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                  <text>BEST AVAILABLE COPY

\
J.J.
•_)_
1

'.) \

FMMOSCOW
SEf,:16/62 SECRET
1U EXTERNAL
673 OPIMMED

INFO TT LDNCPMANDMINISTER)NATOPARIS
OPIMMED
BONNBRU HAGUEROME
WltSHDCPERMISNY EMBPARIS

PRIOR!TY FM OTT

TT DM/DND CCOS OTT FM OTT

PCO OTT FM OTT

.E~G BGRAD WARSAWOSLO VIENNAPRAGUEFM LON

~G BERLIN FM BONN
REF MYTEL672 SEP15

GERMANY
AND BERLIN
HEREWITHCOMMENTSON KHRUSHCHEVS
BERLIN PLANAS DISCLOSED IN HIS

CONVERSATION
WITH KROLL
REPORTED IN

MY

REFTEL.

2.KHRUSHCHEV
REALLYSEEMSDETERMINED,UNLESS
OF COURSEHE GETS HIS
~y

EARLIERBY WESTERN
CONCESSIONS,TO
BRING WORLD
TO VERYBRINK

OF THERMONUCLEAR
WARIN ORDERTO FORCEWESTERN
ABANDONMENTOF OUR
PLEDGEON BERLINERS SECURITY.THOMPSONWAS LONGCONVINCED THAT
KHRUSHCHEV
WASIN FACT SO DETERMINED
TO GO RIGHT UP TO BRINK.
KHRUSHCHEVS
STATEDPLAN IS CONSISTENTIN TIMING ANDCONTENTWITH
OTHERRECENT INDlCATIONSCEG
TO THOMPSON,U
THANT_,UDALL
AND IN SEPl 1
TASS DECI..ARATION)oDETAILS ARE MORE PRECISE AND MAY BE

DESIGNEDTO

MISLEADUS OR BE SUBJECTTO FLEXIBLECHANGES.ITIS FOR EXAMPLE
Sf ILL

P!)SSIBLE THAT.KHRUSHCHEVMIGHTTAKEBERLIN QUESTIONTO UN

BEFORERATHERTHANAFTER SIGNING PEACETREATYANDBLOCKINGACCESS.
1-0WEVER.
~ALCULATION
THATUN TENDENCY
IS NORMALLY
TO URGEPEACEFUL

ACQUIESCENCE
STRENGTHENS
PLAUSIBILITYOF KHRUSHCHEVS
DECLARED
PLAN
TO CREATEFAIT ACCOMPLI,AND
THENGO NOT RPT NOT TO UNGABUT TO
~CUHITY COUNCILWHEREHE HAS A VETO.FACTTHATKHRUSHCHEV
MADENO

CRPTNO MENTIONTO KROLLOF INTENTIONTO HOLDPEACECONFERENCE
OR
ATTEMPT
TO GET SOMENEUTRALS
TO SIGN MAYALSOBE RELEVANT.INTHESE
CIRCUMSTANCES
IT MIGHTBE DIFFICULT EVEN IF WETHOUGHT
IT PROFIT·
ASLE AFTERFAIT ACCO:i!PLIFOR WESTTO TRY TO TAKEMATTERTO

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

000142

�PAGE TWO 673
ASSEMBLY UNDER U~ITING

FOR PEACE PROCEDURES.

DANGER POINT LIES

3.CRUCIAL

I~ KHRUSHCHEVS APPARENTLY GENUINE

CONVICTION THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS

KE:~NEDY AND WEST wILL

SACK DOWN
'

AND ACQUIESCE IN SOME FACE-SAVING

FORMULA FOR RETRE~T~I

E:CONCJfrJY
SENDING BY DEFERRED MSG VIA

NEXT SEA PLANE ANALYSIS

PROBABLE. FACTORS CONTF'.181.IT
U-.G TO THIS

WELL SEEM PERSUASIVE.

CONCLUSION FROM THEM 15 IN PART

AT LEA.ST SHARED BY FRE.NCH GOVT,~JANY KEY GERMANS INCLUDING
AND I

~DERSTAND

4.NEVERTHELESS

MANY GLOOMY MZ~BEHS OF USACMISSION7HN

I NOT RPT NOT ONLY HOPE BUT BELIEVE

IS GRAVELY
MISTAKENIN

THIS

A~D THAT IN

WOULD NOT RPT NOT BACK DOWN ON VITAL

LAST

THAT KHRUSHCHEV

ANALYSISKENNEDY

WHAlEVERCHAPPENED?&gt;

AND GRAVELY WEAKEN l"l I.ITUAL SELF CONFIDENCE At~D HENCE

COHESION OF F'REE WORLD.THIS
POSilION

BERLIN.

FOLLOWED BY SECOND THOUGHTS WHICH WOULD

WOULD BE INEVITABLY

JEOPARDIZE

KHOLL,

ISSUES OF FREE ACCESS AND

CONTit,.;UED AMERICA[\, PRESENCE IN bERLIN,SINCE
IT

OF

VEHY DANGEROUS IMPHESSION.

THESE FACTORS ARE OMINOUSLY NUMEROUS
ANOMAY
KHRUSHCHEV PROBABLY KtOWS THAT HIS

AM FOR

WOULD ULTIMATELY

AS AN AMERICliN POLITICIAN

DESTROY KENC-.EDYS

~iS WELL AS JEOPARDIZE

AMERICAS

ROLE AS LE.ADER OF F'REE WORLD.MOREOVER SUCH A STUPENDOUS VICTORY
FOR KHRUSHCHEV WOULD l THINK
SHIPS PROPENSITY TO THY

INE-VIT,'iBLY INCREASE COMMWIST LEADER-

FURTHEREXPP,NSION OF COM!":
UNIST

11',;FLUENCE

BY NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. IT WOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE RUSS IAN TENDENCY TO
t:XPLOIT

GLOBAL MILITARY

POWER THEY hAVE AT LAST BUILT

GREAT COST OVER MANY YEARS. INCIDENT
MISCALC ULAT I~ G PUBLIC
AMERICA~ PUBLIC

f,LLYKHRUSHCHEV

OPINION

6.TO

OF THEIR

DO THIS

IS F'HOBABLY

REACTION Il'-l USA AND ROLE WHICH /\ROUSED
CAN HAVE 0~ POLICY

5.IT 1S I THINKTHEREFORE VITALLYI~PORTANT
LEADERSHlf'

Uf} AT SUCH

ILLUSIONS

OF USA ADMIN.
TO

DISABUSESOVIET

ON .FIRtv:NESS Of -WESTERN INTENTIONS.

WE MUST TRY TO CORRECT VARIOUS CAUSES OF' SOVIET
0

000143

••

.3

�PAGETHREE673
MISINTERPRETATION
OF
WILL

NOT RPT

WESTERN

WILL TO

DEFEND

ITS POSITIONoTHIS

NOT BE EASY OR PERHAPS VERY CHEAP.

7~WEMUSTRECOGNIZESTRENGTHOF

TEMPTATIONS

LURINGKHRUSHCHEV

ANDOTHERSOVIET LEADERS TO TAKERISK.COLD WARGAIN FOR THEMIN
FORCING A WESTERN BACKDOWNWOULDOBVIOUSLY BE ENORMOUS.
NATO( AND

CENTOAND SEATO)WOULD
BE WEAKENED
ANDTHEIR
PUT IN

QUESTIONvTHEY

EXISTENCE

CONTINUED

REASONABLY
EXPECTTHATLONG-TERM

MIGHT

PROBLEM
POSEDFOR COMMUNISTS
BY SUCCESSFULDEVELOPMENT
OF EUROPEAN
COM~ON
MARKET

WOULD PROBABLY

&amp;iCK Ai'-lD PROBABLE DISILLUSION

BE

GREATLY MODERATED

BY POLITICAL SET

ING OF THOSE CONTINENTAL

WEST

EUkOPEANSWHOLOOKOUTWARD ANDFAVOURCLOSE TIES ALSO WITH NORTH
A"lE.R!CA AND

OTHERPARTS OF FRE£ WORLD.,KHRUSHCHEV MAYNEEDA

ALSO BECAUSEDORREGIMEIS NOT RPT NOT STABLE,ANDBECAUSE

~CCESS

OOMMUN!5T ai.oc IS
WELL

INCREASINGLY

;..oSING COHESION.KHRUSHCHEV MAY

CONSIDERHIMSELF UNDER VERY GREATPRESSURE TO ACHIEVESOME,,

THINGWHICH WILL REESTABLISH HIS ANf)MOSCOWS
DOM
!NANCE
ANDEXERCISE SPECTREOF

GROWING

IN BLOC

EEC PULLINGEASTEUROPEINTO ITS

ORBITs
~DESPITE

ALL THIS WEMUSTREMEMBER AND I THINK TAKEADVANTAGE
OF

POWERFUL FACTORS IN3IDE

WHENRISKS

ALL WE

CAN

SHOWNTO BE TOO GREAT.IMPORTANT
AMONG
THESE IS

CAN BE

PROBABLY SOVIET

SEE

PUBLIC OPINIOM.. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THATJUDGINGFROM
HERE. PUBLIC

ON CUBA AND BERLIN

QUIET.THIS IS IN
filANDABLE

COMMUNIST C.t1MPOPPOSED TO FOREIGN ADVENTURES

HA:3 BfEN

PtdT

TO RECENTTASS

DECLARATION

ONE OF :3HOCKED GLOOM AND PHOFOUND DIS~

BUT NOT RPT NOT EXCLUSIVELY

POPULAR FEELING

RUNNING WAR RISKS

REACT ION

THAT DISTANT

DUE TO UNDER=

CUBA IS NOT RPT NOT WORTH

FOR..BUT LAST AUTUMN WAR SCARE ON BERLIN

ALSO INDUCED SOME Pi\N [C AND I THINK

IMPORTANT PUBLIC

AND

ITSELF

PARTY

ffiESSURESON SOVIET LEADERSHIPTO BE MODERATEo
~WESTERNSHOW OF FIRMNESSLAST YEA2CNOT
RPT NOT MERELY IN
" •• 4

000144

�f'AGE FOUR 6 73

WORDS,BUT IN CO$TLY MILITARY AND ECON
Ott:IC ACTION, AND IN FSYCHOLOGIC/'.',L
PREPARP,TION OF WESTERN OPINION

FOR FIRt-;NESS IN A CRISIS)PAID

AND GAINED US POSTPOt--.EMENTOF KHHUSHCHE.VSDEADL!NE.MY

OFF

IMPRESSION

THEN WPiS ALSO THAT Jtv:FORTANT ELEMENTS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IN-

ME~BERS AND SOME SATELLITE

CLUDING SOME PRESIDIUM

VERYCONCERhED
LEST

KHRUSHCHEV

LEADERS,WERE

GO TOO FAR,AND USEDTHEIR INFLUENCE

ON SIDE OF RESTRAINT AND BACKDOWN.

10.BUT ~y IMPRESSION IS ALSO THAT QUOTEFORWARD
UNQUOTE GROUP IN
COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING

ON THIS

ISSUE KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF,

HAVE INTERPRETED RESULTAf\T WESTERN EUPHORIA AND SUCH EVIDENCE AS
THEY CAN FIND

OF

WESTERNINDECISION

ANOThER ATTEMPT TO TEST

AND D!SARRAY,TO

WESTERtlNERVE,AFTER THIS YEARS FURTHER

MIL I1 ARY PREPARATIONS PART ICUL.ARLY

DDR B LIT ALSO IN SOV!ET ROCKET

}J,

AND THERMONUC!..EAR CAPA31LITIES,~iIGHT

lleKHRUSHCH[VS

SUGGEST THAT

THIS

TIME PAY OFF.

TO SETTINC

DISCLOSURES TO KROLL AMOUNT I~ EFFECT

At-lOTHER DEADLINE,EV£N

THOUGHNOT RPT NOl El\TIRELY PRECISE AND

THIS TIME. AS YET NOT RPT NOT IN PUBLIC.

12.CUR!OUS FACT THAT ~HRUSHCHEV
WOULD
DISCLOSE"HIS
OPPONENTS THIS

TACTICS TO

FAR IN ADVANCE MAY IMPLY EXTENT OF' HIS

CONFlDENCE,ESPECIALLi'

SELF-

SINCE WI::STERN
RESPONSES HAI/ETHUS FAR BEEN

MERELY DEFENSIVE REACTIONSTO SOVJ.ET INITIATIVES.ON
MIGH1 ALSO,OR ALTERNA1IVELY,SUGGEST

OTHER HAND IT

HIS UNCERTAINTY
AND DREAD OF

ACTUALLY PRESENTING WEST WITH SUCH FAIT

ACCOMPLI AND HIS HOPE

THATTHIS ADVANCE
DISCLOSURE IvlAYPROMPT KENNEDY
TO SEEK MTGBEFORE
NOV MD OF'FER FUHTHERCOJ\CESSIONSTO BUY HIM OFF •
. 1Z1.I TH Il\lK A F UffrHEH \\ESTERN DISPLAY

OF F'IRMNESS COHESION AND

GIRDl~G OUR LOI!\SCMATERIAL AND SPIRlTUAL)WILL

BE NECESSARY.WE

SHOULDPHOBhBLY RE.VIH. AND TIG:ffEN CONTINGENCY PLANS Af-.D OUR
hEADlNESS TO IMPLEMENT THEM.THIS wOULD INCLUDE PLANS FOR CAREFULLY

PHASED AND PROGRESSIVE MILITARY MEASURES,ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS IN
0

••

5

000145

�·-

PAGEFI.VE 673
INCLUDINGWESTGERMAN
READINESSTO CUT INTER-ZONALTRADE,AND
PROdABLY
AS DEGAULLEhAS URGEDOTHERMEASURESIN FIELDS OF OUR
OWN CHOOSINGSUCHAS

READINESSTO

CUT

OFF SOV!ET COMMUNICATIONS

FACILITIES IN ANDOVERFREE WOHLD
TERRITORYoABOVE
ALL IT MUSTBE
MADECREDIBLETO MOSCOW
THATWEST IS READYANDDETERMINED TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO BERLIN BY

l"l IL IT ARY FORCE IF

NECESSARY•

l4oIF WE DO THIS KHRUSHCHEV
IS I THINK FLEXIBLE ENOUGH,AND
HIS
ros1TION STRONGENOUGH,TOLET HIM BPCK DOWNAGAINA KEY ELEMENT.
IN POSITION KHRUSHCHEV
HAS BUILT FOF HIMSELF,NOTRPT NOT ONLY
POLITICALLYBUT IDEALOGICALLY,ISTHATWARWOULDBE DISA5TROUSALSO
FOR

COMMUNIST
CAMP,ANDTHATCOEXISTENCEANDMUTUALRESTRAINT

BETWEEN
POWERS IS IN LONG=TERM
INTERESTALSO OF USSRoKHRUSHCHEV
IS A GAMBLER,AND
NATURALLY
SEEKS TO HAVEIT BOTH WAYS.BUTI
THINKTHAT IN LAST ANAtYSIS HE WILL SETTLE FOR WHATEVER
HE CAN
~FELY GET.OURTASK IS

ro

HELP HIM AVOIDMISCALCULATION,AND
TO LET

HIM DEMONSTRATE
ALSO T1 MOREOBDURATE
ELEMENTSIN SOVIET LEADER=
SHIP AND IN COMMUNIST
BLOC THATCUTTINGWESTERNl-\CCESSTO BERLIN
WOULD
INVOLVEHISKS TOO GREATANDTOO CERTAINTO BE ACEPTABLE
ARNOLD
SMITH

000146

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                <text>NATO</text>
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        <element elementId="50">
          <name>Title</name>
          <description>A name given to the resource</description>
          <elementTextContainer>
            <elementText elementTextId="949">
              <text>Berlin Crisis / 16 SEPTEMBER 1962 </text>
            </elementText>
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              <text>1962-09-16</text>
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          <name>Format</name>
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              <text>PDF</text>
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        <element elementId="44">
          <name>Language</name>
          <description>A language of the resource</description>
          <elementTextContainer>
            <elementText elementTextId="4684">
              <text>en</text>
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          </elementTextContainer>
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        <element elementId="51">
          <name>Type</name>
          <description>The nature or genre of the resource</description>
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            <elementText elementTextId="4689">
              <text>Text</text>
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        <element elementId="43">
          <name>Identifier</name>
          <description>An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context</description>
          <elementTextContainer>
            <elementText elementTextId="4694">
              <text>CDTT00040</text>
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              <text>Moscow to External Affairs, ‘‘Germany and Berlin,’’ 16 Sept. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.</text>
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      <name>thermonuclear war</name>
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