https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c6e864fc3e4c2b811c253ec5cfb4a7f3.pdf de5ce3044b19228551139a6e7e99a5ee PDF Text Text -~. --/ • ·- COPY•• / . ""--·Ir~,,,.,,,, P.3.OF.€-. •• . , . J)_J ,_ .,.L l •5 J..,AY-y / I>· 1 8 9 IC) ., ~-•·: 2.•.XF A SIHT ABLE OPPORTUN!TY ARISES, I THINK IT MIGHT BE DESI FAE,_£ TO Mil.KEAT l,EAST HID POINTS IN THE DlSCUSSIO.N..PERIOD~!HE FlFS1 IS 1· • TIJP,T,SO FAR AS BERLIN ,CON1'INGENCYPL$HN.lNG.,IS CONCE'.P.NED, \iE 4....." ·, -~ ..._. BELIEVE ll 1.tRM D!S1'INCTION SHOULDBE MI-\DEsiElwEEN MILITARY F.J_E:'<T MEASURES WHICH ALTHOUGHEXPENSIVE f.1RE RELATIVELY EASY FOR Cl:A JO H'PLEMEMT ;,tITHO!Jf Plf.,LIC COMMOTIONtND ClVIL ALERT MEASURE.$t_iHtCH PRESENT CONSIDERABLE CONSiITUTIONA!: 0R POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOi> !Jf, AS 'IJELl. AS RISKING ESCALATION.THIS IS POINT !1ADE IN PARA 5 or YOUF;TELDL1366 SEPl8pAND THE BRIEFING SEENS LIKELY TO OFFER A GOODOPPOlHUNITY FOR MAKING !T. 3, SECOND POINT IS THAT A DIST IN CTION MUST ALSO BE MADE BETWE.EN ALERT ~;EASURF.SGENER~.LL Y AND ALERT MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT CF BERLIN CO!lTINGENCY PLt,NNI!-lG.I THINK THERE MAY ALREADY HAVE EEEl-: SCIMECONf/lJSION ON THIS POINT.THE F'OllR~POWEHSEQUENCE Pt,1-'ER,FOR E,;AMPLE,SPE,,~xs OF' GOVT DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT A SIMPLE ALERl Al OKE STAGE AND A REINFORCED ALERT LATER If NECESSARY,IT IS NOT RPT NOT CLEAR '//HAT EXACTLY THE PLANNERS ME,iN BY THIS. THE MOST 08V raus MEAN,ING I!3 THAT ALL l'hE SHlPLE ALERT MEASUHES,CIVIL AND t'.!LJTA!~" • ,, WOULD BE 1!4PLEMEN'fED AND9 SUBSEQUENTLY ,ALL Mf:ASUilES, ClVIL THE REINFORCED N,ERT AND MlLl'I'ARY.FURTHERMORESINCE THE SEQUZNCE !--'1;PtR !\(,SLIMEST:-IAT PHASES ~'OULD LAST FOR 11\0NTHS,PAPER COULD BE RE/,D TO MI:AN THAT ALL THE ALERT MEASURES AT EACl-i STAGE WOULDHAVE TO BE 000362 ...... ., �...:.. .. •:- ' :Ji.l - f t~··.. i i ' . ' - ...~ -·-.:.:-;-. -.,.;-..-!. 1• ------------------~-! I \ i . e, ~ ' - • .,. ,'--___ ·· _______ PAGE TWO 23!0 - HE.:~DFOR P!iOLQ!-l_GfD. PERJODS_". ·"---- - - -.,· ~ ....... 4o L!i Tl-llS IS \IJHFITTHE -PL~.NNE:P.S_!jEAN,WEA NEEDS'E·XAM!NING,I T'HNK. ----,.. -·- --·· --..:'.:>. -~~ t - ·-, I Ur1DERSTAND :!°H~T SOME AT LEAST OF ME1\SURES~~~~D_ WERE NE11En INTENDED TO BE IN r'ORCE FOR SO LONG. IT MIGH1\BE1))f(ACJlCAL, INCON• . . ·-.. \ '", 1 /lL~IENT,EXPf.<.NSIVE /\ND UNNECESSARYTO IMPLEMENT-.JHEMALL AND HOLD ' TH'!:t'l FOR PROLONGEDPERIODS.lHIG ''-- -~ -~ SUGGESTS THAT QUESTION WHICH OUGHT -. TO BE PUT '.i'O GOVTS l\T SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF A CRISIS OVER BER.!t-1, ,,,- ~ IS NOT HPT NOT~QUOTE/\RE YOU PREPARli:D NOW TO OHDER A SI!1PLE/RtIN~ FORCED ALEfff'?UNQUOTEBlff,QUOTE WHICH IF AN'/ OF THE CIVIL/MILITARY MEASURES U!·.1DER,~ SXMPLE/REINFORCED AlERT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE I11PLEMEN1EDNOW Hl ORDER TO Df:MONSTRATETHE tETEflMINAIION OF i/ESTERN POWERSTO KEEP ACCESS OPEN TO BERLIN?UNQUOTE.Hl OTHE~ 'i/ORDS9 A SELECTIVE AWl?T ATION OF THE FORMAL ALERTS SYSTEl'1 Mi'.Y BE , WHATBERLIN CONTlNGENCY PLANNING REQUIRES, IF SO THEN IT IS PRESU• l1A3LY (JU THIS ADAPTAT.ION THAT WE SHOULD BE CONCENTRATING, RATHER TljAN OM THE ALERTS SYSTEM AS Sl.K::H'4'HICH IS IMPORTANTBlIT MORE ,I.\PPROPRIATETO PREPI\RATIONS F'OR A FULL STATE OF WAR;WHICH IN THE BERLIN CONTINGENCYCONTEXT IS ONLY BEING CALLED UPON IN EFFECT FOR PSYCHOLOGICALPURPOSES !GNATIEfF 000363 �ASK~::A~fJJff:;J,~EJt~N.C~Uf:jl ON~.9F.:(fHE;)SEL'ECT.I\!El USE;(OF•:NUC!.:E AR'J~El-'=<r=--i • b--'-7-~· J:N THE CAt~!,;9~~Jt!)Fz?IRC.9NJ~ARCON,:_Pl.ANS; IT!:M);AY '.BE,TACJICAI:L -1- • hD.~!?.A!l.!-.f.:, TP.:.~~J'tREJ',AREDJ:TO_.!rP.RESS ,_O,UR::ARGUMENTS 7AGAINsr:.THE. • o/.~ ~ -• JV!, l. . INCLUSION OF THIS OPTION WITHOUTFURTHERD.ELAYo.l,.HAVE! THEREF.ORE . PRE_fA~~-!).:·Ff)J...l,,qWI~G;•N9JE.S:f.O.RJ AJ:_ST.A1,EltlENT;;FOR, 'POSSlBLEl USErIN: THE:; z... ~ COUNCIL.OCT.lOo'I~'WOULOl'APP~ECIATE::.YOUR;:COMMENTS'.:BEFORE,:THAT. TIME•.. •2. IN~.;1/~Tc,THA!;·A:SUBSTANTIAI:!'ANDDETAILEDJ.~PtY··_wERERET.URNED•• rTO.: OUR:QUJSTJQN1ON;,ocr1o;•I-.WOUJ,;D}HOL'D; TliESE:'ARGUMENTS. IN :RESERVE.:,.; AND t!AKE1 A, SH_O~J!STATEMENTJTHANKIN~ iTHE:lRIPART.:t.TE'.'PL'ANNERS. FOR ' THE CON§~D_ERATIQN.:GIVJ::N.tJO:THEJQIJEST.10.NI AN_Dl'Lt,IDERT AKING:TO 'PASS THEIR ARGUi<lENT$_;01\l ror.YOU,IF,:i IN\THE:t,lGHt ;()F~tHEIR:'REPl.Y ro·' , ·-: OUR QU~STI_Qt,J YpU;.STILt1CONSIDER:;THE!'lNCLUSIONJ OF.:NU::LEARPLANNING INADVJ~~L~7;Tl!EN:;!HE;§TATEMENT;COIJLD~BE~MADE FOLLOW INtL'.WEEK. ,, ·: 3. I HOPE_:;IJ~_C/_ULD.:HAVEfYOUR EAfll.;IEST!:P0$SlBL:E"AUTHORIT.YiTO.: AGREE TO. THE REtrlAININGITEMS.,IN·THE·:;CATALOGUEJ:OFJPL:ANSfEVEN IF:IT. - _:'•~.,,., a_ .. _ _. . • • IS DECIDED. THAT THE NUCLEARITEMS ARE'.;iUNACCEP.TABLE~TO! US{ AND;(IIUSTBE EXCLUDED• INDEE~JI!'!:..;~Y!V 1EW 11\!fOUL;DiHEl:,P,:_ TO CARRY:OUR:,POINT." ABOUT'.:THE''.·. EXCLUSIONQf TliE3~UCLEARITEMS:!FTl'.;COULDISAY THAT,REMAlNOER : ..,•. ,....,,._ •.,i,1--~--"'·-, 1·."•.:.. ·······••..., • )..... " Orc- THE CATALOm.•E-IS __ ..\;;tu_ 1 ____ACCEP--TABL·E 'lll:............ - ~ .• ..... ~. DR~'f NOTES BEq~N,tCD,N;-DOUB'fS:ABO ur:THE:-ADVISABIL'ITYOF-_INCl.:UD.ING PROVISION:F.OR~•THE~SELECT IVECIJSEJOF::NUCLEAR:':WEAPONS IN. THE CATALOGUE OF BERLIN;CONTINGENCY:"P.LANS.HAVE BEEN:.::EXFRESSEDON,VA!NUMBEROF · OCCASIONS.MY .PREDECESSOR.MADE ..THIS iCJ.;EARDURING'DISCUSSIONS WHICH. TOOK,P.l.ACE'.A.;YEAR.'AGO Ii/HENCOlJNClL''WAS:GOING'THROUGH-THE STAGES OF 000364 �,,t ''"i .1} • .·, ~ r, ...~ nu1t.1r.Mnt'l l0 S';C\lt l - J~ --i Ou11RE.ttU\i Pt;SECi.i:.l I ·. ~,:.~J,;, ).,60~ l ~ J ·.. . :\ ;',. "'·l1• ·••"f· . 7•,9s5·,...::;~ -~,... •. ..,~1 ; fl A . *t~tl .. · -. \ PAGETWO 2307 . 1 ·~ . -1 I' . : ·' fEB,, .-.~-..~\. ·.,...~-....: "~f!' •;o~"' ,;:~ .---,,. "-'" h. A """ ~' "1. <..J -· • ·.I, ·_;:"··· '. '· DJ(Afl';lNG·'flit' 11-fSTRUCTIOtilS to NATOMILITARYt[ufHi:ilfit i{s!wHic1f:roo"k G: THEIR FINAL .FORMAS C;,.M(6l) 1,04~-rl'.tn:1roF'l {fi.lE&'f{ONS :-w HiCH' i;1'SK£0~~1Nl':'.:X TH£ RESTOSESSION-OF COUNCIL•ONSEP27 REFLECTED~ltHESE'.s·AME-·ooLiifrs;: .• ,i' ~ • !liESlf bouats: HAVEIf" . J" -.:·~ . -:,, ANYTHiNGBEEN INCREASfo=:-svTc:luRYstul)'yJof: :SACEURS'.fCO~ME'NTS, OtH,1',iiEt,'11ERCONIMARCON:(ptfANS.J-iif:-NotEsJfii SHAPE/;. · 70•62• 10/6Z:\r HAt.:tA INucttAR)DEMONstRATION '!WOULff,;H}.vfi<NorRPT ft,io :.<, Pui:tTARv;~ovA1ltAtit;woiJto1 sEl!oFJrQuEsr:ttHuiett=-Potl'r-"icrdJ~A1>vANTi .... \ .,•; ·:,~ -~ AND ~aomJtPRov:xnt ~A~ ;irxc6~: tof¾,.ffssttl:'fo)rilEtAttArE-:W1rif:r-1ucH o .:..;t• ... . . '. GREATERfl1UCL£ARtRF:SPONSES:w1nclilcoutD7ACHIEVE:StGNIFICANT:MiCirA ' .. . .. ' ADVANT AGE'.iFORt uss,a 1. 'fA.D!Or.!:rtt.J'Q UIC:tnu 01,'~ oitt v : ,: :u_,.,;7 i ( 5o tN ..:HlSUNOTEJ POi.627'5l>i ,'SECGtN::x~vifED\ SUGGEst1o&s1'to:RliitifE°NDMENTs~ ; TO r.m::SEr PL:ANSo'INl'VlEw:11DF :.sACElilFIS::coM~lElJ:ts;•ti,THIN!l'.LtHE ,.PAGES .'1 :;,: ;;,;; ABOUTiNUctEI\Rl WEAPONSfVll.L'l,REQU]RI!: 11::MucH: M<iflE::ci\REFuD•'AND-: PROLONGED • i, ,· ,_ ~ ~,.r ,.,_... ___ ,,_... ~••,• ,. STUDY:iA'Sll'OiTHEI!'r:virn:ous:I!'!Ft::If::l\!IONS!BEFORE'' THl!:Y~COULD• SE' INCLUDED . . - ~- 1l '::'. !M ANYJ'AP.PR'OVED ll:AT1iL'OGUE~'trw;l'.'Sll~T:ot~fl7ii<!T I't :QUIT ET'ctEAR':tHAT ~;l~Al NOT R?f'l'Narl RA!SINnl'.AT1:.TfflS, TIME~:J'f!E) WHOLE)QUE'Sf I oN:oFi.TJit':Pi.Ji.'CE .,;:-; 0,1"NUCLEARfWEAPONs::xN:NATO 'in.JllltEGYiA'S1 Sflcl{l,'p'onlt t)w1s"~fo~~:.; :l' ~ ...• STRESS;IS!THAT!l.US!:::oFJNtJCLEAR)wtAPl'.iNSlitN!s£1H:.!~;cotJTEXT CANNOT''"' u: RPT NOT BE:'.'UUSTIF:IEIH.'ON ,TliE'.lSAMElARtl'l.iMENTSlAS'.·JusfiF'i'.:'f:'NtiCLEAR-' • " STRATEGY'.iOJICTH£UPURPOSESf.OF:':WlGENEJfat: .'-WAR~'AS1tHE",TRl PARTITE,L'.'... i · Ft:ANNERSTtlEMSEl.:VES:SA Y;tHElINTROOUCttofiJor;:r-mci.EAR 'WEAPONS' • 'f. woutDlPRODU'CEA':."l'OTALLY.:OIFFERE:NTi'S.iTUA't1oN:ri r:.. · .,.,.,,!~ · · -· • , · 1'A FIRST~USE. 6.,WHATlr/E':AR£JCONSIDERING.'. HEREl:J:S '·POSSIBILITY-~OF of.~~ NUCLEAR'\f/EAPONS]3Yil'HEALl.:IANCE3NOT'.;Rpt::t,iotIN: RESPONSEto A ,i 'L!· ::-, · ~lASSIVESOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACKNOR::trf'lRESP.CJNSE!to!i:HE ·FIRST·'' .• USE·s YJiflEI Of HERl.SIDE;BUT,iIN.'TliE!CONTEX't~OF~A CATALOGiiE..'.OF .:JiROBIN G OPERA!IONS :SUPPOSEDt:Y~REt:ATEDJOIRECTLY.:.Toiit HtJPROBLErf,OF'. RESTORING j ACCESSto::BERLIN~x'N'lHIS!CONTEXT;usEtOFl:NUCtEAR-:wtAPONS-'.AGAINSTfA ·, 1 SIGNIF"ICMJTcsovI~Tll>lIUlT,AR,Y TARGET:lWOULD::!SEE!'lCl'O'. IJScTO.BE QUITE•':. CLEARL't}AN;,ACTfOF.'.)'WAR,tV IRTUAt:I.'!,\GUARANTEE ING:.A NUCLEAR·RESPOOSEo .., ' •nc3 000365 �PAGE THREE 2307 . . JEB.2 ? 1§§5 ON TJ:IE O'.J'HERHANDr. USE:OF A. !)EMON.ST RATION'NUCLEAfl BURST,.UNRELATEd'.·, TO ANY SOVIET TARGET MIGHT-.FA!L TO CONVEYANY CLEAR MSG TO sovu;r'. AUTHOR!TIES~:lN \IHI\TEV~R WAY1THE· WEAPONS~ERE. l,ISE,REAi., RIS){ INVQ)..=.· VED WOULDLIE··IN 1• THE HIGH ·DEGREEOF',,UNCERTAINTYI\S TO WHATSOVIET - • -" • r ~. •, - ' •- • REACTION·MIGliT/BE;;·FOR TtlESE;1REA.SONS~l1E .BELIEVE THAT A· CLOSER .. El<AMOF·;THIS ·PART1CULARFEATURE Of BERLIN CONTINGENCYPLANNING RAISES; DOUBTS,WHETHERIT APf'.ROf>RIATELYBELONGSIN THIS CATALOGUE OF PLANS.DR)6,FTN01'ES END., ! ~ •· , 7. I nqNK ~llE ,SH0Ul,.D,,AV0IDGETTING. OURSELVESIN THE POSITION OF • INSIST!NG THAT THE NUCLEARPAGES BE TORN OUT OF THE BERLIN CATA= LOGUEAND J'HEN,HAVING SECUREDAGREEMENTON THIS, GOING ON TO INSIST THAT OTHER.PAGES BE' TORN.OUT T.OQ.IF ·.THERE·ARE OTHER OBJECTIONABLE - FEATURES TO •THESE PLANS .l THINK WE,SHOULOSA"l so· AS EARLY.AS WECi',N. IF T.HERE~~E NQ.1::· RPT, NOT ;I THINK ,WE,Sl:I0l)l.,DBE PREP.ARED·TO .$EEK APPROVAL,.f.ORAS,)<!UCHOF,,.THEPLANS~/\S,,,WECAN.AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, , BE{IRING.'1N MIND:THAT THERE ~Il.L ALMOSTCERTAINLY BE PRESSUREIN· - COUNCIL TO DXSPLAY THE MAXIMUM SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR NON~ . .,. . - '·•. --·'. . ·, ·, MILITARY AS ~ELL AS MILITARY RESPONSESTO BACK UP THE THREE . . . ' POWERSIN ;B~ALING WITH SOVIE! PRESSURESWHICH:ARE EXPECTEDTO BE RENEWED . IN N0V i.;.;·. IGNATlEFF .. "\ 000366 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 5 OCTOBER 1962 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962-10-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00043 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Alerts," 5 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1. BERCON plans Berlin contingency George Ignatieff Marcon Series