelear weacons could only be acceptable to countries which have the capacity to produce them, lf in turn they can be assured of the availability of auch weapons Incase of eerlous threat to their security. Canadian officials have thus been tended* to view the question of "attractiveness of renunciation* of manufacture of nuclear weapons as the acre promising basis of a satisfactory solution to the "Fourth Power* problem. s. 8. Mr. Dulles' proposal for HATO stockpiles of nuclerr weaoons would, it ssems, go a long tray towards making renunciation of nuclear weapone manufacture and of Individual -possession a more ee eptable proposition. The establishment of HATO stockpiles of nuclear weaoons, under an appropriate system of control, would undoubtedly tend to save other HATO countries the economic burden of developing themeelves these expensive weapons. It would stren then NATO defence arrangements, underline the collective eh?r ct r of the military side of the Alliance, and promote generally the feeling of solidarity within the Allience. It would offer within NATO, to every member government. Including those which have been ho ing to achieve It through the production of their own nuclear wee ons, the kind of "nuclear protection" every NATO country h;s been seeking. It could well therefore constitute ultimately an important ste > towards a liait?tlon In auvlear weapons production, and perhaps strengthen the bargaining position of the Western world In die arm—eat negotiations. . • 3 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Aa Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a f inform* -3 - HATO Stockpiling rnd. Canada's Defence Policy 9. The President of the United St tee, in endorsing the plan for HATO stockpiles of nucle-r weapons, remarked at his press conference that such a move would be "exactly logical" and that to defend themselves against nuclear attacks, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance "ought to have the right, the op ortuaity md the capacity of responding in kind". Mr. Dulles pointed out that such stockpiles would assure allied countries that if war came, they would aot be in a position of suppliants for ths uss of atonic weapons. It would aot be a healthy relationship, he said, to have silled nations wholly dependent on tha Umited States in this respect. The United St'tes leaders seea also to have recognised the desirability of approaching the problem in the NATO form, rather thea attempting to draw a distinction betweea individual allies. Mr. Dulles saw the possible concentration of nuclear weapons in Curops as an act of confidence which would strengthen the fellowship of the North Atlantic Community. Canadian officials concerned with defence matters aad who have beer: following NATO developments would generally agree that4a the whole, implementation of the United St tes ->ro iosel for HATO stock lies of nuclear weapons would carry these advantages, sal be beneficial to the security of the Atlantic Coasunlty. 10. Implementation of the crooossl would nonetheless present the Canadian government with important probleme. As the pronosal, in its latest context, is really new, lt weald seea premature to talk In terms of a Can-dian policy. A number of consider-tions of direct interest to Canada eaa however be advanced at this stage. 11. It is assumed that, in the event of the creation of HATO stockpiles, under conditi as permitting access to them by the NATO members, its supplies would be available te Candian forces on a brsis of equality with forces from all other HATO countries. It is also assumed th t such stockpiles would be located, at least at the outset, is Surops. In theory, the ability of Canadian contingents in Serous to use these weapons should not give rise to serious difficulties. Most of the agreements which Canada has with countries such as Frenee and Belgium for the use of airfields provide that Csn'dipu contingents stationed at those basss would only be armed with conventional weapone. Thess governments, however, would presumably agree, in the event of the establishment of stockpiles of nuelear weapons, to the working out of appropriate agreements permitting C*nrdisa forces equipped with such nuclear wee ons to be stationed en their territory. 12. Canadian officials have been inclined however, se far, to aider that Canada's armed forces in Europe, ae well as in North America, did not, in practice, have say immediate requirement for nuclear weapons, although within a few y^ars, would require certain specific modern defensive weapons, sometimes referred to ae tactical wee ons. The United States Air Foree is already using one such "small" weapon in the air defence of Forth America, and has beam given authority to use lt over Canrda. For technical reasons, the R.C.A.F. does not st present wish to adopt tills particular weapon. 13. Although there has been no reference to this .oscibillty so far, the United Statee roposal could also ef course envisage the establishment of SATO stockpiles of nuclear we a. v ons In Can- da. Canada, like the Halted States, Is in ,rinciple an Integral part of the NATO area. Most of the afreeaeats negotiated with the Halted States regarding the use of bases In Canadian territory by united States forces took place at a time when nuelear weapons meant only nags nuclear deterrent, and when defensive weapons were still at the planning stage. There are therefore in the United States Leased Bases Agreements no reference to U.S. forces being eoulpoed with nuclear wee ons, and in fact no distinction between conventional weapons and others. Recent agreements with certain Nuropean countries concerning the use of airfields by Canadian forces contain however clauses stipulating specifically th?t Candian • • ,! 000516 �mmm Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information -U- forces stationed there would be armed only with conventional weaoons. Although there are, strictly speaking, ao provle cms in the U.S. Leased Bsses Agreements preventing U.S. forces to be equl.v.ed with nuelear weaoons, it is evident, in the light of recent prssedsats, that fresh agreements would have to be negotiated before NATO stockpiles of nuclee* weapons oould be established on Canadian territory, aa would be the eass for most western Europe countries. Control over HATO Stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons 1 . The question of control over stockpiles ot nuelear weapons constitutes the most important aspect of the United Ft tes proposal. It Is desirable that the HATO Alliance be permitted to develop its full military potential by arming itself with the most modern weapons. But it ia unlikely that this objective could bs successfully and effectively reached unless lt is done under a control system which could minimize the "Fourth Power" problem while, at the same time, reducing and softening the differences in status between the two "unclear powers" in HATO and the ether members of the Alliance. 15. It will see equally essential to ensure that the establishment of NAT. stockpiles of nuclear weapons will aot enable any HATO power to embark unilaterally sa a war against any other power, or accidentally to provoke a situation which could lead to preventive or retaliatory action by a major power, Ve can be certain in any event th-1 the Scandinavians, for instance, would look with the greatest concern upon a situation where the Greek?, end the Turks could, in a moment of over-estimated danger, and ensuing national panic, let go an atomic attack, thereby bringing into the fray the whole of the HATO Alliance. Likewise however, the small members of HATO would see little advantage in the creation of HATO stockpiles of nuclear wsapoas if the control over them were left exclusively to SACStJR and to the President of the United Statee. Such arrangements would, in aay case, likely defeat the purpoee behind the proposal of cementing NATO's solidarity, and of decreasing the dependence of each of the HATO members upon the present United States monopoly of the nuclear deterrent. 16. An initial form of control, therefore, might well consist in having the proposed stockpiles under the formal custody of SACHUR. They would be used only in accordanoe with the specific military directions of SACHUR, which in turn would be given only in accordance with general dlrectivee of the HATO Council regarding the use of such weapons. This policy would be In line with the interpret"tion made by the NATO Foreign Mini stirs, including Mr. Dulles, and by General Gruenther, of "MC-H6", the reoort of the Military Committee of HATO en the most effective pattern of HATO military strength over the next few years. This report was a roved by IATO at its ministerial meeting in December 195^t a n d * h e so-called principle of "civilian control" reaffirmed at the last December ainieterlel meeting. Its Interpretation lefvmember^governments through the HATO Co moll rather •thea to the military authorities the decision aa to shea the HATO nuclear weapons would be used. 17. As a result. It would seem that the practices of NATC aight need to be reconsidered in the light of such increase in the ailitary advantages and responsibilities of HATO partnership. At a moment when the central contribution of NATO to a nation's military potential is being increased, it is an opportune moment to Improve the means for guaranteeing that this increased military potential is used in conformity with NATO's objectives. Furthermore, the establishment of stockpiles of auclear weapons without an adeauate system of control might well ffect adversely the balance of power within NATO, as existing deterrents to unilateral actioa (such as the threat of U.S. aad U.K. abandonment of the continental lead-mass to the Soviet Union) might no longer be as efficient as before. The Canadiaa approach, therefore, could be that with the establishment ef NATO's stockpiles of auclear wee ons, it would become necessary to strengthen she political consultation and control machinery of the HATO Council over the disoositi n and use of these weapons. 000517 �r Qd^menfVifl|gll under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information AWBLm "• ' Excerpts from Transcript of the Dulles' Press Conferenoe Concerning NATO Stockpiling of Nuolear Weapons Washington, July 16, 1957 question: Mr* Secretary, it has been reported that as part of your disarmament proposal you have indicated to the other nations, that, lf they do not proceed with atomic weapons development that this country will consider revising the Atomic Energy Act and making more fissionable material and even weapons available to the allies. Could you comment on that, sir? Mr* Dulles: That is an aspect of the matter whloh has been considered and no definitive conclusions have been reached. Certain things are quite clear* Wo do not Intend that atomic weapons shall not continue in existence, because the unanimous report of the scientists, including the report of the Soviet Union itself whioh is contained in its May 1955 proposal, makes it perfectly clear that as far as existing stocks of fissionable material are oonoerned, there can be no assurance that they can be accounted for or thut surreptitious use may not be made in weapons form of existin fissionable material. Therefore, v/e have had to come to the conclusion that, as far as existing fissionable materials is conoerned, we cannot safely ourselves deny its use for weapons purposes because wo cannot get any assurance that others will do the same* Therefore, we predicate our proposals on the assumption that there will continue to .e the use of fissionable material for weapons purposes at least to the extent that that has oocurred up to the cut-off date that we propose* Now, if that is to be the case, we do not ourselves want to bo in a position where our allies are wholly dependent upon us* Vie don't think that is a healthy relationship. Therefore we are studying ways whereby, through perhaps a N. TO stockpile of weapons and various arrangements of that sort, there can be assurances to our allies that if they are attacked, if war comes, that they will not then be in the position of suppliants, as far as we are oonoerned, for the use of atomio weapons. Now, that may or may not require some amendment of the Aot* i:uite possibly it would* But we do not think that we aro far enough along in that path to make it worthwhile to come to any definitive program of that sort. So far the Soviet Onion seema to be unwilling to accept the idea of a fissionable cut-off at ©11, and of coarse if they don't accept it, then the problem beoomes academic. And also, if they are going to accept the fission;.hia cut-off, we don't know at all what the date would be. A lot of things have uo happen before that date comes, because there have to be large installations of supervisor/ machinery and so i'orth* So, you see we don't know today eithe whether the Soviets accept the concept or what might be a possible date. Until we know those two things with greater oertainty, it is not practical or desirable for us to v/ork ou<& any concrete program* . . *mi �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur faeces a I'information i Question: Does that apply, Sir, only to the N TO allies, that possibility, or would it apply in any other quarter of the globe? Mr. Dulles: Aell, so far we have only thought about it in connection with the NATO allies. Conceivably it might apply elsewhere, but so far Hi have only thought about it in that connection* Question: Mr* Secretary, you mentioned the question of inspection zones as another unresolved problem between the United States and some of the allies. As far us I remember, Chancellor ..uenauer, i'or instanoe, has indicated his approval of a European inspection zone. Ahere are the difficulties now? Could you indicate those? Mr* Dulles: Veil, Chancellor Adenauer indicated, pm I recall, a qualified approval, that assumed or presupposed that there could be a European inspection zone which would not militate against the reunification of Germany and v/ould not seem to solidify the present division of Germany. Now, that leads you right away into the question of what type of inspection you're going co have, who is going to operate it, the relationship of ground patrols to air patrols, your system of communications, and so j.orth* Until you get into those matters, it is very difficult to form a dependable conclusion as to whether or not these inspection zom s in ]urope would or would not de fuoto have the effect of solidifying the division of Germany by involving a large number of installations, bases so xorth, whloh would In fact be predicated upon the division of Germany. So until you get into the practical details of this matter, it is, I think, not possible to judge what its impaot would be upon the political problems of Europe* uestion: Mr* Secretary, you said last spring that you hoped to see a wholly new development within the North Atlantic community of consultation, not only about political matters within the community but outside* If this question of providing atomio weapons for NATO were o through, would that not involve a much greater degree of consultation than h.s existed to date? Mr. Dulles: I think it would be an act of confidence which would strengthen the fellowship of the North .Atlantic community. Toa may recall this proposal was made by the French at the Bonn meeting of the Council and it has received very active consideration ever .iince then* We have the pro H e m that has been alluded to of our legislation, and ve that same lem in relation to the matter of establishing intermediate missiles in the United Kingdom. There are certain things that can be done within the confines of the present legislation; other things that will require a change in that legislation. Those are highly technical problems that are being studied by the Defense Department and the Atomic . nergy Commission, and wo hope that there will be some conclusions on that aspect of the matter within the next few weeks perhaps. But so far there Is no definite conclusion. cstion: Mr. Secretary, with an alternative to creating a stockpile of atomio weapons for N TO, would an alternative be to provide atomic weapons to some of the principal NATO partners which were interested in having them, such as Britain and France? . . *3 000519 �mmmmmmmmmmimmmmwmmiimwm^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information | Mr. Dulles: I think that it would be more appropriate to deal 1 1th this matter, if possible, as a NATO matter whioh would not involve drawing lines of distinction as between different allies. That becomes an invidious process. 000520 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02218 Title A name given to the resource Notes Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Jul-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons, Europe Description An account of the resource NATO Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en