https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/df2108fbdf47629b4c6229412a544d1a.pdf 688186997d12610b0107517bf0e25be3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformatio SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT DEFENCE RESEARCH IN HIPLV PLCA*C QUOTE R f r t M N C K A P.APPIUCR V 3338-2-1 BOARD (C/DRAE) CONSEIL DE RECHERCHES POUR LA DEFENSE DCPADTMtNT OP NATIONAl. DKPENCI MINISTER! D t LA DEP«N»« NATIONALE CANAOA DEFENCE RESEARCH ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT CENTRE D'ANALYSE POUR LA DEFENSE NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS OTTAWA 4, ONTARIO —-WiWmeR-GENERAL d . la DEFENSE NATIONALE OTTAWA 4, ONTARIO 21-/I u- - T 23 April, 1969. Ext Aff OPMA - Mr. J.G. Harris Disarmament - Mr. A. Bernier «»—7y* . Aff D Con P. - LCOL K.W. MacDonald ADM(F) - DPG - Mr. W.B. Snarr Vvt IMPLICATIONS TO CANADA OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS: DRAFT NO. 3 1. At a meeting in DRAE on 22 April, 1969, an extensive discussion was held on the contents of Draft No.2 of the paper entitled "Implications to Canada of Anti-Ballistic Defence Systems". 2. A number of points relating to stability, escalation, and arms control could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all present. However, Draft No.3 does represent considerable progress, and is being circulated to serve as the basis for another meeting, tentatively planned for 25 April, 1969. 3. It is emphasized that Draft No.3 does not represent an agreed document. G.R. Lindsey Chief Defence Research Analysis Establishment SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT 000081 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY DRAFT NO. 3 IMPLICATIONS TO CANADA OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS INTRODUCTION 301 One conclusion of Phase I of the Government Review on External Affairs and Defence Policy, as stated by the Prime Minister on April 3, was that Canada would continue to co-operate closely with the United States through NORAD and in other ways in the defence of North America. The primary military threat to North America is from ballistic missiles and recently attention in the United States has foeussed on the Nixon Administration's plans to deploy an im anti-ballistic missile system.) J) -The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications for Canadian policy of this decision. X 4 BACKGROUND SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000082 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Taccks a Tinformation -2SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 302 The US Department of Defense pursued an active program of research and development in the area of anti-ballistic missile technology for many years, but it was not until in September, 1967 that the Secretary of Defense (Mr. McNamara) announced that a "light" ABM system, later called "Sentinel", would be deployed in the US. The Sentinel program encountered considerable opposition, and in February, 1969 the Nixon administration suspended the program pending a review. In March 1969, however, President Nixon announced that a modified system called "Safeguard" would proceed, subject to Congressional approval and an annual review. 303 The three objectives of "Safeguard", as stated by the President are: "a. protection of our land-based retaliatory forced/against a direct attack by the Soviet Union^ b. J))efen</e of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able tq mount within the decade^ ^a^' ..3 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -3SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY C. protection against the possibility of accidental attack from any source." 304 The Safeguard system has the same components as Sentinel; Jthe- Perimeter Acquisition Radai^(PAR) , <Jth-er*Missile Site Radar^MSR), an d two anti-missile weapons: Spartan, and Sprint. ') £ 305 #) WARNING AND DETECTION The first warning of possible ICBM attack would come from several types of long range detection systems sited in Asia, Europe, and in orbiting satellites. These systems can report the launching of large rockets in the Soviet Union or China, although they cannot tell whether the launchings are for the purpose of tests, space launchings, or missile attack. Ballistic missiles on a direct trajectory toward. North America will be detected over the polar regions by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), which can distinguish an object in orbit from one about to impact. 306 PARs installed in the northern US will detect and track approaching missiles over the Canadian Arctic, at a maximum range of about 1500 miles. Information from these radars is passed to control posts where computers process the data and, on receipt of a firing order, the MSR guides the Spartan missile to make its intercept. $ECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY ...4 000084 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -4-. SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY % J£\ ABM Missiles 307 utArf^ The Spartan missile has a giamt 300 to range ^©4— JO™: 400 m i l e s . ^ <EThe effectiveness of Spartan depends on the ; detonation of a very large nuclear warhead in the rieaT-' vacuum of outer space. 308 The Sprint missile complements the Spartan system by intercepting at lower altitudes those warheads not destroyed by Spartan. Sprint has a much shorter range than Spartan, less than about 50 miles from the I launch site. e7teft$g@&&$j»>>*®%<"f&®&BteA&Aat low altitude b^iau&es^he^^ifcn^^ias a *»»By much smaller warhead yield than the Spartan. Safeguard Plan 309 The plan for "Safeguard" is in phased steps. The /^A^d^^dm-7U\h^ first step involves {only two PARs, with associated MSRs, A Spartans, and Sprints. The sites which are near Great Falls, Montana, and Grand Forks, North Dakota, are intended for the protection of ilCBM and bomber bases in those areas. // Subsequent options .could be: i X JbiC&)\ 1, • A X to extend the defence of the deterrent forces against ICBM attack, (A./I <^7^\9y\ t0 P r o v i d e defence against submarine-launched missiles (SLBM), •*• 3 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000085 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -5SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY IAM\ ^W) 7 t 0 provide l i g h t area protection for population. I J V a l l of the .US, including i The totality of these options, labelled "full deployment", >*, A include 12 sites in the continental USA.. A further possible extension is to add sites in Alaska and Hawaii. ^ S a % f u a f d ^ W e reviewed annually from the point of ''view of (a) technical developments; (b) the threat; \ (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation. 310 If the "full deployment" plan involving 12 sites is carried out, the estimated cost is $6.6 billion. At this level, it might hope to provide a meaningful defence against the size of attack that China could mount in the mid-1970s. It might also be able to preserve a significant proportion of the ICBM and bomber strength against Soviet attack, but would not be able to prevent the USSR from being able to destroy most of the urban population. *f (i) 311 TECHNICAL AOT EI^OMIC yQ^^tJi^^t^^ The technical difficulties in intercepting a small object approaching at a speed of 16,000 miles per hour are formidable. However, the development of large defensive nuclear warheads specially designed to destroy an ICBM warhead at a distance of several miles has made successful defence possible without the requirement for a direct hit. An anti-missile can intercept an ICBM within the effective kill radius of the defensive warhead SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY r *" 000086 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -6 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY as has been demonstrated at the Pacific Missile Range. 4 312 Although it can be concluded that it is technically possible for ABM to intercept and destroy an ICBM wj^tas^MiWBywd, it does not necessarily follow than an ABM system is an effective and advisable system to construct. By the use of penetration aids (such as decoys, multiple warheads, or jamming) or indirect trajectories (depressed, extended range, fractional or multiple orbital) the offence may be able to overcome the defence. Although it may be technically possible for the defence to defeat the measures mentioned above, the cost of such countermeasures may be much greater than that required for the offensive measures. _ ? ' 313 ^rrer-s4?t«#*4^.ft^n-^he^ ^*Han«^^^d^by«s^y%fi^'«*Wt, the state of technology in mssiles, radars, and warheads is so advanced that it may well be physically possible for engineers to do almost anything in the offence vs defence or measure vs countermeasure context, but economic factors are likely to determine what is in fact practicable to undertake. 314 s v Because the more advanced techniques of both offence and defence are very complex, it tal \ \ \ years tx> develop them and put them into operational status It is difficult for each adversary to\issess far in, \ \ \ V advance what\the effectiveness of his opponents moves ...7 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY \ 000087 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -7SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY afce goingrto--H.be. Consequently,',-th^rc-d-s-a b u l l t r i n fl '$ y £ur fhur^s=t^ffl^- to esoa-3ra±^ Jsti4^-eaxs-h s i d e \ ^jg±±^7fche s t e p s now>to p r e p a r e f o r t h e worst t h a t t h e i k opponent might have ready f o r them a few y e a r s hence.s- JL^ -c 315 ^*—js..^x^^j^^r^^- KVf *f**'t IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA Against this background, the implications for Canada of the Safeguard decision can.be assessed by examining the following questions: 1. Does the decision affect the stability of the strategic balance? 2 . -Bswe/ithe decision e-€wt*s^tu^-e==e^t?a^ra^0H=-e€1 the nuclear arms race? 3. What are the implications of the decision for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and for other arms control measures? 4. If the program does proceed, what are the implications for Canada, as regards potential risk to our population and potential protection for our population? 5. Should.the ABM system-b* integrated into the Canada/US defence relationship, and if so, how? ... 8 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000088 �•8 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY X 316 Stability The present strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance is one of sis^lae mutual deterrence, since both sides are capable of retaliating with.a devastating second strike, even after absorbing the full impact of a first strike by the other side. The stability of the situation could be disturbed, in the future, in two ways: first, if one side were to develop and deploy defensive systems sufficient to limit damage and casualties to an acceptably low level, § second, if one side was to develop and deploy offensive weapons and techniques capable of overcoming the present invulnerability of the other side's retaliatory forces, /in either case, the situation would be less <8 "stable because one side would have the option of initiating a nuclear exchange with good prospects of coming out a "winner". A Opponents of the Safeguard system argue that its deployment is a step in the direction of the first type of destablizing action; proponents argue that it is a response to a USSR destablizing action of the second type. The detailed arguments as to whether the Safeguard decision is or is not destabilizing are given below. d iX^ot ffeXtabUIXing^ ,4 pM> ^decision to a. 'ihe urs-^ciecision to give give f±irs£ priority, in trexms f- of the schedule of deployment, UQ the protection SFCRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY too t*<& * 000089 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -10 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY ^of ICBM sites and to include protection of oomber bases and command and control X. \ \ facilitie-s in the program implies that the x \ \ US is continuing to emphasize the importance of its second strike retaliatory capability. The US has not only stated that it has no intention of expanding the Safeguard system towards defence of population centres against a heavyNattack, but has also consciously made \ \ it more difficult to reverse thi&. policy, byv \ \ \ positioning Missile Site Radars too far from \ cities to be of use in.controlling Sprint missives against warheads \ \ /aimed Since the light Safeguard aimed at cities. \ system does not affect mutual deterrence and its potential for expansion is low, it is not destabilizing. The provision of full area defence against a light accidental or irrational attack from the Soviet Union or any other nation, gives the USNtime to assess both the intent and source of the attack before deciding to unleash its \ retaliatory forces. \ In this sense the\US action is stabilizing. ^ Always present is the possible spurious indication of an ICBM\ttack, due to mistaken interpretation . ..11 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY \ 000090 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -11SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY of signals from re-entering space vehicles-;- "" natural phenomena, or malfunctions'"^ detector's. The temptation^r seeming obligation to react by* offensive action.-would be reduced by the" existence of anyABM system; in this sense the US^action is ./stabilizing. e. The US decision to deploy Safeguard matches y * • ^«"'"*'","'"", • in the public mind the ABM system already deployed . around Moscow. I.t^thus may provide ^ 'reassurance and contribute to an internal' political climate^favourable to bo'th stability X'' S and the prospects for improved relations between f. the US and the Soviet' Union. When fully deployed, Safeguard will provide effective defence against the likely Chinese .v*.?'•• capability over the next ten^'to fifteen years,, Ad» /' rsStr 7 and hence strengthens^the credibilities US A X jf"7 guarantees under^'the Non-Proliferation Treaty jf'r to nations fefarful of nuclear blackmail by the PRC. Safeguard i s Destabilizing i 7 " g. /* / Part of the US second strike-capability rests Many US in its bombers on stand-by alert y bomber bases along the eastern seaboard^are s4-S vulnerable to attack by SLBMS" bocausfcSubmarine SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY ...12 000091 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -12SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY_ Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) because of the latter's short warning time, and ^-— X XT Safeguard, in'protecting second strike, is designed^o protect the basesjfrforn such attack: On the other hand, if Soviet SLBM capability is / TA /s X viewed as representing' part of their second strike forces, i£*hen defence against them reduces mutual deterrence and is destabilizing. y h. Although MissileySite Radars are positioned away from cities,^the duplication costs would be a small fraction (a few percent) of the cost of deploying a heavy ABM system. Hence,^-rhe importance of this aspect of the <Safeguard system X / has been exaggerated, and the US decision could easily be^-a first step toward a destabilizing heavy defence. 317 ^Arguments at g. and^hr"'detract from a. and b. respectively, and henc.e^eaken them to some extent. In*"" the light of the^a*bove, it may be concluded on balance 'that the Safeguard decision is foot destabilising. tt) AU.«siWx t\r~~CU£JL 318 The investment of national resources in strategic systems by both superpowers over the past twenty to twentyfive years has led-to ErfJfiJat?'!^3^-—^^m^mm.^u.;^.u ,a state of stable mutual deterrence. . . .13 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000092 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information.Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -13SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY Continued investment in strategic systems for modernization through modification or replacement, and continued expenditure to maintain systems already deployed, can proceed without disturbing the ^iMbimni capability. of balanced If, however, a decision is made by one side which could result in achieving a capability^tefeyond^^fao-. .pAgjifegesau. the decision is likely to prompt the other side to respond by initiating deployment action for a matching or counteracting system, and the arms race I I I HMI7'*I1'M>"" ' 1 - " ~ ' ' • » . » • . . . 1 A • • . ^ • ' • - • ' • • q » < . ' i i i i f l | ^ l t , w , I J B I J _ 1 1 L n f • - . Q j i . i e - t r " . * ' % * * * ' * * * ^ £ $ & ' ^ V ihus, any decision which is aimed at reaching a^new level\ (if.11*''*' ^*^*, \ of capability or one which is claimed to*vbe in direct response to suchxa step by other^side can be considered as escalatory. The sfbeond part of the definition of escalation must be ^included siiice^it is impossible to know whichvdecision preceded which, a difficulty which "** is,exacerbated by the understandable tendency ofxmilitary \ planners to try to anticipate the other side's actions. *•**»., f4MI»- ,*p—*irm**arTs- r>*s 19 I j ^ e ^ c j i : ^ ^ ^ ^ J — lead to a new stability at a higher p.la^te'Su, the situation would be rogrettable to^j^hiE^Tbut regrettable. This likelihood is ma4-g*aoubtful, however, by the very long lead time's for development, manufacture, and deployment otcjnaj.or^stxa^e^^^^^^-fe^^^^) The necessity to base decisions on predictions of the enemy's posture far into the future, coupled with the tendency to design for the "greater-than expected-threat" (to be on the safe side), and the ...14 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000093 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -14SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY tremendous difficulties in adjusting a program once started, .jjA-Tir over-reaction When both sides act in this way, continues unchecked,-w-^& TJ*^ the arms £^c$J$fa^wtMty> XZts^^kj-jQr^Z^v^^ 320 Although the Safeguard concept of a phased deployment with annual reviews will mitigate to some extent the problem of ensuring that the deployment represents a measured response to the development of the threat, the US decision, to deploy Safeguard can be considered, as oreal w X j\ti&$^^-&p4&e^&e&*±^ Arms Control 321 A W . One of the most important aspects of the Safeguard ABM system is\ the Impact or potential effect it will have , w,i arms control^ and V>n Canadian interests in that area. & ^As\indicated bel\>w, tihere are conflicting arguments. k^ y Safeguard Does Not\ Hinder Arms Control a. since the original US decision taken in 1967 to deploy Sentinel pre-dated the Soviet Union's positive response to a long standing invitation to beVin the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the decision to deploy the modified Safeguard system is unlikely to have any adverse effect on the USSR willingness to begin the talks. 15 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000094 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -15SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY b. Safeguard, particularly since it is a phased plan,' gives the US a bargaining counter with respect to negotiations which may arise out of SALT, and thus may improve the willingness of the US to enter into productive talks. c. The existence of an ABM system could increase US willingness to accept balanced and mutual. limitations or reductions in offensive weapons, since it is. a hedge against the other side's non-compliance with a disarmament agreement. Safeguard Hinders Arms Control d. The decision to deploy Safeguard leads, by US admission, to a requirement for continued underground nuclear testing and has seriously prejudiced the possibility of achieving early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. e. Desire to improve the warheads for ABM missiles already deployed may, in the future, increase US pressures for renouncing the limited test ban treaty and resumption of atmospheric or exo-atmospheric testing. f. The US decision may result in a postponement of the date on which a "cut-off" in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes could be agreed between the USSR and US despite the ...16 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000095 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu defla Loi sur Tacces a {'information -16SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY recent US proposal for opening negotiations on this subject. g. The US decision can be viewed as a contradiction to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which calls upon the nuclear powers to demonstrate their good faith through measures to end the arms race) and hence may be used to . strengthen the position of nuclear weapon proponents in countries capable of "going nuclear", and may further diminish the prospects for the coming into force of the NPT. The question of relationship of the US Safeguard decision to the prospects for future arms control measures is a difficult one to answer categorically, since progress in arms control depends on a complex interaction of both national and international political, military and strategic considerations. The balance of argument seems to favour, however, the conclusion that Safeguard hinderfe rather than helps' endeavours towards useful arms control agreements. POTENTIAL RISKS TO CANADA If long range "Spartan" ABM missiles, sited near the Canadian border* were fired against ballistic missiles approaching US.targets from the north, some of -lAciiiiJd^ii^ansijrr mirlnnr warheads would explode ...17 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000096 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a /'information -17SECRET CANADIAN EYES.ONLY above Canadian territory. These explosions would occur well above the atmosphere where the Spartans r neutralize the ICBM warheads are designed to *3 s"^r-t-t^s^Be^iQqj^^jtot~d-trteFff3&&> Spartans are programmed to make their interceptions at a high enough altitude to prevent damage to people.living beneath the bursts. Even if the effect of the ABM explosion were to make the ICBM warhead detonate, the high altitude would prevent serious damage on the ground.[yV(yvQ«^DA-v t _ 324 In contrast, if the attacking missiles were to penetrate to their intended targets and burst on the ground, very heavy fallout would ensue, which would be spread by the winds over a large area of the United States and Canada. Consequently, from the point of view of fallout, the presence of the defensive system is a —the possibility of a distinct advantage if nuclear exchange^ cCcTTation from the fallout resulting from high altitude nuclear bursts <6>SP§*"not constitute a more serious hazard than that to which-^we-hajtV"already been subjected during nuclear tests in the atmosphere. =7^JEE^E^r 325 The shorter range Sprint3**f missiles would also be burst at altitudes high enough to avoid serious damage to populated areasfc~ku±_ itM^irnlikely that they would have sufficient range to reach as far as the Canadian border in the new Safeguard deployment. 326 The US have assured us that they will limit the minimum height Of Spartan bursts to altitudes above 35 ... 18 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000097 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -18SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY nautical miles. A Spartan burst at a somewhat lower altitude (say 25 miles) above the earth could break windows, and if the weather were clear, it is possible that fires could be started in tinder-like material and that persons with unprotected skin directly exposed could receive burns. Another hazard that would be present in clear weather, even for a burst at very great heights is that a person unfortunate, enough to be outdoors and looking <i£g!lSE££s in the /JdXrection of the burst would probably suffer temporary flash blindness and could suffer a permanent partial impairment of vision. Potential Protection of Canada The US have not suggested that any of the Safeguard equipment should be located in Canada. Our analysis indicates that for defence of targets in the US against the simpler threats (direct ballistic trajectories of single warheads without sophisticated penetration aids) there would not be much to be gained by siting installations in Canada, although it would be necessary to fire Spartan anti-missiles across the border to burst above Canadian territory. However, if protection is to be given to targets in Canada much beyond the border, or if the defence is to be improved to cope with such threats as depressed trajectories or fractional orbital missiles, it is probable that there would be advantages to Canadian siting. ...19 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000098 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -19SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 328 The question of protection for Canadian targets has not been raised with the US. If Spartans are eventually deployed to Washington State, Michigan, and New England, as well as the Phase I sites in Montana and North Dakota, then it should be possible for many of the larger Canadian cities to have about the same degree of protection that can be provided to US cities. ABM AND THE CANADA/US DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP 329 An important instrument for practical defence co-operation in North America is the NORAD Agreement. The Agreement renewing NORAD for five years to 1973 provided that it "will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment toi participate an active ballistic missile participate in in •< defence". /v^X~%7- z&r^o- ti lh©--erbi^€t_was /Th©--^r&j-&€ t_was ttoo _ J j ] ^ i i r _ £ - t h a t - r o j i t i n u a t i o n .^w-ould n&frHre~'"T,eg-3xd^--aJ5j automatically committing Canada to participate in ABM defence. Never- A theless, it was agreed that Canadian authorities should keep in close touch with ABM developments. This was considered important because of the newness of the concept of missile defence and the uncertainty as to the implications for Canada, both technical and political. 330 At the June 1968 meeting of the PJBD, CINCNORAD, supported by his Canadian Deputy, made a strong case for combining air and space defence under one authority. At the request of the US PJBD chairman, a summary of this . . .20 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000099 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -20SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY briefing was officially entered in the PJBD minutes. At the October, 1968 PJBD meeting, the US chairman stated on record that "the United States government was still considering these issues and had not reached any clear consensus (and) it would assist his government in its deliberations to have the views of the Canadian government on this matter". £Prior to the decision to deploy "Sentinel" the US'iauthi|/iiJies briefed certain Canadians (including the /• vl$. . .' • Minister of National Defence) regarding the=d& intentions, and there have been occasional subsequent meetings at which further information has been passed. . ,/ r It is faoped- that the President will oooa mafii a statutory determination /jfunder the McMahon Act4 which will enable further nuclear information to be released to Canada. US intentions regarding the deployment, firing doctrine, command, and control of Safeguard are far from settled at this time. associated programs The computers and their represent a new order of magnitude in an art that has already grown at a remarkable rate. The speed with which an ABM system must react is such that almost every step in an almost incredibly complex process must.be foreseen in advance and built into the computer program. It is not known how much initiative or authority will be left to the military officers in command ...21 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000100 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -21SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY of the system. At the minimum, it could be that all they are authorized to do is to push a button on receipt of an order from Washington. 333 'Mogt- of the key decisions regarding the na-tu-re ©^operation of the ABM system will, therefore, have / \ to be made a long time (probably years) before -^t eoull/d. P^ThefcfivngXat stake eire of fundamenta-1 ijffp»SLance MiuCh_i*feS ETTH'|1I1<N-U»iJ i t-y -Q^^^4lLP3TT^ir*ar&-2S>n -^f^P M m ilei-t4ju^TT-t. or losing--m-Lllions_j3f live^s—£4rro~ugh a -&eiay—or£~ a f ew—s-e^ojitLsjj***^ \i£iXhaj well be that 9-ycn ' l ' l ^ F ^ V ^ ^ ^decisions will/ibe takenat a level above that of NORAD factors /£W*^ ( ( / / beyond NORAD's sole responsibility are involved, (\ for example, the requirement to co-ordinate the launching of ABMs with that of ICBMs. They may also be of such a nature that the US would prefer to make them without the involvement of any other country. 334 The magnitude and importance of these problems are such as to engage the institutional rivalries of some of the larger elements in the US government. This fact is likely to delay and obscure our ability to foresee just how the eventual arrangements will be made. ' 33^ A^key function of NORAD is the collection and evaluation of intelligence regarding aerospace activity. At present, all of the information.pertaining to air defence and some @±—the sma-lier—tfTTTuTfte pertaining to missile and space activity processed through the NORAD SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY ...22 000101 J. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -22SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY system, is seen by the officers of the Canadian Armed Services holding positions in the NORAD organization, and is available to Canada. In preparing for the ABM s>5tem the US will have to decide whether to process all of the increasing volume of information regarding missile and space activity (including that collected by PARs, early warning and intelligence gathering systems) through NORAD, or through a imrallglrjrefrb separate channel. 33 ^N ^ key function of NORAD is the command and control of the weapon system for anti-bomber defence, consisting of fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles located in both Canada and the US, and manned by servicemen of both countries. ijA ¥ 33! A similar function will have to be exercised over the ABM system. In the case of the NIKE Hercules surface-to-air point defence missile, there is a precedent for the inclusion under NORAD of a system located entirely in the US, and manned and paid for by Americans only. From a purely military point of view, it would be efficient to place Safeguard under the command and control of NORAD. Thus, although extension of the terms of reference of NORAD to include aerospace defence has been mentioned at the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and recommended by CINCNORAD, it is likely that the full significance of such a step has not yet been fully studied within the US. In any event, no official US position is available. to understand fh< strategic/-pi^n, to nadian populatrsm from'( frienc SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000102 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -23SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY action, perhaps to arrange for s«me protection against hostile action,\and perhaps to co-operate infunctioning of theVsystem,/ it will b\srieceisaryfc to partieipatev in or at least ISearn about the formulation of the basic plans which will determine th( firing doctrrne__anir the pirrncip 1 ejy on which-the ABM computers will be programmed. If Canada wishes to play a meaningful part in VA the assessment of aerospace intelligence information, to have a good understanding of the problems and the knowledge necessary to give valid advice to the Canadian government regarding the state of the threat, the offence, and the defence, it would be desirable to extend the integrated arrangements of NORAD to include anti-missile as well as anti-bomber defence. It is not, however, certain that such a move would ensure Canadian participation in the key functions of planning described in the preceding paragraph, should such participation be desired. 340 Participation or co-operation in the command and control of Safeguard would*involve additional implications for Canada's interests. Canada's involvement in this venture could be construed as an extension of the system and thus further escalation. The eventual extent and significance of our participation would be difficult to determine immediately and would add ao. element/ of uncertainty. ...24 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000103 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY Canadian participation in Safeguard would be regarded as approval of the decision to deploy it and Canada's y^ewna-neiit position in the field of arms control and disarmament negotiations would be undermined. Support of a US project which has as one of its objectives, defence against the People's Republic of China, would not enhance the credibility of our efforts to bring the PRC into the world community and to establish diplomatic relations with that country. Technological improvements or thickening of the system would magnify the problems for Canada both with regard to our participation and our position in international arms control negotiations. SUMMARY 341 If the ABM system known as Safeguard is deployed according to the present plan, a. it will need to plan on bursting nuclear warheads above Canadian territory, in order to be able to defend targets in the northern U S , b. if used, it will not inflict serious dangers to Canadian population, c. some protection to Canadian cities could be provided, and d. no significant improvement for defence of US targets would seem to be gained by siting in SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000104 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation -25SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY Canada equipment included in the current Safeguard plan. 342 The Safeguard system cannot provide effective defence of the North American population against a heavy attack from the Soviet Union. 343 The questions as to whether Safeguard represents \ an escalation of the arms race, affects the stability of the strategic balance, or inhibits the prospects of arms \ control, can be argued with evidence on both sides of each question. On balance, the analysis in this paper suggests that Safeguard is not destabilizing; ^^^^-/^H^jyX^^' \Nm^ /tTJvrrSj^^t. a^^H^feaacwi; and -mtrypre j udice early progress in arms control negotiations. 344 Extension of the terms of reference of NORAD to include anti-missile as well as anti-bomber defence would allow Canadians access to the flow of intelligence concerning aerospace activity^ -as wo-11—as pravidi-ng UIIIIIIBWLUU L iffiLiimt -iftteg¥e^4oft~-Q-£^-thc communications., and display fa"c~lli~ri^b . 345 The key planning which will determine the mode of operation of the ABM defence, the firing doctrine, the risks to population, and the priorities for protection will take place long before the system reaches operational status, and may be done at a level above NORAD. Extension of the terms of reference of NORAD to include aerospace SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY • ...26 000105 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformatio -26SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY defence may not ensure Canadian participation in this planning. Canadian involvement in Safeguard would have an adverse effect on Canada's position in the field of international arms control negotiations. 22 A p r i l , 1969. SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000106 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00289 Title A name given to the resource Draft Paper- Defence Research Analysis Establishment Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 4/23/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Implications to Canada of ABM Defence Systems Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en