https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8704a1d7e1f1de5b637853c1b6147dee.pdf 35a777c86ba0d8f500c3bd9fd7cd2146 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation o D E P A R T M E N T OF E X T E R N A L AFFAIRS" [RE subject $JLrr±. Date JBi..M.« 196? X ; > Publication The Cost of ABM > ^7-/A7 * - The_New..York._nmes_ \ Critics of antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment have now been confirmed by Defense Secretary Laird , in their predictions that the so-called "thin" system would prove far more expensive, if built, than initial I Pentagon figures indicated. Mr. Laird!s latest figures, I declassified from Congressional testimony, reveal that the antimissile system will cost $10.8 billion, twice as much as originally claimed and almost as much \ as the price tag originally put on one of the "thick" ABM systems long under discussion. The cost of the original "thin" Sentinel ABM system I proposed by the Johnson Administration in September , 1987 was said to be $5.5 billion. The Nixon Adminis-, tration's modified ABM system, Safeguard, was priced ; for Congress at $6.6 billion in March. It shifted Seni tinel sites from urban areas to presumably less ex, pensive nonurban locations. But it added omnidirectional radar and close-in defense of Minuteman ICBM silos, increasing the number of antimissile missiles 1 from 700 to a reported 900 or more. In May, the Defense Department acknowledged under Congressional and press questioning that it had been understating the price of the proposed Safeguard system by $1.2 billion by not including the Atomic Energy Commission's estimated bill for developing, producing and testing ABM nuclear warheads. The system's total cost then was put at $7.8 billion. But on May 22, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee that now has been pub; lished, Secretary Laird acknowledged that these figures included neither the $500-miHlon cost of ex. tending the Safeguard system to Alaska and Hawaii nor the $2.5 billion cost of research, development and i testing of the system's components. The present $10.8 billion total is still a preproduction estimate, of course. Most recent experience in procurement of complex new weapons systems is that actual production and construction costs usually exceed original estimates by substantial amounts, apart from the normal effects of inflation. In the end, it would not be surprising If the cost of a "thin" Safeguard defense proved to be substantially more than the heavy system under discussion during the Johnson Administration, which was priced by the Pentagon as purchasable for $13 billion. Within reason, of course, cost should not be the determining factor in weapons decisions that could affect the life or death of the nation. But this,is,, precisely what is wrong with going ahead on Safe-', guard: it is not a life-or-death matter. Its utility arid workability are challenged by many experts. Even advocates of the "thin" ABM system agree with the original proponent of Sentinel, former Defense Secretary McNamara, that it has only "marginal" value. The Pentagon's obviously unreliable and vastly escalating cost estimates—from $6.6 to $10.8 billion within about two months—make increasingly pertinent the question whether the possible marginal gain is worth the monMIey, especially at a time when urgent civilian needs are going begging. 'J 000131 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformatio O D E P A R T M E N T OF EXTERNA L AFFAIRS , XJ-lXj Subject &8j2XL Date J.une...l8.,...1.9.6...9 Publication ffiejewjoric Times E Desire and Intention Meanwhile, in a related de-. 'PITV velopment, 40 Senators—only Biit, in the board's judgment, between the C.l.A. and the Pen tagon. thisvdrive falls short of an ef11 short of a majority—joined The bureaucratic ordeal together as co-sponsors of a fort-; to achieve a "first-strike resolution urging the President capability" — he capability to of achieving a consensus posidestroy enough United States tion among various Governto seek agreement with the So-' missiles in a first strike to previet Union to halt testing of veni'this country from launch- ment agencies has stirred Conmultiple-warhead missiles. ing : an effective retaliatory gressional interest 'in the reliability of top .level intelli.blow . The signers included the The "desire" ultimately to gence and the means by which j Senate Democratic leader, Mike acquire such a capability may Mansfield of Montana, and the be present in some Soviet pok- raw data are analyzed. Democratic whip, Edward M. icy-making circles^ the board " In. policy controversies, particularly • on strategic arms But Joint Body Concludes Kennedy of Massachusetts. concluded, but both the capa- questions, individual agencies' Senator Edward W. Brooke, Re- bility and the specific intention Moscow Does Seek More publican of Massachusetts, was *o achieve it were ruled out for tentative or preiimjriary assessments are portrayed-as the latforeseeable future. the chief author of the resolu- theThis Than Parity in Missiles conclusion was re- est authoritative intelligence as tion, which was endorsed by a portedly stated in the formal they are passed around among total of 27 Democrats and 11 "national intelligence estimate" participants in tha debate. Republicans. without any dissenting footBy PETER GROSE The purpose of the United notes'from any of the partici- States. Special to The New York Times Critics of the Administration Intelligence Board is,to WASHINGTON, June 17 — are fearful that Defense Sec- pating agencies. provide a high-level forum for Pentagon strategists have reThe United States intelligence entire intelligence commupeatedly cited the threat of a the to meet and try to achieve community has reportedly con- Continued on Page 10, Column 1 Soviet; first-strike capability to nity cluded that the Soviet Union retary Melvin R. Laird and1 justify the need for the Safe- a nonpartisan consensus for the President. is not now striving for the cap-', Pentagon strategists have guard ABM System. Mr.Helms acts as the spokesability to launch a first-strike drowned out Secretary of State Not a Direct Contradiction * man for the community and the nuclear attack against this William P. Rogers and other The intelligence community's C.l.A. in policy-making councountry but is probably seek- potential restraining, voices — estimate minimized this threat, sels. Pentagon and State Deing more than parity with the including the Central Intelli- though it is not in direct con- apartment intelligence assessUnited States in missile gence Agency — in pushing tradiction with the official Pen- ments can also be called to the President's attention independ strength. for a stern negotiation position tagon view; Mr. Laird's state- ently by Mr. aird, by the chairments raised the possibility of costly defense a Soviet first-strike capability man of the Joint Chiefs of At meetings last week of the and . for United States Intelligence programs by in the critics' by the mid-I970's, a time be- Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Board, which is presided overj view,- exaggerating Soviet nu- yond the two or three years and by Mr. Rogers ' covered in the intelligence comby te Director of Central Intel- clear capabilities. munity's estimate. strength for the coming two or Among Congressional oppoPreliminary assessments prerious civilian and service intelli-J nents of the Sageguard antipared by the C.I.A. and made |gence agencies are understood ballistic missile system, there available to Congressional '! AND vxm. to have reached a consensus is particular resentment at wh. committees were understood to estimate of Soviet strategic they see as the Pen- have come down far harder in strength for the coning two or tagon' shighly selective, if not rebutting Mr. Laird's arguments three years. actually distorted, use' of raw about Soviet capabilities. According to reliable sources, Sent to the White House as intelligence data to promote the; Mr. Helms, aware of the politpro-ABM position. The same. the official judgment of the in-*| ical controversy surroundtelligence community, the de- resentment has been voiced ing the estimates, softened tailed and secret survey seems privately by intelligence offi-j some of the language of the final survey—without alering' bound to become embroiled in cials themselves. the basic conclusions—to avert the current controversy over It;is in this context that the ><an unnecessary confrontation the opening of strategic arms high-level consensus estimate < talks with the Russians and the of the entire intelligence comproposed deployment of an an- "munity assumes special signifitiballistic-missile system. cance. Security Council to Meet The United States IntelThe White House announced ligence Board is a high-level today that the National Secu- coordinating group that meets rity Council would meet tomor-l weekly to correlate all the data row on arms policies. President available across the GovernNixon is expected to disclose, ment. Sitting on the board unat a televised news conference' der; Mr. Hilms's chairmanship at 7 o'clock Thursday night) are .;• representatives of the when and where the Adminis-[ C.I.A.; the Pentagon's Defense tration proposes to open the Intelligence Agency; the intel new round of disarmament! Hgence branches of the Army, talks. ;. _. I Navy and Air Force; the State Department, the Atomic Energy' Commission and the National Security Agency. These agencies agreed last week that the Russians appear to be moving-rapidly, more so than expected several years ago, to strengthen their nuclear forces as a deterrent arid are1 probably striving for more than1 equality of'missile strength with the United States. 'U.S.INTELLIGENC1 FIRST-STRIKE GOAL x *x» \ 000132 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00275 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from NYT Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/18/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource The Cost of ABM Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en