https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a7ac2d07d8617038c92304e0162a674d.pdf 218bb2e84d575b63aa9386ecd8a3702e PDF Text Text i:-otLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEME~T MADE ON THE BASIS o;· YOUR'" IN. COU~CIL OCT23 ~ 'EL DL1509 BEGINS:QUOTE I WISH TO !HANK THE MJLITARY AUTHORITIES fOR HAVII\JG ')ROVIDED AN A~SWER TO THE CD\! QUESTIO"J ABOUT THI SF~U:CTIVE us,;-:OF M UCLEr1R WEAPO"-JS.I SHALL PASS THIS A\JSW[R 0~ TO r1Y AlJf'HORITlES M-10 TRY TD LET THF: COUNCIL HAVE THEIR REACiliOI\J AS OOiCKL'f AS POS.,, S IBLE.FO~ !ffE MOMtNT I WILL CO~PIE M't'SELF TO REMffOING 'fHE com1- CIL THATTHE CD~ QUESTI"ON A~D MYSUBSEQUENT lNTERVENtIONAT THE LAST MTG OF THE COUNCIL O'l THlS SUBJECT' WERE ilESIONED TO QUESTION :· HE APPROPRIATENESS OF T~E USE OF ~UCLEAR W[APONS;!'fOT RPT ~OT IN ':HE CONTEXT OF THE GE~ERAL NtjCLEAR STRATEGY O'F THE AL·LIA~CF: t'.\S DEFINED IN fHE /.\THE!'JSGUIDE LINES,BUT: IN THE CONTi:Xl OF ITS APPLI 0 ' CABILITY IN THIS CATALOGUE OF PROBINGACTIONSDESIG~!O TO A~!RT /\NO DEFEND WESTEfiN RT.GHTS IN BERLIN IN CIRCUMSTANCES SMORT OF A GENERALWARANDfOR PRIMARILY POLITICAL ANDPSYCffOLOOlC~L PWRPOSESm 2., WE HAVE TALKED A GOOD DEAL ASOUT wHAT TH£ OUTCOME OF OUR DISCUSS!ON SHOULD BE FROM A ?ROCF.DURAL POINT OF VIEW.A NUPII-ER Of Sl/!3GES,. T IONS HAVE BEEN PUT fORWARD.,ACCORD I NO TO SOME 'IIE SHOUl.O QUtlTE AP?ROVY UNQUOTE THt BtRCOr-J/Mf1RCO'\i PLANS; OT:1ERS HAVE SUGGESTED WE SHOULD QUOTE APPROVE THESE PlA"J6 IN PRI~CIPl.E UNQUOTE;OTHERS HAVE SUGGESTEDTHATWE QUOTENOTF UNQUOTE THE PLANS;ORQOOTEAPPROVETHE PLANS FOR PLAi'JNHfGPURPOSESUf\lQUOTE;OR QUOTEAPf'ROVZETHE PLANS AS 1\ CATALOGUE tNQUOTE.,LEAVlt-,tGASIDE THE FACT THAT,IN THE FORl''i WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THEM, THESE Aft£ t-fOT RPT \JOT MILITARY Pt..A.-.JSIN 1HE ORDH!~PY SENSE OF THE WORO,I WOULDBE GREATLYASSISTED IF I COUL~·HAVE SOME INDICATIO~ OF WHATSORT OF FORMULA THE COU~CIL MIGHT JD0°T 'S ••• 2 000699 �·,., ·, , .... ·, PAGE TWO 2467 THE AGREEDREACTIONTO THE PAPERSW~ICHHAVEBEEN SUBMITTED TO US. 3.ANOTHER STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CLARlFICATIO~WILL,! UNOERSTANO, BE TAKENTOMORROW WHENTHE COU~CILRESUMESDISCUSSIONOF ECONO• MIC COUNTERMEASURES.WHILE I HAVEASKEuFOR NEWINSTRUCTIONSON THIS SUBJECTI HAVENOT RPT NOT YET RECEIVEDANY.NEVERTHELESS I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAINFURTHERCLARIFICATION ON THE RELATIONSHIPBETWEE'\1 ECONOMIC CONTINGENCY PLANNINGMW MILITARYCONTINGENCY PLANNING. 4.THE SAMEAPPLIES TO PARALLELPOLITICAL PLANNING.ATOURLAST MTG IT SEEMED TO ME THATALL THE OTHERMEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCESTRONG- LY URGEDTHE THREE TO PROVI DE. US Wl TH INFO ON POLITICAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I THINK THlS WOULD HELP A GOOD NUM• BER OF US TO CLARIFYTO OURGOVTSWHATIT IS THAT IS BEING ASKED OF THEMUNDERTHE HEADINGOF MILITARYCONTINGENCY Pl.ANNING.I THINK WE ALL RECOGNIZETHAT IT IS NOTRPT NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVEDIPLO AND POLITICAL CONTINGENCY PLANNINGI~ THE SAMESENSE AS TKEREHAS BEEN MILITARYCONTINGENCY PLANNING.~EVERTHELESS THOSEOF US WHOARE NOT RPT NOT DIRECTLYCO~CERNED WITHco~tINGENCYPLANNINGARE PLACED AT SOME DISADVANTAGE BECAUSEOF THE CONTINUING FLOWOF ~EWSPAPER COMMENT 0;-~ POSSIBLE POLITICAL PHTIATIVES.OF COURSE THERE MAY BE NO RPT NO SUBSTANCE AT ALL I~ THESENEWSPAPER STORIES.SOMEOF THEM HOWEVER SEEMTO HAVEBEE~ WRITTE'JBY RELIABLEJOURNALISTS.OVER THE PAST FEWWEEKSTHEY HAVEDEALTWITHA VARIETYOF POSSIBLE POLITI• CAL ANDDIPLO INITIATIVES OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE WHICHHAVE NEVER EVEN BEENDISCUSSEDIN THE COUNCIL.WHAT AFTER ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCILNEEDIN DALINGWITHTHIS HEIGHTENING OF I~TERNA• TIONALTENSION IS A CALMJUOOME~T BASEDON AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE TOTAL ISSUES WITHWHICHWE ARE DEALINGWHICHWECANONLYGET FROM SEEING THEMIN A PROPERPERSPECTIVE~UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS IGNATIEFF 000700 �RlECOff 503J/J ./1--~ 1/o f's-o ·~ .·~-3 ,;' .P- TO EXTERNAL 2466 OPIMED l ,_L INFO CCOS EMBPARIS LDN WASHOC PRIOfiITY I REF OURTEL 2464 OCT24 2 3 ~.1/U/ 4 / • ,.L BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING 6 H --- 7 1( FOLLOWING IS THETIXT OF THEREPLYOF THEMILITARYAUTH0RITTES 9 THECON~UESTIONABOUTTKE SELECTIVEUSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPO~S~ _!9,_ TEXT OF ANSWERBEGINS; IN RESPONSETO THE R!Ql..€ST'OF, THE COUNCIL, THE FO:.LCW ING ANSWERS TO QUEST IONS ON SELECT IVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONSf'OSEP BY CDN DEl. ARE TRANlilU1TE·D TO THE stCG.tN FOR TM:&:NAC. 2.AS INDICATED IH I.HE STANDING 8ROUP APPRAISAL SGtt-479-62,SELEC-- TIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FORQENONSTRATION PURPOSES WOULD .BE POLITICALAHD PRIMARILY SUADE THE SOVIETS PSYCHOLOGICAL lH NATURE IHT!N9ED OF NATO D£TERM1HATIOH LIT !CAL DECISION.THEY lN ORDiit TO PER.. TO OBTAIN A PO- ARE NOT RPT NOT CURRENTLY DESIGNED TO HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY M!L lTARY VALUE. HOWEVERSELECT.IVE USE OF NUCLEfR WEA·,. P:JNS IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULAR PLAN FOR BOTH DEMONSTRI\- TION PURPOSES AND DIRECT MILITARY VALUE,COULDBE AN OPTIONAL COUR.,., S~ OF ACTION.FURTHER THE STANDING GFOUP HAS POINTED OUT THAT IN THE CASE OF QUOTE NO RPT NO TARGET LNQUOTE DEMONSTRATION,NATO IN~~ 1RITIES SHOULD BE C!..E:ARLY MADE MANIFEST TO THE SOVIET AUTHC TENTIONS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THIS IS A DELIBERATE USE AND NOT HPl' NOT I\'~ ERROR.. 3"ACCORDINGL Y THE GENERALCONCEPT FOR THE SELECTIVE WEAPONSAS EXPRESSED IN THE BERCON B SERIES BERCON BI AS FOLLOWS; PROVIDES A QUOTE NO RPT NO TARGET UNQUOTE AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TRATION rs USE OF NUCLEAR A QUOTE NO RPT NO DAMAGE UNQUOTE NUCLEAR DE~:ONS,., DETONATED OVER SELECTED AREAS PREFERABLY NEAR MILITPRY COMPLEX.'f'iE OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE1'0 PERSONS ?1ND/ OH PROPERTY AND YET ASSURE THAT THE EXPLOSION BERCON BII CONSISTS OF AN AIR IS BURST ON A MILITARY SEEN FROM THF. GROUND~ TARGET 000701 �•'. FEB2 7 1985 PAGE TWO 2466 DETONATEDt,WAYrROf'l POPULATION CENTERS.THE SIR1CTLY MILITARY T1'r.iGETS INCLUDE AT:ACKIMG AIRCRAYT,AIRFIELDS,SA~l SlT[S,TftOOP CONC'!:N• TRATION ETC:. •I 4. li'ROM .~ C•PERATIOMAL \' IEW POINT SELECT IVE USE OF TACTIC~L NU• CLEAR WEAPONSIN 8ERCON f'LANS IS COVEREDSY SPECIFIC PROCEDUR!S _(\NDCOt-4STRAUiT8 WMICH PROVIO£ FOR l:P9,-L&WM!HTOF NUCLEAR WEAPCNS EITHER SINGLY OR ffi Llt1ITED HtJtlBIRS ,oft 9PECir!C PURPOS!:S,AND tN SP~CIF IC AREAS., 5.·to MINIMIZE DANCJER OF [SCALATICINT·O G!:lfERAL.WAR,SACEURS :>OLI~Y IS TO EXERCISI QEtrl'fitALIZiD eOttTROL &F "UCL!AR V!:AP(Jtfs BY RF.:T/\I'HNG FOR HIMSELF TJtE ~ Alft.KORifY '•IM:AC! F'OR &tM:et ING 11ftI T? EMF'LJ'f.. MENT IN co:\fOJlltlTY WITfl A SP[CIFIC TO EMPLOY NUC1.£AR 1WIAPMS POLITICA'L D!CI'S'ION AT THE T !TW:E SE!.!GTMLY/fm . ' ··Erffls.·~ ·., 000702 �EllE-CoeY -/0 FM NATOPttRIS OCT24/62 '," ;i ~SEC Ip EXTERNAL2464 OP!MMED 2.',,WERECEIVED AN ANSWER FROM THE STANDING GR.OUP .IO OUR QlJESTION ABOUT . ' . . .; : . ' ;_ I( l ' •, :., . • THE SELECJ'IVE USE OF NLICLEP, R WEAPONS., 1 ,,SHALL BE _S.ENDING THE TEXT . ... ' ·: . ' -· ' ' ,; SEPARATELY.IAMALSO SENDING3EPARATELY ThS TEXT OF A STATEMENT I 1,; .. -~}, !¥ADE AT MTG BASED ON YOUH REF'TEL. :' . j '-:;' ' ... ,!, .:,e.DISCUSlON CONGENTHATED ON T)Wt~UCLEAR A~PECT :· PLANS ..F'ROM THE DISCUSSION ' · . lHE CONCLUSION 1'0 THEYSHARE NUCLEAR ,, OF .J.HE 3ERCO.~,/MARCON 1 .~. ·,) ;., . .; . ~ ~-; • ;, THAT,1~LTHOi.JGH A NUMBF;R OF DLS SAY, PRIVATELY . : ' < . ~ .: ·.J.·.. -. THAT PLANSFOR THE SELECTIVEUSE OF INCLUDIN3 WEAPONS IN BERLINCATALOGUE,ONLY NORWEGIANS WOULD BE LIKELY : . . -: . ~ . SUPPORTUS 10 . AND F'.iOM PJ?IVATE CONVERSATIONS I HAVE COME I . • '!N .• A.H VIEWSABOUT OUR i, ;J' .. IF WE WERE TO INSIST THAT ANY FORM OF COUNCIL APPROVAL . :, .,. ';ff:' • ' :,: ..,, " ~ r' C ,, "l • OF THE PLANSSHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE PLANSFOR THE SELECTIVE · -.,r. - · . -~ : . ·• :· , ·t :t~· .. ·r ~ .~:~::.if! .,;., · USE OF NUQLEAR WEAPONSmBELGIANS ANDITALIANS PARTICULARLY SHOWN . . '7.i._ . . • .: . ·,: -,, ., t. . r .') HAVE ...-...\."' .'i' SYMPATHYFOR AND UNDERSTANDING CF OUR POSITION '. ,• f: ·t ?'I,. • • THE CUJNCIL BOTH IN Ii ,, : ANDIN PRIVATE.HOWEVER THEYWJULDNO[ RPI NOTCARRYTHIS TO THE ~ ( ... :i POINT OF INSISTING THATTHE NJCLEARPAGES 3E FOR~ALLYTORNFROMTHE "'J CATALOGUE., ,. 4." THE ARGUMENT Of A CLEi~R MAJJRITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE C OJNCIL WAS THATA DECISION WASTARENLAS~ YEAR{li C-M{61)104,TO ASK MILITARY AUTHORITitS TO PREPARE THESE PLANS,INCLUDING PLANS:FOR THE SELECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONSoIF -ONE AS?ECT OF THEM WERE NOW TO SE EXCLU~ DED THIS WOULD THROW DOUPT. ON THE CATALOGUEAS A WHOLE.BY ONE ~JEANS OR ANOTHER SOVIET AUTHORITIESWOULDBECOME A\IAREOF THE CHAN~ G£D POSITION.JMTHEY MIGHTDRA·w THE l1.1RONG CONCLUSION FROMlHE·FACT . THAT, . ~HEREAS NATO WAS PREPAR!:D TO HAVE CONTtNGSENCY PLANNING INCLUDE PLANS FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONSIN 1961,THE ALLIANCEHADDEC!~ (J ~ 2 000703 �,,. PA81 ?VO 246'4 OED IN 19'1 NOT JIPT NOT TO INCLUD£ TNIS OPTION.Tia: PLANS CtNSTITUT!D A CATALOGUI.Tltlllll VAS NO Rftt NO QUESTION OF APPROVING PLAN IN DETAIL., I INDUD SONI DELS.NOTABLY YRINCH,INSIST THAT THE ONLY VAY IN WHICH THEY CAN APPIIOff THE ftl.ANS IS IN G!NtRAL TERNS AS A VMOL[CATALOGUE, SINCE THEY COULD NOT RPT HOT AGREE TO THIii IN DETAIL. TH[ MAJORITY LAY GRIAT EllaaHASIS<II THE FACT THAT TH[R! IS NO RPT NO QUESTION Of ANY ADVANCE D[L ~E or AUTHORITY IN ANYFORMWHATSOEVER.THEEXECUTION or ANY OF THE PLANS OR ANY C<IIBINATIONOF TH!: PLANS-ANDTHIS INCLUDES TH! PLAIISFORTKI SELECTIVEUSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPCIIS•WOULD BE THE SUB• JECT OF A SPECIFICPOLITICAL DECISIONBY GOVTSAT THE TIME. 5.AT TH[ SAMETINE I THINKTHEMAJORITY RECOGNIZE TKATWHATIS BEING CONTDIPLATED ICIRI COULD INVOLVE A DECISION BY GOVTS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS801N8 IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES8!Y(Jf0 WHATWASFOftES[IN IN ATHENS 8UIDE LINls.,uRTHEAIIORE THE MILITARY CIIDRS HAVE POINTED GUT THAT,FOR TNI PURPOSE OF PROTECTING TKEIR OWNF<R:ES,THEY MIGHT FIND THIMS[LVISIN THt PSITIOO or HAVINGTO ASKFOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL AUTHORITYTO USl TACTICAL NUCL[AR WEAPONSIN CIRCUIISTANCES NOT RPT NOT ENV!SA8£D BY COUNCILWH!N IT DRAFTED ITS INSTRUCT! CNS TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN C•MC61)10~.TO THE THREE SETS OF CIRCUNSTANC[S [NVISA8ED IN PARA6C D>TH! CNORS HAVE ADDED TWO OTHER SETS o, CIRCUIISTANCES(9E[ PARA 15CC>CF SGM-479--62 AND PARA 7C81 OF ENCLOSUR£ ONE TO TKE SAME DOCU>, 5.NEVERTHILESS TKE FOUR TO~THER WITH ![LGIUM DENMARKGREECE ITALY HilD THE NETHERLANDSHAVEINDICATED THAT THEY WOULDBE PREPARED TO [f,QVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO AGR[EMiNT ~ SOME SORT OF APPROVALOF THE BER;ON/MARCON PLANS, THE N~•FOlJR WOUL.DPROBAE,LY AGREE OOLY ON THE UNDERSTANDINGTHAT TH[R[ '3E' crnTINUOUS CatSULIATI~ ON PARAL- LEL POLITICAL PLANNING.COUNCIL AGREEDTHAT A SMALLGROUP OF ?E~REPS SHOULDMEET INFORMLLYTO TRY TO WORKOU'r SUCH A FORMULA.I SHALL OF COURSE KEEP THE TE~S • 0 .3 OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS VERY fllUCHIN MIND IN 9 t 000704 �PAGETHREE2464 PARTICIPATINGIN THESEDISCUSSIONS. IT MAYBE THATWHATWILL RESULTIS A DECISIONBASEDON PARA8CB>OF P0/62/641.THE FIRST SUB-PA~AHERE APPEARSTO RAISE NO RPT NO DIFFICULTY.IT WOULD SIMPLYAMOUNT TO SAYINGTHATIN DRAWING UP THE PLANSAS T-MEY HAVE,CMOftS ·HA0 DONE 1 WHAT THEYVEREASKEDTO.WHETHER WEARESATISFIED WITHALL ASPECTS OF THE PLANSOR NOT RPT NOT, I DONOTRPT NOTTHINKWECANFAIL TO AGREETHATTHE CMDRSHAVEONLYDONEWHATTHEYWEREASKEDTO DO LAST YEARIN C•MC61)104.THE DIFFICULTIESWOULD ARISE OVERTHE SECCND SUB=PARA,THE OPENINGWORDS OF WHICH.WOULD HAVETO BE MODIFIED.I THINKSEVERALDELSMAYBE PREPARED TO CONSIDERPRIVATELYSOMEFORMULA WHICHWOULD HAVETHE COUNCILQUOTEAPPROVE THE MAJORNATOCNDRS PLANSIN THE BERCONANDMARCON SERIES IN PRINCIPLEFOR PLANNING PUR... POSES••• ETC.UNQUOTE. 7.,0N THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONSO FAR HOWEVER I STRONGLY DOUBTIF WE COULDOBTAINSUPPORTFOR A DECISIONTO ELIMINATETHE NUCLEAR PAGES FROMTHE CATALOGUE.IN THESECIRCUMSTANCES I THINKTHE BEST PARCTICAL OUTCOME WECOULDHOPEFOR WOULD BE ONEALONGTHE LINES FORESHADOWED IN YOURINSTRUCTIONS;THAT IS,A FORMOF GENERAL NON-COMMITTAL APPROVAL SUBJECTTO FURTHERPRIOR POLITICALDECISIONSBY GOVTSAT THE TIME COMBINED WITHA STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD REGISTERINGOURRESERVATION ABOUTTHE INCLUSIONOF THE PLANSFOR THE SELECTIVEUSE Of NUCLEAR WEAPONS.WE COULDAT THE SAMETIME INSIST-AS INDEEDWEHAVEALL ALONGTHATWE MUSTHAVECONTINUOUS CONSULTATION ON PARALLEL POLITICAL PLANNING SINCE THE MILITARYPLANSMUSTBE SEEN IN THEIR RELATI{:111 TO THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF OTHERASPECTSOF CONTINGENCY PLANNING. 8.I SHALLHAVEAN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSSTHE FORMULA QUESTIONPRIVA· TELYWITHFINLETTERANDDE STAERCKE ON OCT25oIF YOUHAVEANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS I WOULD BE GLADTO HAVETHEMBY THEN I GNATI EFFO 000705 O O V < � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 24 OCTOBER 1962 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962-10-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00045 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 24 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2. BERCON plans Berlin contingency Denmark econmic countermeasures George Ignatieff Greece Italy Norwegians