https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2e926ff80ca925f0ec01d7c25874ca25.pdf 6f68cd03c7900dfec47583c30eea2031 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Infonmatii Document divulgue en vertu de la LoLsucTacce^Tinfbrmation^ w D E P A R T M E N T OF E X T E R N A L A F F A I R S Subject. Date / July..J.O.v.. 19.6.9 Publication The._Gazetfce TtBM debate has "air of unreality Johnson, McNamara. have responsibility By ROBERT CAMERON At this point, most "people who read newspapers or look at TV will probably know that "Safeguard" is not some new Trudeau beef-up NORAD? acosmetic deodorant, about to |be foisted on .the ever gullable lU.S. public. For Safeguard is Jof course a proposed defence system against ballistic missiles and thus of considerable V. ' interest to ever skeptical Canadians. Is it necessary? Can it be effective? Will it encourage proliferation and speed up the arms race? And can_the US afford it? These are the principal issues involved. An unusually large number of people have already aligned themselves either pro or con. Debate on the issue seems to be reaching a climax in the U.S. Congress. Much has already been said about the problem and it is hard to imagine anything useful being added. Nevertheless, t h e r e are some aspects that have been presented to the public with over abundant emotion, and so little reality, that a few hard facts should certainly not go amiss. The principal hard fact and clinching argument for some form of action on ABM defences, is quite elementary. Moreover, it is one that must surely dominate the thinking of any administration, be it Democratic or Republican. It is simply this: no government can fail to take reasonable measures against the demonstrable ICBM threat and hope to stay in office. The recent Democratic administration certainly tried its best to duck .this responsibility. In an effort to get off the hook, former defence secre-, tary Robert McNamara tried they gotthemsgjves trappea by fears ot escalation to 'fullJ deployment' and the enormous cost which this would involve. When you have no choice but to buy defence with the low costneffectiveness of ABM systems at the present time, the way to proceed is by 'stepped up development' or perhaps a 'pilot installation'. So long as the offence has an unmistakeable advantage over defence — as is 'the case now and will be for the foreseeable future — it makes no sense whatsoever to do much more than provide a good hedge against unexpected technical break-throughs. A most unrealistic argument against Safeguard is1 advanced by those who see it* only as a proliferation and liable to deter,potential signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To them there is just one thing to be said. No country is going to ratify this treaty, or having done so, abide by it, if nuclear weapons ever seem vita! fadefence and can be obtained To suggest that the' U.9 : irogram would have any i y7>-:- McNamara persuasion failed ^ • to persuade Russia to halt construction ,of its Safeguard system. But his pleas were countered with a simple bit of thilosophy for which there is simple answer. As one Russian general put it: "Only the side which intends to use its weapons for aggression can wish to slow down the creation of ABM systems by others." So, once the US had established technical feasibility for even a limited defence, there was no alternative but to do something about it. However, even' ihough you have to do something in defence, how you proceed can make a world of difference. And in this respect the U.S. record is not brilliant. Former President Johnson and his team made a serious tactical error. They correctly decided on a relatively small ABM expenditure. But "they then used the wrong justification for it. As soon as they called it a 'limjteri deployment' aimed at China, the fat was in the fire. Quite predictably 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation •- * iJ#h DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS . • 2 of 2 Subject Date JuM.3.9..* 1.96.9 Publication ^...Gazette. more effect than propaganda value in a decision to abstain from signing, is a conspicuous case of dishonesty or, more charitably, self-deception. The ABM d e b a t e gets larded with emotion by those who would prostrate their common sense simply to 'get along with the Russians', They therefore argue that approval of Safeguard will adversely affect the forthcoming U.S.-Russian a r m s limitation talks. But this is nonsense. In the first place the Russians aren't liable to complain if the U.S. builds something which Russia itself believes in and already hasJ And secondly, they would probably be delighted to see the US throw as much money as possible into a project which, in 'the art, is essentially a bottomless pit. Can the U.'S. afford Safeguard? It's a good question. But at the same time, one has to ask whether or not the US can afford going to the moon, so many super-highways and two-car garages, an incredible number of homes with wall-towall carpeting and two or three TVs, etc. So the simple answer is that even if dollars are scarce, the ABM-project can't be rejected on this fact alone. What it boils down to, then, is a problem of compromise with other priorities -and, above all, leadership. With opposing forces on the ABM issue being so evenly matched in Congress, Safeguard may well be reduced in scope: Though never much more than a healthy 'pilot installation', it will be more easily justified if it is advertised as such. In these circumstances, Canada will have time to refine and mature her thinking on this important aspect of the strategic weaponbalance. Hopefully she. rhighf then tike a more- sensible' attitude when re-assessing her contribution to NORAD than simply modernizing our anti-, aircraft defences. T^ Mr. Cameron is a freelance journalist who specializes in defence matters. -He is a retired air vice marshal in •iiig-GmiEftlian Air Fori �«. *-•*'• Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - \ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a TinformatioA Q DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS y A A X7- 7 Subject. /., — Date .J..ul.y..&9., 1.96.9 Publication The New York Times MIRV Responsibility If a new arms race takes place in the strategic .-offensive missiles that multiply nuclear delivery vehiEcles fivefold, an important share of the responsibility i.will have to be shouldered by President Nixon. The dangerous; expensive and totally unnecessary prospect rthat development of MIRV multiple warhead missiles 7could, pass a point, of no, return was known to- Mr. | Nixon last November when he moved to discourage \ Soviet acceptance of a Johnson Administration pro'•posal to open missile-curb talks. .Mr. Nixon has since "delayed the strategic arms-limitation talks (SALT) with j Moscow nine months, has permitted MIRV flight testi n g to proceed apace and has rejected repeated suggestions that he propose a moratorium to the Kremlin.. No one can object, of course, to a review by the :-new,Administration of the SALT preparations of the. ;, Johnspiib,team. But there was no justification for 'the leisurely nine-month pace nor for refusing to propose !•• a temporary suspension of MIRV flight testing by both Esides while the review was in progress. That is why •.•MIRV/Opponents in Congress suspectthe Administrai lion's aim from the start was to .delay the SALT talks ! until it was too late, to halt MIRV deployment.. . 7< But is it really too.late now? A Presidential decisionf has not yet been made, it is said, and both the.formerl Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmamentl Agency,vAcirian Fisher, and former Assistant Director* '.Herbert Scoville Jr. have told! a House, subcommittee bin. the-last* few Says, that a MIRV moratorium: is not Jtinly still possible but essential and urgent. : The Nixon'Administration case against a MIRV ban, as put forward by Philip J. Farley, Mr. Fisher's succes-sor, starts with the possibility that the United States .might need MIRV to penetrate a "heavy" Soviet antifballistic missile, system (ABM). But there is no evidence that Moscow intends to go beyond the light • system already deployed and that could be quickly i.pinned down in the SALT talks. Mr. Farley has also f raised the possibility that the Soviet Union could j deploy MIRV without further testing or that it could 'test during a moratorium without detection. *. Mr.'Fisher argues the contrary view. "An understanding under which both sides refrained '.from ' further" MIRV testing "could be = verified' by Rational means,", Mr.-Fisher told the subcommittee! "It. is of course possible that some testing looking ..toward MIRV development. : might. escape detection, •but the . testing, necessary !t'o" '.A. .' an . effective "system Would, I believe, fun an unacceptable risk of detectibri." " ,. - r ~ 11 This debate, recalls the arguments before'conclusion; in 1963 of the atmospheric nuclear test-ban treaty.-It. was said that the Soviet Union1 would evade the ban >by testing behind "the moon or in far outer space. Any •arms-control agreement involves taking a calculated risk. The concept of so-called no-risk arms control, as Representative Eckhardt (Dem., Texas) commented, "ignores the larger and far more dangerous consequences of an escalation of the arms race." • .No issue awaiting Mr."Nixon's decision after his \ 'trip around the world, is more important than MIRV or, along with-Vietnam, will more shape history's verdict on .his Administration, \»-.i i J 000067 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00292 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from The Gazette Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 7/30/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM Debate has Air of Unreality Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en