-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/529d778113c760fe75b99e06565f3a10.pdf
23e52ef7a291e7d6a9de805b45ac1195
PDF Text
Text
I'
I
SECRET
SECRETARY
November
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
OF STATE
FOR
, 1961.
THE PRIME MINISTER
NATOPlannin
for
In giving your approval to he guidance for Mr.
Leger on October 19, reserving
t
Canadian position
on
paragraph
6 of the instructions
or the NATOmilitary
authorities
(annex B to P0/6lb 65, copy a~tached),
you
expressed particular
concern
hat careful
attention
be
given to the need to clari
the 11circumstances
of and the
authorities
responsible
f
the
specific
political
decision"
to employ nuclear weapon selectively
to 11demonstrate
the
will and ability
of th Alliance
to use tl,em 11 (sub-paragraph
6(d)(3)).
For exempl,
~ould the decision
be taken by
_ all of the NATOgove nments or by the Three or by a
restricted
group,
rhaps a majorityl
;f~~~..,_
•
2.
instructions
for the NATOmilitary
authorities,
w h some minor amendments (underlined
in
attached
copy of annex B), were approved on October 25
and sent for ard.
Partially
because of our reservation
in connect·
n with paragraph
6 and because other members
considere
that more consultation
was required,
it was
agreed tat
there would be further
discussion
of the
cµ estio
of what "politic al authori ty 11 VD uld take the
decis·
ns required
when the plans are drawn up.
The
ques on you raised,
therefore,
will be discussed
at
an arly meeting of the Council.
The discussion
will
b related
mainly to the_attached
paper P0/61/8O9
epared by the Secretary
General.
• •
000569
• 2
_
�- 2 -
It is clear from Mr. Stikker 1 s paper that he feels
all references
to the "political
authorities"
in paragraph
should be considered
as referring
to the NATOCouncil.w'"1--l~
"the wilJ. of governments will be expr!3ssed by the
Permanent Repres enta ti ves 11• In addition,
the 11spec • c
,.,...1./
political
decision"
referred
to in paragraph 6~d)
annex B would be a_decision
to be taken by the y,(l,uncil_,~JIt is also evident that the interpretation
p
ed on the11...u<• K;
draft instructions
by the Secretary
Gener
s that the rul~'l'."-'
.
of unanunity must apply in respect of an
ATO action which
may be taken in accordance with these
structions.
of=·;::/:::
4.
In the circumstances,
ould recommend that Mr.
Leger be authorized
to accept
. e interpretation
contained
in the Secretary
General's
p er.
While, as Mr. Stikker
suggests, _it may be necess
in the future to consider
amending the agreed rule of unanunity covering such decisions,
the type of situation
ich is likely to arise in relation
to Berlin is one w
e full consultation
and agreement would
be essential
befo e any decision were made to take military
1
action involv
NATOforces.
5.
would also recommend that Mr. Leger be instructed
to raise
e question of the adequacy of existing
arrangements
enabl
the Council to deal effectively
and expeditiously
with
portant matters in the event of an emergency.
A
te gram setting
out these points is attached for your_
nsideration
and comment.
000570
�SEEN BY THE Mtf,Jc;JEl-11'
•
9~•·''·"1
:
SECRET
SECRETARY
November
OF STATE
21,
FOR EXTERNAL
A
I
1961.
I
I
I
•").,
I
I
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
.:::cTH=Ec...=.P.:.:Rc=IME=c.....:::Mc::r,'~:=.S.:::cT=E:::R
NATO Planning
for
Berlin
f
~z=l-
o oJ c -
)>
'
.· J
\
In giving your approval to the gui :ance f'or Mr.
Leger on October 19 1 reserving
the Canadian position
on paragraph
6 of the instructions
for the NATOmilitary
authorities
(Annex B to PO/61/765 1 cppy attached),
you
expressed particular
concern that ca· eful attention
be
given to the need to clarify
the cir umstances of and
the authorities
responsible
for the 1specific
political
11
decision
to employ nuclear weapons selectively
to
•~emonstrate
the will and ability
the Alliance
to
..use them 11 ( sub-paragraph
6( d}{
• For example, would
the decision
be taken by all of the NATOgovernments
1
or by the Three or by a restricted
group, perhaps
;
a majority
of the governments represented
in the Council,?
2.
The draft instructions
for the NATOmilitary
authorities,
with some minor amendments (underlined
,
in attached
copy of Annex B), were approved on October 25
and sent forward.
Partially
because of our reservation!
in connection
with paragraph
6 and because other members
considered
that more consuJ.tation
was required,
it was/
agreed that there would be further
discussion
of
the
1
question
of what 11political
authority 11 would take the 1
decisions
required
when the plans are_drawn up.
The
I
question you raised,
therefore,
will be discussed.at
an early meeting of the Counci~.
The discussion
will
be related
mainly to the attached
paper P0/61/8O9
prepared by the Secretary
General.
• • • zl
I
I
I
'
I
I
I
I
000532
:i /.//.1~/J~)
I
'
�--
•
1..- -·
- 2 -
3.
It is clear from Mr. Stikker 1 s paper that he
regards all references
to the "political
authorities"
in paragraph
6 as referring
to_the NATOCouncil, where
"the will of governments will be expressed by the
Permanent Representatives'.'.
In addition,
the "specific
political
decision"
refer:red
to in paragraph
6(.dJ(3)
of Annex B would be a decision
to be taken by governments,
expressed
through the Council.
It is also evident that
the interpretation
placed on the.draft
instructions
by
the Secretary
General is that the rule of unanimity
must apply in respect
of any NATO action which may be
taken in accordance with these instructions.
4.
In the circumstances,
I would recommend that
Mr. Leger be authorized
to accept the interpretation
contained
in the Secretary
General 1 s paper stressing
that the execution
of all plans re*atmgto
the emergency
in Berlin "will be subject
to decisions
by governments
at the timE1"• While, as Mr. Stikker
suggests,
it may
be necessary
in the future
to consider
amending the
agreed rule of unanimity covering such decisions
the
type of situation
which is likely
to arise in relation
to Berlin is one where full consultation
and agreement
would be essential
before any decisions
were made by
governments to take military
action involving
NATO
forces.
5.
I would also recommend that Mr. Leger be
instructed
to raise the question
of the adequacy of
existing
arrangements
enabling
the Council to deal
effectively
and expeditiously
with important matters
in the event of an emergency.
A telegram setting
out
these points is attached
for your consideration
and
comment.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 21 NOVEMBER 1961
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1961-11-21
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00036
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Memorandum for the Prime Minister, ‘‘NATO Planning for Berlin,’’ 21 Nov. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Léger
NATO planning
Stikker