https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/de20d3d12f919449dc84054a49de020c.pdf c35e89933f5635c5555aea8c138b2048 PDF Text Text .• ., •... \ J)L(,)Yl'l~i..t>,q (-J...'i '(, '1 .• A-rt=l..w......tA -;-- i October 11, 1951. BERLIN - CONTINGENCY PLANNING Following repeated requests from other members of the Council for information on contingency planning, the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities presented a report to the Council on their contingency planning for Berlin on September 27. The information contained in this report was supplemented by a briefing given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional information was also obtained during recent meetings of the Council and from conversations which General Kitching had with Major-General Baker of the United Kingdom who is responsible, under General Norstad, for the preparation of "Live Oak" plans, Following is a summary of the main features of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the information currently available .• 2, As explained by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" : organization started, on a tripartite basis, in the winter; of 1958-59, More recently a West German observer had participated. The underlying purpose of the "Live Oak" planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly concerned to carry out their special responsibilities regarding Berlin in all contingencies. It is primarily directed at readying appropriate immediate responses to possible Soviet Bloc interference with Western rights of access to Berlin in the air or on the ground. 3. According to the Three Power report, General Norstad has been responsible, in his capacity as.Commanderin-Chief of United States forces in Europe, for developing these plans over the past two years on the basis of instructions received from the French, U.K, and U.S.A. governments. Although the Three Power report appears to, be clear in this regard, the discussion in NATOCouncil · indicated some difference of view between the Permanent Representatives of the Three as to the origin of General: Norstad's precise authority. It was the U.S. Permanent 1 Representative's under·standing that General Norstad. had been given a special capacity which was neither that of,' USCINCEURnor that of SACEURbut was one which gave him, planning and command responsibilities with respect to the Three Powers' troops in Berlin. That capacity had been: given to him in order to create a better relationship between Three Power planning and NATOplanning, ••• 2 000477 J. 1 �·, .. • D10 Stt\\t.1 uo'Nt\t,\U\~ .. sltit't \\iD\\\1 I'\ - #sECRE')2 2 - r,;~ 4. "Live NATO activity: \~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5 Oak" planning covers three main areas of (1) The development of small-scale military probes to determine Soviet/GDR intentions with respect to the denial of ground or air access by force; (2) The use of air lifts as appropriate essential requirements in the event access is interfered with or ground denied; (3) The readying of limited ground forces and tactical air forces to be employed, if necessary, to demonstrate tripartite determination to use force. '.1 to meet civil air access is Ground Access 5, The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the three countries most directly concerned. According to the Three Power report, the plans call for the use of "small tripartite convoys of various configurations designed to test the access routes and overcome physical o'ostacles". The plans also include supplementary military efforts (3 above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe efforts, to demonstrate the determination to react with force, or to test the range of force the Soviets are prepared to apply". The plans for these supplementary efforts provide for a total of three battalion group_s, each comprising troops of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. These groups would form approximately one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has indicated that study has also been given to the possibility of employing a tripartite division. According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if necessary, to extricate any Western forces in the corridor. 6. All the information available indicates that, whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate on instructions to remain within the previously defin°~ corridors. i,,oreover,. they would be instructed not to open fire first~ if fired upon, they may fire but must then withdraw. Under no circumstances would a force continue to advance if fired upon. 7. The French authorities have agreed to plan for such battalion convoys but because they have not allocated any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize any authority for the employment of these convoys before the event; it is estimated that it would take at least three days to assemble the initial battalion groups. It is also clear that these ground forces will be armed with conventional 000478 �10 StC\\tl n"'Nt\G\U\O! ..?.i-\ ~tr-:1::1 uu ~n~,\,; ~1~'""'. ir.u •· · 5lttJ.\\ P.) C ' • }:J::-~ - 3 - e£5fSECRET fl~ '2.1 \9?J'°l weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet and East German authorities before any convoy route crosses the East-We st German border. It is also intended that maximum publicity should be given in the Western press so that it will be clear that the movement of limited ground forces is not a part of a surprise offensive operation. Air Access 8. It is considered that the first interference with the Allied rights in air corridors will consist of a refusal by the Soviet and East German officials to acknowledge the · agreement for service of West Berlin b11Western airlines. In the circumstances, the present plans provide for military air crews to fly empty civil aircraft to test Soviet reaction. Five complete air cr&ws have been trained on civil aircraft by both the United States and the United Kingdom and are standing by at all times. In the case of France, civil air crews will continue to fly the aircraft under an administrative arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly converted to "military" status by a system of "call-up". 9. In addition, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five fighter aircraft to be available to act as escort for the civil aircraft which fly to test Soviet intentions. The present thinking in the planning group is that fighters should not accompany the first civil aircraft but would be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft is attacked or forced down. If such should happen, it is intended that four or five fighter aircraft will act as escorts for each succeeding aircraft which may be sent into the corridor. The original authority given to General Norstad contemplated the immediate despatch of fighter aircraft to escort the first civil aircraft travelling in the air corridor following interference with normal access. Because of a difference of view which has developed, however, it seems likely that the authority currently given to General Norstad in this respect may be changed to maim it clear that the first civil aircraft to be sent in would be without fighter escort. No definite information is available on the question of warning to the Soviet and East German authorities. Apparently the "Live Oak" military planners have recommended that such a warning be given in the event it is intended to send in fighter escorts. However, no final decision has yet been reached in this regard. Air Lifts 10. Two types of air lift are envisaged. The first would be an entirely military air lift designed to administer to Allied forces in Berlin. This would be put into effect immediately if land access were blocked and these military aircraft would continue to fly even if flights by civil aircraft were prohibited. The second type would ..• 4 000479 �•• ..;2:QVSECRET be a larger operation for the support of the city of Berlin. Because of existing stocks of supplies in Berlin, it would not be necessary to institute such an air lift immediately. 11. Although the proposed relationship between the various measures is still not entirely clear, the latest report from the Delegation (Telegram 2564 of October 6) indicates that tho immediate reaction to the blocking of land access would be the flying in of a comparatively small number of military aircraft for the support of the military garrison. Other Measures -·--- ·12. In his oral briefing to the Council on September 29, General Norstad referred to the "Live Oak" planners' responsibility for recommending "quiet precautionary military measures". According to his explanation, the terros of reference for this aspect of planning include: (a) intensification of NATOpractice alerts; (b) maintaining supplies for Berlin garrison at lG-month level; (c) increased patrolling of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces; and (d) an increase in autobahn traffic. He did not elaborate on these plans nor did he indicate whether any of them may have already been implemented. Relation of ''Live Oak" Pl~nning to N,ATO 13. It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for approval but for information. Progress has, however, been made in the sense that, for the first time, the other members of NATOhave been given a general outline of the planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad can provide additional details on request. In addition, the report contains a commitment on the part of the Three that, insofar as possible, the Council will be consulted before any of these contingency plans are implemented. 14. Apart which additional areas requiring (i) (ii) (iii) from a few details on "Live Oak" plans on information would be helpful, the main clarification are: how these plans relate to non-military currently under consideration (e.g., counter-measures); measures economic the possible sequence in which the various and non-military measures might be applied; military the eventual relationship between existing "Live Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military plans which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on the necessary guidance is arrived at in the NATO Council. The report of the Three and the remarks of General Norstad clearly imply that the "Live Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate from ••• 5 000480 �,,, ··• \ ,,., • . .; .-PS:'<" C'-7li'I' -~ ,1., •. ..:1 the NATOmilitary plans although the latter will be co-ordinated with and will complement the more limited "Live Oak" plans. On th_e other hand, a statement by the Secretary--General on Septer;;ber 29 was open to interpretation that at some later stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO military authorities is approved, "Live Oak" planning would be reviewed and would become completely a NATOresponsibility; (iv) the expected relationship between "Live Oak" plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general overall strategy, .. on a world-wide scale" referred to in the draft instructions to the NATOmilitary authorities. These instructions go on to refer to the selective application of a wide variety of measures "agreed upon both in Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would contribute to the purpose of arriving at a settlement on the problem of Berlin while progressively malcing the Soviets aware of ttie danger of general war". 000481 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 11 OCTOBER 1961 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961-10-11 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00033 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum, ‘‘Berlin - Contingency Planning,’’ 11 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1. air lift Berlin contingency France German Democratic Republic Lauris Norstad Live Oak Three Power report