https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/40a8ef69ace81c32d9dcb56b32a9129b.pdf 14b23ca41174457bb3a8fabd468bca68 PDF Text Text u jD^ument disclosed undejr the Acc&a toinformation Act '0JX-^"/^Wument divulgue en verti de X^Soiiurfatcesal'informat ^ 5HELJ(* ^ CANADIAN EYES ONLY IMPLICATIONS TO CANADA OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS INTRODUCTION One conclusion of Phase I of the Government Review on External Affairs and Defence Policy, as stated by the Prime Minister on April 3, was that Canada would continue to co-operate closely with the United States through NORAD and in other ways in the defence of North America. Although the bomber threat remains, the primary military threat to North America i3 from ballistic missiles and recently attention in the United States has focusaed on the Nixon Administration's plans to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications for Canadian policy of this decision under the following headings: I Background (a) (b) (c) (d) II Safeguard Plan Warning and Detection ABM Missiles Technical and Economic Considerations Implications for.Canada (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Stability Nuclear Arms Race Arms Control Potential Risks to Canada Potential Protection of Canada III ABM and the Canada/U.S. Defence Relationship IV I Summary BACKGROUND 1. In September 1967 the Secretary of Defense (Mr. McNamara) announced that a "light" ABM system, later called "Sentinel", would be deployed in the U.S. The Sentinel programme encountered considerable opposition, and in February, 1969 the Nixon administration suspended the programme pending a review. In March 1969, however, President Nixon announced that a modified system called "Safeguard" would proceed, subject to Congressional approval and an annual review. Safeguard has also encountered considerable opposition and Congressional authority has not yet been provided. 1 2 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EIES ONLY - 2. are: 2 - The three objectives of "Safeguard", as stated by the President "a. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union. b. Defense of the American people against the kind | of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade. c. Protection against the possibility of accidental attack from any source." I (a) The Safeguard Plan 3. The Safeguard system has the same components as Sentinel: Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PAR's), Missile Site Radars (MSR's), and two anti-missile weapons: Spartan and Sprint. The plan for "Safeguard" is in phased steps. The first step involves only two PAR's, with associated MSR's, Spartans, and Sprints, planned to be operational in 1974. The sites which are near Great Falls, Montana, and Grand Forks, North Dakota, are intended for the protection of ICBM and bomber_ba&ea_in those areas. Subsequent options, as described by the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, Packard, could be: (i) to extend the defence of the deterrent forces against ICBM attack, (ii) to provide defence against submarine-launched •missiles (SLBM's), (iii) to provide light area protection for all of the U.S., including population. The totality of these options, labelled "full deployment", include 12 sites in the continental U.S. A further possible extension is to add sites in Alaska and Hawaii, President Nixon has stated that Safeguard "will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developnents; (b) the threat; (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation." 4. If the "full deployment" plan involving 12 sites is carried out, the estimated cost is $7.8 billion. At this level, it might hope to provide a meaningful defence against the size of attack that China could mount in the mid-1970,s. It might also help to preserve against Soviet attack, a sufficient proportion of the ICBM and bomber strength to maintain an effective deterrent. It would not be able to prevent the USSR from being able to destroy most of the urban poBBlaJaLon.. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 3 - I (b) Warning and Detection 5. The first warning of possible ICBM attack would come frdm several types of long range detection systems sited in Asia, Europe, and in orbiting satellites. These systems can report the launching of large rockets in the Soviet Union or China, although they cannot tell conclusively whether the launchings are for the purpose of tests, space launchings, or missile attack. Ballistic missiles on a direct trajectory toward North America will be detected over the polar regions by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), which can distinguish an object in orbit from one about to impact. 6. PAR'S installed in the northern U.S. would detect and track approaching missiles over the Canadian Arctic, at a maximum range of about 1500 miles. Information from these radars would pass to control posts where computers process the data and, on receipt of a firing order, the MSR guides the Spartan missile to make its intercept. I (c) ABM Missiles 7. The Spartan missile has a maximum range between 300 to 400 miles. The effectiveness of Spartan depends on the detonation of a very large nuclear warhead in the near-vacuum of outer space. 8. The Sprint missile complements the Spartan system by intercepting at lower altitudes those missiles not destroyed by Spartan. Sprint has a much shorter range than Spartan, less than about 50 miles from the launch site. Since it is designed to be used at low altitude, the Sprint has a very much smaller warhead yield than the Spartan, I (d) Technical and Economic Considerations 9. The technical difficulties in intercepting a small object approaching at a speed of 16,000 miles per hour are formidable. However, the development of large defensive nuclear warheads specially designed to destroy an ICBM warhead at a distance of several miles has made defence feasible without the requirement for a direct hit. It has been demonstrated at the U.S. Pacific Missile Range/an anti-missile can intercept an ICBM /that within the effective kill radius of the defensive warhead. 10. Although it can be concluded that it is technically possible for anti-missiles to intercept and destroy an ICBM, it does not necessarily follow that an ABM system is an effective and advisable system to construct. By the use of penetration aids (such as decoys, multiple warheads, or jamming) or indirect trajectories (depressed, extended range, fractional or multiple orbital) the offence may be able to overcome the defence. Although it may be technically possible for the defence to d efeat the measures mentioned above, the cogt of such_countermeasures may be much greater than that required for the ofjCensiyjejaeasures, �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET '". CANADIAN EYES ONLY - L, - 11. In summary, the state of technology in missiles, radars, and warheads is so advanced that it may well be physically possible for engineers to do almost anything in the offence vs defence or measure vs countermeasure context, but economic factors are likely to limit what is, in fact practicable to undertake. 12. Because the more advanced techniques of both offence and defence are very complex, it takes several years to develop then and put them into operational status. It is difficult for each adversary to assess far in advance what the effectiveness of his opponents moves are going to be. Consequently, there is a tendency for each side to take steps now to prepare for the worst that their opponent might have ready for them a few years hence, with important economic implications both now and for the future. II IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA i 13. Against this background, the implications for Canada of the Safeguard decision can be assessed by examining the following questions: 1. Does the decision affect the stability of the strategic balance? 2. What is the effect of the decision on the nuclear arms race? 3. What are the implications of the decision for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and for other arms control measures? 4. If the programme does proceed, what are the implications for Canada, as regards potential risk to our population and potential protection for our population? 5. Should the ABM system be integrated into the Canada/U.S, defence relationship, and if so, how? II (a) Stability 14. The present strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance is one of mutual deterrence, since both sides are capable of retaliating vdth a devastating second strike, even after absorbing the full impact of a first strike by the other side. The stability of the situation could be disturbed, in the future, in two ways: First, if one side were to develop and deploy defensive systems sufficient to limit damage and casualties , to an acceptably low level; �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 5 - Second, if one side were to- develop and deploy offensive weapons and techniques capable of overcoming the present invulnerability of the other side's retaliatory forces. In either case, the situation would be less stable because one side would have the option of initiating a nuclear exchange with good prospects of coming out a "winner". The difficulty with defensive systems like Safeguard is that they can be used either to limit damage and~casualties~or to help maintain the invulnerability of the deterrent. Opponents of the Safeguard system argue that its deployment is a step in the direction of the first type of destabilizing action; proponents argue that it is a response to a USSR destabilizing action of the second type (e.g. the deployment of SS-9 missiles with very large or multiple warheads). > 15. The U.S. decision to give first priority, in terms of the schedule of deployment, to the protection of ICBM sites and to include protection of bomber bases and command and control facilities in the programme, implies that the U.S, intention is to strengthen stability by giving evidence that it is continuing to emphasize the importance of its second strike retaliatory capability. There is however a contradictory argument. Part of the second-strike capability rests in U.S. bombers on stand-by alert. Many U.S. bomber bases are within range of attack by SLBM's and are vulnerable because of the latter's short warning time. §jr_ providing an_ail-rpupd capability, Safeguard will offer.-a-measure-oX. protection to cities as well as retaliatory_forces from 3uch attack. On the~oEEer hand, the Soviet SLBM capability can be viewed as representing part of their second-strike forces, and defence against it could be regarded as disturbing the balance of mutual deterrence. It is a matter of judgment as to which of these two contradictory arguments should be given the greater weight. Since the anti-SLBM capability is provided . only in the full Safeguard deployment, it can be said that the first phase, at least, is stabilizing in terms of protection of the U.S. second-strike forces, 16. The U.S. has not only stated that it has no intention of expanding the Safeguard system toward defence of population centres against a heavy attack, but has also made it expensive to reverse this policy, by positioning MSR's too far from cities to be of use in controlling Spring missiles against warheads aimed at cities. Although MSR's are positioned away from cities, the duplication costs in a heavy ABM system would be a small fraction (a few percent) of the total cost of deploying the heavy system. TheU.S. decision could still serve as a first step toward a destabilizing heavy defence. • 17. The provision of full area defence against a light or accidental attack from any source gives the U.S. time to assess both the intent and source of the attack before deciding to launch its retaliatory forces. To this extent, the U.S. decision contributes to stability. .,. 6 000073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 6 18. The U.S. contends that if fully deployed, Safeguard will provide effective defence against the likely capability of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) over the next ten to fifteen years; by strengthening the credibility of its assurances to nations fearful of nuclear blackmail by the PRC, the U.S. ABM capability adds to stability and may forestall the development of future destabilizing nuclear capabilities by additional countries. 19. In thelight of the above, it may be concluded on balance that the Safeguard decision does not disturb the stability of mutual deterrence. II (b) Nuclear Arms Race 20. The investment of national resources in strategic systems by both superpowers over the past twenty to twenty-five years has led to a state of stable mutual deterrence. Continued investment in strategic systems for modernization through modification or replacement, and continued expenditure to maintain systems already deployed, can proceed without disturbing this state. If, however, a decision is made by one side which could result in achieving a new level of capability, the decision is likely to prompt the other side to respond by initiating deployment action for a matching or counteracting system, and the arms race goes on. f 21. The necessity to base decisions on predictions of the enemy's posture far into the future, coupled with the tendency to design for the "greater-than-expected-threat" (to be on the safe side), and the tremendous difficulties in adjusting a programme once started, make over-reaction almost inevitable. When both" sides act in this way, the arms race continues unchecked with large expenditure of resources with no improvement in security. 22. Although the Safeguard concept of a phased deployment with annual reviews will mitigate to some extent the problem of ensuring that the deployment represents a measured response to the development of the threat, the U.S. decision to deploy Safeguard could, if implemented, be considered as a further step, albeit a measured one, in the arms race. II (c) Arms Control 23. One of the most important aspects of the Safeguard ABM system is the impact or potential effect it will.have on arms control and on Canadian interests in that area. 24. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): The proponents of Safeguard argue that the decision to deploy will strengthen the U.S. position in SALT; the opponents contend that the decision will complicate and possibly obstruct the long-awaited negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. The USSR's interest in opening SALT has however continued, despite the U.S. decision to deploy Safeguard, and the commencement of SALT does not, therefore, appear to have been affected. 000074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 7 - The possible U.S, intention of using Safeguard as a bargaining counter in negotiations or as a hedge against Soviet non-compliance with an agreement on strategic arms may however affect the Soviet negotiating attitude. 25. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB): The U.S. decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM system involves, according to U.S. authorities, a requirement to continue underground nuclear tests until 1973. If this requirement is to be met, early achievement of a CTB will be prejudiced. *• 26. Cut-Off: The U.S. decision on Safeguard involves use of fissionable material for ABM warheads, but this has not adversely affected U.S. support for a "cut-off" in production of fissionable material. (This may indicate that the U.S. already has adequate supplies). The USSR has recently rejected new U.S. proposals for progress on this issue, which may indicate that the USSR is not in a similar supply position. 27. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Many non-nuclear countries consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be inequitable, and many signatories may be more reluctant to ratify and to surrender their options to acquire nuclear weapons, if the two superpowers do not implement Article VI of the NPT which calls upon them to demonstrate their good faith through taking measures to end the arms race. If the U.S. decision is seen as a contradiction of Article VI of the NPT, this reluctance would be further increased. 28. The question of the relationship of the U.S. Safeguard decision to the prospects for future arms control measures is a difficult one to answer categorically, since progress in arms control depends on a complex interaction of both national and international political, military and strategic considerations. The balance of argument seems to favour, however, the conclusion that Safeguard may hinder rather than help endeavours towards useful arms control agreements. i II (d) Potential Risks to Canada . 29. If long range "Spartan" ABM missiles, sited near the Canadian border, were fired against ballistic missiles approaching U.S. targets from the north, some of the Spartan warheads would explode above Canadian territory. These explosions would occur well above the atmosphere were the Spartans are designed to neutralize the ICBM warheads. Spartans are. programmed to make their interceptions at a high enough altitude to prevent damage to people living beneath the bursts. Even if the effect of the ABM explosion were to make the ICBM warhead detonate, the high altitude would prevent serious damage on the ground. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the radiation from the long-term fallout resulting from even a large number Spartan bursts would not constitute less of a serious hazard than that to which the world has alreadybeen subjected during nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The shorter range Sprint missiles would also be burst at altitudes high enough to avoid serious damage to populated areas. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 8 - 30. In contrast, if the attacking missiles were to penetrate to their intended targets and burst on the ground, very heavy fallout would ensue, which would be spread over a large area of the United States and Canada downwind frora each burst. Consequently, from the point of view of fallout, the presence of the defensive system is a distinct advantage if the possibility of a nuclear exchange is accepted. 31. The U.S. have assured us that they will limit the minimum height of Spartan bursts to altitudes above 35 nautical miles. A Spartan burst at a somewhat lower altitude (say 25 miles) above the earth could break windows, and if the weather were clear, it is possible that fires could be started in tinder-like material and that persons with exposed skin could receive burns. Another hazard that would be present in clear weather, even for a burst at very great heights, is that a person unfortunate enough to be outdoors and looking in the general direction of the burst would probably suffer temporary flash blindness and could suffer a permanent partial impairment of vision. II (e) Potential Protection of Canada 32. The U.S. have not suggested that any of the Safeguard equipment should be located in Canada. Our analysis indicates that for defence of targets in the U.S. against the simpler threats (direct ballistic . trajectories of single warheads without sophisticated penetration aids) there would not be much to be gained by siting installations in Canada, although it would be necessary to fire Spartan anti-missiles across the border to burst above Canadian territory. However, if protection is to be given to targets in Canada much beyond the border, or if the defence is to be improved to cope with such threats as depressed trajectories or fractional orbital missiles, it is probable that there would be advantages to Canadian siting, 33. The question of protection for Canadian targets has not been raised with the U.S. If Spartans are eventually deployed to Washington State, Michigan, and New Ehgland, as well as the Phase I sites in Montana and North Dakota, then it should be possible for many of the larger Canadian cities to have about the same degree of protection that can be provided to U.S. cities, III ABM AND THE CANADA/U.S. DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP 34. An important instrument for practical defence co-operation in North America is the NORAD Agreement. In the Agreement renewing NORAD for five years to 1973 it is stated "that this Agreement will not involve in anyway a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence". The object was to avoid committing Canada automatically �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY " 9 - to participate in ABM defence. Nevertheless, the Canadian Government has kept:in close touch with ABM developments. This was considered important because of the newness of the concept of missile defence and the uncertainty as to the implications for Canada, both technical and political. 35. Prior to the decision to deploy "Sentinel" the U.S, Secretary of Defense briefed the Minister of National Defence regarding his Government's intentions, and there have been occasional subsequent meetings at the official level at which further information has been passed. It is understood that the President has been asked to make a statutory determination under the MCMahon Act which will enable further nuclear information to be released to Canada. i 36. . A key function of NORAD is the conimand and control of the . weapon systems for anti-bomber defence* consisting of fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles located in both Canada and the U.S., and manned by servicemen of both countries. A similar function will have to be exercised over the ABM system. U.S. intentions regarding, the deployment, firing doctrine, command, and control of Safeguard aire far from settled at this time. The computers and their associated programmes represent a new order of magnitude in an art that has already.grown at a remarkable rate. The speed with which an ABM system must react is such that almost every step in an almost incredibly complex process must be foreseen in advance and built into the computer programme. It is not known how much initiative or authority will be left to the military officers in command of the system. At the minimum, it could be that all they are authorized to do is to push a button on receipt of an order . from Washington. 37. Many of the key decisions regarding operation of the ABM system will, therefore, have to be made a long time (probably years) before the system is operational. Since the issues at stake are of fundamental importance, it may well be that certain programming decisions would have to be taken at a level above that of NORAD. They may also be bf such a nature that the U.S. would prefer to make them without the involvement of any other country. 38. The magnitude and Importance of these problems are such as to engage the institutional rivalries of some of the larger elements in the U.S. Government. This fact is likely to delay and obscure our ability to foresee just how the eventual arrangements will.be made. 39. At the June 1968 meeting of the PJBD, CINCNORAD, supported-by his Canadian Deputy, argued in favour of combining operational control of air and space defence under NORAD, At the request of the U.S. PJBD Chairman, ... 10 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 10 - a summary of thi3 briefing was officially, entered in the PJBD minutes. At the October 1968 PJBD meeting, the U.S. Chairman 3tated on record that "the United States Government was still considering these issues and had not reached any clear consensus...(and) it would assist his Government in its deliberation to have the views of the Canadian Government on this matter". It should be noted that there is a precedent (the Nike Hercules, the surface-to-air point defence missile) for the inclusion under NORAD of a system located entirely in the U.S., and manned and paid for by Americans only. 40. Another function of NORAD is the collection and evaluation of intelligence regarding a ierospace activity. At present, all of the information pertaining to air defence and some information pertaining to missile and space activity processed through the NORAD system, is seen by the officers of the Canadian Aimed Services holding position in the NORAD organization, and is available to Canada. In preparing for the ABM system the U.S, will have to decide whether to process all of the increasing volume of information regarding missile and space activity (including that collected by PAR's early warning and intelligence gathering systems) through NORAD, or through a separate channel. 41. Extension of the integrated arrangement of NORAD to include active ballistic missile defence might enable Canada to play a meaningful part in the assessment of aerospace intelligence information, and to have a good understanding of the problems and the knowledge necessary to assess the state of the threat, the offence, and the defence. It is hot, .however, certain that such a move would ensure Canadian participation in all key functions should such participation be desired, 42. Moreover the importance of purely air defence is likely to continue to decrease in relative importance as the already preponderant space threat continues to grow. Accordingly, a decision by Canada; not to be involved in active defence against missiles could mean exclusion from an essential element of North American defence for the future. On the other hand opting in could mean a long-term commitment which might be difficult to revoke. In any event, from a purely military point of view, it would be efficient to place Safeguard under the command and control of NORAD. 43. Thus, although extension of the terms of reference of NORAD to include aerospace defence has been mentioned at the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and recommended by CINCNORAD, it is likely that the full significance of such a step has not yet been fully studied within the U.S. In any event, no official U.S, position is available, 44. Participation or co-operation in the command and controliof Safeguard would involve additional implications for Canada's interests, Canada's involvement in this venture could be construed as an extension of the system and thus an extension of the arms race. The eventual extent and significance of our participation would be difficult to determine i , 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 11 - immediately and would add an element of uncertainty. Canadian participation in Safeguard could be regarded as approval of the decision to deploy it and Canada's prominent position in the field of arms control and disarmament negotiations could be undermined. Technological improvements or thickening of the system would magnify the problems for Canada both with regard to our participation and our position in international arms control negotiations. IV SUMMARY 45. If the ABM system known as Safeguard i s deployed according t o the present plan, a. i t w i l l need to plan on bursting nuclear warheads above Canadian t e r r i t o r y , in order to be able to defend t a r g e t s in the northern U.S., b. if used, it will not inflict serious dangers to Canadian population, c. some protection to Canadian cities could be provided, and d. no significant improvement for defence of U.S. targets against the current threat would seem to be gained by siting in Canada equipment included in the current Safeguard plan. L 46. The Safeguard system cannot provide effective defence of the North American population against a heavy attack from the Soviet Union. 47. The questions as to whether Safeguard affects the stability of the strategic balance contributes to the arms race, or inhibits the prospects of arms control, can be argued with evidence on both sides of each question. On balance, the analysis in this paper suggests that Safeguard is not destabilizing; contributes to the arms race; and may hinder rather than help endeavours towards useful arms control agreements. Canadian involvement in Safeguard could have an adverse effect on Canada's position in the field of international arms control negotiations. 48. The key planning which will determine the mode of operation of the ABM defence, the firing doctrine, the risks to population, and the priorities for protection will take place long before the system reaches operational status, and may be done at a level above NORAD. Extension of the terms of reference of NORAD to include aerospace defence may not ensure Canadian participation in this planning. 12 000079 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lpi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 12 i 49. | Extension of the terms of reference of NORAD t o include a n t i m i s s i l e as well as anti-bomber defence would allow Canadians access to the flow of intelligence concerning aerospace a c t i v i t y . May 13, 1969. 000080 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00290 Title A name given to the resource Draft Paper- Defence Research Analysis Establishment Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/13/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Implications to Canada of ABM Defence Systems Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en