https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/927714516ff9d8ba82093f433d61720a.pdf 69352b91a8052392f247080a04885841 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information $ f SES3ET DD/2929 The Diplomatic W i r e l e s s S e r v i c e , FOREIGN O F F I C E , S.W. 1. August 2, 1962 \ ___<X-_£ The following r e p r e s e n t s our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the d i s c u s s i o n s which took place in Ottawa between July 18 and July 20 regardin g the introduction of STRAD to the Canadian t e r m i n a l of the Hydra c i r c u i t . We understand that the decision to close down the Hydra t e r m i n a l at L e i t r i m a r o s e mainly from a d e s i r e to " h a r d e n " the signals c e n t r e in o r d e r that it could continue to function during and after a t h e r m o - n u c l e a r attack. The decision to use STRAD was dictated by the limitation s of space available both for equipment and accommodation in the "Hardened" site. T h e r e is insufficient space available to house e i t h e r the t o r n tape equipment from L e i t r i m or the staff r e q u i r e d to operat e this s y s t e m . You e s t i m a t e that STRAD will come into s e r v i c e on Hydra in September 1963 and that t h e r e will be a saving of approximatel y 50 in your operating staff once the change over has been completed. PROCEDURE Your officers explained that only m a r g i n a l a l t e r a t i o n s would be r e q u i r e d in the m e s s a g e headings, the changes would consist of a new first line group to a l e r t STRAD, and a s e c u r i t y indicator . All o t h e r , routing i n d i c a t o r s etc . , would continue exactly as on the Hydra traffic a s it now o p e r a t e s . In addition, a special end of m e s s a g e sign would have to be included at the end of each t e l e g r a m . I am not, in this p a p e r , attempting to spell out the p r e c i s e signs that would be used since it i s obvious that the actual r e q u i r e m e n t s would have to be specified in a P r o c e d u r e document p r e p a r e d by your people. MESSAGE PRECEDENCE The proportion of high p r e c e d e n c e traffic as handled on the Hydra c i r c u i t s would s e e m likely to introduce a number of p r o b l e m s when t r a n s f e r r e d to STRAD. This was a g g r a v a t ed by the fact that STRAD automatically produce s to the S u p e r v i s or copies of all m e s s a g e s graded Operational I m m e d i a te and above. Your officers made a suggestion that whilst continuing to use the s a m e d e s c r i p t i o n of p r e c e d e n c e , namely, Routine, P r i o r i t y , Operational I m m e d i a t e , E m e r g e n c y and F l a s h , that we should in fact down grade each one of t h e s e in o r d e r to include the pro sign for the Deferred Grading. This would have the effect that the only types of Hydra traffic which would be produced to the S u p e r v i s or by STRAD would / be those Colonel P . D. Smith, D i r e c t o r of the Royal Canadian C o r p s of Signals, D e p a r t m e n t of National Defence, A r m y H. Q. , OTTAWA, 4. Canada. y <^Z 000010 �0 2929 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \&®3EflV lz be those graded E m e r g e n c y and F l a s h . This p r o p o s a l was made owing to the high p e r c e n t a g e of p r e c e d e n c e traffic handled on the Hydra c i r c u i t s which would have a tendency to flood the S u p e r v i s o r ' s position with a resulting back-log. Your officers made it quite c l e a r that although the production of the traffic to the S u p e r v i s o r would be delayed this would not in any way delay the onward t r a n s m i s s i o n of the traffic through STRAD. Whilst it i s unlikely that this delay would have caused us any concern on the Hydra link it would unfortunately also introduce delays into the Military c i r c u i t s operating through the other p a r t s of the STRAD installation. This we understood was unacceptable to your people. We w e r e obliged to explain that we could not accept any down grading of m e s s a g e p r e c e d e n c e s used on our traffic since these w e r e d e t e r m i n e d by the o r i g i n a t o r s and dictated entirely by the m e s s a g e content. We could not a g r e e to any down grading in this r e s p e c t nor could we indeed give an undertaking that t h e r e would be any reduction in traffic of this type. Your people undertook to take another look at STRAD with a view to ascertaining whether it would be p o s s i b l e to a r r a n g e for it to produce to the S u p e r v i s o r only those m e s s a g e s on the Hydra c i r c u i t graded E m e r g e n c y and above, whilst at the s a m e time leaving the p a r t of the equipment handling the Military traffic connected in such a way that it continued to produce to the Supervising position all traffic graded Operational I m m e d i a t e and above. We await further information from you on this point. During our d i s c u s s i o n s on the introduction of STRAD and following our own investigations of the s y s t e m , we all a g r e e d that satisfactory operation of STRAD could not even begin u n l e s s we could e n s u r e that the routing indicators were c o r r e c t l y received. In o r d e r to do this E. D. C. equipment would become e s s e n t i a l . Whilst we have some r e s e r v a t i o n s regarding the use of E. D. C. equipment, we undertook to look into the m a t t e r with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the additional financial c o m m i t m e n t which would fall on the F o r e i g n Office in o r d e r to p u r c h a s e equipment, the r e q u i r e m e n t for which r e s u l t s entirely from the introduction of STRAD. It was a g r e e d that the NSA/GCHQ traffic would be handled outside of STRAD and t h e r e f o re does not r e p r e s e n t any p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m . ALERTS TRAFFIC Bearing in mind our t r i p a r t i t e c o m m i t m e n t for the rapid handling of A l e r t s traffic, we had a numbe r of r e s e r v a t i o n s regardin g its working through the STRAD equipment. Various types of warning s y s t e m s whereby the S u p e r v i s or might be warned before any signal entered STRAD were d i s c u s s e d . The possibility of some form of automatic warning which would enable d i r e c t connection to be established with all t h r e e u s e r s was examined. We all a g r e e d that some m e a n s of making c e r t a i n that no A l e r t s m e s s a g e was delayed or p e r h a p s tangled up in STRAD was e s s e n t i a l . Your people suggested that a "black box" might be introduced which would have the effect of a l e r t i n g the S u p e r v i s or over and above the n o r m a l a l a r m system i n c o r p o r a t e d in STRAD which b e c o m es active on receipt of a F l a s h m e s s a g e . Robin suggested that a device known a s "Mabel" might be introduced which would have the same effect. If "Mabel" suitably modified for the Hydra c i r c u i t s could be made this might be capable of producing a warning signal which could be sent over the existing c i r c u i t s without interruptio n of traffic. / T h e traffic . . . �m Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • >-J/2929 \^P_y /3. The traffic being only i n t e r r u p t e d during the actual t r a n s m i s s i o n of the A l e r t s signal. We all a g r e e d that this m a t t e r m e r i t e d further consideration and Lt. Col. Scott undertook to investigate the possibility of a "black box" and Robin undertook to take another look at "Mabel" with a view to seeing what could be done to modify the equipment for this p u r p o s e . PICCOLO TESTS You kindly undertook to help us with our t e s t s of the Piccolo equipment which a r e due to c o m m e n c e in about a month or so. We explained that your testing of Piccolo would form p a r t of a r a t h e r wider s e r i e s of t e s t s , the r e s u l t s from which would d e t e r m i n e whether and to what extent we should introduce this system to the D. W. S. c i r c u i t s . We would like to send out an Engineer with the equipment and we would suggest leaving him with you for the first month of the test period. The whole period to l a s t some t h r e e to six months. We had some fairly detailed d i s c u s s i o n s on the Piccolo s y s t e m of signalling, the introduction of which would not complicate the STRAD i s s u e . Robin suggested that it might be possibl e to produce something like a six channel Piccolo which if used on a long wave c i r c u i t would go a long way to i m p r o v e the reliability of Hydra, LONG WAVE TRANSMISSIONS Long wave t r a n s m i s s i o n s , t h e i r advantages and t h e i r d i s a d v a n t a g e s, were d i s c u s s e d in some detail. Robin was a strong advocate for the introduction of long wave since it was his opinion that it would provide a much l e s s vulnerable c i r c u i t than that at p r e s e n t provided by either the cable or the short wave Hydra c i r c u i t . He considered that an investment in long wave equipment would s e e m likely to be much m o r e profitable than the hiring of further p a i r s in the T r a n s a t l a n t i c c a b l e s . This was based entirely on his f e a rs that the cables might be i n t e r r u p t e d in the event of or i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r to a r e a l e m e r g e n c y . We undertook to let you have some idea of the cost of the equipment and als o an a s s e s s m e n t of the relative m e r i t s of long wave v i s - a - v i s c a b l e s . EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM The system of a r e a calling as at p r e s e n t used by the D. W. S. was d e s c r i b e d and we explained that we w e r e actively engaged in modifying this s y s t e m in o r d e r to provide a method of making contact with the r e m n a n t s of D. W. S. following a n u c l e a r attack. The b a s i s of this system is that all surviving stations of the network would listen to c e r t a i n fixed frequencies at fixed p e r i o d s throughout the 24 h o u r s . Any station wishing to contact would call on the a p p r o p r i a t e frequency with previously allocated call signs and any D. W. S. station hearing this call would reply. It will be seen from this brief explanation that by this method any two or m o r e stations within range should eventually establis h a contact. We suggested that it would be to our mutual advantage if your signals c e n t re could come into this e m e r g e n cy network, bearin g in mind its limitations and the fact that it would be operated on hand m o r s e . Your people showed g r e a t i n t e r e s t and we undertook to send out the full detailed scheme when it is complete. To s u m m a r i s e the position c r e a t e d by the introduction of STRAD into the Hydra network (1) NSA/GCHQ traffic will be outside STRAD. (2) The need for special steps to be taken to warn the STRAD S u p e r v i s o r of the existence of an A l e r t m e s s a g e was recognised by both /sides. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ( J/2929 \J9BP»V /4. sides. We both undertook to take another look at this p r o b l e m . (3) Procedure We a g r e e d that the changes to p r o c e d u r e w e r e m a r g i n a l and saw no great difficulty in thei r introduction. (4) High P r e c e d e n c e traffic We had some difference of opinion h e r e as we could not a g r e e to any lowering of the p r e c e d e n c e signals on the traffic for which we a r e r e s p o n s i b l e . Your officers undertook to look into the limitations in this respect with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e as to whether STRAD could be made to operat e at a c e r t a i n level for Hydra traffic and at a different level for Military traffic. (5) We recognised that STRAD could not o p e r a t e effectively unless E. D. C. was introduced to the Hydra c i r c u i t s . We explained that it will be n e c e s s a r y for this r e q u i r e m e n t to be further examined by the F o r e i g n Office. (b) You a g r e ed to join us in testing of the Piccolo system. (7) Robin undertook to examine the possibility of producing a six way P i c c o l o and a l s o an e s t i m a t e as to the cost of suitable long wave equipment. We als o undertook to investigate the relative m e r i t s and reliability of long wave and c a b l e s . (8) You w e r e i n t e r e s t e d in o u r p r o p o s a l s for an e m e r g e n c y s y s t e m and we u n d e r t o o k to s e n d you a c o m p l e t e s c h e m e a s s o o n a s i t c o m e s available. Both R o b in and I found o u r b r i e f v i s i t to O t t a w a m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a n d we a r e i n d e e d g r a t e f u l to you a n d y o u r staff f o r t h e t i m e t h e y s p e n t in d i s c u s s i n g o u r p r o b l e m s a n d a l s o i n t a k i n g u s a r o u n d to s e e y o u r v a r i o u s establishments. We a l s o v e r y m u c h a p p r e c i a t e d a n d would l i k e to t h a n k you a l l for the s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h we e n j o y e d . P e r h a p s you would be good e n o u g h to l e t m e k n o w if you a g r e e with t h i s l e t t e r w h i c h we c a n t h e n u s e a s a r e c o r d of o u r m e e t i n g s . I am s u r e you w i l l u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h i s l e t t e r i s not i n t e n d e d in a n y w a y t o i n d i c a t e a g r e e m e n t o r a c c e p t a n c e of t h e p r o p o s a l s w h i c h w i l l h a v e to f o r m t h e s u b j e c t of official c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e F o r e i g n Office a n d t h e C a n a d i a n D e p a r t m e n t of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . You w i l l of c o u r s e r e a l i s e t h a t we c a n n o t d i s c u s s t h e m a t t e r f o r m a l l y i n t h e F o r e i g n Office u n t i l we h a v e r e a c h e d / agreement 000013 �m Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information X^MJP2 / DD/2929 /5. a g r e e m e n t on what exactly took place at the m e e t i n g s . Thanking you once again. "Uv^ &^~J^. (W. J. Sharpe) 000014 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hydra Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context HY00233 Title A name given to the resource [STRAD HYDRA Introduction] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 08/02/1962 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Hydra Communications - Policy, RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Emergency planning, Emergency communications, EASE, STRAD, DWS, Tripartite Alerts Description An account of the resource Material duplicated in <a href="https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/items/show/9105" target="_blank" rel="noopener">HY00142</a>. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en