https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ae679ae2469d084646eeb97d30e794bb.pdf ec9c89f418f0d10e64478ac341283162 PDF Text Text ARrAS CON I KUl AND D15ARM. Document disclosed Document divulgue en' DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 2 Subject. D^iei Zl-fi-l jdj3J22L iUIE...lZ69. Publication.. ..MM....XQEL...IJMS... » Nixon Tries the Soft Sell on a Closely Divided Senate WASHINGTON — After years of being subject to the Johnson hard-sell treatment, members of Congress are frankly baffled by the sales pitch the new Administration has devised for its missile defense program. , i The Nixon Administration, committed to a system of missile defense which it insists is absolutely essential for national security, is headed for its first major confrontation in Congress with the outcome decidedly uncertain in the Senate. On two or three Senate votes hinge not only the prestige of the White House but, as the Administration would have it, the security of the nation. No Calls Yet this is occurring without any of the insistent beseeching phone calls that many Senators will testify they used to receive from President Johnson. President Nixon's White House is not prone to using the privacy of the Presidential office—a technique that usually impresses even the most jaded Senators-^for political salesmanship. These days there is no apparent armtwisting by the White House, ,: no party loyalty appeal to re, calcitrant Republicans, no subtle hints dropped that contracts may not be forthcoming if a Senator does not vote with the ',! Administration. i About the only incident mild{ly redolent of political pressure was that encountered recently by Senator James B. Pearson, Republican of Kansas, who has broken with the Administration on- the antiballistic-missile (ABM) issue. The White House failed to notify the Senator it had changed its mind abouf moving some Federal offices out of Kansas City, Mo.; the Agri. culture Department decided it could not support the Senator's rural job development bill, and an Army general called an airplane manufacturer in Kansas to hint rather pointedly that. a contract might not be forthcoming if the ABM project were not ' approved by Congress. But the White House was quick to disclaim any complicity in these N^l! actions, and they were written off as "goofs" by overzealous subordinates. To all outward appearances, the White House's sales effort on behalf of the Safeguard ABM system is so soft and so lowkeyed as to be politically inaudible. Rather than apply pressure, the White House has seemed content with making its case by "educational" methods. The burden of this educating has fallen on the Pentagon and particularly on David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and on John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering. In the past two months, these two officials have made countless trips to Capitol Hill to brief the Armed Services, Appropriations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees as well as Republican Senators. The Pentagon, too, has been doing just a little more Congressional briefing than usual and has put just a little more time, effort and money into the fancy "visual aids" that seem to impress members of Congress more than mere words. There certainly has been no sign of a highpowered Madison Avenue-type publicity campaign, however, such as the Army once proposed in an effort to sell ABM to Congress and the country — and which was publicly vetoed by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird when exposed by the press. Sales Manager At the White House,,the job of chief sales manager has been assigned to / Bryce N. Harlow, Presidential assistant in charge of Congressional relations, and Kenneth E, BeLieu, his deputy for Senate relations. Mr. Harlow knows his way about Capitol Hill, and he also knows how to package and sell a political product. But he appears these days like a man who has been too busy answering Republican patronage complaints from Congressmen to have had much time to think, about ways to' promote the Safeguard system. Neither has Mr. BeLieu been pounding any Congressional doors on behalf of Safeguard. Instead, he waits for a Senator to make an inquiry, then sends him information or arranges an educational briefingi Operating at a somewhat more subterraneal level Herbert Klein, White House coordinator of communications, has come up with some new propagandizing techniques designed to sell ABM. Mr., Klein sends "background" information to editorial writers and reporters, supplies material to politicians wanting to make speeches on behalf of Safeguard and arranges for television interviews. Mr. Klein's efforts may help explain why some of the leading veterans organizations have entered the fray on the side of Safeguard and why many local commanders suddenly deliver pro-ABM speeches. There is a suspicion on Capitol Hill that the Klein operation may also help explain the formation last week of a prominent proABM committee headed by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The White House has also sent Vice President Agnew and Governor Rockefeller to talk to dissident Republicans. There was a hitch here,, however, because the Vice President and the Gov-' erndr were found to know less about ABM than the skeptical Senators. If the Safeguard system is to be sold to Congress at all, it is evident that President Nixon will have to step forth as the principal salesman. But thus far he has not done so. Shunting Critics Aside For some time the President refused to discuss the ABM issue with Republican opponents in the Senate. He shunted the critics off to Henry J. Kissinger, the national security adviser, or to Secretary of State William B. Rogers. This almost-studied aloofness helped, neither the Safeguard cause nor the-President's somewhat ambiguous .relations with Congress... , In recent weeks, however, he has become more accessible. On a flight to the Kentucky Derby he discussed ABM with Senator Another Decision. One of the decisions facing President. Niton-when he took office was whether to back liberalization \of trade with Communist countries. A 20-year-old Export Control Law stringently limits shipment to Communist countries of more than 1,000 categories of products freely exported by Western Europe and Japan, With the law expiring on June 30, liberals in Congress and elsewhere hoped to replace it with one opening the way to freer trade. The-State Department was said to favor such a change. Last week Mr. Nixon, after discussing the issue with the National Security Council, made his decision: no expansion of trade with the Communist countries at this time. Administration witnesses before the Senate Banking Committee asked that thjs. Export Control Law be extended in its present form. ';,.'•' E E —'• ' Washington observers cited two reasons for the President's decision. One was his controversial policy of ."linkage" between various areas of possible accommodation -with the Soviet Union, ranging from arms control to Vietnam and the Middle East. The other was reported to be his feeling that dominant sentiment in Congress, particularly among Republicans, was against any relaxation of trade, controls. ~ . John Sherman Cooper-Of Kentucky, Republican leader of the ABM opposition. The President also invited Senator J William B: SaXbe; the'newly elected Republican from Ohio who has surprised everyone by Ms adamant opposition to ABM, to the White House for a chat. According to Senator Saxbe, the' President merely restated his- position and made no effort to pressure him into a change of mind. The President's withdrawn manner may be explained by a preoccupation with Vietnam, or. it may reflect his dedication to a more detached, almost passive political technique. Whatever the reason;' his approach worries and baffles ABM opponents and proponents alike. Getting Through < without that: interchange of a White House phone call or visit, ABM opponents wonder whether the pros and cons of the issue are getting through to the President; whether he realizes that intelligence projections used by Mr. Laird are not necessarily concurred in by the intelligence community; whether he appreciates that some mis- , sile warhead tests scheduled by the military could jeopardize any chances of a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.. On the other hand, the proponents of ABM are worried that their cause may be lost in the Senate unless the President intercedes more actively oil their behalf. Even among the opposition it is conceded that in the closely, divided Senate the President could prevail if he makes it an issue of personal and party prestige, and puts the heat on a couple of wavering Republicans. But with the first crucial vote perhaps a month away, there are no'sighs df Presidential pressure, and the opposition, if anything, is hardening. AH of which gives rise to the suspicion in Senate circles that the President is deliberately keeping a few doors'open for a possible compromise. —JOHN W. FINNEY �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation Nixon CrificsTSay Intelligence Gap Clouds ABM Issuq\ But some leading ABM oppo- around Moscow as a continuing, community prepares "national one of their most telling argu- of Central Intelligence.^ ThjiS for ments. But they are somewhat they are reluctant to do, for jjjg nents in the Senate, who have potentially effective project for intelligence „. projections planning purposes" once a year. inhibited by security and per- one senior committee membes, WASHINGTON, May .31 — had access to the Pentagon which a second generation of These attempt to project Soviet sonalities in making the argu- long a critic of the C.l.A,, puttys Boiling beneath the surface of testimony as well as to secret missiles was being developed. ment publicly. "Helms is the ^only one under the missile defense debate in briefings by the C.I.A., are in- But intelligence experts have' developments 10 years into the Because the intelligence in- present conditions who tells j t future. As intelligence officials the Senate are charges by crit- sisting that the Pentagon pro- reportedly come to the conclu" 4 . formation was presented to as he sees it." ics of the Administration that jections of Soviet strike capa- sion that .the Soviet Union has acknowledge, uncertainties in- them by the C.l.A. under the But indignation over ' M*. the Pentagon is exaggerating bility are not supported by the al .but halted construction of evitably are a part of such long- strictest secrecy provisions, the Laird's "selective decla'ssificar the Soviet threat by distorting estimates agreed upon within the, system after completing range projections, because they Senators are not willing to dis- tion" is now reaching the point intelligence estimates. are based more on assumptions about 70 of the 120 planned than oh conrcete. intelligence cuss the information publicly. where some ABM opponent These charges center on ap- the intelligence community. Furthermore, they fear that are prepared to publicly chai^missile sites. According to these Senators, parent discrepancies between information. if they do so and suggest their lenge his intelligence estimate's the national -intelligence esti- the following inconsistencies The Defense Department has 'Worst Possible' Developments anti-Administration information by referring, at least obliquely mates, prepared under the di- have developed between the insisted that its projections are was obtained from the C.I.A., to the contradictory informarection of the Central Intelli- Pentagon assessments and the based on estimates agreed upon Then, for its planning pur- they could jeopardize the career tion they have received from gence Agency, and the far estimates of the intelligence by the intelligence community. poses, the Defense Department of Richard ;!Helms, the director the Central Intelligence Agency, Dr, John S:1 Foster Jr., director also prepares its own estimates grimmer projections of the So- community: V ,™».-.*s£* viet military potential offered qThe Defense Department of Defense Research and En- in which it attempts to antici>:. fyy:i f^yy'-~'^•-'•'•• •***s$il by the Pentagon in defense of projects that by 1975, the So- gineering, asserted in a speech pate all the "worst possible" dethe proposed Safeguard anti- viet Union will have 500 SS-9 May 12 that "Mr. Laird's velopments and comes up with missiles, each carrying three statements are based upon its estimates of a "greater-thanballistic missile system. expected threat." As seen by ABM critics, this independently targetable, highly agreed, intelligence data." "intelligence gap," goes to the accurate warheads. The C.l.A. This assertion has been dis- In a debate over an issue such heart of the argument over reportedly questions that the puted by some members of the as ABM deployment, however, whether there is a military ne- current SS-9 deployment rate Senate Foreign Relations Com- these estimates tend to be used mittee, which has had several interchangeably by military ad cessity to start immediate de- will be continued to 1975. ployment of the Safeguard sys- <1 Defense Secretary Melvin R. secret briefings by the C. I. A. vocates, who may employ the upper range, or even a footnote, Laird has contended that Penta- in recent weeks: tem. gon -projections.of Soviet SS-9 These divergencies may be in an admittedly hypothetical The Underlying Premise strength were£ based on "new explained at least in part by projection in order to justify The underlying premise of evidence," 'notravailable to the the varying methods by which some decision, which is then the Pentagon's case for the Johnson Administration. In se- intelligence estimates are pre- claimed to be based on intelligence estimates. Safeguard deployment around cret briefings, the C.l.A. has pared and interpreted. Minuteman missile" bases is that reportedly said it has no new All estimates begin with the That is basically what hap the Soviet build-up in offensive intelligence information justify- so-called "national intelligence pened in the "bomber gap" is military strength threatens to ing Mr. Laird's extrapolation. estimates," prepared by.ah in- sue in the 1956 Presidential erode American retaliatory ca- <JMr. Laird has described the teragency committe. It is com- campaign and in the "missile pacity by the mid-1970's. In SS-9 as a "first-strike weapon," posed of representatives of the gap" issue of 1960—both of support of this contention, the developed by the Soviet Union C.I.A., the Pentagon, the State which were projected in some Defense Department has of- to eliminate American retalia- Department and the Atomic intelligence estimates, but fered projections showing that tory capability. No such judg- Energy Commission. These sta- neither of which materialized tistics only attemptto project by 1975, the Soviet Union will ment has reportedly been in fact. have a missile force capable of reached by the intelligence Soviet developments up to a As the Senate ABM debate two-year period. • knocking out 90 per cent or community. nears a climax, opponents of more of the 1,000-missile Min- <IMr. Laird has tended to de- Beyond the national intellig- the Safeguard system believe uteman force. scribe the Soviet ABM system ence estimates, the intelligence the "intelligence gap" could be By JOHN W. FINNEY Special to The New York Times b Co 9= rt. n c_ S 3 D m > H 2 m z H O c ft o TTf m X H m z So o > r S3 > 3 H J5 0> ft) k H ^ in 000143 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00268 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from NYT Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/1/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Nixon Tries the Soft Sell on a Closely Divided Senate Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en