https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2b212a9c4192e96d407b7dbeb1812e3f.pdf 7e19cde3d1a3f0d50e1ee73e0d2ca379 PDF Text Text BRIEFINGWASA PRELIMINARY OULINEOF NATOMILITARYPLANSWITHRESPECT .. TO A BERLINCONTINGENCY WHICHHE HADBEENINSTRUCTED TO PREPAREIN PARA10 or COUNCILS DIRECTIVECM(6!)104.A WRITENREPORTON THESE PLANSWOULD BE SUBMITTED IN ABOUTTWOWEEKS TO THE STANDING GROUPFOR CONSIDERATION THROUGH NORMAL NATOCHANNELS IE BY THEMILITARYCTTEE ANDEVENTUALLY BY THECOUNCIL.HE ASKEDTHATTHEMATERIAL BE GIVEN ' SECURE THE HIGESTCLASSIFICATION,THAT ITS CIRCULATION BY BY THEMOST MEANS or TRANSMISSION ANDTHATCONTENTS BE 'RESTOON A NEEDTO KNOW BASIS. 2.NORSTAND EMPHASISED THATWHAT HE WASABOUTTO DESCRIBEWASTHE QUOTECATALOGUE OF PLANSUNQUOTE MENTIONED IN PARA6(8 >or CM•(61)104 FROMWHICHAPPROPRIATE ACTIONCOULDBE SELECTED BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES IN THELIGHTor THECIRCUMSTANCES.HE WASNOTRPT NOT HIMSELFPRESSINGANYPARTICULAR .PLAN.INADDITIONTHESEPLANSWERE 7 MEANT TO APPLYONLYWHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION or LIVE OAKPLANSHAD FAILED.THEY WEREMEANT,IFTHIS STAGEor A CRISIS WEREEVERREACHED, • TO PROVIDE.THE POLITICALAUTHORITIES or NATOWITHSOMEOTHERCHOICE THANALL..OR. NOTHING• THE•-EXISTENCFQOF THEfLANS DID NOTRPTC.NOTNECES. ; , SARILYIMPLYAT THIS STAGEAN ABILITYTO CARRYTHEMout.NOR COULD IT BE ASSUMED THATIT WOULD BE POSSIBLETO CARRYOUTPLANSIN THE STAGESWHICHHE WASABOUTTO SKETCH.NEVERTHELESS THEVERYEXISTENCE OF PLANSGAVEDESIRABLE FLEXIBILITYTO THECHOICESWHICHMIGHTHAVE TO BE MADEBY THEPOLITICALAUTHORITIES.INSUMMARY HE WASINDICATING PLANSWITHRESPECT _TOWHAT THEALLIANCE SHOULD BE ABLETO DO BUTNO'l'. RPT NOTNECESSARILY WHAT THEPOLITICALAUTHORITIES WOULD DECIDE TO DO. ••• 2 ••• 000459 �.. r , .. ~- - .. ~' . PAGE TWO 506 3.THE NATO MILITARY PLANS IN THIS- CONTE°XT HAD.BEEN GIVEN THE NAME .. . ' ' . ' . .. ,i ]" OF QUOTE BERCONUNQUOTEPLANS.THERE WERETHREE MAIN SETS COVERING > ~ ,,- ... PLANS FOR AIR,GROUND AND SEA ACTION AND WITHIN EACH SET THERE WERE I ·! ,:i T ~4".,,# ,,' , GRADUATIONS.. . .. " •• ~ ... • J • 4.THERE WERE THREE PLANS F ~ T -'-• ~ :BERCON ALPHA 1,ALPHA 2, ,_ANDBRA~of ALPHAl,! 1~p;;;~;-;;O:;;-V-;I D~E;;D;· .~F~:;;_ ;::;;;;.:~_A~Tr,I~_O~N""'O;F~L~A;R;~~i-~S~C:~~_L;~~F~,1;-;G;i:H ESCORTS IN THE BERLIN CORRIDOR ALPHA2/PROVIDED FOR A NON-NUCLEAR 0 ,~ATT~E FOR AIR SUPERIORITY OUTSIDE THE C.ORRiDOR,EI OVER EASTGERMANY. \~R~ PL~NNING PROVIDED FOR A NUCLEARDEMONSTRATION ON A SMALL -- .. -~ . NUMBEROF SELECTED TARGETS EACH ONE OF WHICH WOULDBE AT LEAST TWO ADVANTAGES OF LPHA 1 WERE THAT ,, . THERE WOULDBE RELATIVELY SMALL FORCES INVOLVED IN A SMALL AREA,ALL :.I, -- ' t· .. t, OF WHICH WOULDBE INSIDE THE CORRIDORS.IT THEREFORE INVOLVEDTHE LEAST RISK OF ESCALATION.THE DISADVANTAGESWERE THAT IT WOULDBE I. t .. • EASIL y FRUSTRATED,THAT ITS SUCCESS woui:D NOT RPT NOT NECESSARITY .,A ,, '>. AFFECT THE PROBLEMOF ACCESS AND THAT IT \iOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT I f' " . I .J - .. ,., IN AN AREA WHERETHE MAXIMUM SOVIET CONTROLEXISTED.THE ADVANTAGES ~F fLPH~·J2 ,wERE ~HAT ITS INITIAL :succEss ~As HIGLY L,,I-KELYs~-NCE IT WOULDINVOLVE ALMOST 1000 PLANES.IT W0ULDCAUSE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE f, 0 _r ~ I ., \ . - . TO THE sov IET AIRFQRCE. ITS PURPOSE WOULDBE TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY AND IT WOULDBE AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION.THE DISADVANTAGES . . .. ..,OF THE PLAN WERE THAT IT INVOLVED.A GREAT RISK OF' GENERALWARSINCE ~ ~ ' \~-. IT WAS A LARGE SCALE OPERATION WHICH WQULDPROBABLYINFLICT SUCH ·.,. HEAVYDAMGESON THE SOVIET AIRF'ORCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT THOSE DAMAGESWITHOUTRETAPIATION.THE' ADVANTAGESOF' 'THE \BRAV'ofPLAN WERE THAT IT WAS:s_IMPLE AND INVOLVEDTHE MOS~ LIMITED . USE Of NUCLEARWEAPONS.NORSTADINDICATED THAT ANY CUCLEARWEAPONS . I ' r ,,: , ., .~ ~ ENVISAGED UNDER THIS PLAN WOULDBE UNDER !OKT IN YIELD AND WOULD ' ' ' ~~ BE DIRECTED AT PURELY MILITARY TARGETS MORETHAN TWOMILES FROM ANY 000460 �. ii,'-• r - -.; ~•.,. DOWNGRAOfJJ lfJ S;:CRET ; . R'EOOIT ASECRi T . ~~ &~1,0 -•· -~ ) PAGE_ THREE506 ,. I . , .· ~ ' FR27,985' CENTREOF' POPULATION.AT A LATERPOINT IN HIS BRIEF'itr<rHE GAVEAS .SHORTRANGETARGETIN ORDERTO ACHIEVEQUOTERIF'LE ACCURACYUNQUOTE, AT .A . A~ EXAMPLEA NUCLEAR WEAPON OF' I, 5KTS F'.IREDFROMA HOWITZER ' I - ' THE DISADVANTAGES OF' THE PLANWERETHATIT OF'F'ERED NO RPT NO SIGN!· ' FICANTMIJIIARY ADVANJ'AGE ANDTHATIT PROVIDETHESOVIETS IF' T~EY WISHEDWITHAN EXCUSETO REPLYWITHLARGESCALENUCLfARWEAPONS. ·- THE RESULTCOULDFROMTHE MILIT ARY,POINT OF VIEWMEANTHE ACCEPTANCE ' OF GREATMILITARYDAMAGE ON OURS-IDE. ' 5. IN GENERAL COMMENT ON THESEPLANSANDIN RESPONSETO_._QUESTIO~S, NORSTAD INDICATEDTHATALL THREESTAGES·OF THE PLANSHADQUOTE NUCLEAR ANNEXES UNQUOTE IE THE SAMETYPE OF OPERATION BUT USINGNU· CLEARWEAPONS.SUCH DOUBLEPLANSHADTO EXIST HE BELIEVEDIN THE EVENT THATTHE SOVIET RESPONSEAT ANYPOINT WOULD BE TO IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE THRESHHOLD,IE TO RESPONDWITHNUCLEAR WEAPONS.HE INDICATEDAS . ' WELLTHATANYLOSSESSUFF'ERED BY THE WESTERN FORCES IN THE EARLIER . ' ' ' STAGESOF'THESEACTIONSWOULD NATURALLY DETRACT FROMTHEIR MILITARY ABILITYTO CARRYOUTMOREADVANCED OPERATIONS. 6, PLANSWITHRESPECTTp--@OUND 5IoN WERESUBDIVIDEDIN FOUR~ IE BERCON tHARLIE ttCHARLIE 2i:CHARLIE3\AND CHARLIE4• CHARLIE1 fROVIDED F'ORAN ATTACKBY A REINF'ORCED D.IV ALONGTHE AXIS HELMSTEDT·BERLIN. CHARLIE2 PROVIDED FOR A TWODIVISIONALATTACKIN FRONTOF'THE CASTTLE i AREA.CHARLIE 3 PROVIDEDFOR A THREEDIV ATTACK ON THE AXIS HELMSTEDT TO MITTLELAND CANAL-ELBE RIVER.CHARLIE4 PROVIDEDFOR A THREEDIVISI· ' ONALATTACKIN THE THURINGER-WALD AREA.EACH OF' THESEPLANSALSOHAD _NUCLEAR~ANNXES, I I· 7.THE GENERAL ADVANTAGE OF ALL THESEPLANSWASTHATTHEYWOULD DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSINTENTOF NATOIN THE FACE OF SOVIETTHREATS i ' ANDTHE READINESSOF WESTERN FORCESTO ENGAGEIN AN INCREASED SCALE OF'GROUND ACTION.THEGENERAL DISADVANTAGES WERETHATSURPRISEWOULD BE DIFFICULTTO ACKIEVE,THAT CONTROL OF THE AIR OVERTHE BATTLEAREA ' ' ALL MIGHTBE DIFF'ICULTTO ACHIEVEANDMAINTAINANDTHATTHEYWERE i ' •• •• • 4 000461 �., .. oov,in\unEn 1J s·~cnrr I~ ..., - i: •.· , ' ;RtOOll ASECRtl h \...5(tt~ ~p.\ PAGE FOUR 506 fEB 2 7 \985 SUBJECT TO RAPID DEFEAT.THE SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF • CHARLIE WERE THEN OUTLINED.THE ''-f - r, I ADVANTAGES OF CHARLIE I WERE THAT IT WAS D_IRECTLY RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO BERLIN, THAT IT COULD BE EASILY MOUNTED,THAT IT HAD NO RPI NO MAJOR AFFECT ON NATO"s OVERALL .. . . .. ... . . ·~. . DEFENCES.AN~ I.HAT IT WAS EASIER TO JUSTIFY BECAUSE IT WAS DIRECTED ' .· ~ , ( ~ _"':'. r. . TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS ON THE AUTOBAHN.ITS DISDVANTAGES WERE THAT 'f:. 1. ""' THE C0.-'1BATAREA WAS FAR AHEAD OF NATO·s EMERGENCYDEFENCE PLAN' 'i>os'I.- . ' .I < TIONS AND. THAT IT WOULD BE EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO CONTA.IN SUCH A .. ' ' . i • \) ; • SMALL. FORCE.THE ADVANTAGES OF CHARLIE 2 WERE THAT IT WAS EASY TO EXECUTE AND, THAT ITS INITIAL = f • r_• f, . .,;. .. SUCCESS WAS LIKELY, ITS DISADVANTAGES · · • ~ f' • ~; .'\., -WERE THAT IT ,WAS OFF THE AUTOBAHN AND THEREFORE PERHAPS MORE DIFFI• . CULT TO JUSTIFY IN RELATION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS AND THAT IT .. , TOO COULD BE EASILY CONTAINED BY THE SOVIETS.THE . ' . . LIE .· ADVANTAGES OF CHAR• .. 0 3 WERE THAT IT WOULD BE RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE PRQ,ELEM0F GROUND - . . .. _, ·:-ta ; ·,1-+ ~t' · ACCESS TO. BERLIN AND THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A GREATER PENETRATION CA• ' •. ~ PABILITY,ITS . ' OVERALL. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY i LIE •,•T~~~-~ ..' DISADVANTAGES WERE THAT IT WOULD BEGIN TO DEGRADE THE - .• .. . . ' ~ . OF NATO DEFENCES,THE ADVANTAGES OF--CHAR- ' . 4 WERE THAT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE FORWARDDEFENCE POSTURE OF . ' 1'1'1E7tLLIANCE IF - ITS WERE SUCCESSFUL.HOWEVERIF . I IT WERE DEFEATED THE ..___, VERY SUBSTANTIAL .LOSS OF FORCES INVOLVED WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN TERMS ~TO •1·.s,,NORS,TAD THEN. TURNE_~TO DEFENCE, . . .· _ ~~~~·R _HIS DIR~CT PLANNING FOR~ CONTR(l., T HERL WAS ONLY ONE PLAN OF A GENERAL ORDER IN THIS CONTEXT KNOWNAS QUOTE BERCON DELTA UNQUOTE.IT INVOLVEDCA>SURVEILLANCE AND -· CONTROL OF. .SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING ...... - ,. •. -• IN QUOTE ALLIED CCl'lMAND EUROPE . ., _.,. . ~. FOCAL AREAS UNQUOTE;CB>THE Ci.l<TROL AND/OR MINING OF THE BALTIC . • . STRAITS;CC)THE ·r CONTROL AND /OR MINING OF THE TURKISH STRAITS;AND . 1: . '• ' ~' l ~- ( D) BOARDING, SEARCH AND ARREST WITH RESPECT TO BLOC SHI PPING, THE AD, VANTAGES OF,THIS AND THAT IT I ~ '~ • ~ PLAN WERE THAT THERE WAS A LOW_RISK .~F ESCALATION ALLOWED FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF Clli:Nli:RALALLIED SUPERIO. , HITY IN SEA POWER.ITS DISADVANTAGES WERE THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT 000462 �•.. • ( .. - M;~n /H"<\-n ~ f ,, .. t .• ' • ~~--'i f'-"o"\r)!:,''r '-' • --~~\~'I DOW1ilifV•li ..;·.·,_;~ 'j,J R£DUIT A SECRi.T l 1-S(i:,_% I A;) I PAGE FIVE. 506 FEB2 7 1985· '[ DIRECTL y R:LATED TO THE BERLIN SITUATION AND THAT IT MIGHT PRECI-, AGAINST ALLIED PI TATE LARGE SCALE.. SOV!ET SUBMARINE ACTIV!TY SHIPPING ' ·" ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. 9.GEN NORSTAD THEN .SUMMEDUP THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN GENERAL TERMS. OF ALL BERCON PLANNING WHETHER RELATED TO AIR,GROUND OR SEA, THE ADVANTAGES WERE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PLANS WOULD DEMONSTRATETHE WILLINGNESS OF NATO TO USE SIGNIFICANT FORCE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTION.PREPARATION TO EXECUTE THESE PALSN WOULD IMPROVE THE GENERAL FORCE READINESS OF THE ALLIANCE.SOME OF THE PLliNS MIGHT PRODUCE REAL MIL IT ARY ADVANTAGES. THE IMPLEMENTAT !ON OF ANY OF -<::-------- 1 THE PLANS MIGHT LEAD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE OR CAUSE ' ' THE:i•l_TO REOPEN ACCESS ROUTES WHICH/THEY HAD BARRED.THE DISADVANTAGES --- WERE THAT ALL OF THE PLANS INVOLVED THLP.J.S.K-OF_G.£,NERAL WAR,THAT ~ ' MANY OF THEM COULD Bi. CONTAINED AND FRUSTRATED AND THEY MIGHT LEAD TO THE SEIZURE OF WEST BERLIN OR ro AGGRESSIVE sov IET ACTI ON ELSEWHERE. BE.RCONPLANS WERE MUTUALLY INDEPENDENT BUT TWO OR MORE COULD BE CARRI E.D OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.IMPLENENTATION OF THE GROUND PLANS WOULD REQUIRE ' .'UR SUPERIORITY AND IT WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE ' THEREFORE THAT ,GROUND I A.ND AIR PLANS \IIOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT THE SAME TIME, 10. THE NORWEGIAN REP SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE OBJECTIVITY WITH !/.!.XP3 ...i' '.vlTH WHICH GEN NORSTAD HAD GIVEN THIS PRELIMINARY OUTLINE.HE WONDERED IF THE. EXPLANAT ION OF' BERCON BRAVO DID NOT RPT NOT DEMONSTRATETHE ZXTREME DIFFICULTY OF' EMPLOYING THE SELECTIVE USE OF N UCLE AR WEAPONS c T • RATHER THAN THE OBJECT STATED r,BILITY ni/ cMr.01>104 IE QUOTE THE WILL AND THE OF THE ALIANCE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNQUOTE.WAS IT 'CON- CEIVABLE THAT ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON COULD BE USED WITHOUT BRINGING A NUCLEAR RESPONSE?NORSTADSIMPLY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DRA~J UP, PLANS BY THE DOCU IN QUESTION AND THAT HE /'- BEi TF:VFQ IT _WAS DESIRABLE TO HAVE SUCH PLANS.HE ,WAS PERFECTLY AWARE HOWEVERTHAT ~GOVTS ACTING TrlROUGrl COUNCIL 1-!ADNOT RPT NOT APPROVED ANY OF THESE .. , • 6 000463 • i �DOVINGRADED TOSECREJ· REBUIT AS,fCRET ;;.. 1 .... l , -' .· • k,'"'5 .i, ~ PAGE SIX, 506 ·1 (!:1~1~) FEB2 7 ,ss5 PLANS AND MIGHT NOT RPT NOT DO SO.THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THERE~ FORE WAS PRIMARILY POLITICAL AND NOT RPT NOT MILITARY,ALTHOUGH TURALLY WHATEVER DECISION WAS TAKEN HAD CERTAIN MILITARY NA- CONSEQUENCES, THE DANISH REP ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE NORSTADS RESPONSIBILITY TO CHOOSE WHICH OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANS MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED.NORSTAD SAID HE BELIEVED THAT GOVTS ACTING. THROUGH COUNCIL MIGHT APPROVE THESE PLANS AS PART OF THE CATALOGUE OF PLANS ENVISAGED IN CMC61)104 BUT HE FELT CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD RESERVE TO THEMSELVES DECISION WITH RESPECT TO IMPLEMENTATION.HE BELIEVED THAT BERCON PLANS WERE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT NATURE THAN LIVE BK FFF~CTTVE.THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT THE CASE HOWEVERWITH RESPECT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BERCON PLANS.LIVE + OAK PLANS.THE EXPERIENCE -, OAK PLANS ENVISAGED ACTION WHICH WAS ESEN'f IALL Y DEFENSIVE .BERCON PLANS ON THE OTHER HAND WERE MEANT TO PROVIDE A DEMONSTRATION OF INTENT TO GO FURTHER AND THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A DECISION TO BE TAKEN BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. THE ACTING SECGEN INTERJECTED TO REMIND THE MTG THAT PARA 8 OF DOCU CM(61) i04 PROVIDED TH/\T QUOTE THE EXECUTION OF APPROVED PLANS WILL Bf THE SUBJECT OF DECISIONS BY GOVTS AT THE TIME UNQUOTE. J l oNORSTAD,WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS,POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS SOME- THH;G IN THE CHARACTER OF' HAVING TO TAKE EXECUTIVE DECISIONS WHICH M~.DE A COMMANDEREJ(TREMF.LYCONSERVATIVE.HE HAD HAD THIS EXPERIENCE IN THE PST TWO WEEKS.Hr: HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF QUOTE A GREAT DEAL OF f;DVICE UNQUOTE IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS AND HAD. BEEN EXPOSED TO QUOTE MANY BRILLIANT IDEAS UNQUOTE AS TO HOW TO PROCfrED.IN RESTROSPECT ' f1LL THE ADVICE HAD BEEN BAD AND HE BELIEVED THAT COUNCIL WOULD AGREE IF HE COULD EXPOSE SOME Of THAT ADVICE TO THEt'J.HE SAID HE HAD TO 1\ADNIT THAT QUOTE HE HAD NOT RPT NOT HAD A BRILLIANT \\HE TOOK OVER THE RESPONSIBILITY IDEA SINCE OF SUPREME COMMANDERUNQUOTE. 000464 �FEB2 7 1985 Pf-\GE SEVEN 506 12.FINALL Y IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER,'QUESTIONNORSTAD INDICATED THAT I PLANS AFFECTING SPECIAL NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULDBE DISCUSSED IN· GREAT DETAIL WITH APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES IN ORDER THAT' THIY COULDBE IN THE BEST POSITION TO TAKE SPECIFIC AND DELIBERATE DECISIONS.HE MOVEDON THEN TO SPEAK IN MOREGENERALTERMS OF NATOS l"ORWARD STRATEGYAND HIS BRIEFING IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE DEALT v'ITH IN A SEPARATE l1SG IGNATIEFF•' •. -- ---- -~- ,_ I I I 000465 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 24 FEBRUARY 1962 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962-02-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00039 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘NATO Military Planning,’’ 24 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1. BERCON plans Berlin contingency Lauris Norstad Live Oak North Atlantic Council