https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0e7df16120e32db29371d40b532bf5c6.pdf 3fd9312e5183eed3562f416ab207db6a PDF Text Text D ;r J\%eJ3ccess tii/e/Access totoInformation ° _ W _ | , _ : disclosed under Information . Act ^™^_, — ... . _ _ de l__o/ sur Tacces a I'infoi 0 COPY .<£. . . OF JP.. " S&P*\ _S y ^ i - ^ Fl. NATOPARIS 0 C T 2 1 / 6 1 - ^ . S E C vtf TO EXTERNAL 2 7 4 1 _dt^ v>tv G I. FO CCOS WASHDC PERMISNY LDN EMBPARIS BONN BRU HAGUE ROME TT DM/DND FM CCOS BAG ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON FM LDN VATO NUCLEAR STRENGTH GEN NORSTAD MET WITH COUNCIL FOR SOME TWO HOURS 0N.0CT20 TO BRING UP TO DATE THE EXPLANATION OF THE TYPES AND NUMBERS OF ATOMIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE WHICH HE HAD GIVEN TO THE COUNCIL IN HIS BRIEFING ON JAN26.DETAILS OF THAT EARLIER BRIEFING WERE REPORTED IN OURTEL 19S JAN27 AND IN A NUMBER OF LETS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING WHICH WERE SENT ONLY TO OTT.NORSTAD EMPHASISED THE SENSITIVITY OF SOME OF THE DETAILED INFO AND ASKED THAT IT NOT RPT NOT BE PROVIDED TO ANYONE EXCEPT ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.WE SHALL DEAL IN THIS TEL ONLY WITH THE MORE GENERAL POINTS EMERGING FROM THE BRIEFING. 2.N0RSTADS PERSONAL PRESENTATION WAS PRECEDED BY A BRIEF OUTLINE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE IRON CURTAIN.THIS INFO WAS PROVIDED BY NORSTADS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.GEN PIGGOT.GEN PIGGOT SAID THAT 100 PLUS DIVISIONS OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES COULD BE DEPLOYED QUICKLY AGAINST ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE,IN THE VANGUARD OF THESE WOULD BE 2 0 SOVIET DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY.BACKED UP IMMEDIATELY BY II MIXED SOVIET AND SATELLITE DIVISIONS IN THE SAME AREA9FOUR SOVIET DIVISIONS IN HUNGAR7~AND~SEVEN' BULGARIAN DIVlSIONSoTHIS VANGUARD WOULD BE B A C K E D ^ U P W I T H I N ^ A FEW DAYS BY 4 5 - 5 0 MIXED SOVIET AND SATELLITE DIVISIONS,HE DEALT WITH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET BT0C~STRENGT-H-i3MD_RT FIVE HEADINGS OFCA)MANPOWER INCREASESCB)EQUIPMENT INCREASESCOREQRGANIZATION OF UN I T S . D> UNIT TRAINING.AND CE)WARSAW PACT MANOEUVERS.THE UPSHOT OF INFO AVAILABLE ^ 2 5 \ I ... n. 2'Wu ______ In mi ill • " _ „ ' " ,-•-•. T~'\i-\ «•'•••• -•• • Di. ' "•' h,;>;-oric_i sson 'IL. i r w 000179 �t - t *• \ -_,-«.,*.•*••• mil k SECrfcJF. GI: Tl TWO Document disclosed under the Access to mf&rmation^Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - BEST AVAILABLE COPY •' : 2741 f £g 2 2 1985 INTELLIGENCE UNDER THESE HEADINGS LED TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS^ < ->' H E R O A J L B E J : N _ J U 4 ^ ^ OF S V ET AND SATELLITE FORCES IN EAST GERMAN.B)THERE HAD BEEN AN I C: EASE IN CONVENTIONAL SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES IN EAST GERMANY, A D ' O A GREATER EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO INTEGRATE SATELLITE AND S-.V'ET CAPABILITIES.NO RPT "NO MILITARY STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN WHICH V/.'Ul.D INDICATE THAT FORCES WERE BEING PUT ON A WARTIME FOOTING BUT 0 ' HE OTHER HAND THERE HAD BEEN AN OVERALL INCREASE IN THE CAPABIL- ITY OF THE SOVIET SATELLITE FORCES TO ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES.GEN P GCOT,FOLLOWED BY GEN NORSTAD,EMPHASISED THAT THE MOST GENERAL CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WAS THAT THE SOVIET A'0 SATELLITE MILITARY CAPABILITY HAD IMPROVED AND THAT WE HAD TO , «T'EFEFORE ACCEPT THAT THERE WOULD BE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN T.E PERIOD OF WARNING WHICH WOULD BE AFFORDED US IN THE EVENT OF A D. CISION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION Af-ArNST EUROPE. 3-Ai.. INDICATED ABOVE NORSTAD THEN OUTLINED THE DETAILS OF THE ATOMIC DYlyVERY CAPABILITY OF ALLIED COMMAND FORCES EUROPE IN SURFACE-TOSYRIACE WEAPONS SYSTEMS,SURFACE-TO-AIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR D.LYVERY AIRCRAFT.THERE WAS LITTLE NEED FOR HIM TO POINT OUT THAT A! LIED COMMAND EUROPE AT THIS MOMENT POSSESSED A TREMENDOUS NUCLEAR C P,.CITY.NORSTAD SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TRANSLATE THIS C E C I T Y INTO MEANINGFUL TERMS HE COULD SAY THAT IT REPRESENTED Q O.E THOUSANDS OF TIMES UNQUOTE THE FIREPOWER AVAILABLE IN ALL -AV'LIER WARS.HE REMINDED COUNCIL AS HE HAD IN JAN THAT ALLIED COMMAND E ROPE HAD HAD AN ATOMIC DELIVERY CAPACITY SINCE JUN 1952. 4 NORSTAD THEN PROVIDED THE COUNCIL WITH WHAT HE TERMED QUOTE SPECI LYY SENSITIVE INFO UNQUOTE CONCERNING ATOMIC WARHEADS AVAILABLE T . .HE ALLIANCE AND SPECIAL AMMUNITION STORAGE SITES WHICH EXISTED « - o vi 000180 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a {'information .•DOWNBRAKOTa. SECRET • . ••;•. . -RSNIIT .A SECRET PAGE THREE 2741 FEB 2 2 1985 THIS INFO,SIMPLY STRENGTHENED THE IMPRESSION OF THE GREAT AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH PRESENTLY EXISTED IN NATO EUROPE.HE SPOKE OD ALL OF THIS STRENGTH IN TERMS OF THE TARGETS WHOSE ENGAGEMENT MOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF EUROPE WAS TO BE DEFENDED.THERE WERE SOME 700 OF THESE TARGETS IN ALLBA LITTLE OVER HALF OF THEM WOULD BE ENGAGED BY QUOTE EXTERNAL FORCES UNQUOTE.ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE ITSELF WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ABOUT 3 0 0 . 5.N0RSTAD AS WELL DEALT WITH THE PURELY- MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK REQUIRED TO ACTIVATE AND CONTROL NUCLEAR FORCES.THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATIONS HE SAID WAS, ONE OF THE GREATEST PROBLEMS AND INDEED ONE-OF THE GREATEST WEAKNESSES OF .HIS COMMAND,EVERY-EFFORT WAS BEING . . . ' • » ' . MADE TO DECREASE THE VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND. TO QUOTE DOUBLE BANK UNQUOTE THEM. IN ADDITION TO AN ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS - . _. CENTRE WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED IN A QUOTE HOLE IN THE GROUND UNQUOTE SOME MILES FROM .SHAPE HQS, EVERY EFFORT WAS .BEING MADE TO DEVELOP EVEN MORE FLEXIBLE COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS. HEPSACEUR, ALREADY HAD AT HIS DISPOSAL AN AIRCRAFT WITH SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES WHICH WOULD PERMIT HIM TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM IF REQUIRED.BY JAN 1962 HE WOULD HAVE AVAILABLE TO HIM FIVE LARGE AIRCRAFT WHICH WERE IN EFFECT FLYING COMMUNICATIONS CENTRES.ONE OR OTHER OF THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE IN THE AIR AT ALL TIMES AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, 5.NORSTAD ENDED HIS BRIEFING WITH A SUMMARY OF HIS PERSONAL REACTIONS OF HIS VISIT TO WASHDC TWO WEEKS AGO.HE SAID HE HAD SEEN THE SENIOR OFFICIALS OF USA GOVT AND HAD SAT WITH THE PRES AND OTHER OFFICIALS FOR A PERIOD.OF SEVERAL HOURS.HE CAME AWAY WITH FOUR MAIN IMPRESSIONS? CA)THAT THE PRES REALLY UNDERSTOOD-THE WEAPONS WHICH WERE AVAILABLE . TO WESTERN F0RCES 9 THEIR DISPOSITION AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.B>THAT THE PRES HAD A DEEP APPRECIATION OF THE TRAGEDY WHICH A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD INVOLVE<C)A CONVICTION THAT USA GOVT WOULD TAKE ALL o0 o r . 000181 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information j\ct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PiSE FOUR 2741 FEB 2 2 1985 REASONABLE STEPS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF PRESENT PROBLEMS W THOUT THE USE OF ARMS(D)AN EQUALLY CLEAR CONVICTION THAT IFpIN S.'ITE OF EFFORTS TO REACH AGREE.ENT.THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE tf.YST WERE ATTACKED,USA GOVT WOULD FIGHT WITH WHATEVER WEAPONS MIGHT BY NEEDED TO DEFEND NATO TERRITORIES. 7.:.ANY OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE RAISED WERE OF A DETAILED AND NOT RYT NOT TOO IMPORTANT NATURE,WE SHALL THEREFORE SIMPLY GROUP TOGETHER SOME OF NORSTADS ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE MORE INTERESTING QUESTIONS. to Hi: SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE ^SOVIET UNION WAS NOT RPT NOT AS WELL OFF AS THE WEST WAS WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.INDEED H_ BELIEVED THE WEST WAS SUBSTANTIALLY AHEAD IN THIS FIELD,HE BELIEVED TKAT THE SOVIETS HAD COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS WHICH WERE MORE DIFFICULT EVEN THAN OURS.THEY,THE SOVIETS,WERE WORKING ON JAMMING TECHNIQUES BUT SO WERE WE,HE WAS NOT RPT NOT SURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION Hf.D SUPERIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD EVEN IF ONE INCLUDED THEIR BIGGEST MISSILES.THE DISTANCE A WEAPON WOULD GO_WAS_NOT_ RPT NOT THE M.-.IN ISSUE. IF IT COULD REACH ITS TARGET ANY ADDITIONAL RANGE IT MIGHT HAVE WOJ1LDBE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE WEST HAD THE CAPAPT1-TTY Tn Rp:a ™ fl * ! T " F ESSgNTTAI. TARGETS, WJ-AT WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT WAS THAT WE KEEP AHEAD AND PROVIDE WEAPONS SYSTEMS NOW WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED 4 - 5 YEARS FROM NOW,NORSTAD SAID IT WAS HIS BELIEF THAT THE ATOMIC CAPABILITY OF SATELLITE FCRCES WAS NIL.THEIR CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH HOWEVER WAS IMPROVING AND RAPIDLY.WESTERN DIVISIONS WOULD STILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL COMBAT C/PABILITY WITHOUT NUCLEAR STRENGTH BUT WOULD BE MUCH MUCH WEAKER IF TIEY WERE NOT RPT NOT TO USE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH WERE INTEGRATED INTO THEM SUCH AS,FOR EXAMPLE,THE HONEST JOHN,THE EIGHT INCH HOWITZER Al'D THE DAVY CROCKETT.NORSTAD GAVE IT AS HIS FIRM CONVICTION THAT TKE SOVIET UNION DID NOT RPT NOT ENJOY ANY DEGREE OF IMMUNITY 000182 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informath Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tin, ti. _.3jps_s; > w_ HHHT A $.__...„_ PAGE FIVE 2741 FEB 2 2 1985 FROM NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION GREATER THAN WAS ENJOYED BY THE WEST. THE SOVIET UNION WAS AS VULNERIBLE AS THE WEST TO NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION NO RPT NO MATTER WHAT PUBLIC SPEECHES MR.KHRUSHCHEV MIGHT MAKE. IN SUMMARY HE SAID THE NATO ALLIANCE HAD THE MEANS FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET THREAT SO LONG AS THE WILL TO USE NLCLEAR WEAPONS EXISTED.IF, AS WELL, WESTERN GOVTS WERE WILLING TO GIVE SOME PRIOR INDICATIONS OF THIS WILL,THE ALLIANCE ALSO HAD THE STRENGTH AND THE MEANS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE OF WAR. LIIGER A 000183 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW05456 Title A name given to the resource NATOParis to External 2741 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10/21/1961 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO agreement for cooperation regarding atomic information," RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-40, Part 1.2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource NATO Nuclear Strength Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en