https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5003b08bcc9240d886ebf4641f8d1274.pdf af20c641e012e15ff438ad6e9feb08aa PDF Text Text -- . ·-- i·• .f"oo3o - v-1¥-¥--, ,.._.. 5-1' FM NATOPARIS OEC4/61 TO EXTERNAL 3273 SECRET OPIMMEO INFO CCOS LON WASHOC EMBPARIS PERMISNY BONN BRU HAGUE ROME PRIORITY TT OM/ONO PRIORITY OM/FIN FM CCOS OTT DM/DDP OTT PRIORI TY FM OTT. ' BAG ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON FM LON REF OURTEL 3249 NOV30/61 DEC MINI!:.1'ERIAL MTG:GERMANY AND BERLIN i THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE WILL DOMINATE THIS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE DOUBT THAT THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY AND BERLIN YEARS DEC MINISTERIAL MTG.AT THIS PARTICULAR TO BE SURE WHETHER THE EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE BE TO MOVE TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON COPING WITH THE BERLIN OR WHETHER IT wILL AGREE, IT ALSO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC-RELATIONS WILL BE TO REVEAL THE INABILITY BECAUSE THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AND WILL EITHER TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL IS WILL PROBL£M, OF THE ALLIANCE TO ASPECT OF THE MTG HAVE MET PREVIOUSLY ON OECtl, HAVE ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WILL REQUIRE NATO FOLLOW-UP ACTION IT WILL TIME OR,AS WE HOPE,WILL HAVE DEFERRED MTG THE ISSUANCE. OF A COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE THESE VERY FACTORSCTHE PRE~EMINENCE OF THE SUBJECT,THE MTG OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS, SURROUND THE SUBJECT)WH!CH MAKE IT BY WAY OF A USEFUL PREDICTION POSSIBLE THAT FURTHER BILATERAL AND THE PUBLIC DIFFICULT OF THE LIKELY INTEREST PRIOR WHICH WILL FROM HERE TO GIVE MUCH COURSE OF EVENTS.IT PROBING AT THE STATE DEPT,THE IS FO, AND THE QUAI DORSAY MIGHT CONTINUE TO PROVE ILLUMINATING. 2.0NE FACTOR WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN CONSTANT,AT LNTIL HIS MTG WITH ADENAUER ON DEC9 AND POSSIBLY THEREAFTER,IS OPPOSITION OF DE GAULLE TO ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS,OR FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE HE C<NSIDERS A THREAT FROM THE USSR.<THE , LON TEL 4283 LEAST PREPARING THAT THE WEST IS, UNDER SECGEN AGREES WITH EMBPARIS TEL NOV30 IN MAKING THIS THE 1588 ASSESSMENT. )SEEN FROM HERE, 000497 AND �... ,.. .. .......·-·· ..,.., -- PAGETWO3273 THEREIS A MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE REALGERMAN POSITION.THE KROLLINTERVIEW WOULD SEEMTO SUGGESTTHATNEGOTIATIONS HAVENOT RPT NOT BEENRULEDOUT;THERECENTEMPHASISON AN INTERNATIONALIZED AUTOBAHN SUGGESTSHOWEVER THATTHE GERMAN STARTINGPOSITIONFOR NEGOTIATIONS MAYNOTRPT NOTBE A VERYFRUITFULONE.USAADOPTION OF THIS IDEA,ANDTHE EMPHASISON THE RETENTION OF OCCUPATION RIGHTS AS A FALL-BACK POSITIONCSOTHATANYAGREEMENT BETWEEN USA,THEUK, FRANCEANDTHE USSR WOULD MERELYBE SUPERIMPOSED ON THESEEXISTING OCCUPATION RIGHTS)MIGHT SUGGESTTHATUSA ATTITUDEIS NOWSOMEWHERE . BETWEEN THOSEOF GERMANY ANDTHE UK.EVENTHE LATTERMUSTNOT RPT . . . NOTBE EXPECTED TO TAKETOOEXPOSEDA POSITION IN FAVOUROF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEWOF UK NEEDOF FRENCHANDGERMAN SUPPORTWHILESEEKING ADMISSIONTO EEC.WHAT THIS ANALYSISSEEMSTO SUGGESTIS THAT PRESSUREAMONG THE FOURPOWERS MOREDIRECTLYCONCERNED IN F'AVOUR OF' NEGOTIATIONS,OR AT ANYRATEFOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A BASIS WHICHMIGHT BE MEANINGFUL TO USSR,HASDECLINEDDURINGTHE LASTMONTH.THE NATO COUNCILRESOLUTIONS NOV6AND15(0URTEL2914 NOV6ANDP0/61/840; OURTEL3060 NOVIS ANDP0/61/864)SEEM IN RETROSPECT TO HAVEREPRESENTED THE HIGH POINT IN THE COUNCILSPRESSUREON THE FOURTO AGREEUPON A NEGOTIATING POSITION ANDRESUME THE INTERRUPTED CONTACTS WITHUSSR TO DETERMINE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.SINCE THENTHE ONLYVISIBLE MOVE HAS BEENKROLLSCONVERSATION WITHKHRUSHCHEV. 3.THE LINE OF ACTIONWHICHTHOSEFOREIGNMINSTERSwiio'ARENOT RPT NOTOF THE FOURMAYWISHTO ADOPTWILL.PRESUMABLY BE DETERMINED IN PARTBY THE SORT OF REPORTCOR REPORTS)THE FOURMAYMAKEAT THE BEGINNINGOF THE NATOMINISTERSDISCUSSIONOF'BERLINANDGERMANY. THEREIS ALSOA POSSIBILITY THATTHE ALLIANCE WILL HAVEMADEAVAILABLE TO IT A PAPEROR PAPERSPREPARED BY THE AMBASSADORIAL WORKING GROUP IN WASHDC F'ORDISCUSSIONBY THE SENIOREXPERTS,AND THATTHE SENIOR . EX?ERTSTHEMSELVES MAYBE MOVED TO GIVE A BRIEFINGTO COUNCIL ••• 3 000498 �' ' I ,1;,t_ ,.,::- f.t,tl :'ilf,, ill'Ol PAGE .T.HREE, ,. AJ .... • a ,-,_..,,.., 3273_ ... ,nuc:. ..... ., vr.u,.; :) -., r·1;1u O1· JJ~f" ,~138 3VA~; HCCi 1:~T 1 • I{'.' BEFORE.DEC13•.IF.,HOW.EVER,ASIS SUGGESTEDIN ,PARA5 OF LDN TEL 4283 u .... .., ....... ic -'-'"" .. , rl,,,. 1..;i..:1.1 nJ!Nv ,.,:u'1 !ilAU,t;-,•l\ -!l·,;Ofi\'t NOV30,THE,FOUR .FOREIGNMINISTER$, ARE .LIKELY TO _PART.WITHOUTREACHING ...,_ ... .,........ , ..,,......, J..,. -'.lC V'l ,,.., 1CJ.1' .. ~t'G l'l'I !111 ll,1'1 1'01 It'll U.JO(·, AGREEMENT pAND TO CARRY.THEIR LACK.OF .AGREEMENTINTO_THE NATO MINIST• c.. ,.' ' ,i..3.-J ,..Jtu ,,. ....,l..:iii-. . ..,,_,.•v ..~v.:i ,.,)tC:t ,-1.:,..C 1·.1,.1rt,~}1~~;- -l:C •.J!&'1lt~U-.1H l,"ljiMJ.J.-·'H(Jii J!G.-w.,,r~b~?f.i'.~~}f. io. ERIA,,L. ~~.!--.I~f!-Yr;!,.H,A""ti"'T~f .~11INj!Jll.~~utA~ 1,M,TGl.JT~:,,S_,E..fMJ, 11 RECONCILE DIFFERENCES.AMO~GJ,TH~, FOUR,O_RT!'AT ,.THE.cqMM,!JNIQUE, WILL BE, .c-lu.i•~-•if.....-. .• JJl••.f•\J t· ..,.ht r,U"\ t. .. i.-,Jt,1 1Jf·f~c.,,.:tt"1 ABLE TO.REFLECT ANY SUBSTANTIALMEASURE,OF AGREEMENT. ,vu_.., 2~,.;.,f\l -w ,,f,._.,;f c;, ,>.u:J ,,.,,.,, ~~i..:11 -iH.JI :Cl)•~ ,;·.1,'lc.'JT;A8 ~..-1,~ Jh1 ,, 4. THti~EStE.N,l~A;.5 ..~c.EJP._F~,C}J J.H,E Jl.!,Nl~Jf,Ri.~~ MT,~},~ ~1~,,,~~!H,}H~~-l.P\J~, r,.oR~.IGN,MINISTERS .MOST.DIRECTLY,CONCERNEDWITH GERMANYAND.BERLIN ' ]\JLGG.!11':C)rJH, 'V,U.-l A ,..,-~IJ.J .lGt!l..!l:",W l'I.., .J:..~ ..:i:t,1I "I.U l...J l t l :,J;JJh CA C::Jf." 1 .~ tt""., ADOPTINGA RANGE.QF ATTITUDES TOWARDSTHE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION VHQIAW ;:a,,,1.1b1 Ci,11.; ,211: ,n.,·;i1,:m,11!u~ '.;/',,_).-, 1·1J'l"'·'''·''·'•ll!I \\,, ,J, ll'J · WITH.USSR.,.HE Is ,.NATURALLY DEEP.LYcONCERNED .BY THIS PROSPECT AND.,AS ~:.11..t ..1.;.in 1 .d~'.ihli.)1.3i.i. JGA~f ..1n& Pi1 'lt c:,h~J .....-'tu. '\,.; n•C(Jty .. ~~tc .iJ~Tfi.1:i..1 1 ~11 _,:,~· .rs TRYING,TO .INFLUENCE,THE.FRENCH ,1v11Alll,',tlll..1 u,;i,. '1:Jlll:: _._, l::i'.J~ ... ': YOU \HLL .KN.OW .F:ROM.MYTEL 32.72 DEC2 dl.:n, u.:,:aC:.:11'<,-11, au•• 1·,r1 ,u,. GIU• POSITION ,WHICH .SEEMS TO.•BE THE. CRUCiAL ONE FOR.ACHIEVING SOME SORT1 . C.;!H.;i"\IH n;,i,.Cin,,11 I\Jll'! ..,111 .;,1"1 •,u t.,4C:tJ.'H:f•·.t.:1111m 11"1 1,)<.Ui\ l~•t!,1 , I~R~~~~ 11~'.1~~' ~~1 0 2 OF I r!iil~~~~G ,F :', !, J1½s~.i~ 1' C THAT.HE FEARS THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME INCLINATION ONATHEP.ART OF. "-'""-"" , .... '\o 111t1C! ,:::nl JIU 1,.. ,,; IH,11,1 r.v c:<:... ,t<!A.:IA tl.-J:; Cui,'!:,;>.~ THE.FRENCHHTO,USE. NON•AGREEMENT O.VER0THER M_EAS.URES, PARTICUl.ARL'f oVER 0 l .:l<.1»1 C: <" lM I '" · Jtci,' .J.ii\ •.• , 1 ~ "" i nJ4 11 \u c.1 ,uu<I J fl\, ii 1"1 'lDIIAf COUNTERMEASURES ASAA~'-'EXCUSE,,F,OR ,REEUSING,AGREEMENT..,,TO.NEGOTI ATE.,, ._ Q~~t ,~u r1l1u~n .:,J;-~A 1..tJ ..:u1l '\:J Gn.us·1.:i~ n~Ju .....ilr·;;; "'.J(J"tWHJf". • THERE HA~.,.BEEN,.ATENDENCY, WHICH BEG1N wITH RUSKS ADDRESS iiTO THEr r· t-,,A,f .., l 1 ~1J ..J. 1ti1 t,U 0 fl 110 1 ~••Jj COUNCIL LAST AUG AND WHICHHAS BEEN RE-ITERATED BY THE SECGEN AS .'lvA1t .:ill.u.1;sI, 1;U .,.nT {•~ .sl.1 ut ,,.1.:12.:,il\1'l.:11.~r<1 T1.ula uli .lRtn.3\~HH" - - •--;.-,_- • -~••if 3 .,,1ll'IJ. '\ .a,rvnrr."r,..1 1 ..i..:.;.·, Rttr~tl~LXe~ I [~:-~IEW .THE ,BE~LIN' _ 3;1 ASPECTS FOR NATO.THERE IS A GENUINE FEELING ON THE PART OF: THE SECGEN .,uJI\V .1..11n:: 3•111 ,3," 11·•tlil .i• 1 AND USA THAT,.P.RPGRESS_ ON ANY ONE~OF{THESE THREE ASPECTS SHOULDNOT , 11\MI-. 1 ,.:nv,.:i"."1111,-'c!li ?'~-,;,•• 1 ,1.:,;J,,-, .:,• Pl .:,'1fl\~1•c:1,u<! -.,J .\Ul.?UJ;J.,VJ RPT NOTO~E~1h~o~~r.:1ioJYiiuJ~Ol~ ~R·i3E~~!?itt8G~;~s=-~NT'!'~E: °,TH~~ 1~':~CTS. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOMETHINGCLOSE TO SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS IN ... 1J\T.::u l'1A ,;I .lI.1>1..s~,, ,vl ,: ',} l l t J. 10u.:111 \'.J l Jl j'-''l ~.::ilff•: \ ,- ' 11u.1 ' .,. THEi'.IELD lOF ,MILIJA,R'(~PREPAREDNESS.IN THE ~EM~IN~NG Tw9 FIE~DS -,,1'1, !> r.J ii tll _ _ _ _ .. • .. H C'J.1.Ju~~-_.H; , l • J • ··" 1 ., ,. r L rr~~~-' OF N~GOTI~:.:_ON~I~~Dl'fC?~~~!R<1~9u,~1E.flM~~~~REJp PROGRESS AND MOREOBV_IOUSDIVERGENCEOF 1INTERESTS.,THE NON-FOUR,AIDED JI', .J,"l)V;IA tfJl'l.tfl1 .SMI d~llli1PH, llll 3'J;11 <1 l•JUL.J •-,J1; .,,; 1.. .: .. s,li;!nt1 , IN THE PAST BY TW0 0f THE FOUR,HAVE PREVIOUSLY SHOWNAN INTEREST h ~(;IJ cir..i1 1 AiTu:;.,~ 1u , IJJl6!.;:;cl.l'1 _.,11, ,:.;;,.1,,,; o, ;t_;<11Jj.1 •-"" =: IN GETTING ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS~SOMEOF THE NON•FOUR,HOWEVER,HAVE MIi i .IU 1.:iii.11' .,nu!1 11.JUll }llH, J .i.J i;U u ' •.Ol 1",IJ ' l t. •., T . C:' ,c,. - - ,, ii s ,'-t JI• · t.!J:' BEEN MORERELUCTANTTO MAKEPROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERMEASURES .:1v1TAr,:,.11JA ·rilA R.!!•t'l.::lfJ 1ti.,t1t1u2 t,T r,11111, .. •iJT ,. 1,. , Ir"'' ,. oo-e4 000499 I , �........, . . ,),- ' •• -·._··,;,~.. . PAGE FOUR 327 3 WHILE THE FOUR HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UNITE ON COUNTERMEASURESEXCEPT - . ··~ ,-.~, r FOR ONE IMPORTANT POINT WHICH IS DEALT WITH IN MYTEL 3272.THUS RPT NOT wouLo Not 't BE roo suRPRisrNG r· r j_~ TO.SEE. THE FouR,.iF ""'.-·-. _. . t. ~i .. IT cRITic-fzto T. _ •• · ' -~~;,,•::~ . FOR LACK OF AGREEMENT OVER NEGOTIATIONS, COUNTER-'ATTACK OVER ECONOMIC COUNTERMEAsuhE:S.THIS WOULD BE .AN _ . IMPO.RTANT _ , 1: · to"KEEP.. IN FAC1'0R •T · ., · -. MIND f ·- '-, t . ': -;· .r tt, IN EXERTING PRESSURE FOR THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. 1 5. THE BRITISH, • t. . l ., •" . , - . ' ., __ ,._ - ... - . WE KNOW FROM MSGS FROM LDN~TEND TO THINK ·or NEGOTIATI CNS r • IN TERMS OF a'ROADE; GERMAN QUEST! ONS( AS THE DEPT' DOES), INV0Lv'1Na'• 1 sucH ·MATTE~s AS RECOGNITION or THE • ooiR-NEissE ;j I p; • ..,. ·! ..1_ NON •.AGGREss·xaN"" LINEtA _·•;.<.·~~ ..···•·~:,,·• . PACT OR ARRANGEMENT OF SOME SORT BETWEEN THE NATO AND THE WARSAW. ' . - . ' .' .·.- ! T ,. ' -~.,. . , ' I .,__ t 1'' _· • ! • 1: . t ~. = :,,, - . . :- POWERS,AND SOME SORT. OF DEALINGS WITH THE- EAST GERMANS.THESE ARE ' '7 • ; r, , ) ~~.. : •. (""•.-' , .'..~. • • ••:-- _.._, .~f : . SUBJECTS ON WHICH NATO EXAMINATION HAS NOT RPT NOT PROGRESSED VERY - . T ;"" • ... 1 .. • • . • I 1> : T• 0-,,. ,- ·•. ·r' I , ,,_ , "(;' tJ .I,~ .. FAR, BUT. AGAIN THE BRITISH ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH 'APPROACH APPEARS "'J'f'" _• ..., • I_~ '_! .• "'. "r.'.,r. • ..,, • ", j_l'. ' TO BE SIGNIFICANT<PARA3 LDN TEL-4283):THERE WOULD°CLEARLY"BE SOME > i.• T~ . - ~'l \, "" _..,.~,• .,._ f ,. • ·!' . 1 - ·: - ... " RISK IN TOO MUCH READINESS ON OUR PART OR ·oN THE PART OF ANY MEMBER ... • fO . f'""'-. ... -• OF THE ALLIANCE M> .- .... AT THIS ~-T. ·- _. GERMANS-FEEL STRONGLY WHILE 1 RETICENT:THE ,,,,. • ,.... . ;- . •_f ,, ".: - " C ~,,, .... " ' - ..... : r '• ·• r 0 1 ,¥' O ... ,. 'HAVE IN,.OURTEL 309:.iNOVl'i ' , T .. • • .'" 1:•i ., :, •. T 0 ,-. '."' 1 T·'" •·"1 ;i . -,,-_ .- l''l' - _.. -,: ..,.... ",- f •-,_ -,, · --~: i.1 · THAT ,-;J:· THERE ARE AS YET NO RPT NO SIGNS OF THE COUNCIL BEING ABLE TO "' "!'· t DEVELOP AN AGREED POLiCY MOSTLY\1s ~t A RESULT oF"DE "'" .t ·;·• .. r ,~ ..,~ -.• i .., GAULLES - ATTITu!Sii:: His ... _~ .. ,.. .....,,,. FORTHCOMING,MTG WITH, t' ·1 I ' · • ' .. -"\\I "Ii '( • • ' · t ·7 f 1 • ., ' <':' RPT No LoNGER ro' BLOCK THE poss1B1L1rY' r• -~ ,-,, & '"".', f\ • .. RESPECT.IF ~EM~DE 1N· 0k1NoiNG rHEFRENCH ~ROUND-No~ PERCHANCE PROGREss•foGu;:, '. ·"t .,. ADENAUER WILL -THEREFORE BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THIS · --, QN NEGOTIATIONS OVER BERLIN IN ANY DETAIL, -,,·":1-- • ;•-C, 1 -• - · REMAIN. AND THINK THEY - ARE STILL VALID. ' ., • ' ' ' "'' f~ l rr-~ .... .,,.. , ·"• :1· 1- r. '1' ·.: ·" ... ~-- -~.,.. , .._... 6. OUR CONCLUSION ON SUBSTANCE AT THE 'PRESENT TIME,THEREFORE;Is , ·' .. THE UN 'i1£Lo1wE iHE.SUGGESTIONS MADE IN"T~rs-Fi'ELD , r .,,1~-"t"_,.. .~ • .. 't.1t.IN 0 ·~ ' ATTHE .FORTHCO'lING A ·cDN'INif'i'ATIVE·, MT; MI GHT' THEREF'6RE' SEEi/'ro RE~EXAMINED' ~- ?' -, .•., - __ r-. 1 "'\ ' .. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE JAIN";'LINE ..·F'OR MINISTE~I~c' M' •• STAGE To BARGAiN AWAY 'i>oINTS' ON WHICH THE· · .- ' "'\ •''" n .• - - - ¥ oF NEGOTIATIONS t,_ :'"' r- • · , _ QUADRIPARTITE .-:.. oN ·A i , . .. BASIS,THE SITUATION WOULD LOOK MUCH MORE HOPEFUL THAN _·-, _ - .. · ; . ,. • ":0 n :·· • ;;,- -· · - · r ,,-,, , ,. -· · '.' · rIT DOES NOW.IT. IS T'OO'EARLY TO SUGGEST WHETHER ANY ALTEfiNATIVE 000500 �•• .... -, PAGEFIVE 3273 TO QUADRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS(EG USA-USSREXCHANGES>COULD BE CONTEMP• LATEDo 7.IF ONEPASSESFROMSUBSTANCE TO PUBLICRELATIONS,THE PROBLEM WILL BE A RELATIVELY SIMPLE If THE FRENCHPOSITIONCANBE CHANGED.IFIT • CANNOT RPT NOTTHENSOMEEFFORTWILL HAVETO BE MADETO AVOID LEAVINGTOOOBVIOUSAN IMPRESSIONOF A SPLIT WITHINTHE ALLIANCE. THIS EFFORTWOULD HAVETO BE IN VERYGENERAL TERM~.ATTHt VERYBEST, IF THE FRENCHPOSITIONWERENOT RPT NOTALTOGETHER UNYIELDING,THE COMMUNIQUE MIGHTBE ABLETO BALANCE ON THE ONEHANDEMPHASISQN ' ADHERENCE TO PRESENTRIGHTSANDFREEDOMS COMBINED WITHPREPAREDNESS, WITH,ONTHE OTHER,ASTATEMENT OF READINESSTO NEGOTIATE UNDER SUITABLECONDITIONS.DEPENDING UPONTHE DEGREEOf DIVERGENCE Of THE. FRENCHPOSITION,READINESS TO NEGOTIATE MIGHTHAVETO BECOME A TENUOUS ELEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE.IF THERECOULDBE NO RPT NO OFFERTO NEGOTIATE IN THE COMMUNIQUE,THE POSITION OF THE ALLIANCEWOULD BECOME DIFFICULT INDEED. LEGER 000501 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 4 DECEMBER 1961 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961-12-04 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00037 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Dec Ministerial Mtg:Germany and Berlin,’’ 4 Dec. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1. de Gaulle France Léger