https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/15926421683a748e80c4fc37306d311a.pdf de9be05d4b80e7607e123d58b49f24cb PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a f information ^™ ** s *i EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPLY TO BE ADDRESSED T O : THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXT CANADA FFA RS o™; ' OTTAWA, M a r c h 8 , 1947 Dear A r t , I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have received from Captain Wilson as a result of our informal meeting with him recently. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether, in your view, this accurately represents the position. I do not know whether our plans are sufficiently advanced to answer the question raised in paragraph 10. I have been informed by Captain Wilson that both A.S.A. and N.G.A. have accepted Rockex for Sigint communications on a trial basis. He goes on to say that he is confident that, once it is installed and working, they will not wish to replace it with anything else. I am sending similar letters to Captain Worth and Group Captain Hendrick. Yours sincerely, G. G. Crean. Colonel A. E. Wrinch, O.B.E., Director of Signals (Army), Department of National Defence^, Ottawa, Canada. * 000206 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information it divulgue ei COPY -•s m • SECRET m SIGINT COMMUNICATIONS, NORTB^j^g Memorandum by Captain P.A. Wilson, R.N. (Retd). I have taken the opportunity whilst in U#S.A. and Canada of examining the problem of SIGINT Communication between the United Kingdom and North America, and between Canada and U.S.A. It is abundantly clear that there can be no real increase in the quantity of traffic that can be exchanged until the cyphering arrangements are improved and that, in.fact, the provision of adequate and rapid cryptographic aids (and the necessary operators) is a more urgent matter than the provision of additional channels. The two are, of course, complimentary; existing cyphering facilities are not adequate to load the existing channels to capacity and the projected additional channels will not be able t© be used unless the cyphering side is stepped up considerably. 2. V/ith a view to improving the cyphering arrangements action, as indicated in succeeding paragraphs, has been initiated to mset immediate and future requirements* To appreciate the problem and the action proposed it is necessary to have a clear picture of the existing and projected channels and cyphering terminals* these are given below (I have deliberately not included all channels but only the vital ones). A. Existing Arrangements. O.G.M.) C.BJ.B.C. Ottawa. TYPEX ) /Felecrypton (Rockex) HYDRA 0shawa. ^•.-cMorse channel to U.K. Tel^crypton Wfp British Liaison Office Washington n__ . y (Rockex) A.S.A. \Army)JffiN.C.A. (Navy) Washington Trashing ton ' ' Washington Washmgt C.C.M. , C.C.M. vW/T .>' Link * Londonderry I l000207 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information ^. 2 - Projected Arrangements. Canadian Intercept Stations (Rockex) - *• ' I I » awWi uiiii»j>i-|iiini iw r 11 OTTAWA f r/p (Ro skex) R.C.A.F. Signals Centre.-, \ 2 A/T Channel, to U.K. HYDRA H,r-_-,/Q Channel A/T t o U.K. OSHAWA. (Rockex) British Liaison Office Washington (Rockex), / S h a r e d F.O. and External Affairs.) d A.S.A. Army —~* %WASHIHGTON • / r (Kockex) N.C.A. (Navy) Washington" -? (Rockex) \ W/T ^Link Londonderry , 3. At the moment the following cyphering facilities exist in North America:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (gj Hydra - Rockex Washington Liaison Office - Rockex C.B.N.R.C. Ottawa - Typex and C.C.M. A.S.A. - Washington. C.C.M. N.C.A. - Washington. C.C.M. (a) to (b) Telecrypton. (a) to (c) Telecrypton. 4. . Prom an examination of the above it will be seen that Bydra is at pre-sent the only holder of Rockex but has no cypher channel to A.S.A.; traffic passing over the Hydra link in Rockex has to be decyphered (or cyphered! at Hydra and passes over a clear teleprinter circuit between Hydra and A.S.A. The Hydra Rockex link can therefore only be used for raw material. | ^000208 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - ™ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information 5. Any crypte chat; recoveries and intelligence between U.K. and A.S.A. and/or N.C.A. has to be exchanged in C.C.M. 6. The only cypher between the agencies in Washington and the Centre at Ottawa is C.C.M* which is obviously inadequate. 7. The British Washington Liaison Office has no cypher with the Ottawa Centre. 8. The projected arrangements which have been agreed separately with A.S.A., N.C.A. and the Canadian Coumunications Research Committee are as follows:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) A.S.A. Washington - 4 Rockex. N.C.A. Washington - 2 Rockex. Ottawa Centre -Rockex (Number not settled), Canadian Intercept Stations - Rockex. Hydra will retain Rockex but in the future will not be a major cypher office but mainly a signals relay centre. (f) British V/ashlngton Liaison office will retain Rockex thereby linking with Canada as well as U.K. It will be seen that the basic idea is to make Rockex the common and combined cryptographic system to link U.K., Canada, and U.S.A. leaving Typex and C.C.M. as back up systems, further, it is the intention for the cyphering and decyphering to be done at the SIGINT Centres and to eliminate Hydra as a main cyphering and decyphering centre. 9. The channels of communication were discussed in general terms with Communications Research Committee Canada and the following is the tentative outline plan based on the assumption that the Hydra A/T 8 channel circuit will be exclusive to SIGINT, Foreign Office and External Affairs and that 2 SIGINT Channel will be provided by on the R.A.F, — R.C.A.F. link. 10. A signals centre will be set up in the Ottawa SIGINT Centre which will be connected by teleprinter lines to the R.C.A.F. Signals, Hydra and External Affairs. The Canadian Intercept Stations will be connected with the Ottawa Centre by A / T links. Whether through one Central Receiving Station or through separate R.C.A.F., R.C.N., and Canadian Army receiving station I am not clear. ... 4 000209 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information^ m -;4 SECRET 11, Canadian Intercept will come into the Ottawa Signals Centre in Rockex where a page printed copy and a P/L tape can be taken, the latter being used to run through another Rockex (with U.K. and/or U.S.A. tapes) for passing to U.K. and/or U.S.A. When 3-way tapes become available one of these processes can be eliminated. 12. Although no rigid allocation of traffic as between the Hydra and R.C.A.F,, R.A.F, circuits can be made the general intention as regards the traff1G from North America to U.K., is to use the R.C.A.F. link for raw material and crypte chat originating in Canada and the Hydra link for similar traffic from the U.S.A. plus, of course, External Affairs traffic. The division of traffic from U.K. between the two circuits is a matter for further consideration. (Signed) B. A. Wilson D. A. Wilson. (MtL 000210 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hydra Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context HY00026 Title A name given to the resource SIGINT Communications North America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 03/08/1947 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Hydra Communications - Policy, RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource DND, External Affairs, Oshawa Wireless Station, SIGINT, signals intelligence, NSA, ASA, NCA, Rockex, intelligence sharing Description An account of the resource Letter and attached report from G.G. Crean, External Affairs to Col. Wrinch, D Sigs. Crean notes ASA and NCA currently trying Rockex machines for encryption and suggests they will be a success. Enclosed report by Captain D.A. Wilson summarizes informal meeting between Crean, Wrinch, and Wilson. Report notes that problem in SIGINT communication between UK and North America, and Canada and the UK is lack of encryption facilities. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en