https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f9036ac1f7fda539aef724c26c84dbf3.pdf cb725707504ea57901fd0ca326afc8d4 PDF Text Text CO~y - FM NATOPARIS SEP29/61 TO EXTER-4AL 2486 REGl'STRY OPIMMED INFO LDN WASHDCEMBPARIS CCOS PRIORITY DM/lliD PRIORITY FM CCOS REF OURTEL 2458 SEP28 BERLIN-CON TIN GENCY PLANNING OFOLLOWING IS A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF GEN NORSTADS ATLANTIC COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON LIVE-OAK PLANNING.NORSTAD BEGAN BY POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD REVEALED MUCH OF LIVE-OAK PLANNING BEFORE WITHOUT REFERRING TO IT BY THAT NAME AND WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO.HE SAID THAT ANNEX A TO P0/61/765(PARA4 OF OUR REFTEL)COVERED LIVE-OAK RATHER WELL.LIVE-OAK HAD NOT RPT NOT EXTENDED TO PLANNING OF OPERATIONS WHICH COULD BE SAID TO BE OF A MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE ON THE BASIS OF THE SIZE INVOLVED.WIDER PLANNING,IE OR NUMBER OF FORCES PLANNING WITH A MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE, TOOK PLACE ON A NATO,NOT RPT NOT A TRIPARTITE,BASIS.IT IS TO THE WIDER PLANNING THAT ANNEX B(PARA5 OUR REFTEL)REFERS. 2.THE LIVE-OAK ORGANIZATION STARTED IN THE WINTER OF 1958-59 THE 1958 CRISIS OVER BERLIN,ON A TRIPARTITE WEST GERMANOBSERVER HAD PARTICIPATED.THE AFTER BASIS.MORE RECENTLY,A TERMS OF REF FOR LIVE-OAK, AS DESCRIBED ON A CHART DISPLAYED AT THE NEET ING, WERE: ( 1 )RECOMMEND QUIET PRECAUTIONARY MILITARY MEASURES;(2)ASSIST IN BClJN IN AIRLIFT PLANNING:(3)PLAN INITIAL TIOOS IF ACCESS TO BERLIN WAS DENIED; (4)PLAN THE THREE E~!BASSIES PROBE OF SOVIET INTENFOR SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY EFFORTS. 3.IN AN AMPLIFICATION,NORSTAD SAID THAT INCLUDED IN ITEM(l)IN THESE TERMS OF REF WAS INTENSIFICATION MAINTAINING SUPPLIES OF NATO PRACTICE ALERTS; FOR THE BERLIN GARRISON AT A TWELVE-MONTHLEVEL; INCREASE PATROLLING OF EAST GERMANBORDERS BY UK AND USA;/-,$ 8,:43-- SE IN AUTOBAHNTRAFF IC. 4.RE ITEM(3),NORSTAD SAID THAT LIVE-OAK HAD DEVELOPED PLANS TO DETER- MINE WITHOUT QUESTION WHETHER THE ENEMY INTENDED TO USE FORCE TO 000206 �DOWNGRA~D T9S~CREl ·,.JDUIT A SECRET . .~).J l p.) PAGE TWO 2486 FEB2 7 1985 PREVENTACCESSTO BERLIN.THECHARTTHATNORSTADDISPLAYEDAT THIS POINT UNDERTHE HEADINGQUOTEPROBEOF SOVIET INTENTIONSUNQUOTE PROVIDETDIN THE AIR FOR A PROBEBY ONE MILITARYTRANSPORT FROMEACH OF THE THREENATIONSANDFOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORTS TO BE MANNED BY MILITARYCREWS;a-J THE GROUND THEREWERETO BE SMALLTRIPARTITE CONVOYS.THE QUOTEGUIDINGPRINCIPLE UNQUOTE SHOWNON THE BOTTOMOF THE CHARTFOR THESE PROBESWASGIVENAS QUOTEWILL NOT RPT NOT FIRE WNLESS FIRED UPONANDTHEN ONLYAS NECESSARYTO EXTRICATEITSELF UNQUOTE. SPEAKINGOF THESE PROBES,NORSTAD SAID QUOTENONEOF THESE PROBESHAVEENVISAGEDSUSTAINEDCOMBATUNQUOTE.HE THENWENTON, HOWEVE~TOWARNTHE COUNCILAS HE HADDONEIN THE PAST THAT,WHILE FORCE WASIN CONTACTWITHFORCE,THEREWASALWAYS DANGEROF LARGER INVOLVEMENT EVENTHOUGHINSTRUCTIONSSOUGHTTO MINIMIZE THIS DANGER. THE DANGERREMAINED NO RPT NO MATTERHOWSMALLTHE FORCE.WHILELIVEOAKPLANS HADNOT RPT NOT BEENCOORDINATED IN A TECHNICAL SENSE WITHNATOPLANS,THEYHADBEEN DEVELOPED TO BE CONSISTENTWITH THEM:THEFACT THATNORSTADHADLIVE-OAK UNDERHIS CONTROLWASA GUARANTY OF THIS. 5.TUR-JING NEXT TO ITEM(4),SUPPLEivJENTARY MILITARYEFFORTS,NORSTAD POINTED OUT THATTHIS WASBASEDON RATHERLARGERFORCES.HIS CHART SAID THATTHE PURPOSEWOULD BE TO QUOTETEST THE RANGEOF FORCE THE USSR WASREADYTO APPLY UNQUOTE,AND STATEDTHATTHE OBJECTIVEWAS QUOTETO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION TO REACTWITHFORCE OR TO TEST THE RANGEOF FORCE THE SOVIETS ARE READYTO APPLY UNQUOTE.FOR THIS PURPOSE,IN THE AIR NORSTADENVISAGEDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORT AIR PROBESANDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORTGROUND OPERATIONS.CN LAND,ATRIPARTITE BATTALIONPROBEWOULD BE INVOLVED.STUDY HADTAKEN PLACE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING A TRIPARTITE DIV.NORSTADALSO SAID THATCONSIDERATION HADBEEN GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDINGTHE NUMBEROF COUNTRIESINVOLVEDBEYONDTHREE,BUTHE THOUGHT THIS PROBLEMFELL UNDERANNEXB.NORSTADREMARKED THATHE THOUGHT ••• 3 000207 �DOWNGRAO~D TOSECRET REBUIT AjECRET _lliltt~i~) PAGE THREE2486 FEB2 7 1985 THERE WASA BASIS FOR MAINTAININGTHE LIVE-OAK GROUP:THEREWERE LEGAL AND OTHERREASONSWHYTHERE MUSTBE A BASIS FOR A TRIPARTITE EFFORT.HE DREWATTENTIONTO THE FACT THAT ON THE PROBE LEVEL PLANNINGWAS NOT RPT NOT ON A NATIONALBASIS BUT TRIPARTITE,GIVING IT AN QUOTEALLIED FLAVOURUNQUOTE. 6.TURNING TO AIRLIFT OPERATIONSCITEM 2 IN HIS TERMS OF REF)NORSTADS CHART SHOWEDA NUMBEROF ALTERNATIVES:Cl)A GARRISONAIRLIFT;(2)A CIVILIAN AIRLIFTCSUBSTITUTINGMILITARY FOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORT); (3)QUOTE TRIPLE PLAY UNQUOTE<THE AIR EVACUATIONOF ALLIED NONCOMBATTANTS AND OTHERSFROMWEST BERLIN IN 36 HOURS);(4)QUOTE Q-BALL UNQUOTE<FULL ALLIED AIRLIFT IN SUPPORTOF WEST BERLIN).NORSTADSAID THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN BONNHADSPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO AIRLIFT PLANNING,BUTOBVIOUSLYIT WASTHE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTUREWHICHWOULDHAVETO CARRYOUT THE OPERATION. 7.CONTINUING WITH HIS ORAL PRESENTATION,NORSTAD SAID THAT IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAD TAKENSTEPS TO INCREASEPREPAREDNESS,FOREXAMPLEBY . ESTABLISHING A LIVE-OAK OPERATIONSAND INFO CENTREWHICHCOLLECTED INFO CONCERNINGINCIDENTS AND OTHERMATTERSOF INTEREST TO THE LIVEOAK PLANNERS,FOLLOWED TRENDSAND COULDMAKERECOMMENDATIONS.IF NECESSARY,THEOPERATIONSAND INFO CENTRECOULDASSUMESOMEOPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OR AT LEAST ASSIST WITH IT.NORSTAD EMPHASIZEDIT AS HIS PERSONALVIEW THAT IF A PROBE WERENEEDEDIT WOULDBE BETTER TO CONTROLIT THROUGHNATOCOMMAND CHANNELS.HEHAD ALSO ACTIVATEDAN AIR COMMAND POST,SITUATED AT RAMSTEIN,ANDSTAFFED BY TRIPARTITE REPS, WITH THE DUTYOF EVALUATINGTRAFFIC IN THE AIR CORRIDORSAND ASSESSING INCIDENTS.IT TOO WASCAPABLEOF EXERCISING OPERATIONAL CONTROL.AFEW TRANSPORTANDFIGHTER AIRCRAFT WEREKEPT ON THE ALERT TO REACT QUICKLYTO ANYRELOCKINGOF AIR TRANSPORTARRANGEMENTS. THERE WASA CAPABILITY TO USE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WITH OR WITHOUTFIGHTER ESCORT IN SUCH A REACTION.HESPOKE OF THE INTRODUCTION RECENTLYOF A NEWFIGHTER AIRCRAFTWHICHWOULDBE QUOTEUSEF'UL•••• 4• 000208 �DOWKGRAD£D TOSECRET . IDUIT ASECRET ) ·_lbW\~Pt FEB2 7 1985 PAGEF'OL:R2486 IN THIS OPERATIONUNQUOTE.THE EXACTIMPLICATIONOF THIS TERMWAS NOT RPT NOT CLEAR;BUTSIGNIFICANCEMIGHTBE ATTACHED TO IT BECAUSE HIS REF WASSO POINTEDBUT AT THE SAMETIME SO VAGUE.THESEAIRCRAFT ARE KEPT ON CONSTANTALERT,SOMREOF THEMON FIFTEEN-MINUTENOTICE, SOME ON THIRTY-MINUTE,SOME ON ONE-HOURANDSOMEON SIX-HOUR.THEY WEREREADYTO MEETA SITUATION QUICKLYANDEFFECTIVELY. 8.LIVE-OAK IS CONSIDERINGANDREVIEWINGEAST GERMAN MEANSOF INTERFERENCEWITH GROUND ANDAAIR TRAFFIC ANDMEANSOF REACTINGPROMPTLY TO SUCH INTERFERENCE.NORSTAD SAID THAT EXPERIENCETHIS SUMMER HAD CONVINCEDHIM THAT IT WASPOSSIBLE TO REACTAT ONCEMORESAFELYAND ON A SMALLERSCALE THANAFTER A DELAY.HEWASTHEREFOREKEEPING FORCES IN POSITION FOR RAPID RESPONSEHO ANYACTIONBY THE OTHER SIDE.REFERRING TO THE RELATIONSHIPOF LIVE-OAK TO NATOPLANNING, NORSTADASSUREDTHE COUNCILTHAT IN HIS DUALCAPACITYHE HAD ALWAYS MADESURE ANDWOULDALWAYS MAKESURE THAT LIVE-OAK PLANS WOULDCOMPLEMENT ANDSUPPLEMENT NATOPLANS,NOTRPT NOT CONFLICT WITH THEM.NATOMUSTBECOMEFULLY INVOLVEDIN°ANY LARGERPLANS FROM THE FIRST MINUTE. 9.THE DISCUSSION WHICHFOLLOWED THIS PRESENTATIONANDNORSTADS QUESTIONOF A NEWEXERCISE TO FOLLOWUP QUOTEOPERATIONLONGTHRUST UNQUOTEWHICHWASCANCELLED LAST MAYARE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATETELS.• 000209 �s c~~.fv .·s (!/,· ,. ----~R,.:;;E~G:,.,!l~S~T~R!.Y!_j FM NATOPARISSEP29/61 SECRET . TO EXTEFtlAL2483 OPIMMEDCLIMITED DISTTRIBUTION~ INFO CCOS OPIMMED LDN WASHDC EMBPARIS DM/rn D FM CCOS C '- . . i !, ·010\,_ - C-vo 1> ,.~,JJ /U ,s,'1'7 n~co¼v ;J\ ~) r (./ ~v ,.rr v ~v r , ·O, REF OURTEL2458 SEP28 BERLINCONTINGENCY PLANNING '1. COUNCILGAVEPRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION TO DOCUP0/61/765 AT A R STD ,..../ MEETING CH SEP29. GEN NORSTAD WAS PRESENT.HE BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ~Ji/ ON THE SCOPE AND PRESENT STATUS OF LIVE OAK PLANNING.FOR SAKE OF ,J_, / COOVENIENCE WEARE REPORTINGHIS FORMALBRIEFING IN A SEPARATEMSG. 2.IN INTRODUCING THE DISCUSSIONSECGENSAID THATHE REGARDED TODAYS SESSIOOAS ONEDSIGNEDPRIMARILYTO ELICIT FURTHERINFO.HE THEN SET OUTHIS OWNINTERPRETATION OF THE TWOANNEXES TO THE DOCU.ANNEX A,THE REPORTOF THE THREEGOVTS,WAS NOT RPT NOT IN HIS ESTIMATION 00 E WHICHCOUNCILCOMMENT WASNECESSARILYREQUIRED. IT WAS REPORTING ACTIONOF THE THREEGOVTSTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR OCCUPATION FORCESIF ATTACKED IN BERLIN.HETHOUGHT THE THREEGOVTS, AS ANYOTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTREPRESENTED IN NATO,HADTHE RIGHTAND THE DUTYTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR OWNFORCESIF ATTACKED. \ ANNEXB, IE INSTRUCTIONS TO NATOMILITARYAUTHORITIESWASDIFFERiNT \\ \ ; J IN NATURE. IT WASSECGENSUNDERSTAND.nm THT IF IT OR SOMEVERSIONOF ! IT WEREADOPTEDBY COUNCILALL EARLIERINSTRUCTIONS TO NATOCOMMANDERSWITH.RESPECTTO BERLINWOULD BE WITHDRAWN ANDTHEREAFTER ANY CHANGESWHICHMIGHTBE DESIREDIN LIVE OAKPLANNINGWOULD BE DEVELOPEDIN NATONO RPT NO MATTERFROMWHERETHE INITIATIVE FOR CHANGE MIGHTCOME.IF THIS WASTHE CASE WECOULDFORGETTHE PROBLEM WHICH I HADBEENPOSEDBY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AMBASSADORIAL STEERINGGROUP IN WASHOC.HE MADETWOFURTHERGENERALPOINTS.POLITICALDIRECT:VEAND STRATEGICCONCEPTWERETHE GUIDINGDOCUSFOR NATOMILITARYPLANNING ANDNO RPT NO PLANSINVOLVING NATOFORCESSHOULDBE MADEWHICHDID NOT RPT NOT COMEWITHINTHE AMBITOF THESETWODOCUS.HEDID NOT RPT NOT THINKTHATTHE PLANNINGTOUCHED ON IN EITHER ANNEXA ORB HAD ••• 2 000210 / / :~ \ �N PA GE TWO 2483 IN FACT OF THESE BASIC GONE BEYOND THE LIMITS BELIEVED THAT THE MILITARY PLANS SEEMED NECESSARY TICAL DIRECTIVE AUTHORITIES CONCEPT.NO CRISIS PRIMARILY FOR PLANS TO DEFEND THE ALLIANCE THE MILITARY RPI NO MATTER WHAT COlvJMANDERS WERE RESPONSIBLE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE DOCUS. 3.AFTER THIS ARISE, TO MAKE WHATEVER THE BROAD CONCEPT OF THE POLI- IMMEDIATE BASIC MIGHT HAD THE RIGHT TO THEM WITHIN AND THE STRATEGIC DOCUS.SECONDLY,HE NORSTADS POINT,A WHICH MIGHT BRIEFING SERIES ON LIVE OAK PLANNING OF QUESTIONS BETTER WERE RAISED BE REPORTED IN WHICH TOOK PLACE AT BY COUNCIL MEMBERS SEQUENCE RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO GROUP THEM UNDER GENERAL HEADINGS. 4.ITALIAN MILITARY ACTION CONSULTATION WOULD IN THE THREE .POWERS VIEW WITH NATO. DID THE IDEA FOR EXAMPLE, THE SMALL SCALE REPLY WAS TO THE EFFECT OF PLANS OF PREVIOUS THAT THE QUESTION PREVIOUS CONSULTATION HE DID ON THIS SUBJECT INVOLVED HIS THE IMPLEMENTATION SCOPE OF RESPO.'J HE WOULD CERTAINLY ANY PLAN OF MILITARY NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY DECISION BY ANY POLITICAL HOPE THAT ACTION IF GOVERN PARA 3 .N ORSTADS HAD BEEN CHARGED ONLY WITH DRAWING UP PLANS.HE TO SAY HOWEVER THAT BEEN TAKEN REQUIRE PROBES REFERRED TO IN WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT PROPERLY WITHIN SIBILITIES.HE MIND OF REP REFERRED TO PARA 8 OF ANNEX A AND ASKED WHAT SIZE AUTHORITIES. HE WAS REQUIRiD HE COULD BE EMPOWERED TO IN WENT ON THAT HIS HAD OWN TU IMPLEMENT DO SO THROUGH NATO COMMAND CHANNELS AND NOT RPI NOT THROUGH SOME OTHER CHANNELS. SEC GEN SAID PLANS 1 THAT IT AT THE POINT WAS HIS VIEW THAT AT WHICH THEY MIGHT PARA 8 WAS MEANT TO COVER ALL HAVE TO BE HiPLEMENTED.USA, FRENCH AND UK REPS AGREED. 5.SECGEN THEN ASKED WHETHER IT POSSIBLE USE OF CORPS FORMATIONS AT THE MOMENT.NORSTAD THAN A DIV WAS BEING SAID THAT WAS TRUE THAT PLANNING WAS BEING THE DONE ONLY ON A USA BASIS ANY PLANNING DONE ON A NATO BASISCAS INVOLVING INVOLVING DISTINCT,WE UNITS LARGER PRESUME, ••• 3 000211 �PAGE THREE2483 FROMLIVE OAKOR TRIPARTITE BASIS). 6.1 PUT MYFIRST QUESTIONSIN THE CONTEXTOF A FEW GENERALREMARKS EMPHASISINGIN THE FIRST INSTANCETHAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLEFOR MY AUTHORITIESTO CONSIDERTHE ISSUES INVOLVEDANDBE IN A POSITia~ TO GIVE DECISIVE COMMENTS UNDERTHE PROPOSEDTIMETABLE,IE BY NEXT WEEK.THEPLANS REFERREDTO IN THESE PAPERS HADBEEN IN GESTATION FOR SOMEMONTHS. OURAUTHORITIESWOULD REQUIREMORETHANA FEW DAYS TO DIGEST THEM.TURNING THENTO PARA8 OF ANNEXA I SAID THAT SINCE IT WASA REPORTBY THE THREE POWERSWE WOULD NOT RPI NOT PROBABLY BE EXPECTEDTO CONSIDERREDRAFTINGIT.WE MIGHTHOWEVER EXPRESS OUR VIEWS 00 ITS SUBSTANCE. IT STRUCKt'iE,FOR EXAMPLE, THATTHE FIRST SENTENCEOF PARASHOULDBE PUT IN MUCHMOREPOSITIVE TERMS.THETHREE GOVTSWOULD RECOGNIZETHATTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF LIVE OAKPLANS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVEPOLITICAL AS WELLAS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO.INDEEDTHE PROBINGHADALREADYSTARTEDWHENUSA GARRISOO IN BERLIN WASINCREASED.THISPROE HADALREADYHAD ITS POLITICAL EFFECT ON THE SITUATION.WEMIGHTASK AS WELLWHAT· WASTHE SIGNIFICANCEOF QUOTETIME PERMITTINGUNQUOTE IN THE SECOND.SENTENCEOF THE PARA.TIMEWASALWAYS A FACTORWITH RESPECTTO MILITARYACTIVITIES. NOOEOF US WOULD WISH TO PREVENTNECESSARYACTIONSBUT WE MUST CLARIFY AS MUCHAS POSSIBLE WHATTHE INTENTIONOF ALL CONCERNED WAS. WASIT SATISFACTORY,FOR EXAMPLE,TOALL MEMBERS OF ThE COUNCILTHAT THIS ESCAPECLAUSESHOULDEXIST.WOULDIT NOT RPI NOT BE BETTERTHAT COUNCILMEMBERS SPOULDBE BETTERINFORMED CONCERNING THE ~UOTECATALOGUEOF PLANS UNQUOTE REFERREDTO IN ANNEXBIN ORDERTHATTHEIR GOVTSCOULDPERHAPSTAKEDECISIONS IN ADVANCE WITH RESPECTTO SOME OF THESE PLANS.IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT OF COURSEBE PROPERFOR ME TO RESERVE THE C DN GOVTS POSIT ION WITH HESP ECT TO A REPORT CONTA IN ING THE VIEWS OF THE THREE GOVTS.I COULDHOWEVER WARNTHE COUNCILTHAT THEREWERECOMPLICATIONS AHEADIF IT WASINTENDEDTHAT TH£ ••• 4 000212 \ \ �PAGE FOUR 2483 IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS WHICHCOULDAFFECT THE ALLIANCEDEEPLY WASTO TAKEPLACEWITHOUTTHERE HAVINGBEENCONSULTATION ANDCONSENT IN THE COUNCIL. 6.SECGEN ANDREPS OF USA ANDUK TOGETHERGAVEA FAIRLY SATISFACTORY ANSWERTO THIS LAST QUESTION.THEY ALL AGREEDTHATTHE INTENTIONOF THE PHRASEWASTO PROVIDEFOR THE ABILITY SITUATIONSWHEREIMMEDIATE ACTIONWASFORCEDUPONA MILITARYCOMMANDER BY EVENTS.FOREXAMPLE,IF AN AIRCRAFTWASFIRED ON PLANNINGWOULD HAVETO PROVIDEFOR THE ABILITY TO RESPONDIMMEDIATELY.USA REP EXPLAINEDHIS THINKINGIN THIS REGARDBY REFERRINGTO A PEARL HARBOUR TYPE OF SITUATIONWHERE NECESSARYDEFENSIVEACTIONHADTO BE TAKENIMMEDIATELY.PARA 8 WAS NOT RPT NOT INTENDEDTO LEAVETHE IMPRESSIONTHAT THEREWOULD BE TWO KINDS OF CONSULTATION, a'J E BETWEEN THE THREEPOWERSANDTHE OTHER WITH THE COUNCILAS A WHOLE.THISLAST COMMENT MADEBY USA REP WAS IN DIRECT RESPONSETO BELGIANREPS POINT THAT IF THEREWASTIME FOR THE THREE GOVTSTO CONSULTTHERE WASTIME FOR THE COUNCILTO BE CCNSULTED. ?.NETHERLANDSREP LED OFF THE QUESTIONINGWITH RESPECTTO ANNEXB IN ASKINGWHETHER IN NORSJADSVIEW THE THREECIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED IN PARA6 D FITTED WITHIN THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDTHE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.NORSTAD SAID THAT BEFOREREPLYINGTO THIS PARTICULARQUESTION HE WOULD LIKE TO FIT THE DOCUIN SOMEPERSPECTIVE.HEHADHEARD ABOUTTWOMONTHSAGOOF A POSSIBLE DIRECTIVE WHICHMIGHTBE PREPARED ANDHADTAKENTHE VIEW THAT HE DID NOT RPI NOT NEED A NEWDIRECTIVE SO FAR AS HIS MILITARYRESPONSIBILITIES WERECONCERNED AT LEAST.HE UNDERSTOOD THATOTHERFACTORSHOWEVER HADMADESUCHA DIRECTIVE NECESSARY.HEHADSEEN A DRAFTDIRECTIVE SOMETWOWEEKSAGOAND COULDSAY THATTHE PRESENTDRAFTWASA VAST IMPROVEMENT OVERTHAT ORIGINALDOCUEVENTHOUGHHE WOULD HAVEWRITTENIT DIFFERENTLY .THE IMPORTANT THING IN HIS MIND WASTHAT DOCUAS DRAFTERPERMITTEDA ••• 5 000213 �PAGE FIVE WRIE BROADRANGEOF INTERPRETATIONANDHE WOULDBE THE ONE WHOWOULD HAVETO INTERPRET IT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.HECOULDASSURE COUNCILTHAT ANY INTERPRETATIONHE WOULDGIVE IT WOULDBE FULLY WITHIN THE TERMSOF THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDWOULJSE CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHEDSTRATEGICDOCTRINE.HEWOULDOF COURSEGO FURTHER IN HIS MILITARY PLANNING.FOREXAMILE,MEASURES OUTLINEDIN PARA 10 WEREIN HIS VIEW ONLYSOMEOF THE MEASURESWHICHHADTO BE CONSIDEREDTO PUT NATOFORCES IN A POSITION TO COPE WITH A MILITARY EMERGENCY.HE HADALREADYDIRECTEDHIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO PREPARESUCH PLANS AS THEY THOUGHT WERENECESSARYFOR A MILITARY EMERGENCY ANDWHILE THEY INCLUDEDTHE MEASURESOUTLINED N!PARA 10 THEY WERENOT RPT NOT LIMITED TO THEM.HEMADEIT CLEARTHAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN TERMSOF PLANS WITH A NATO-WIDEAPPLICATIONANDNOT RPI NOT IN TERMSOF LIVE OAKPLANNING.SOFAR AS THE SPECIFIC QUESTION PUT BY NELHERLANDS REP WASCONNERNED,HE COULDONLYSAY THAT AN INCONSISTENCY WITH NATODIRECTIVES AS HE UNDERSTOOD THEMWOULDONLYEXIST IF PARA 6D WEREREADAS BEING RESTRICTIVE IN • THE PLANNEDRECOURSE TO NUCLEARWEAPONS.INOTHERWORDSIF THE SUBPARAMEANTTHAT ONLYUNDER THESE THREE CONDITIONSCOULDNUCLEARWEAPONSBE USED HE WOULDTHINK SUCH AN INTERPRETATIONRESTRICTIVE AND INCONSISTENTWITH THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTAS HE UNDERSTOOD IT. 8.I FOLLOWED UP WITH THE QUESTIONSPECIFICALLY CONCERNING SUBPARA 6DEMDIDTHIS IN GEN NORSTADSMINDSPECIFICALLY FALL WITHIN THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.I WASTHINKINGIN TERMSOF POSSIBLE EFFECT OF USE OF A QUOTENUCLEARSHOT ACROSSTHE BOWUNQUOTE.ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME WAS THE RAPID ESCALATIONSUGGESTEDEARLIER IN THE PAPER INTO A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.THISWASA RESULTWE DID NOT RPT NOT WANT.ONEOTHER POSSIBLE RESULTWASTHAT THE"OTHERSIDE WOULDNOT RPT NOT RESPOND ANDTHEN THE WESTWOULDBEARTHE ODIUMBEFOREWORLDOPINION OF THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS. : MMY,T.JT T ' ' • 000214 �PAGE SIX 2483 9. GENNORSTADSAID THAT HE THOUGHT FIRST OF ALL THATTHE ACTION COVEREDIN SUBPARA6 D3 WASCONSISTENTWITH NATODIRECTIVES.HE WENT ON THENTO TRY TO ADDSOMEPERSPECTIVE.IT WASHIS VIEW THATUSE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS EVENSELECTIVELYCOULDBE CONSIDEREDONLYWHEN EVERYTHING ELSE HADFAILED,WHENPOLITICAL NEGOTIATIONSHADBROKEN DOWN, WHENECONOMIC PRESSURESHADFAILED,WHENMINORPROBESHAD FAILED TO CHANGETHE SITUATIONANDWHENFORCES HADACTUALLY BEEN FI RED ON.NO RPI NO MATTERHOWf1UCHWASSAID ABOUTTH:C::SE PROBLEMS EVENTUALLY WECAf'1EBACKTO THE SAMEROOTPROBLEl'<l, WHENGOV TS WOULD BE FACEDWITH A DECISION TO ACCEPTDEFEATOR TO TAKENUCLEARACTION. HE HOPEDTHEREFORETHATWHENCOUNCILWASCONSIDERINGTHIS PARTICULAR ASPECT THEYWOULD CONSIDERIT IN THIS LIGHT,NAMELY THATALL OTHER CONCEIVABLE STEPS HADBEEN TAKENTO REMEDYTHE SITUATIONAND HAD FAILED TO HAVETHEIR EFFECT ON THE OTHERSIDE. 10.I FOLLOWED UP WITHTHE QUESTIONSET OUT IN PARA 12 OF YOURTEL DL1223,IE WASIT INTENDEDTHATTHERE SHOULDBE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICHA POLITUCALDECISION WOULD BE REQUIRED. NORSTADSAID HE ACCEPTEDTHIS PARAAS A GENERALFRAMEWORK FOR \ ; PLANNINGAS HE WOULDINDEEDACCEPTTHE WHOLEDIRECTIVE IF IT CAME TO HIM.HE DID NOT RPT NOT REGARDTHE DIRECTIVEAS GIVING HIIvlANY OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE;THAT WOULD HAVETO COMEFROMHIGHERAUTHORITY. SECGL~CONCURRED ANDDREWCOUNCILSATTENTIONTO THE GENERALPROVISO MADEIN PARA8 OF ANNEXB THATALL PLANS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DECISICNS BY GOVTS. 11.ITALIAN REP SOUGHTFURTHERCLARIFICATIONAS TO WHENPOLITICAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKENANDBY WHOM.SECGEN ADMITTEDTHAT U GOOD DEALMORECLARIFICATIONWASREQUIREDON THIS POINT.REVERTINGAGAIN TOXTHEISSUE DEALTWITH IN PARA6D SECGENSAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BY SELECTIVEUSE WASMEANTUSE OF A SMALLWARHEAD WITH GREATPRECISION ANDNOT RPT NOT,FOR EXAMPLE, THE USE OF THE STRATEGICAIR ••• 7 000215 �PAGE SEVEN2483 COMMAND.NORSTAD AGREED.FURTHERMORE SECGENTHOUGHT THAT SO FAR AS POLITICAL DECISIONS WERECONCERNED CONSIDERATION HADTO BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT BILATERALAGREEMENTS WEREINVOLVED,!£ BETWEENUSA AND OTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTS.COUNCIL HADNOT RPI NOT MADEMUCHPROGRESS IN ITS STUDYOF THE CONTROLANDUSE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS.AGREATDEAL OF FURTHERCLARIFICATIONWASREQUIRED.UNTILTHAT ISSUE WASCLARIFIED THE PRESENTSYSTEMOF CONTROLWOULD CONTINUETO EXIST.CSECGEN WASREFERRINGIN THIS INSTANCETO USA CONTROLOF WARHEADS>. 12.BELGIAN REP,REFERRINGTO PARAS9 AND 10 OF ANNEXB,ASKEDWHETHER WE WEREJUST BEGINNINGTHE PROCESSOF PLANNINGOR HAOTH£ MEASURES OUTLINEDALREADYBEENCONSIDEREDIN THE TRIPARTITE CONTEXT.NORSTAD RPTEDWHATHE HADSAID EARLIER TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HADALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONSTO HIS COMMANDERS TO PREPAREPLANS ON THESE MEASURESANDON OTHERS.NATO-WIDE PLANNINGTHEREFOREWASBEING UNDERTAKENcx,;J A NATO-WIDEBASIS ANDNOT RPT NOT ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS EXCEPTFOR THOSESPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS WHICHHADHERETOFORE COMEUNDERTHE LIVE OAKLABEL. 13.THERE FOLLOWED SOMERATHERCONFUSEJDISCUSSION ON WHATWASMEANT IN PARA6 B BY TERMQUOTEPOLITICAL AUTHORITIESUNQUOT£.FRENCH REP SAID THATTHEYWERETHE COMPETENT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES,WHICH WAS NOT RPI NOT PARTICULARLY ENLIGHTENING.USA REP SAID THATTHE TERMUSED IN PARA6 B HADTHE SAMEMEANINGAS THE TERMINOLOGY OF PARA8.NORSTAD WASAS USUALSTRAIGHTFORWARD ON THE SUBJECT.IT WASCLEAR,HE SAID, THATSOMEBODY HADTO DIRECT HIM TO IMPLEMENT PLANS WHICHHE HAD DRAWN UP. UNTIL HE WASTOLDDIFFERNTLYPOLITICAL AUTHORITESNEANT TO HIM COUNCIL.HEWISHEDEVERYONE TO UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION CLEARLY. IF AN EMERGENCY WERETO ARISE TOMORROW HE WOULD SEEK COUNCILDIRECTICN. IN INTERPOSEDTO SUGGESTTHATFOR CDN AUTHORITIESIT WAS DIFFICULT AT SUCHA DISTANCETO SEE GENNORSTADSUSCINCEURHAT.FOR THEMANDFOR THE CDN PUBLIC GENNORSTADWASCOMMANDER OF NATOTROOPS • • ••8 000216 �PAGE EIGHT 2483 NORSTADACCEPTEDTHE POINT WITH GOODGRACEBUT DID SUGGESTTHAT INSOFARAS ANNEXA WASCONCERNED ANOTHERAUTHORITYDID EXIST.S£CGEN ONCEAGAINAGAINMADETHE POINT THAT IN HIS MINDTHE THREE GOVTS HAD THE RIGHT ANDTHE RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKEACTIONTO DEFENDTHEIR FOR:;ES IN BERLIN AGAINSTATTACKJUST AS EACH GOVTOF THE ALLIANCE HAJ THAT RIGHT.I THOUGHTIT WISE TO LEAVENO RPT NO DOUBTON THIS POINT IN THE MINDS OF THE COUNCILAND I INDICATEDTHEREFORETHAT I WASSURE MY AUTHORITIESWOULDHOLDTHE VIEW THAT IF ANDWHENNORSTAD ORDEREDFORCES INTO ACTIONHE WASSACEURANDNOBODYELSE.THAT HE MIGHTPLAN WITH DIFFERENTHATS WASONE THING,BUTFOR PUBLIC OPINION, CNCEHE ENGAGEDIN MILITARYACTION IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE LEGALDISTINCTIONS.FINLETTERSAID HE DID NOT RPI NOT WISH AT THIS POINT TO COMMENT FURTHERON PROBLEMANDNORWEGIAN REP URGEDTHAT FURTHERDISCUSSIONSSHOULDBE RESTOTO A MUCHMORELIMITED GROUP. DISCUSSIONTHEREFOREBROKEOFF FAIRLY ABRUPTLYANDWILL BE RENEWED ON TUES OCT3. 14.IT IS FULLY RECOC¾JIZED THAT NO RPT NO DECISIONS CAN BE REACHED NEXT WEEKANDTHAT WE SHALLCONTINUETO ATTEMPTTO CLARIFY THE MEANINGOF PAPERS BEFOREUS.THE ANSWERSTO SOMEOF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN YOURTELDL1223 WILL BE APPARENTFROMTHE BRIEFING GIVEN BY NORSTADON LIVE OAKPLANNING.I SHALLPURSUETHE OTHERQUESTIONS AS COUNCILDISCUSSIONCONTINUES LEGER 000217 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 29 SEPTEMBER 1961 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961-09-29 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00032 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Berlin-Contingency Planning,’’ 29 Sept. 1961, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-1-40, part 1. air lift Berlin contingency Lauris Norstad Live Oak tripartite