https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/965774cd5fe665536181fb0cd0eaf143.pdf 63c748eb62928c2b71c568d358880e77 PDF Text Text D.L. de If. Mathewson/TP DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS • MEMORANDUM ;===/............. TO..... MR•. -IG.NA!J.?~ ................................................ FROM= .. ( 1)/A. ~~\t.\r.,~\\~, er· ~--t . •uiji\l~1'!.Vi ... ."l. ·f.· ·$.;.1.J ~cunty o~N\\\ I'\ \ 11-) -i'l:~jJ.\:».\P~~-... ':-"f.~\~ ·i-T·\~Ii .I!~JJ4'1.G~. -~-:i;~;i;$9.1i! .. u.J. p:i;y_:i;:;;_r_Q~ ...... REFERENCE: ......................................................... lltte cJ30,, r;1~~ t/4-'tf - o . l ...................................................................... SUBJECT: ...... . .......... . S.EC.J.'iE!r . I F.~D.r.\lP.:rY .. \l.~. l9P.2 •..... .--. J'\Eff_),iA; ... 9.'?J?-.~tA8!3.J?-~Y. J'.~~-~J?-_g~................................................ . I To refresh your memory concerning contingency planning over Berlin and the relationship of tripartite ( "Live Oak" ) planning to NATO planning, we attach the following papers: 1 A. ______ CIRCULATION A Departmental memorandum of October 11, 1961 summarizes, · the main features of "Live Oak" and touches· on some of the difficulties and obscurities in B. the text of the "Instructions to NATOMilitary Authorities" in connection with NATOplanning for a Berlin eme~gency (circulated as Annex B to NATODocument P0/61/765). These instructions were approved by Council on / October 25 and have bean circulated by the Military Committee as NATO Document C-M(61)104. Canadian approval was,however, only given subject to a reservation as set out in c. telegram DL-1325 of October Prime Minister. _,D. 19, approved by the Telegram DL-1521 of November 20 contains com~entsj approved by the Prime Minister on an interpretation given by Secretary-General Stikkar of certain phrases which occur in Annex B to NATO Document P0/61/765 (see B above). The text of this inter- 1 I • • • 2 Ext. 326 (6/56) 000475 �.oowM~fl· ~r.nTO l\l..l :-, L .• J ,.,,.., E. the statement substance is contained ~->.A- G\. o.t~.oN =t> ', t~, ,.__Ji.'I o. '} ~h ")<'av-..J. ~tl.k a....&. Liaison ('.',,_<,. \ P"-"'--~ &.~ FEB2 7 t98 3 (1) Division. ( o..~d, .. & ) e.o-...<.>.;. \ ~ \\l<M....e-~~ (:'.J,. , ,a .,... ',. ;_t;._t..;,._,_le;, ~ ,Jf-1.-,-c, &~! R.) )..I..S in of NATODocument P0/61/809, Defence f <_;. r• . : .•. . • '- REBD:T A SECR, f - 2 - pretative , c:..,.,,..._.c,.' o l'i, Gv-&. o-""' 6}~ .L...;...DJ..."' ~ <:.,,..........,Y W~(M 000476 .;.~. �.• ... • ., \ J)L(,)Yl'l�i..t>,q (-J...'i '(, '1 A-rt=l..w......t October 11, 1951. BERLIN - CONTINGENCY PLANNING Following repeated requests from other members of the Council for information on contingency planning, the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities presented a report to the Council on their contingency planning for Berlin on September 27. The information contained in this report was supplemented by a briefing given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional information was also obtained during recent meetings of the Council and from conversations which General Kitching had with Major-General Baker of the United Kingdom who is responsible, under General Norstad, for the preparation of "Live Oak" plans, Following is a summary of the main features of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the infor­ mation currently available.• 2, As explained by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" : organization started, on a tripartite basis, in the winter; of 1958-59, More recently a West German observer had participated. The underlying purpose of the "Live Oak" planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly concerned to carry out their special responsibilities regarding Berlin in all contingencies. It is primarily directed at readying appropriate immediate responses to possible Soviet Bloc interference with Western rights of access to Berlin in the air or on the ground. 3. According to the Three Power report, General Norstad has been responsible, in his capacity as.Commander­ in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, for developing these plans over the past two years on the basis of instructions received from the French, U.K, and U.S.A. g overnments. Although the Three Power report appears to, be clear in this regard, the discussion in NATO Council indicated some difference of view between the Permanent Representatives of the Three as to the origin of General: Norstad's precise authority. It was the U.S. Permanent 1 Representative's under·standing that General Norstad. had been given a special capacity which was neither that of,' USCINCEUR nor that of SACEUR but was one which gave him, planning and command responsibilities with respect to the Three Powers' troops in Berlin. That capacity had been: given to him in order to create a better relationship between Three Power planning and NATO planning, ••• 2 000477 J. .• A -;-­ i �·, .. • D10 Stt\\t.1 uo'Nt\t,\U\~ ..~ sltit't \\iD\\\1 I'\ - #sECRE')2 2 - r,;~ 4. "Live NATO activity: \~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5 Oak" planning covers three main areas of (1) The development of small-scale military probes to determine Soviet/GDR intentions with respect to the denial of ground or air access by force; (2) The use of air lifts as appropriate essential requirements in the event access is interfered with or ground denied; (3) The readying of limited ground forces and tactical air forces to be employed, if necessary, to demonstrate tripartite determination to use force. '.1 to meet civil air access is Ground Access 5, The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the three countries most directly concerned. According to the Three Power report, the plans call for the use of "small tripartite convoys of various configurations designed to test the access routes and overcome physical o'ostacles". The plans also include supplementary military efforts (3 above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe efforts, to demonstrate the determination to react with force, or to test the range of force the Soviets are prepared to apply". The plans for these supplementary efforts provide for a total of three battalion group_s, each comprising troops of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. These groups would form approximately one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has indicated that study has also been given to the possibility of employing a tripartite division. According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if necessary, to extricate any Western forces in the corridor. 6. All the information available indicates that, whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate on instructions to remain within the previously defin°~ corridors. i,,oreover,. they would be instructed not to open fire first~ if fired upon, they may fire but must then withdraw. Under no circumstances would a force continue to advance if fired upon. 7. The French authorities have agreed to plan for such battalion convoys but because they have not allocated any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize any authority for the employment of these convoys before the event; it is estimated that it would take at least three days to assemble the initial battalion groups. It is also clear that these ground forces will be armed with conventional 000478 �10 StC\\tl n"'Nt\G\U\O! ..?.i-\ ~tr-:1::1 uu ~n~,\,; ~1~'""'. ir.u •· · 5lttJ.\\ P.) C ' • }:J::-~ - 3 - e£5fSECRET fl~ '2.1 \9?J'°l weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet and East German authorities before any convoy route crosses the East-We st German border. It is also intended that maximum publicity should be given in the Western press so that it will be clear that the movement of limited ground forces is not a part of a surprise offensive operation. Air Access 8. It is considered that the first interference with the Allied rights in air corridors will consist of a refusal by the Soviet and East German officials to acknowledge the · agreement for service of West Berlin b11Western airlines. In the circumstances, the present plans provide for military air crews to fly empty civil aircraft to test Soviet reaction. Five complete air cr&ws have been trained on civil aircraft by both the United States and the United Kingdom and are standing by at all times. In the case of France, civil air crews will continue to fly the aircraft under an administrative arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly converted to "military" status by a system of "call-up". 9. In addition, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five fighter aircraft to be available to act as escort for the civil aircraft which fly to test Soviet intentions. The present thinking in the planning group is that fighters should not accompany the first civil aircraft but would be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft is attacked or forced down. If such should happen, it is intended that four or five fighter aircraft will act as escorts for each succeeding aircraft which may be sent into the corridor. The original authority given to General Norstad contemplated the immediate despatch of fighter aircraft to escort the first civil aircraft travelling in the air corridor following interference with normal access. Because of a difference of view which has developed, however, it seems likely that the authority currently given to General Norstad in this respect may be changed to maim it clear that the first civil aircraft to be sent in would be without fighter escort. No definite information is available on the question of warning to the Soviet and East German authorities. Apparently the "Live Oak" military planners have recommended that such a warning be given in the event it is intended to send in fighter escorts. However, no final decision has yet been reached in this regard. Air Lifts 10. Two types of air lift are envisaged. The first would be an entirely military air lift designed to administer to Allied forces in Berlin. This would be put into effect immediately if land access were blocked and these military aircraft would continue to fly even if flights by civil aircraft were prohibited. The second type would ..• 4 000479 �•• ..;2:QVSECRET be a larger operation for the support of the city of Berlin. Because of existing stocks of supplies in Berlin, it would not be necessary to institute such an air lift immediately. 11. Although the proposed relationship between the various measures is still not entirely clear, the latest report from the Delegation (Telegram 2564 of October 6) indicates that tho immediate reaction to the blocking of land access would be the flying in of a comparatively small number of military aircraft for the support of the military garrison. Other Measures -·--- ·12. In his oral briefing to the Council on September 29, General Norstad referred to the "Live Oak" planners' responsibility for recommending "quiet precautionary military measures". According to his explanation, the terros of reference for this aspect of planning include: (a) intensification of NATOpractice alerts; (b) maintaining supplies for Berlin garrison at lG-month level; (c) increased patrolling of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces; and (d) an increase in autobahn traffic. He did not elaborate on these plans nor did he indicate whether any of them may have already been implemented. Relation of ''Live Oak" Pl~nning to N,ATO 13. It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for approval but for information. Progress has, however, been made in the sense that, for the first time, the other members of NATOhave been given a general outline of the planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad can provide additional details on request. In addition, the report contains a commitment on the part of the Three that, insofar as possible, the Council will be consulted before any of these contingency plans are implemented. 14. Apart which additional areas requiring (i) (ii) (iii) from a few details on "Live Oak" plans on information would be helpful, the main clarification are: how these plans relate to non-military currently under consideration (e.g., counter-measures); measures economic the possible sequence in which the various and non-military measures might be applied; military the eventual relationship between existing "Live Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military plans which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on the necessary guidance is arrived at in the NATO Council. The report of the Three and the remarks of General Norstad clearly imply that the "Live Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate from ••• 5 000480 �,,, ,,., ··• \ • .; . .-PS:'<" C'-7li'I' -~ ,1., •. ..:1 the NATOmilitary plans although the latter will be co-ordinated with and will complement the more limited "Live Oak" plans. On th_e other hand, a statement by the Secretary--General on Septer;;ber 29 was open to interpretation that at some later stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO military authorities is approved, "Live Oak" planning would be reviewed and would become completely a NATOresponsibility; (iv) the expected relationship between "Live Oak" plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general overall strategy, .. on a world-wide scale" referred to in the draft instructions to the NATOmilitary authorities. These instructions go on to refer to the selective application of a wide variety of measures "agreed upon both in Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would contribute to the purpose of arriving at a settlement on the problem of Berlin while progressively malcing the Soviets aware of ttie danger of general war". 000481 �• \ , ]:)/_..(<) WI""--'>6)'fj,. \ \ G,I b 2 ~&-="-~ \,, S E C R E 'I > SDG~EST·E:D INSTnUC'I'IONS TO :•U.'1'0ivlILITA?.Y AiSI'iiOliI'l'I;<;S Tho parties • acco,danco to '.'.'ith Articles of: the. crisis' l~r)1t 5:::rl tn consulted tnl:en the to rne;;t North Treaty 4 and 6 of the provoked toi;;other the Atlanti& ,lith rei;ard. to decide present t•n•eat to ~erlin ~re: Treaty to ·ahat ac;:inst have and in t"he CitJ in the of ste[;S s• .cc.ld be Borlin • , 0 • in r~~ard . ' " n) tho ~1nintcnance of' t::ie [':cesc!"1ce and sec:..:rit/ of o/ t,10 1:;r;.intcnar,co o:: tllG ot \·iest c), freedom s.nd viabilit:1 • . ,j Eerl in; t.h0 ma:intenonco of' froodom of accesi.i to .iest ~· Derlin. •~. 3ve::.y_ effort oL ·j ectives· if a,.o;,l :cr.tion •' sarJ to s o-c'.,ll y1.tll te of non-military for•t};e ::ms :::ay not ~;ac.o to attain b:r nef;otiations pos:.;ible prepare :1or:otiati / , tu :)J.ocl~ Jest•Jrn It c:mtin,:;ency ed ".German Domocra tic a..::c1..3s.:.:to ~~ that is· however such deter the Re';h.i:,li ~" from ~e1~1:i.n or nee es- u,easures U,J.S,rt, ' or O:::' t~,c' ac t.i.on tddn:; ot!""1erv.:ise to i.n1'rii1.ge . f:.,,d c::,lloctivoly , indivituall·J· ~uropc. foregoing and throu;;h measures, i!'l them:ielves the ' d F'.JJPGSE: , :3. " The purpose ,n'ep,u•ation by or the£e tho major 0 allipd L1strL\Ct,_ons com~:.anders i .... .a,.,_ 000482 .i~ ...... .-~ ... .--,... .....~ ...... �• 2 " plans in ·.., i th order actions to put the'alliance in a position by the ·Sov 1:et 1?loc. in a Berlin to eris cope ~ is, Gl:,.SR.AL CCll3IDErtA'I'IONS :\ ~ G. The following pro;:,aration of' all oonsid.er&tions military military actions :,:c;icral, overall. strate;;y . ::orld-wide • ' :-,ave to be ' \ <\ff<i-Jpropriate and includin<; "l:ilitary measures-; 1 to l . . contr.iu:.ite .. political, imd p<1.1'a- a~plics.tion·o1· V l , a these . - 'in, s~r:~'pe and -on ~ world-\•tide o..~;reed upon both :,Gsi::~1cd into . military ,,_ii ' . is ·i~al, The selecti~~:'' . r:ies._:..1 tll'GS, I on a . . t psyc1t,10 economic, in.tcgrated· as aprropriute appli'2abie 1 C:~plamutic, . the. , will . scale uncterlie plans: J a) should to . . \ basis, . t':;e ;)U,"pose of' arriving at a '\ r,Jt·t'··~,·,,,t ..L.t:.:•• v.~ •oi' ~ tl•c .1. ..,,_. Soviets t:Hi aware ':',·,are to should appropriate Berlin 111 cl::,ri t:;r to . of access, . •···---·-- Ern ic:, '!ii Soviets At the in. caso bi n,lans ·, bY:\pbliticnl \ . ... ' -' prese1t sr,o'.lld . . on \1th 1.1nn:ist(J.kable risks, 1 :;.n contiaued to c) t:i.e Soviet • I . ~ sos s'i the course . -\ pbl'itical ' ,. qf' act\i.o;i., . Soviets oporiltion enemy action, objective to ro-opon of all access, risks rapid TLorufore, 2,etions military will . i escalation ·.1hile h:10 immediate !At . p~ans str~3,te,sy. 'l'hoy must, with cu:·ront thorofore, . musi\.' tako defens.ive r0tr,in and/or 1. to ;.induce b0 the ty ... · · -~\ of' r;nd be consist0~t be des ira.bili \ l pl'o-E:mptive denial us m,my oppor- ::Covern\ont paus o a:1d re-as a dangerous any military . ' .... ' . \~• oner.nous · . ______,. __----·"··-.-----------·--•·•······ . of continuin;-' authorities \ ·1. . . feav0 as possible tuni ties which . tis110, tb~ vray ,t'beso.,. nlu.z1_s ·:;ould sa:ne • ttho r1im of appl;ring I im::,lornonteci from . . \.--··-·. z.nd v:i!h \:o.ild th~ . of interference ; . 1 ..but detorrr,ined. . .· be solsctei c~1ld pressure· .1.naJ.-.1:n,, ·~ be gradt!t0d of circw:-,st.:.ncos - I w&.r, · a catalot~ue -·~---··· t~ns li;ht iime1·al m0~ure,s s,,ould bo o:.n:i.ilable action incref,sin,;; danc;er\of military . .in 0 ,"el•f m ·of' J....,"""._--·\".1..A.. ,Jr11•nt"'n' ., 10 t·ro·~r,,,~ . :.;;~....,,:,,..-:i... v.; of' the a:;>prppriate 3.ccoss 0 ~~- ~--'-'-' . b) with ""··•bl • .,~ ac;,ount . concept:<i " defr,ncc . the of NATO und tr..e·;:J must ....",.. . ... '-. of tho 000483 . not • �"·, . "'' . -·----•-~--·---•·-·'!it ... ,--•-- ---- S_ E C }~ JZ·'.·,:T 3 co;::1rr:i t c'.lpabili'ti.93 to the prejuci.5..cv of tLc in mi~1r::tho· risl: l~~~i~l? to ,:e.f',J:icl 1-L" ..1io territory·:, 0T10rall _C(.'.pacit~r of n possible ~ r~sc 1 'IV.rJ.ichmight :rec0 ini t'..E 1~i·1 CJ o:· t:10 '. •• rvacti bu conr.:it"..:od in Sovie ..t mov cs ·;:ouJ.d de pond on to ;;,:::o l:iuild-up a.t the op0ro..tions on results existine a3 wol::. u~\.circur,tstc.nco~ Jest's at the \ d) . t:10 Alliance 'st1:.nd \ ror.dy .~ r1ill . for nuclear action at • '7 • oxocu ti on o'f ·aµp!'ov ;;(: ......... Govurn:nont.:i 0'F··,,-·,rc .!..C:.1...... s. I"'•"Ru~n-o"S -~t.i.tl •1'( 'Jndcr the tho UnJteci ::orstad ' 1~ilitnry Kincdom, in his at --1 :"-"-··· •rn ".,...',J. l th-v - tlrno.· ~,,, ;\, ·o,;,sr, !.·,I'" l•J · bo · v-. .. 0 Subj UC t of \i . \ '"""-lo,-··•1;;" ·,,·,-1T,T~,-_ ..,,,"'' .. ... _,J,. 2.nd• tho Unit·e:i Stc,tos I .,-,.,.1..:: __.r-:_-!:J __,,.,,_ ofatf,iorica, :\ .' as USCLJC.3Ui1 h2.s maC:0 certr.in plans (LIVZ 6AK) to on~ble "',, these cEci'ry out 'Il1or0. n:u::;t !>·, full \ , Sh:.d llA.'IO r.lr:..n.ning • 1i. re::ipo,,~1hilH;: thoi.r ·;, spociul . .coordin~';ion ... . .- ~ ~- 0 0. 1.Jot;-:oon this ~ ! GcnC~al. tripr\rtito Gov ern.mof1t"~ ,,,- conc::irn.lng Berlin, LIVE. OAK planning ' · 000484 · I ~ .. \. ; to .'-.- 1n·struc ti"on~ o:'' ·-the Go~10rrur1Gnts of ?ranee, capacity contin~nncy ,,, ' �• • 4 10. For t~·1.c.1:,urpos o Of ::1·ov:"t.din..: · .cs gr8~ t :i· c:"ioic c as ,'•)'.J~i'blc.: of s_:~pplo:;i_;;1ti...i·y ::lt~rn-tivus; ' c:Vv,i1'i:1~·-·bl;O,l<l l&nd, '' ;' ;;;sc, :nilit:1ry plans ·-•{ .. , . . . air or nhv.:.l .. '. . - ' sl-,oul~ D(; ;:rc,pared I,!(l<!SUl'OS \ l . .:J ',r::·.:...~or ];.:~o·. com11·-io.l1dorn a.s G.!:'p·rop?'i:.:;.to •. In oG.ch cc..su, C ..,, by tl:0 -, :,x:J'ac_t-ccl° ·:.,dv.c,ntt,:~e,s an-cl osti.11at,:,d r·isks. co s;;ould s·3t :;out in Jn'.purticular, for a) the ·follo·.-:in:; ·;;.ppro~riate initiation alert 'c) d) . . \· . 0:xpandod ·non-nuclear . . . non-nucloE:.r suppott; selective use of nuclear oporations-; I oporations ' weapons ' of th0 Allii.\.ncll ... t . . \ . ,I ( v;i th ,. \ arid ability to mec,suros; l~ ,;round jir ,:rior .. . \le' n~coss~ry •.'/ill n:llit"ry ' . air'and/or.n&val . .. . expandod ur:;:intly: i'or ;.;;,:r-o i'orcos ~oasur':is of a:1:1 ~i.i~ar~lto . b) should . . . ·, I bo studio~_ to pl,:ms \ to domonstrate to use tllom, "\\ ~ \ \\ t • ' tho ·, .· :, ,.. • . ,• ~ ~.,. ~ , ' • • ' • '• t ·,· • --~ ' ~ -~-· .....- ... ·-_......-·---~-- - ....- - , .. • • • ,~ --·-·- ~ ,t· • ~ ' -- _). -..... _..,:_,.___ .-----------·--· . ' ,. \; .,' , Q. \: ---•' ,, • 000485 • • �j DL (' ) 1\11.'-'-'--'-t, "} 1-.t-'(I l 'L- ~IM,Q,v..'< C FI1 EXTERNAL OTT OCT19/tS1 SECRET TO NATOPARIS DL1325 OPHli-lED INFO CCOS DM/DND OPIM~1EDWASHDCCJS WASHDCPERM!SNY LDN E!'l'lBPARIS BON BRU HAGUEROMEPRIORITY Bi\G ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON FM LDN REF YOURTEL2687 OCT18 NI\TO MILITARY PLANNING • PRIOOEMINISTER HAS APPROVEDTHE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS: PROVIDED YOU ~!_AKE IT CLEAR THE CON AUTHORITIES WISH TO RETAIN THEIR RESERVATIONIN RESPECT OF GENERALCONSIDERATIONSSET OUT IN PARA6 . -.\ PENDING FURTHER STUDY AND CLARIFICATION IN COIJNCIL,YOUARE _AUTHO~ fEZED TO AGREE TO DESP OF ANNEX B AS A DIRECTIVE TO MAJOR MILITARYCOMMANDERS FOR PLANNING f'URPOSESo ~~c 2. THIS APPROVALIS GIVEN ON UNDERSTANDINGTHAT DETAILED PLANS WT.THC<l-1!4ANDERS ASSESSMENTSOF RISKS AND ADVANTAGESARE AD RE:FERENDU[1 TO GOVTSAt-JDPENDING RECEIPT OF SUCHPLANS,THE WAY WOULDJ:3ECLEARED FOR:COUNCIL TO TAKE UP,AS A M!\TTER OF FIRST PRIORITY . ~~ S'F.CGENS INXT!ATIVE FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON A WESTERNNEG0° ' TJ.ATING POSITXON. S. IN APPROVINGTHIS TEL PRIMEMINISTER EXPRESSEDPARTICULARCON• CERN THAT CAREFULATTENTION BE GIVEN TO NEED TO CLARIFY CJ:RCUM 0 l>lANCESOF AND AUTHORITIES .RESPQ'IISIBLEFOR QUOTE SPECIFIC POLITICAL DECISION UNQUOTEREFERREDTO IN PARA6CD)3. DECISXOM!';:'. Ti.::::::, -; ..LL FOR EXAMPLE,WOULDTHE ,:,. NATO GOIJTSOR BY :,. RZC!D G,ROUP 0 PERHAPS A MAJORITY OF COUN,Cit. 000486 �' . DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, • II LSS · 1 l;'ILE DIARY OUTGOIN~ MESSAGE BIV ---. F l LC --'ffi'JW-l'filHir-~,--"---·------J¾ h.,--{·r- •-- ~ C U_I(TJ)~ .. - Off -------- ~Qy __20/jJ NUMBER ---------· . am ··. - . 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DECISIONS 'J.:OBB TMqnf; 111 · R1IiS?1i:CT OF !{ATO PLAHS VffllCIIARE-·'DRAiliifUI10 'rdE "RULi: OF! . . ; ll'l'IAUDII'l'YFOR NATO AGTlOH IS THE PRf..SENTfllSJ.TIOir' • r . . a~ ff rs CLEARFROMIJIR/ s11m:ER1 !Ji PAl'Ji:R 11 AS FARASl'IA1'0, . rJ.A,ii:,mo FOR :BRRLIUC0N:I'INC,~1Cll::srs • . fli.ntE!il2iCB to 11l'Ol.l'l'1CAL AUi'HORI'l'I!m 1 i~ an: :z.~Tr:Rl'RET.ED M REiU<illG • li'UR 001iVE"£DID , fRfi: ll:13 DE:J1SIOilS . . ,; ' CU.NCEHN,ED Tilh'l' tmit rn PARA 6 OF ANtni:t, B sncULD • 1-0· TEE UA'l'O a::i1niort as Oil' GOVER!llllEUTS.· ANINSTBI.WEH'I' IN .ll.D.DI'l'IOU.p . 11SP\~ClFIC , ( . ' j'OJJlTIOAL .DECISION" Ri:'>PSRED Tu Dl FAI!A 6( d)t i) I A.1:DTBB .ll'l'ROVALJ.Nl,}Di.PLRM!l:nl'J:ATION 1:'ROCIEDvRl~Ili i'ARAS '7 ······----- -·--· ··-" - ====================<i'~====-~-·=--=--. APPROVEO BV �, All't 8 ARE HITERffil."'rEP BY CANADA.AS,NEAJfINO THAT ALL)'IJ,.BB BEFORE IMPLEDN'l'AT10!1 RAV"~'J.'O BE APPROYEDBY OOVf.RNM.@~TS . . AND T:tAT THE EXECU'lIOli OF AP.i'RCVEDPLANS WILL BB "'l'H.E . 3'.JB,L,CT OF' DEOISIOJS BY GOVEh'lilUillTSAlf THE Tll!!E.11• a. .FOR THE:PURPOSEOF lti ,'.;:)ll!r;ECTIONl\'I'l'li 'l'H¼ Di!.ALINO\llITa 'lt!ILITAR\'. PLANNING ' BE.RI.n, Sii'U/1.T'l:cl;J, IT IS. IM1'0HTANT ,, 'i'l:1lT IT IS OLEARLY WDERS'l'OGD THAT THE lrINAL HJ,;~HVtlSIBILITY , \ .B,;•rHPOH APfHOVAL OF FLA.NS AND F'GR DECISIONS TO IMl'LEM.li.1fT ·;:~!EUSiiO-JLD illj;Sf }7I'J.'HO-OVERli.lllmTSVldO i'iILL IDIPRESS TIJEIR ' . VlEW5 '.'1'fffiOUG:H THEIR PE!lMAREN'fREP.IGSENTATIVES IN THE tlATO c::;:nlCIL AtlD fliAT NO DELEGA'l'IOHOF GOYEKHIIBNTALAUiHORiff IN s1:CI! CUUCIAL MA'l''.tERSCAN DE OONTEW>I.ATED Pl'{OVIDEP 0 T.t:iIS IS UliD.ERSTOOD 0 CANADAaABAfJCEPT.THB INTARPl{E'rATlQli ' PLACED Oll ffl:&SB PARASBY THE SEORE'l'ARl GENEBAL 0 . BEARllG IN. JI' llD fHE CONCLUSIOll;tN THE SEORET~RY '• .. mm,;p..u,,sJ'APEfl TB.AT "I'l' 18 DI 'l'RE COUNCIL 'r.liA'l' THE WILL 01'' GOVERNl&ENTS. WILLBE EXPRT.SSSDBY THE PEHiiANEUTP.El'R£SEllTAT·IYE8• 0 WE BELI':~VE THAT Tlill COU'lfCIL SliOULD CONSIDER \'illAT iU::.t.SUiIBS ARE P.EQ.UXRED TO EN/IDLE IT TO DEAL EFF~CTIVELY /,l~D f..xTEDITL1tlSLY Wl;tH SUCH D,U>ORTANTQUESTION&Iii ':raE EVENT OF AN EHEF!GENCYo 0 ·, " 000488 �, ..- .. , .., ·, ~ •• '• • ,"D,c_(,) . ., .. ,_,.-.; · Ii 11· 1 _'.!'.lit, """""'~'1r-.,,1,-~ (,2 ·~ .. '.:0-,:. N.'.TO SEClhlT . .,··ii),'.·, \,, ' E h.'M iw-.t- ~<- ·/. ,:· -~ • .:~- '. ··. ··.: '~. ·po/§1/809 ,, " The ..Council will remember th.it durin[( its discussion. of ~'Q/61/765, . .nnox .C, if was recogni sod tha."t. some. slightly, cl.1fferent wording ror;nrding ·p.ol i t'ic;:il uu thori tics,· governments,,. Coui1cil etc., wns" to ho found in four.pnrt.s of' this document:. • .. , .. . of I • ~ (1 )• Tho e:stnbiishment n cct:.;toguo of plans nsked for• in pcrogrnph G(b) is intended to enabJ.c the .ll.OJJ ti..9.c.l _g_u_t)1oy_l;ti.o_s. to select the sppropriate · aotioh .in the ligh't of circumstnnces.. .. · (2). In 6(d)(3.) it. is st~,ted that there v1ilJ. have ·bei "a specific i2,.<1,l_i_i;J,.£-aj. __dccision to employ ,nucl"ear weapons ••.•• • to In. pc.ro.grai)h 7 ..upproval of the. plans is in.tended to .. ~ be obt:iinod through the 'following procedure: ·t_he i/ • plans. will ··be sent; to the Standing Group for. •·1 · appro:i sol in c onsulta.tion 11'.ith t~e Mili tnry Committoe,/ .• in accordtmcc ·with established NI.TO,procedure, and ff will be fo.rwarcicd to .the North :.tL·.ntic Counsil for f :ipproval by _gpvernments throuE,h the Permanent (, B._0prcscn_t.£,t).y_e_§..,. ~ · '~ ·,•,.. (3) (4) The executio; ~f.tll'e j:lans, upprov~d o.ccor.ding to this proceclurc, \vill bu the' subject of :ie<Cj_s.i_ons_~ ,&oyo:rn_ments o.t :thcftime (purogrcph cl). -~ . _ .· .. C . 2. · It seems' to me that these diffcrpnt ,wordings h.:ive .not been deli bcro. tely, us.0d for the purpose of cs tabli shing reo.lly clear-cut di st inc tioris :and, special' tren tmo)1ts as regards tl:le ·severecl h,ypotheses covered in. the relevunt",pur,ts of __nnox B; I c.malso _convi_nccd trot.we i~ight be faced with·grcat difficulties it' wu <lid not try ,t,o polish up' the drafting and t'o (;Ct a more orde1•ly text. · ~ I ~ >• • -~• t -•"-• - • •• - •- ...._ - - - - - ___...~ --;;·.~···-~-·--··•· "~ ' ·• -- ,. ' . . .:;. · On _the other hand, 1 think I _cp.n ~,_ssurnc that there i,s agreement among us ·that the _!_n:s_ty_u_c_:tions should be sent. to the Military· Comtic.nders. 1'urthcr delo. 0' wciuld be unc:c.ceptablf.;. right now·. ~ . a complete. ~ . ' ' 4 •. _. \"iould it, therefore•, be p.ossibJ.·e that we upprove the _·.nnexes ;. and D as they· stdnd i1t -this morrient, it being uridcre,tood that .we must,ritill find ,c.· butter understanding of. the .r1uestion: _wha~tpo;J.i.tico.l, authority hCls to mClkc decisions. I am sure .tho.t discussions on-that matter will still take a ·Jong time :ind this wi.11 bocoine c,uite-clear"whcin w0 com0 to · discuss ·the ,,uestions ro.iscd in ·-my P0/61 /785. ·· .~ - ~ ,;.;..J .\. .. . ---·-ta.'"'' · ,000489 0 ' • ., ;;%'"' ~--~- �. . .. •· :··J:I . __·-. • · · ·.5, · >-During our. disqussions · stat-ements huvc been ..,,mude, und • . I think .£1,gJ'.ccmont...ho.s beim roe1ched; -th.it .until we t_C:ke another clcci cion,. tho i?gli t_!.g::_it_g~j;l)ori~ "meant in 6(b) and 6(d) 3, is the 8ouncil, · ·we h:lVC not· yet ·discussed pt,r::gruphs 7 and 8.Hero tho position might be slightly clif'ferent because, ncccrding:o to ::irticl o 5 of the Tro~:-ty, each member hns the right of individual . sclf"'-dcfcnce. Therefore, if nttacked, cc.ch individual member can dee Jde how it is going to defend itself and .. take~ those ac tiohs which it deems necessc.ry. On the other hahd; if collec'£1ye·N..TO . c.c tion is to, be ·to.ken, I think tlm t in that cnsc also the expressions used in pnrctgraphs 7 .:tnd 8. 'will .1i1ply c. clec·i_sion by . the C9uncil. . · · · · · · '~~" ·· · ' ' 6. It nby be ·thl,t in •tho future· the presently agreed rule '.of unc.nirni ty wil1 'h:;Ye to be umended, bu,t we· h~-:vc not yet reached the. sfuge at' which such ·ch..,nges ·can ou ll)ade to this rule. · Hence, "wo must take it for grantee. that this rule of imnriimi ty .. for, lL'.L'O .tiction is the present posi tiof! and c~:nnot be nl t-ercd. ' .. . . . ·:- / , . ''· ,,,..·,, . . . . 7, ·The inter'pretc.tion I suggest, o:ccording to. which decisions ·w1'J.1 be tc.kcn· by· the ·Permanent .council under . tho J;'ule of unanirni t:,r, seems· to be ..in. line with' tho Tre., ty • · -'-rticle 9• stc.tcs th.,t the P-..irtics· t.o the Treaty "estoblish a Council, on. y.,hich each of them shc.11 bQ repros.entod, to conqider matters cone crning , the i mpl cinen tn ti on of this Treaty" • :. s c.n armed atto.ck. agc'.inst one or more .of the ,.llied ,countri·cs shnll be COJ'\Siclcred Lm r:ttcck· ~,g~:inst them all (.'.rticles 5 r,nd 6),, it scc\ns norm-,1- to c onsidor thb. t ~my Ni.TO action to be t:::kcn in cr,se of such c,n ,ittc.ck would be discussed and decidud i,n the Council. Tho · governments nc. turr,:ll'y will .send instructions to their · Pe:rrr,nhent Rcpresen tati vei;:;.,··c.nd, therefor,,, it would s,c,c:m the. t whc11 the text . of .".nnex· B spcolrn -of. ·"dc,c i sions by governments"· and of·H·pc,11 ticc.l c.uthoritics;', there .. is ·no contrc.diction b0tween this wording and the ''fu.ct thc:t -it is·in the Counci1 .that the will of g9vernP1entsi)Vill. . be:-cxprossod by the Permanent Representotives. . . • • ' ' ,,. :~ ' - . • V . • . ' ,. . ' ... ,r 000490 <' - • - ' . ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 9 FEBRUARY 1962 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962-02-09 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00038 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Defence Liaison (1) Division to Ignatieff, ‘‘Berlin: Contingency Planning,’’ 9 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1. air lift Berlin contingency France George Ignatieff Lauris Norstad Live Oak SACEUR Stikker Three Power report